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Abstract

Moral psychology and naturalistic moral philosophers should strive to understand how moral and non-moral norms differ. Using Patricia Churchland’s recent book Braintrust as an example, I describe the pitfalls of failing to take this issue seriously, and I introduce a new research program about the delineation of the moral domain.

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