1. INTRODUCTION

It is widely known that Kasimir Twardowski was a student of Franz Brentano. In view of the fact that Brentano generally had great impact through his lectures, especially during his Vienna period (1874-1895), and consequently became one of the towering figures of Austrian philosophy, it is a matter of no small interest to determine how he influenced Twardowski. There are, however, difficulties in examining the relationship of Twardowski to his teacher, as there are in the case of the relationships between Brentano and his students generally. The main obstacle to this endeavor lies in the fact that Brentano published very little during his lifetime. Moreover, what has been published posthumously is far from adequate in terms of both the quantity of texts and the quality of editing. For this reason it is highly desirable to discuss Brentano in relation to his students by drawing upon his hitherto unpublished manuscripts. This is the strategy that I will pursue in the following analysis of Brentano and Twardowski on the topic of presentations (Vorstellungen).

2. BRENTANO ON PRESENTATIONS

The main source for Brentano’s psychology is his most significant publication, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Aside from this, one of his most important lecture courses in psychology, namely the one on “psychognosy” from the winter semester 1890/91, has been published. While the latter is by no means a critical edition, it is certainly an improvement over previous editions of materials from Brentano’s manuscripts. In addition to these two works, however, other material on psychology is of considerable importance in relation to the topic of presentations. But aside from the material on psychology, there is one absolutely crucial manuscript on logic originally from the winter semester 1869/70 and repeatedly revised in the Vienna period. I’ll first consider presentations as they are described in Brentano’s psychology and then proceed to discuss Brentano’s account of the latter in his logic.

2.1. Presentations in Brentano’s Psychology

As is familiar from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano regards presentations as a class of psychical phenomena. Generally speaking, a psychical phenomenon is involved in any instance of intentional reference or relation to an object or content. Whenever something is imagined, desired, perceived, or is in some way an object of consciousness, the phenomenon that thereby takes place is a psychical one. Physical phenomena such as colors and tones, by contrast, do not exhibit such relations to objects. Since presentations are in all cases presentations of objects, they are accordingly psychical phenomena for Brentano. While Brentano also identifies two other classes of psychical phenomena, namely judgments (Urteile) and love and hate (Liebe und Haß), he assigns to presentations a special status insofar as he regards them as the basis (Grundlage) for all other psychical phenomena. Hence, judgment about a certain object is possible only because the judgment is based on a presentation of the object in question. The same goes for love and hate. It is possible to love or hate only that which one is presented with. This founding character of presentations is so important for Brentano that he even proposes it as providing an alternative criterion for distinguishing psychical phenomena from physical ones: psychical phenomena are either presentations or phenomena which are based on presentations.

The rest of what Brentano has to say in the published text of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is primarily restricted to the thesis that judgments may not be regarded merely as combinations of presen-
While it is tempting to consider a judgment such as “A tree is green” as a combination of the presentation of a tree and the presentation of green, it is possible to present a green tree without engaging in any judgment at all about it. Accordingly, Brentano insists that in judgment there is something in addition to mere presentations. This additional element is to be found in two attitudes: accepting (Anerkennen) and rejecting (Verwerfen), a contrast which he most emphatically only finds among judgments. The act of presenting for him does not exhibit any such contrast, nor do acts such as loving and hating.

Further considerations on the topic are to be found in a volume that misleadingly announces itself as if it were a continuation of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. However it consists of materials from much later dates which were not intended by Brentano to be continuations of the earlier work. As it turns out, in Brentano’s Nachlass there actually is a manuscript that was intended for publication as a partial continuation of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. The part that was published consisted of two “books” and the manuscript in question also contains drafts for additional chapters that were intended as additions to the second book as well as for a third one. The third book is of interest here because it is devoted to the topic of presentations.

In Brentano’s treatment of presentations one finds two features that become more and more prominent in Brentano’s lectures during his Vienna period. The first of these features is his notion of descriptive as opposed to genetic psychology. The second is the distinction between the content and object of thought. Let us say a word about each of these features.

Though the published part of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint contains no systematic distinction between descriptive as opposed to genetic psychology, Brentano says the following at the outset of the unpublished part of this work concerning presentations:

The task that we have to fulfill regarding presentations is twofold. We must describe them and state the laws to which they are subject in their origination and their occurrence.

This is an explicit statement of the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, though these terms are not yet used here. In Brentano’s lecture course given in 1885/86, entitled Selected Questions from Psychology and Aesthetics, the first public discussion of the distinction in question appears. Here Brentano puts forward a descriptive theory of the imagination that had already been sketched out in his draft for the continuation of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. The distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology became even more prominent in three lecture courses given in succession, Descriptive Psychology (1887/88), Descriptive Psychology or Phenomenology (1888/89), and Psychognosy (1890/91). Though it is impossible to discuss Brentano’s descriptive psychology (phenomenology or psychognosy) in detail here, a few words on this topic will prove helpful.

