Besides “items of interest,” and “citations received,” this issue includes the following items: An “in memoriam” for architectural theorist Bill Hillier, who died in November; Entries relating to Goethean science as a phenomenology of nature, including three “book notes” on recently-published volumes as well as the last part of philosopher Henri Bortoft’s essay, “Goethean Science and the Wholeness of Nature;” A “book note” on sociologist Michael Hviid Jacobsen’s Encountering the Everyday: An Introduction to the Sociology of the Unnoticed; Essays by writer David Ferlic (“Walking the Dog Phenomenologically”) and anthropologist Kevin Browne (“Negotiating National Memory and Forgetting through Cemeteries”); Psychologist Akihiro Yoshida’s Japanese translation of the “twenty-three definitions of phenomenology,” originally published in the 2019 summer/fall issue of EAP.

Recommended Citation

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact cads@k-state.edu.
This EAP begins 31 years of publication and includes “items of interest” and “citations received.” We offer an “in memoriam” for space-syntax theorist Bill Hillier, who died in London in November at the age of 82. Hillier’s work is essential for understanding and making robust places.

A major focus of this EAP issue is Goethean science, as we include the fourth and final part of a 1999 conference presentation on Goethe’s way of understanding by the late philosopher Henri Bortoft. In this entry, Bortoft discusses the eye-opening work of biologist Wolfgang Schad, who uses Goethean method to understand the lived worlds of animals. Coincidentally, a new, expanded edition of Schad’s remarkable Understanding Mammals has just been published, and we feature this work in a “book note” and commentary by ecologist Craig Holdrege.

In addition, we feature two “book notes” describing important work relating to Goethe’s phenomenology of color—first, an edited collection of writings by the late artist and photographer Michael Wilson; second, an exhibition catalogue, Experience Colour, edited by Goethean researcher Troy Vine and including hands-on demonstrations of such color phenomena as afterimages, colored shadows, and prismatic colors—all key topics in Goethe’s 1810 Theory of Color.

We also include a “book note” on sociologist Michael Hviid Jacobsen’s Encountering the Everyday: An Introduction to the Sociology of the Unnoticed; and essays by writer David Ferlic and anthropologist Kevin Browne. We end with psychologist Akihiro Yoshida’s Japanese translation of the “twenty-three definitions of phenomenology,” originally published in the 2019 summer/fall issue of EAP.

Below: Drawings from Wolfgang Schad’s Understanding Mammals of the mountain or snow hare, in its summer coat, left; and winter coat, right. Schad writes: “Mountain or snow hares (Lepus timidus) are noticeably smaller than brown hares but larger than wild rabbits. They often sit up on their disproportionately large hind legs, and their ears are usually upright and alert. Whereas brown hares are often solitary, mountain hares prefer to live in groups. Rather than hopping along, mountain hares generally jump short distances, even when moving slowly. Nevertheless, they are not able to sprint as fast as brown hares. They dig short tunnels, but these are not as extensive as rabbit burrows. Mountain hares are crepuscular (i.e., active at twilight) [and] seek nourishment in the early morning or late evening hours” (from Schad, vol. 2, pp. 928–29; drawings: P. Barruel and F. Murr).
The 12th-annual conference of the Architecture, Culture, and Spirituality Forum (ACSF) takes place at Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater in Bear Run, Pennsylvania, May 27–31, 2020. The conference theme is “Practices Toward a Future,” though papers and proposals relating to other topics are also considered. Keynote speakers are architectural historian Anat Geva, filmmaker Brent Green, and architectural theorist David Leatherbarrow. Established in 2007, ACSF provides an international forum for scholarship, education, practice, and advocacy regarding the cultural and spiritual significance of the built environment. The forum’s central assumption is that design and experience of the built environment can assist the spiritual development of humanity in service of addressing the world’s most pressing issues. http://www.acsforum.org/symposium2020.


