Keywords
philosophy, History of Analytical Philosophy
Abstract
Russell is commonly accused of failing to solve Bradley’s problem of unity. In this paper I argue that the problem doesn’t really pose a distinctively philosophical question; that Russell’s account of unity exposes the problem as unworthy of an answer. I accept that this isn’t a solution, but it does constitute a substantive non-solution! Furthermore, some scholars have read in Russell’s writings a confession of guilt to the effect that he was defeated by the problem of unity: this, I argue, is a misreading of the texts in question.
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Recommended Citation
Lebens, Samuel
(2008)
"A Substantive Non-Solution To The Problem Of Unity,"
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication:
Vol. 4.
https://doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v4i0.141
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