Brentano’s mature conception of descriptive psychology consists in the analysis of consciousness into its elements (i.e. the psychical phenomena belonging to the three distinct classes) and the specification of their modes of combination. Genetic psychology, by contrast, is concerned with the causal origin of psychical phenomena and must rely heavily on physiology. While Brentano thought that he could deal with the issues of genetic psychology in his draft of the continuation of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, as plainly indicated in the passage quoted above, he became more and more convinced that physiology had not reached an adequate level of development for genetic psychology. He was nonetheless convinced that, in spite of the difficulties involved in descriptive psychology, he had made contributions not only to this discipline as such, but also to its application to the branches of practical philosophy (logic, ethics, and aesthetics) as well as to metaphysics. At a time when psychology was establishing itself academically as a discipline independent from philosophy, Brentano’s efforts in his Vienna period were in fact a thoroughgoing integration of psychology and philosophy. While such efforts were hardly appreciated in some circles, they certainly came to have great impact on his students from this period, such as Twardowski, Meinong, and Husserl, but also on earlier students, such as Stumpf and Marty.

As is well known, Brentano was, from his earliest encounter with philosophy and onward to his death, very heavily influenced by Aristotle. Though he parts from Aristotelian doctrines in various ways (especially in the theory of judgment), Aristotle and Aristotelians are always among his most respected discussion partners in formulating his views. For this reason he and his school were sometimes regarded as “scholastic”, a term typically used in a derogatory sense at the time.
Aristotle's influence on Brentano's descriptive psychology, as we will see, is of some relevance to Twardowski. Brentano did not underestimate the difficulties involved in the endeavor to analyze consciousness into its elements and to specify their modes of combination. Such difficulties come poignantly to light when the differences between philosophers and psychologists regarding consciousness are considered. Brentano critically examines views on consciousness that were to be found among his predecessors and contemporaries. In responding to these views Brentano is particularly critical of the division of consciousness into three classes: thinking, feeling, and willing. This division, which was the dominant one in the German-speaking world for most of the nineteenth century, was to be replaced by Brentano with the one he put forward in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and continued to defend for the remainder of his philosophical career. On Brentano's view, what was called “thinking” is in fact divided into two classes: presentations and judgments. What was called feeling and what was called willing are united into one class: acts of love and hate. This is an aspect of Brentano's theory that will be retained by Twardowski. Though theories of judgments were common among various schools during the late nineteenth century, a theory of presentations was quite unusual and it may be said to have been one of the most original aspects of Brentano's descriptive psychology.

Now let us turn to the distinction Brentano makes between content and object. While this distinction is not explicitly made in the published part of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and one may easily get the impression that the distinction in question was first made by Twardowski and elaborated on by other students of Brentano, the manuscripts of Brentano give us an entirely different picture. This is a substantial point and I quote again from the unpublished part of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*:

> We speak of indistinctness of a presentation in two senses, in a proper one and in an improper one. When we say, “Objects that we saw in the distance appeared indistinctly to us”, what we mean is: “The visual presentations that they caused in us did not allow for a judgment about how the objects would appear up close, and did not allow us for this very reason to come to an assured conjecture regarding other peculiarities”. Which content they had may be completely clear to us. Thus they are indistinct in an improper sense. In the proper sense, by contrast, we call those presentations indistinct in which we are unable with assurance to give an account of the content itself.

Examples of the distinction that Brentano is making here are not difficult to cite. We may see an object at a distance and not be able to make out whether it is a human being or a wax figure. In the content, however, it is very distinct which colors are presented and how they are juxtaposed to each other. While it is accordingly evident that Brentano distinguishes between objects and contents of presentations in his psychology, the way he makes this distinction in his logic is even more noteworthy and of greater relevance to the topic at hand.

### 2.2. Presentations in Brentano’s Logic

The lecture course that is of special interest to us here is one that Brentano first gave in Würzburg and again in Vienna with certain revisions and simply entitled *Logic (Logik)*. While it has not been determined exactly in which semesters these lectures were held and it is thus difficult to know if Twardowski actually attended them or not, it is quite certain that they had considerable impact within Brentano’s circle of students, including even students from an earlier period, such as Stumpf and Marty. As a student of Brentano during the late 1880s, Twardowski likewise would have been influenced by the lectures under consideration here, whether he attended the lectures or not. This will become clearer as our discussion advances.