The 39th annual International Human Science Research conference (IHSR) will be held at New York City’s Pace College, June 12–15, 2020. The conference theme is “Building Bridges: State of the Science.” The central focus is the variety of theoretical and methodological approaches in phenomenology and their impact on practical and conceptual understanding. The contact person is Dr. Eileen C. Engelske; eengelske@pace.edu. Additional information is available at the IHSR website: file:///C:/Users/seamant/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCacheContent.Outlook/QAXZIP4G/2019%20IHSR%20Newsletter.pdf.


The 59th annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) will be held in Toronto, Ontario, at the Hilton Toronto, October 8–10, 2020. Papers from diverse philosophical perspectives in all areas of continental philosophy are welcome. Meeting conjointly with SPEP are two other groups supporting phenomenological research: The Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences (SPHS) and the International Association of Environmental Philosophy (IAEP). www.spep.org; www.sphs.info; www.environmentalphilosophy.org.

**Psychology of religion and place**


**Books on atmosphere**

In the last several years, the phenomenon of atmosphere has become a prominent topic in phenomenological and related research. Here, we provide a list of seven recent books on the topic. Two prominent figures in the field are German philosophers Gernot Böhme and Hermann Schmitz; note entries by these two thinkers in the list below.


This German philosopher has played a major role in facilitating academic and professional interest in “atmosphere,” which he defines most simply as “tuned space.” This collection includes 21 articles by Böhme published over the past 25 years and “maps out a huge range of questions, themes, and fields covered by the idea of atmosphere.” The articles are arranged thematically in four parts: “Theory: Aesthetics and aesthetic economy”; “Aesthetics of nature and art”; “Architecture”; and “Light and sound.”


Volume editor and translator A.-Chr. Engels-Schwarzpaul explains in her introduction that atmospheres as understood by Böhme reflects “the relationships of many elements in an enfolded, expansive space” and are “dynamic, diffused and pre- and inter-subjective, spatial carriers of mood and suffused with emotional power.” This volume is said to “bring together Böhme’s most seminal writings on the subject, through classic books and articles, many of which have hitherto only been available in German.”

*cont. next page*
Wolf suggests how atmospheres can be actively altered to improve learning.

Defining atmosphere

Atmosphere is what relates objective factors and constellations of the environment with my bodily feeling in that environment. This means: atmosphere is what is in between, what mediates the two sides... and can therefore be approached in two different ways: either from a perception aesthetics or a production aesthetics viewpoint.

Atmospheres are quasi-objective, namely, they are out there; you can enter an atmosphere, and you can be surprisingly caught by an atmosphere. But on the other hand, atmospheres are not beings like things; they are nothing without a subject feeling them. They are subjective facts in the sense of Hermann Schmitz: to talk about atmospheres, you must characterize them by the way they affect you. They tend to bring you into a certain mood and the way you name them is by the character of that mood. The atmosphere of a room may be oppressive, the atmosphere of a valley may be joyful.

But on the other side, you can argue about atmospheres, and you even can agree with others about what sort of atmosphere is present in a certain room or landscape. Thus atmospheres are quasi-objective or something existent intersubjectively.

But as mentioned, you can approach the phenomenon of atmospheres not only from the side of perception aesthetics but also from that of productions theory and practice of atmospheres: you can learn from a stage designer what means are necessary to produce a certain climate or atmosphere on the stage: what colors, objects, signs should be used, and in what way should the space of the stage itself be arranged.

The art of stage setting again proves that atmospheres are something quasi-objective. Namely, if each member of the audience were to perceive the climate of the stage in a different way, the whole endeavor of stage setting would be useless (Böhme 2017, pp. 1–2).

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“Atmospheres are omnipresent and they are frequently highlighted in everyday language. Yet, when do we perceive atmospheres and how can we explore them? The concept of atmosphere extends aesthetics to aisthesis and conceives of perception as a relation bound to the present and with regard to others. In this context, the astonishing atmosphere is identified as a watershed moment when the object of perception becomes the object of discourse.”


German philosopher Hermann Schmitz is the founder of a conceptual approach he has labelled the “new phenomenology.” From the introduction: “Schmitz has developed his phenomenological insights in 20 volumes of writings, accompanied by 13 related books on the history of philosophy and the history of ideas.” The book includes discussion of “atmosphere,” which Schmitz defines as “the unbounded occupation of a surfaceless space in the region of what is experienced as present.”


