Keywords
game theory, logic, partial information
Abstract
Games of partial information have been used to explicate Gricean implicature; their solution concept has been murky, however. In this paper, I will develop a simple solution concept that can be used to solve games of partial information, depending on the players' mutual trust and tolerance for risk. In addition, I will develop an approach to non-conventional quantity implicatures that relies on "face" (Goffman (1967), Brown and Levinson (1987)).
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Clark, Robin
(2013)
"Trust and Risk in Games of Partial Information,"
Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication:
Vol. 8.
https://doi.org/10.4148/1944-3676.1073