What is of special interest in this lecture course is that Brentano not only distinguishes between contents and external objects, but also distinguishes between the contents that are characteristic of the various classes of mental phenomena. He says that a presentation has a content that is as such different from the content of a judgment and also from a content of love and hate. Likewise, a judgment has a content that differs from the content of a phenomenon that belongs to one of the other two classes. The content of a presentation is called “the presented as such” (das Vorgestellte als solches). The content of a judgment is called “the judged as such” (das Geurteilte als solches).
Brentano approaches the distinction among contents in the course of his reflection on the expression of mental phenomena in language. Brentano regards names as appropriate for expressing presentations, statements (Aussagen) as appropriate for expressing judgments. But what is the meaning (Bedeutung) of a name? And what is the meaning of a statement? Brentano’s answer to the first question is that the content of the expressed presentation, the presented as such, as distinct from the named object, is the meaning of the name. In order to support his point, Brentano makes use of an argument we will find later in Twardowski and in Husserl, namely that there are cases where two names have the same object and yet differ in meaning. As Brentano’s own example indicates, the names “the son of Phaenarete” and “the wisest among the Athenians” both name the same individual, that is Socrates, but their meanings are different. If we now consider Brentano’s thesis of intentional reference in application to presentations, it should be taken to mean that every act of presenting has a content, not that every presentation has an external object. In this connection Brentano in fact speaks of objectless presentations (gegenstandslose Vorstellungen), though without any reference to Bernard Bolzano, who had used the term long before him.

There is no presentation for which something would not exist intentionally in the mind, but there are objectless presentations. Also something that is not, indeed something that cannot be, can be presented. The “something existing intentionally in the mind” in this passage is the content of a presentation or what Brentano calls the intentional or immanent object. In Brentano’s lecture notes, we find the notion of a content of a presentation cropping up again and again. Perhaps one of the most interesting applications of this notion arises when Brentano comes to distinguish between universal (universell) and individual (individuell) concepts. While the latter are characterized as concepts to which in each case there corresponds only one object, the former are characterized as concepts to which there correspond more than one object in each case. In this connection he explicitly tells us that a concept (Begriff) is the same as the content of a presentation. As regards the old debate between realists and nominalists, he says that the realists were wrong to regard universals as objects outside the mind. However, he says that they were right to regard the status of universality as parallel to that of individuality. Presumably he thinks that the nominalists were wrong in this regard. The distinction between universality and individuality for Brentano is restricted to the meanings of names, that is, to concepts, in other words to the contents of presentations. As a consequence, it would be wrong to say along with Locke that everything that exists is a particular as it would be wrong to embrace full-blown Platonism.

Now let us turn to Brentano’s conception of the meaning of a statement. Brentano says that the meaning in this case is to be identified with the content of the expressed judgment, the judged as such, as distinct from the object designated by the statement. While this thesis is of course highly suggestive, we must be cautious about reading later developments in the school of Brentano into it. Brentano does not speak here of propositions, states of affairs, or objectives, but simply of the content of a judgment or the judged as such. In the lecture course on logic under consideration here Brentano says little more about what he has in mind here. If, however, we take into account what Brentano says in the lecture on truth he gave at the Philosophical Society of Vienna in 1889, the contents of judgments turn out to include all sorts of irrealia, such as a lack, a possibility, or even impossibilities. What makes a judgment about these irrealia true cannot be things in the strict sense (such as a man or a horse). Moreover, they cannot be the acts of consciousness, which cohere together in what Brentano calls “physical phenomena” such as colors, sounds, and the like. Nor can the irrealia be objects such as Platonic Ideas existing outside of the mind, which can have no place in any respectable ontology according to Brentano. The contents of judgment for Brentano at this stage of his philosophical development are accordingly the only non-things which can take on the role of truth-makers whenever there are no real things to do so. However, instead of continuing to develop and elaborate on the notion under consideration here, he later shifted to a position that no longer allowed for contents of judgments. But as this later position which he worked out after 1905 apparently had no influence on Twardowski, it will not be considered further here.

What precedes should have established that Brentano, on the one hand, distinguished between the contents of presentations and those of
judgments, that is, between the presented as such and the judged as such and, on the other hand, assigned to the latter the role of meanings of names and of statements respectively. Let us now turn to examine the impact these distinctions had on Twardowski.