“An atmosphere bears an effect wherever it is perceptible by human beings, including situations in educational institutions. Due to their efficacious potential, atmospheres can exude an influence that enhances or weakens, encourages or inhibits children in their development. This book considers various kinds of atmospheres that typically emerge in pedagogical contexts.

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This philosopher writes that “Personal ownership of one’s housing… is becoming a luxury and not a necessity and is becoming increasingly unlikely… for those who do not have the means to afford down payments or finance mortgages on increasingly inflated property prices. Such precariousness… is precipitated and even made possible by a certain tacit (though sometimes overt) understanding of what housing is, specifically, the notion that housing is not a fundamental condition of human life related to our being “at home” in the world, but a commodity to be bought and sold on the free market, “real estate,” or, as is increasing common, a major financial “investment.”

“[I contend] this understanding of housing as commodity and investment is complicit in creating a world where fewer and fewer people have adequate housing in the very concrete sense of having a shelter that will guarantee a minimal level of stability for the foreseeable future; furthermore, that the lack of such housing and the way its distribution is organized forecloses the more general possibility of feeling situated or ‘feeling at home’ in the world at all.”


This social theorist draws partly on phenomenologist Alfred Schutz’s work to consider today’s rapidity of societal change — “a progressive acceleration in the ‘pace of life’.” He speaks of the “defamiliarization” of the taken-for-granted lifeworld, including the breakdown of constancy (people’s taken-for-granted assumption that their lifeworlds will remain relatively stable over time) and shifts in typicality (the taken-for-granted ways in which people define and master lifeworld actions and needs).

Gros argues that current feelings of disorientation are propelled “by a process of defamiliarization of the lifeworld that follows from its relentless dynamization… [I]ndividuals do not have enough time at their disposal for learning the skills needed for dealing with novel things, events, and situations that emerge every day…. Furthermore, the fluidification of social groups, milieus, and institutions taking place in accelerating societies aggravate the problem, insofar as [this fluidification] destabilizes and undermines socialization processes.”


Integrating architectural theory and recent developments in neuroscience, this architectural theorist emphasizes the “emotional and aesthetic responses” of design and “the sense of homeostatic wellbeing of those who will occupy any designed environment.” Includes a chapter on “the atmosphere of place.”


This scholar of literature examines how mobility contributes to interpersonal relationships, including courtship, bereavement, and mid-age experiences. “How,” asks Pearce, “could there be relationships, if people did not come and go?” The author writes: “Working with autobiographical, non-fiction and literary texts from the twentieth century, [I investigate] the foundational significance of mobility in interpersonal relationships of various kinds, and at different stages of the lifecourse: this includes courtship (and its modern-day equivalents), marriage and other enduring relationships as well as the mobilities associated with bereavement and loss.”


This architect examines “how the users of Thames Town—an English-like village built in China’s Songjiang New Town near Shanghai—negotiate the notion of authenticity through their everyday social and spatial practices.” Piazzoni argues that “authenticity underlies the social and physical production of space through both top-down and bottom-up dynamics.” The author portrays Thames Town as “many places at once: a successful tourist destination, an affluent residential cluster, a city of migrant workers, and a ghost town.” She demonstrates how “people negotiate a sense of authenticity in an explicitly ‘fake environment’ and suggests that “it is precisely the experience of ‘fakeness’ that allows Thames Town’s users to develop a sense of place.”


This geographer argues that “from the perspective of everyday experience, landscape is like a sign language that has to be constantly deciphered merely to find our way around. But the usual idea of landscape is that it is a backdrop to life that can be regarded or analyzed with detachment, and it is from this perspective that it has been argued that landscape can be read like a book that provides clues to history and culture.”

Relph “considers the idea that landscape is language and reviews suggestions by geographers and others about ways to read landscape and to understand its grammar. The idea of landscape has coincided with the so-called mechanical age of print and..."
rationalism that has prevailed for four centuries and is now being displaced by electronic communications and social media that favor feeling and participation over contemplation and careful reading. A consequence of this displacement is that the language of landscape is shifting from something that was once reasonably coherent and decipherable to something that is increasingly heterotopic and constantly changing and requires new ways of understanding.”


The chapters in this edited volume aim to demonstrate that “photography is a prevalent practice of making American places. [These chapters] epitomize not only how pictures situate us in a specific place, but also how they create a sense of such mutable place-worlds. Understanding photographs as prime sites of knowledge production and advocates of socio-political transformations, a transnational set of scholars reveals how images enact both our perception and conception of American environments. They investigate the power photography yields in shaping our ideas of self, nation, and empire, of private and public space, through urban, landscape, wasteland, and portrait photography.”


Philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus is a major researcher in the “phenomenology of illness and health.” The latter he interprets as “a form of homelike, silent harmony that recedes to the background of a person’s being-in-the-world,” whereas illness relates to “painful and obstructive moods demanding attention and making it hard or impossible for the afflicted person to carry out everyday actions and projects.”

Svenaeus’ central argument is that “health is a homelike being-in-the-world in opposition to the unhomelikeness of illness.” In this article, he begins with a helpful overview of a phenomenology of health and illness (which he labels PHI) and then responds to two contrasting conceptual critiques: first, naturalistic criticism (the medicalization of health and illness); second, Nietzschean (the possibility that illness can in some cases make the sufferer a stronger and better person).


These urban planners write that “in a world where change is unrelenting, people long for authentic places. This book examines the reasons for and responses to this longing, considering the role of community development in addressing community and neighborhood authenticity.” The eighteen chapters include Vikas Mehta’s “Neighbourhood Authenticity and Sense of Place”; Na Matsumoto's “Negotiating Diversity: The Transitioning Greektown of Baltimore City, Maryland”; and Leslie Shieh and Jessica Chua’s “Chinatown, not Coffeetown: Authenticity and Place-making in Vancouver’s Chinatown.”


This architectural theorist draws on the work of three important Nordic architects—Alvar Aalto, Jorn Utzon, and Sverre Fehn—to consider aspects of architectural experience and to argue that one can find design commonalities in their work.


This British architect discusses a range of design possibilities whereby “we can build neighborhoods and communities where residents feel more connected to their homes and to one another.” The author reviews “prototypical American housing design and then suggests ways to both learn from the past as well as adapt for new environmental imperatives, demographic changes, and lifestyle needs.” Chapter headings include “Housing yesterday,” “Housing today,” “Community planning and design,” “Siting and lot patterns,” “Floor plans and building image,” “Interior details,” “Exterior details,” “Multifamily housing,” “Manufactured housing,” and “Toward more sustainable homes and community.”


These16 chapters work to extend the concept of “complete streets”—an urban-planning approach that moves away from an “auto-normative paradigm” to provide safe access and mobility to all users, including pedestrians and cyclists. Chapter titles include: “Urban Spatial Mobility in the Age of Sustainability” (Themis Chronopoulos); “The Street as Ecology” (Vikas Mehta); “One Day the White People Are Going to Want These Houses Again’: Understanding Gentrification through the North Oakland Farmer’s Market” (Josh Cadji and Alison Hope Alkon); and “The Politics of Sustainability: Contested Urban Bikeway Development in Portland, Oregon” (Thaddeus R. Miller and Amy Lubitow).
In Memoriam: Bill Hillier (1937–2019)

Architectural theorist Bill Hillier died in London on November 5, 2019, at the age of 82. Working with architect Julienne Hanson, Hillier developed a significant environment-behavior theory known as space syntax, which demonstrates that the spatial arrangement of pathways—whether roads, streets, sidewalks, building corridors, or other spaces of movement—play a major role in whether those pathways are well-used and animated or empty and lifeless. This theory was first laid out in Hillier and Hanson’s seminal The Social Logic of Space, published in 1984 and demonstrating convincingly that different pathway configurations can bring users together spatially or keep them apart.