3. TWARDOWSKI ON PRESENTATIONS

Twardowski’s most important contribution to philosophy is a short work that he wrote and published in 1894, while he was still in Vienna, entitled On the Content and Object of Presentations. This work had considerable impact. In the cases of both Meinong and Husserl the critical reception of this work, especially with regard to the content-object distinction, marked an important turning point in their philosophical developments. On the Content and Object of Presentations was Twardowski’s “habilitation thesis” and was written after his doctoral dissertation in order to grant him the status of a lecturer. Officially, Brentano could have directed neither Twardowski’s dissertation nor his habilitation thesis because at that time Brentano himself was only a lecturer and not a professor. (After he got married, Brentano had to give up his professorship in Vienna: he had earlier been ordained and his marriage was impermissible by Catholic standards which prevailed in Austria at that time.) The professor who officially directed Twardowski’s dissertation was Robert Zimmermann (to be discussed further below), who as a young man had been a member of Bernard Bolzano’s circle of students. While the habilitation thesis was more or less independently written, it nonetheless had to be approved. As a mere lecturer Brentano was unable to be involved in any official capacity in Twardowski’s early philosophical work. Be that as it may, Brentano’s substantial influence is easily traceable in the habilitation thesis.

3.1. Brentanian Aspects of Twardowski’s Theory of Presentations

The subtitle of Twardowski’s habilitation thesis is “A Psychological Investigation.” It is accordingly not meant to be a work in logic, ontology, semantics, philosophy of language, or epistemology, but rather in the philosophy of mind. From the Brentanian standpoint this does not make the work unphilosophical. Quite the contrary. According to Brentano, a “psychological” work understood in the latter sense, especially one that is concerned with the fundamental class of psychical phenomenal, has potential applications in all areas of philosophy. Moreover, inasmuch as the work in question is plainly one in the lineage of Brentanian descriptive psychology, it presupposes that mental phenomena divide into three classes: presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In Twardowski, these classes are understood as three different modes of intentional reference. There is, moreover, no indication of an allegiance to any kind of style of investigation aside from an empirical one and in particular, the high-minded rationalism that could be found among the Neo-Kantians at the time is completely alien to Twardowski. Twardowski’s habilitation thesis is one of the most extreme cases of “scholasticism” to have come out of Brentano’s school. That is to say, it is more a product of conceptual analysis than of the observation of “facts”, either from everyday life or from laboratory experiments. Like Brentano, and though this was by no means the usual practice among those developing the psychological theories of the time, Twardowski does not hesitate to cite scholastic philosophers. While these general points are no doubt true, there are, however, two very specific aspects of Twardowski’s work which exhibit the influence of the lecture course on logic that Brentano held in Würzburg and again in Vienna.

The first of these aspects lies in Twardowski’s very explicit distinction between the contents of presentations and the contents of judgments. According to Twardowski, there is a perfect analogy between presentations and judgments. As acts of consciousness, judgments have contents and objects as well. While others spoke of contents of judgments, it was unique to Brentano and his followers, including Twardowski, to do so by pointing out this analogy. One can see the difference here by looking at the way in which Stumpf spoke of the content of a judgment in his lecture course on logic in 1887. Here Stumpf uses this term (Urteilsinhalt) as what is meant by the combined names of a predicative statement (“Sp” in the case of “S is P”) and therefore as something hardly different from the content of the underlying presentation. To be sure, Stumpf was later (within a year’s time no less) to speak of the content of a judgment in a very different way that exhibited the influence of the previously discussed lecture course that Brentano had held in Vienna. The point here, however, is that it was Brentano
who began speaking of contents of judgments as distinct from and yet analogous to contents of presentations. When Twardowski elaborated on the contents of presentations and insisted on this analogy, he was thus, as a member of Brentano’s circle, clearly under the influence of the master.

One additional remark may be made here regarding Brentano’s influence on Twardowski’s content-object distinction. It is widely known that Twardowski regards contents as analogous to pictures. Here I will not discuss how strictly this analogy is to be taken. I wish only to observe that we find something similar in Brentano’s content-object distinction as it is made in the unpublished part of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. We have seen that he says therein that in an improper sense we speak of a presentation being indistinct when we cannot decide from the content how the object would look close-up. In that case we are dealing with contents in a sense that is somewhat analogous to a picture. It is therefore entirely possible that the source of Twardowski’s picture-analogy is to be found in Brentano’s psychology as well.

The second way in which Twardowski exhibits the influence of Brentano’s aforementioned lectures on logic lies in his views on presentations in relation to names. Though it was by no means unusual to speak of contents of consciousness in the late nineteenth century and even to distinguish them from objects, the characterization of contents as meanings, more specifically the characterization of contents of presentations as meanings of names as distinct from the named objects, is a notion that Brentano introduced. By advocating this view, Twardowski is once again following in the footsteps of the master. To be sure, he refers to Anton Marty’s articles “On Subjectless Sentences”, where the view in question is stated. In these articles, however, Marty is likewise following Brentano regarding meanings as contents.