One crucial question for our time is understanding the ways in which the physical and spatial environment supports or stymies human life and wellbeing. Hillier’s work is central for answering this question because he and Hanson actually located something real: the lived intimacy between pathway configuration and degree of users’ co-presence, co-awareness, and co-encounter.

I only met Bill Hillier once, but I did have the pleasure of spending three days with him because we were both in Istanbul, Turkey, for the sixth international space syntax symposium held at the Istanbul Technological University. I was invited to the conference as a keynote speaker, after which Hillier and I travelled to Ankara to give a set of joint lectures for the School of Architecture at Middle East Technical University.

Bill was one of the sharpest people I have ever met, and we had a series of arousing discussions on the phenomenological possibilities offered by his work. I remember Bill’s saying that few people really understood the promise of space syntax. Then, in his next sentence, I was flattered because he said, “David, you’re one of the few.”

I was flabbergasted and humbled because, here I was, the phenomenologist; and there he was, the analytic scientist. I felt honored that he would say what he said, but of course I admired him hugely for what he had been able to “see,” identify, and describe. As five of us were driving in a tiny car to visit Turkey’s “cave city” of Cappadocia, the topic of the title of Bill’s Space Is the Machine was mentioned. I said, “You really chose a poor title for a remarkable book.” His wife Sheila laughed and quickly spoke up, “See, Bill, I told you it was a bad title. Finally, somebody’s telling the truth!”

Bill chuckled at our glee and explained that the book’s title was suggested by one of his graduate students as a means to highlight the spatial environment as the central engine of place robustness. Though I still think the book could have been better titled, I do believe that space syntax is one of the few real theories that has come out of the social and design sciences in the last fifty years [1].

Why do I say that? One central space-syntax concept is axial space, which relates to the one-dimensional qualities of a pathway and has bearing on human movement throughout a building, town, or city as a whole. Axial spaces are illustrated most perfectly by long narrow streets and are represented geometrically by the longest straight line that can be drawn through a street or other movement space before that line strikes a building, wall, or some other material object.

Axial lines are significant phenomenologically for at least two reasons. First, because they indicate the farthest point of sight from where one happens to be, axial lines speak to the lived relationship between “here” and “there” and thus, at the settlement scale, have bearing on environmental orientation and finding one’s way in a place.

Second, because they collectively delineate the spatial system through which the various parts of a place are connected by pedestrian and vehicular circulation, a settlement’s web of axial lines provides a simplified rendition of the potential movement field of a place. Hillier’s important discovery is that differently configured pathway webs play a major role in generating different patterns of pathway movement and face-to-face encounter among pedestrians and other users.

An important quantitative measure of axial spaces and pathway webs is integration, which Hillier defined as an index of the relative degree of connectedness that an axial space has in relation to all other axial spaces in a pathway system. The assumption is that a pathway connected to many other pathways will be more travelled because
users will need to traverse that pathway to get to other pathways and destinations in the town or city.

Such a pathway is said to be strongly integrated in the movement field because many other pathways run into that well-connected pathway and potentially provide a large pool of users. In contrast, a segregated pathway has few or no other pathways running into it—for example, a dead-end street. All other things being equal, a segregated pathway will be the locus of less movement, since it serves a more limited number of users in its immediate vicinity only [see London’s axial map, p. 9].

Through integration and other quantitative measures, Hillier developed a compelling understanding of the global pattern of a place—in other words, the way the spatial configuration of a place’s pathway fabric as a whole lays out a potential movement field that gathers or separates co-presence.

Natural movement is the term Hillier used to describe the potential power of a pathway network to automatically stymie or facilitate movement and the face-to-face interactions of pedestrians and other place users. With many people present involved in their own regular routines and activities, the result typically is an animated pathways and exuberant local places. Hillier recognized that other place elements like density, building types, and number, size, and range of functions and land uses also contribute to place vitality, but he argued that, ultimately, pathway configuration is most primary and most crucial (Hillier 1996, p. 161).

In relation to cities, Hillier demonstrated that most urban pathway systems have traditionally been an integrated, interconnected fabric of variously-scaled deformed grids—pathway systems in which the most active, integrated streets make a shape that roughly suggests a wheel of rim, hub, and spokes. Typically, each of these deformed grids is associated with some designated neighborhood or district—for example, London’s Soho, West End, or City.

In turn, the integrated pathway structure of these districts conjoin to shape a much larger deformed grid that founds the movement dynamic of the city and London region as a whole. Hillier pointed out that twentieth-century urban design and planning regularly replaced integrated pathway configurations with treelike systems of segregated pathways that stymied or destroyed the intimate relationship between local and global integration and thereby eliminated much face-to-face interaction—for example, the “cul-de-sac and loop” pattern of low-density, automobile-dependent suburbs or the hierarchical circulation layouts of many modernist housing estates.

From the perspective of a phenomenology of place, what is striking about space syntax is that it offers a descriptive vehicle for envisioning how the pathway network of a place works to facilitate or inhibit movement patterns throughout that place. In spite of its objectivist framework, space syntax gathers and holds together the parts of place that sustain traversals within that place.

This integral togetherness is possible because understanding is grounded in the underlying topological constitution of the pathway structure as a whole—the way that a pathway is more or less enmeshed topologically in the place’s overall pathway configuration and, thus, potentially, supports much or little human movement along that pathway. Each line of traversal, in other words, is not interpreted as a separate, disassociated pathway piece but as an integrated, continuous thread of the larger pathway fabric. As Hillier (2008, p. 30) explained, “The configuration of the space network is, in and of itself, a primary shaper of the pattern of movement.”

The key phrase here is “in and of itself,” which intimates the inherent wholeness of the pathway structure. In this sense, space syntax offers a synergistic portrait of the potential pathway-movement dynamic of a place, and this portrait arises, not analytically (from the summation of empirical movement data for each pathway) but synergistically from the very structure of the pathway configuration itself as pictured quantitatively. Via measurement, space syntax provides a descriptive means to identify and evaluate a web of continuous, intertwined pathways “that are themselves mutually defined only through the way in which they are gathered together within the place they also constitute” (Malpas, 2006, p. 29).

In terms of place making, space syntax is crucial because it demonstrates how one aspect of the designable environment—its spatial and topological features—plays a pivotal role in the movements of people-in-place and therefore contributes to that place’s degree of “life” in terms of whether users are drawn together intercorporeally or kept apart.

Space syntax offers a superlative example of how environmental spatiality and materiality—though in one sense inert and passive—can actively contribute to making day-to-day human worlds one way rather than another. Hillier was able to demonstrate conclusively that the physicality of place, via pathway structure, prearranges a spatial field, the nature of which has central bearing on the relative amount of human movement and co-presence in that place.

In Hillier’s memory, we reproduce portions of his Space Is the Machine (Hillier, 1996) and a chapter he wrote for an edited collection on urban design (Hillier, 2008).

—David Seamon

Note
1. Portions of the following are drawn from Seamon 2018, pp. 145–47.

References

The local structure of space
The following passage is from Hillier’s Space Is the Machine and incorporates what Hillier calls a “thought experiment” in which he hypothetically reconstructs the typical pedestrian experience for an individual X who lives on an ordinary London working-class street vs. another individual Y who lives in a modernist housing estate on a short upper walkway remote from a public street.

Imagine an individual, X, living on an ordinary London street. It is midday.
X comes out of his or her front door. A stranger is about to pass by the door. Another is slightly farther away but will also pass the door shortly. A third is passing in the opposite direction on the other side of the street. In these circumstances, the presence of strangers seems natural. X even finds it reassuring. Certainly, X does not approach the person passing the door and ask what he or she is doing here. If X did this, others would think X’s behavior odd, even threatening. Unless there were special circumstances, someone might even send for the police if X persisted.

Now consider Y, who lives on a short upper-level walkway remote from the public street within a London housing estate. Like X, Y comes out of his or her front door and looks down the walkway. Suddenly a stranger appears round the corner in exactly the same position relative to Y’s doorway as in the previous case the stranger was to X’s.