The influence of Brentano on Twardowski that is being pointed out here is one that is often understated or completely overlooked by commentators. All too often we get the impression that Brentano used the terms “content” and “object” interchangeably and Twardowski in fact went beyond Brentano by making a sharp distinction between content and object. This impression prevails, however, because there tends to be too much reliance on the published text of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* as the source for Brentano’s position. Brentano’s students, however, were much more inclined to rely on his lectures, and often the most recent ones to which they could gain access, whether they actually attended them, copied the notes from others (as Husserl often did), or were informed about them in some other secondhand manner. This fact will not become as evident as it should be, however, until Brentano’s lectures are properly edited and published. As things now stand, researchers of his work and of the work of his students have little choice but to draw primarily from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and a few other works that he published. Whoever relies on the editions of material that he left unpublished, as they have been produced thus far, is engaging in research at his own risk.

### 3.2. The Question of Influence from Others

Twardowski’s habilitation thesis, I claim, including its content-object distinction, is by and large the result of Brentano’s influence. But to what extent was Twardowski also influenced by that other towering figure of Austrian philosophy, namely Bolzano, whom Twardowski repeatedly cites and who was later perceived by Brentano as the very one whose work misguided not only Twardowski, but also Husserl as well as other students? Overall, Twardowski tends to assimilate Bolzano to Brentano and, by contrast to Husserl, does not seem to see conflicts between their views. Twardowski sees Bolzano’s notion of a presentation in itself as equivalent to that of the content of a presentation and does not make a big deal about presentations’ being in themselves, that is to say, independently from the presenting consciousness. The very term “content” suggests quite the opposite, namely that the item under consideration is as such contained in the presenting consciousness. Though this version of the content-object distinction is not the one Bolzano had in mind, Twardowski nevertheless played an important role in the transmission of Bolzian thought among other students of Brentano as well as among the Polish logicians.

According to one commentator, the content-object distinction that Twardowski develops in his theory of presentations had its origins in the works of Zimmermann and Benno Kerry. While Twardowski cites both of these authors, this hardly indicates that the distinction in question was initially made by them. He tells us, to be sure, that Zimmer-
mann stresses the need to distinguish between content and object, but
the passages to which he refers in this regard are concerned only with
the contents and objects of concepts (Begriffe).\footnote{55} Objects in this sense
would simply be the extension of a concept. The concept of man, for
instance, has all individual human beings as its objects, whereas the
content (or, as one could say, intension) of this concept would consist of
whatever is mentioned in the definition of “man”. This distinction, how-
ever, had been standard fare of logic textbooks for a very long time.\footnote{56} It
is no doubt true that Twardowski wants his content-object distinction
to extend to the intension-extension distinction. Accordingly, he cites
Zimmermann and others who also make the latter distinction as if they
agreed with him. At the same time, however, he goes beyond this dis-
tinction in making the analogy between the content of a presentation
(or the intension of a concept) and the content of a judgment. This is
something that he uniquely gets from Brentano, not from Zimmermann
or apparently from anyone else.

As regards Kerry, it lies far beyond the scope of this paper to en-
ter into a lengthy discussion of his series of articles “On Intuitions and
their Psychical Processing” \footnote{67} However, a few points of interest here
may be briefly touched upon. First of all, Kerry does extensively re-
fer to Bolzano and shows considerable appreciation of the notions of
a presentation in itself and a proposition in itself.\footnote{58} Be this as it may,
these notions, as already pointed out, must not be equated with Twar-
dowski’s notions of contents of presentations and of judgments respec-
tively. Secondly, Twardowski adopts one of Kerry’s arguments for
the content-object distinction, namely that what can be ascribed to an ob-
ject need not be ascribable to the concept of that object (or, in Twar-
dowski’s terms, to the content of the relevant presentation).\footnote{59} Thirdly,
Twardowski explicitly rejects one of the arguments Kerry makes in fa-
vor of the content-object distinction when considering general presen-
tations.\footnote{70} This argument was not in fact made by Brentano. Fourthly
and most importantly, whatever one may find in Kerry’s texts, one must
be reminded that he was attending Brentano’s lectures and was also in-
volved in discussions with Brentano’s students.\footnote{71} His series of articles
“On Intuitions and their Psychical Processing” seems by and large to be
the fruit of his Brentanian education (which was abruptly ended in 1889
due to his untimely death). Therefore, if the content-object distinction
under consideration was made by Kerry, this in no way eliminates Bren-
tano’s influence from the picture.