Due to the local structure of the space [marked by much shorter pathways and thus minimal visual contact with the estate’s larger pathway network] …, it is likely no one else is present. Unlike X, Y is nervous and probably does one of two things: either Y goes back inside the dwelling, if that is easier, or if not asks the stranger if he is lost. The encounter is tense. Both parties are nervous. Y is being “territorial,” defending local space, and the stranger is being asked for his “credentials.”

Now the curious thing is that in the prevailing spatial circumstances, Y’s behavior, which, if it had occurred on X’s street, would have seemed bizarre, seems normal, even virtuous. In different environmental conditions, it seems, not only do we find different behaviors but different legitimizations of behavior. What is expected in one circumstance is read as bizarre in another.

So what exactly has changed? There seem to be two possibilities. First, the overall characteristics of the spatial configuration… has changed…. Second, Y’s expectation of the presence of people has changed.

These two changes are strictly related to each other. Changes in spatial configuration produce, quite systematically, different natural patterns of presence and co-presence of people. People know this and make inferences about people from the configuration of the environment. An environment’s configuration therefore creates a pattern of normal expectation about people. These expectations guide our behavior. Where they are violated, we are uncomfortable and behave accordingly. What is environmentally normal in one circumstance is unexpected in another.…. The behavioral difference we have noted is therefore environmentally induced, not directly, but via the relation between configurational facts and configuration expectations.

One effect of this is that it can induce environmental fear, often to a greater degree than is justified by the facts of crime, because it takes the form of an inference from environment rather than from an actual presence of people.

It is these inferences from the structure of space to the pattern of probable co-presence that influence behavior and are also responsible for the high levels of fear that prevail in many housing estates. This is the fundamental reason that the urban normality of street-based systems usually seems relatively safer than most housing estates (Hillier 1996, pp. 190–91).

**A fundamental urban relation**

Why should the network of space preoccupy us to the point where we seek to make it the centerpiece of theory? The answer is that syntactic studies of cities as networks of space have, in recent years, brought to light a fundamental link between the form of cities and their functioning, one which affects our whole approach to the city: the configuration of the space network is, in and of itself, a primary shaper of the pattern of movement.

This is not simply a technical observation. In shaping movement, space also shapes the pattern of human copresence—and of course coab- sence—that seem to be the key to our sense that good cities are human and social, as well as physical, things. This effect arises not from the properties of the individual spaces, or even from the local connections, but from the whole configuration of the network at a nonlocal scale.

The implication is that the large-scale architecture of the urban spatial network, which has been neglected for decades by both research and practice, matters more than we thought to the life of the city and how it comes into existence.

The idea is, of course, not really new. Most designers believe that we can manipulate space to create emergent human patterns, although there are conflicting views on how this can and should be done. What is new is the idea that this is a scientific proposition.

The idea does not feature significantly, for example, in most engineering-based movement models, where movement is seen as a matter of attraction: locations attract movement according to the “mass” of their attractions, such as the shopping floor area, and the space network is the means of getting there. The models work by analogy with a Newtonian physical system, and this is where the core idea of attraction comes from. As with planetary bodies, attraction is seen as proportionate to the combined “mass” of areas and inverse to some definition of distance.

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**Local vs. Global**

The current preoccupation with ‘place’ seems no more than the most recent version of the urban designer’s preference for the local and apparently tractable at the expense of the global and intractable in cities…. Places are not local things. They are moments in large-scale things, the large-scale things we call cities. Places do not make cities. It is cities that make places. The distinction is vital. We cannot make places without understanding cities (Hillier 1996, p. 151).
Such models can of course be made to work, but they can never be true theoretical models because attraction is not primary. The space network, by shaping movement, also shapes the pattern of attractors, since attractor activities like retail follow the patterns of movement already created by the network.

So, if we want a theoretical understanding of the city we should not start with the distribution of attraction, since this is in good part an emergent product of the network. The shift to a network view of the city, as implied by space syntax, is then also a paradigm change. It puts the phenomena of the city into a different order.