Finally, mention should be made of Twardowski’s reference to the
logic textbook that Alois Höfler wrote in collaboration with Meinong.
There the distinction between contents and objects of presentations
is explicitly made\footnote{23} but there is no mention of the content of a pre-
sentation being analogous to the content of a judgment. In addition,
we should not forget that both Höfler and Meinong were themselves
students of Brentano, in spite of whatever antipathy they might have
shown in reaction to commentators who viewed them as mere disci-
plines.

3.3. Twardowski’ Originality

I do not want to give the impression that Twardowski merely repeats
Brentanian doctrines in his habilitation thesis and was accordingly a
mere disciple. It was indeed a mistake on Husserl’s part, in his manuscript
of 1894 on intentional objects, to think that Twardowski was merely
saying that there are presentations which are indeed without external
objects, but none without intentional objects, that is to say, no pre-
sentations without immanent objects.\footnote{73} This was in fact the position
of Brentano, who uses the term “objectless presentations”, as already
pointed out, in precisely the way just indicated. Twardowski, by con-
trast, criticizes the thesis that there are objectless presentations.\footnote{74} To be
sure, he explicitly criticizes Bolzano in this regard, but his criticism ap-
lies to Brentano as well. While the object of a presentation need not be
real or exist in the strict and proper sense, this fact, from Twardowski’s
point of view, does not in any way put into question the objectivity of
the object, so to speak. Accordingly, unicorns and round squares are
indeed objects. On this view it is even permissible to speak of general
objects,\footnote{75} a notion that was anathema to Brentano. In this regard Twar-
dowski breaks away from Brentano and shows a greater proximity to
the theory of objects which Meinong was later to work out in detail. It
was in fact Twardowski’s habilitation thesis which prompted Meinong
in his article “On Objects of Higher Order”?\footnote{76} to make a sharper distinc-
tion between contents and objects than he had made previously and
thus to bring objects as such into view as the subject matter of a special
discipline distinct from psychology.\footnote{77} The relation between Twardowski
and Meinong is yet another one that merits close examination. Suffice it to say that Twardowski sets out from the standpoint of a Brentanian descriptive psychology and arrives at a point of view which was certainly original in 1894 when he published his habilitation thesis. This originality on Twardowski’s part, however, can only be seen against the background of those aspects of Brentano’s philosophical work, especially to be found in his manuscripts, which have been discussed above.

Notes

2 For a list of lecture courses that Brentano gave in Vienna, see Werle (1989), pp. 157-162.
3 Brentano Y 4/13: “In Austria nothing had been accomplished in the domain of philosophy in earlier times. Things have become different in recent times. [In Österreich wurde in früherer Zeit auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie nichts geleistet. In neuerer Zeit ist das anders geworden].”
5 While the German term here is translated by some as “idea” and by others as “representation”, I still think that “presentation” is the best translation in the context of the present discussion. While Brentano and Twardowski conceive of Vorstellungen as acts of consciousness, it is hardly acceptable to speak of an idea as act, indicated by the fact that only a highly artificial verb (“to ideate”) can be constructed from this term. The verb “to present” by contrast is very natural. And though it may in some sense be said that some sort of representation takes place in a Vorstellung, neither Brentano nor Twardowski conceive of the act of Vorstellen as the medium of representation. It is at best this act’s content which could be said to be such a medium, i.e. something analogous to a sign or a picture. For an argument in favour of using the term “representation”, see Hickerson (this issue).
6 See Brentano (1874), part of which appeared in a second edition in Brentano (1911) and again posthumously in its entirety in Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1924) and Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1925). The texts of both Brentano (1874) and Brentano (1911) are now available in Brentano, (eds.) Binder and Chrudzimski (2008).
7 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982).
8 Brentano (1874, 256-265).
9 Brentano (1874, 115 ff.); see also Brentano (1889, 14).
10 Brentano (1874, 104-111).
11 Brentano (1874, 276 ff.) Every psychical phenomenon for Brentano is a presentation of itself. See Brentano (1874, 181): “The question thus arises whether psychical phenomena, when they are the object of a consciousness, are something of which we are conscious in one manner or in several. Up to now it has been proven only that they are presented . . .” The entire second chapter of the Brentano’s second book (1874, 101-180) is to be taken as a proof for this thesis.
12 Brentano (1889, 15).
13 Brentano (1874, 115 f.)
14 Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1928).
15 This manuscript is to be found under the quote Ps 53 along with a later one on psychophony (a term Brentano apparently did not use until 1889).
16 A “book” in this context is not a “volume”, but rather a block of chapters. Brentano (1874, v) planned a book on psychology as a science, one on psychical phenomena in general, one on presentations, one on judgments, one on emotion and will (i.e. love and hate), and finally one concerned with the mind-body problem and immortality. Only the first book and part of the second one were published.
17 The unpublished material for the second book, which is concerned with psychical phenomena in general, consists of chapters on the narrowness of consciousness and exhaustio (die Enge des Bewusstseins und Erschöpfung), Bain’s law of relativity and Mill’s law of the relation to contradictory oppositions (Bains Gesetz der Relativität und Mills Gesetz der Bestehung auf kontradiktiorische Gegensätze), habit (Gewohnheit), and the law of self-advancement (das Gesetz der Selbsfördcrung). The unpublished material for the third book, which is specifically concerned on the indistinctness of presentations (Undeutlichkeit der Vorstellungen), the unity and multiplicity of presentations (Einheit und Vielheit der Vorstellungen), presentations of perception and imagination (Vorstellungen der Wahrnehmung und Phantasie), intensity of phantasy presentations and their content (Intensität der Phantasiusvorstellungen und ihre Fülle), and a look at the traditional doctrine of the association of ideas (Blick auf die überlieferte Lehre der Ideenassoziation).
18 Brentano, Ps 53/53002: “Zweiwach ist die Aufgabe, die wir hinsichtlich der Vorstellungen zu lösen haben. Wir müssen sie beschreiben und die Gesetze feststellen, welchen sie in ihrer Entstehung und ihrem Verlaufe unterworfen sind.”
19 Brentano, Ps 58. This material is edited in Brentano, (ed.) Mayer-Hillebrand (1959) and is very much in need of a re-edition.
20 Brentano, Ps 76.
21 Brentano, Ps 77.
22 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm (1982), edited from EL (74), which still contains unpublished passages.
24 It was of course Wilhelm Wundt’s establishment of a research institute for psychology in Leipzig which set the pace for the rest of the academic world. Twardowski in fact spent some time as a student in Wundt’s institute between receiving his doctorate and doing his habilitation in Vienna. Brentano, by far the greater influence on Twardowski, was very critical of Wundt’s experimental psychology, as can be seen from his remarks in Psychologie from an Empirical Standpoint concerning Wundt (1874). See Brentano (1874, 85ff, 106ff, 223n). Wundt was no less critical of Brentano and attributed what he regarded as the weaknesses in Husserl’s thought to the legacy of Brentano. See Wundt (1910, 511-634). See also Wundt (1904, 222n). For a discussion of the contrast between Brentano and Wundt, see Titchener (1929, 1-22) and Rancurello (1968, 78-97). It should be stressed that Brentano was not in principle opposed to experimental or physiological psychology. He only thought that it could not achieve anything of significance without
an adequate descriptive foundation. His most prominent students, even Meinong who himself established a research institute for psychology in Graz, followed their mentor in this regard. 


26 Brentano, (eds.) Baumgartner and Chisholm, p. 28.

27 Earlier Schopenhauer had published *Welt als Will and Presentation* (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*), but his use of the term has very little in common with the psychological or logical literature of the later nineteenth century.

28 Brentano, *Ps 53/53003*. The emphasis on *Gegenstand* and *Inhalt* here, as well as “content” and “object” in the translation, are my own: "Wir sprechen von der Undeutlichkeit einer Vorstellung in einem doppelten, einem eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Sinne. Wenn wir sagen: Gegenstände, die wir in der Ferne sehen, erscheinen uns un- deutlich, so meinen wir damit: Die Geschöpfsvorstellungen, die sie in uns erwachen, gestatteten kein Urteil darüber, wie die Gegenstände in der Nähe aussehen würden, und ließen uns eben darum hinsichtlich anderer Eigentümlichkeiten zu keiner sicherer Ver- mutung kommen. Welchen Inhalt die Vorstellungen hatten, mag uns dabei vollkommen klar sein. So sind sie undeutlich nur in einem eigentlichen Sinne. Im eigentlichen Sinne un- deutlich nennen wir dagegen solche Vorstellungen, bei welchen wir uns den Inhalt selbst nicht mit Sicherheit Rechenschaft zu geben fähig sind."

29 Brentano, *EL 80*. Here we may note that the lectures under consideration were poorly edited. In the Mayer-Hilbrandt (1956) edition, parts of the lectures are published, but indifferently mixed up with other texts of Brentano’s and also with notes from his students.

30 A case can also be made that they influenced Husserl, namely in his distinction between the noema on the one hand and the object *simpliciter* on the other (see *Husserliana* III/1). This aspect of Husserl’s philosophical development becomes all the more prominent in *Husserliana XXXX*.

31 Brentano, *EL 80/13014*.

32 Brentano, *EL 80/13020*. The lectures under consideration are first and foremost concerned with judgments and secondarily with presentations. Acts of love and hate or their contents are hardly touched upon.

33 Brentano, *EL/13012-13019*.

34 See Twardowski (1894, 31ff) and Husserl (1901, 47).

35 Brentano, *EL/13017*.

36 Bolzano (1837, vol. I, § 67). Bolzano uses the term *gegenstandlos*, though few have followed him in this regard. In another lecture course, entitled *Elementary Logic and the Reforms Necessary in It* (*EL 72*), Brentano did explicitly refer to Bolzano, specifically to Bolzano’s *Paradoxes of the Infinite*. He did not refer to Bolzano’s four-volume *Theory of Science*, which came to have such a great impact among Brentano’s students.

37 Brentano, *EL 80/13016*. This passage is from an earlier version of the lecture in question. The emphasis on *gegenstandlose Vorstellungen* and the translation thereof is my own; “Es gibt keine Vorstellung, bei welcher nicht etwas intentional im Geiste existierte, aber es gibt gegenstandlose Vorstellungen. Auch etwas was nicht ist, ja etwas was gar nicht sein kann, kann vorgestellt werden.”

38 Brentano, *EL 80/13024-13025*.

39 An Essay concerning Human Understanding, III.iii.1

40 Brentano, *EL 80/13020-13022*.

41 Propositions and states of affairs became important concepts for Husserl, whereas “objective” is Meinong’s neologism for designating something comparable. For a more extensive discussion of this topic see the relevant parts of Rollinger (1999). In Dummett (1991, 250), the question is left open whether Brentano, Husserl, or Meinong fall prey to criticisms that the author makes of the Fregean concept of a thought (*Gedanke*). What is at stake in this concept is its independence from the mind. In this regard it may be said without hesitation that Brentano does not conceive of contents of judgments in this manner and is accordingly not susceptible to criticisms which presuppose that they are conceived of in this manner.

42 See Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1930, 3-29).

43 Brentano (1911, 149) explains that “something other than things, all of which fall under the concept of the real, does not provide psychical relations with an object”. This view, “reism”, is elaborated in Brentano (ed.) Kastil (1933) and Brentano, (ed.) Mayer-Hilbrandt (1952). Though it was not accepted by Brentano’s most prominent students, it became the official doctrine for the next generation of disciples, such as Alfred Kastil, Oskar Kraus, and Franziska Mayer-Hilbrandt, who accordingly made this standpoint the basis for editing material from Brentano’s Nachlass. See Kastil (1951). For this reason, in the attempt to examine Brentano’s philosophical orientation in the Vienna period it is necessary to try to make use of unpublished material. It is of interest to note here that, Twardowski did not embrace Brentano’s reism, Twardowski’s student Tadeusz Kotarbiński independently worked out a position that was comparable to the later Brentano’s. See Smith (1995, 193-246).

44 Twardowski (1894).

45 The relation between Husserl and Twardowski is explored in Schuhmann (1993), Cavallin (1997), and Rollinger (1999, 139-153).

46 Twardowski (1892).

47 Twardowski (1894, 1). The dissertation, by contrast, is subtitled “An Epistemological Investigation of Descartes” (Twardowski 1894, 1). The concern with Descartes is by no means alien to Brentano, who in fact regarded Descartes, along with Locke and Leibniz, as one of the philosophers of prime interest in the modern period, followed by practically oriented philosophers (e.g. Berkeley), sceptics (e.g. Hume), and finally mystics (i.e. the German Idealists). See Brentano (1895, 22ff). Further investigations concerning Brentano’s philosophical work in relation to that of Descartes is certainly to be encouraged, though hardly possible within the scope of the present paper.

48 As indicated in Cavallin (1997), p. 35, Twardowski “explicitly declares himself to be an adherent of psychology” in a manuscript from 1897. This was of course a few years before Husserl (1900) made “psychologism” a derogatory term. Twardowski’s psychologism, just like Brentano’s, lies in the priority of empirically oriented psychological investigations in philosophy and the exclusion of all speculations of the kind that had been rife in Germany during the early nineteenth century (“metaphysicism”). In this sense psychologism was only a further elaboration of Brentano’s thesis, defended in his habilitation in Würzburg, that the method of philosophy is no different from that of natural science. See Brentano, (ed.) Kraus (1929), p. 147. As a teacher in Lvov Twardowski became father of Polish logic, which however was anything but psychological in Husserl’s sense.

49 See the references to Suarez and Aquinas in Twardowski (1884, 38) and the reference to Abelard in Twardowski (1894, 56).

50 Twardowski (1894, 1-9).
Though Husserl misunderstands Twardowski’s position, much of his argument still has bearing on the proto-Meinongian view that Twardowski develops and consequently on the Meinongian thesis that it is possible for something not to exist (or subsist) and still to be an object.

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