Once we understand the relation between the network configuration and movement, we can begin to see how cities come to be as they are and how they work. In particular, we can begin to understand why and how cities, if they are allowed to, tend to self-organize into a polycentric pattern, by creating a network of linked centers and subcenters, at all scales, from a couple of shops and a cafe to whole sub-cities, all set into a background of residential space.

This is the nature of the organic city, which evolves over tens or hundreds of years to form the seamless web of busy and quiet places, with everything seeming to be in the right place. So what we are talking about here is a theory of the self-evolving city. A key element in this is that the process by which cities create themselves is about the relation between scales: that how local places arise in cities depends as much on how they are embedded in their larger-scale context as in their intrinsic properties (Hillier 2008, pp. 30–31).

Above: Axial map of central London. In this mapping generated quantitatively by numerical integration values, the reddest lines represent the most integrated pathways and thus the streets of most pedestrian movement. The long red line running almost horizontally from central left is Oxford Street, said to be one of the world’s most heavily used streets by pedestrians. Note the yellow, orange, and red lines form rough “deformed wheels” indicating important London neighborhoods like Soho or The City. In turn, these smaller “wheels” weave themselves into a larger city web that allows for a great degree of permeability and ease of movement with and between neighborhoods and districts. The blue and indigo lines indicate pathways much less integrated into London’s pathway system and thus streets of much less movement. Map image © Space Syntax Limited and used with permission.
Book Note


The 16 chapters of this edited collection aim to offer “a clear, contemporary and comprehensive overview of the sociologies of everyday life.” The entries are arranged in three parts, the first of which focuses on foundational traditions that include the Chicago school and human ecology, American pragmatism, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, existential sociology, and critical everyday life sociologies.

Chapters in the second part deal with more recent points of view, including French sociologies of the everyday, Erving Goffman, and ethnmethodology. The last part focuses on recent developments including the sociology of emotions, social semiotics, cultural studies, and interpretive interactionism.

Jacobson concludes that “what makes everyday life so difficult to capture is that it is or seems to be everywhere. As an emporium of experiences, everyday life is universally available, although it is not necessarily the same type of everyday life experienced by different people at different times and different places. It is also ineradicable… and therefore inescapable. Thus, as experience, we cannot escape the everyday… because the everyday equals what phenomenologists call the “paramount reality,” a reality we always eventually return to… (p. 15).

In his introductory chapter, Jacobsen defines “the everyday” in several different ways, drawing on articulations from sociologists Norbert Elias, Mike Featherstone, and Andrew J. Weigert. These descriptions are provided in the following sidebars.

### Everyday & non-everyday

Norbert Elias’s inventory of the everyday via contrast with the “non-everyday” (1998):

- The everyday as opposed to holiday.
- Everyday = routine as opposed to extraordinary areas of society not subject to routine.
- Everyday = the working day as opposed to the bourgeois sphere, that is people living on profits and luxury, without really working.
- Everyday = the life of the masses as opposed to the life of the privileged and powerful.
- Everyday = the sphere of mundane events as opposed to everything regarded by traditional political historiography as the only relevant or “great” events in history.
- Everyday = private life (family, love, children) as opposed to public or occupational life.
- Everyday = the sphere of natural, spontaneous, unreflecting, genuine experience and thinking as opposed to the sphere of reflective, artificial, unspontaneous, especially scientific experience and thinking.

- Everyday = ideological, naïve, superficial and false experience and thinking as opposed to correct, genuine, and true experience and thinking.

### Recurring day-to-day patterns

Mike Featherstone’s list of frequently recurring features of everyday life (1992):

- An emphasis on what happens every day—the routine, repetitive, taken-for-granted experiences, beliefs, and practices.
- An emphasis on the sphere of reproductions and maintenance, the pre-institutional zone of basic activities, predominantly carried out by women.
- An emphasis on the present providing a non-reflexive sense of immersion in the immediacy of current experiences and activities.
- An emphasis on the non-individual embodied sense of being together in spontaneous common activities outside, or in the interstices, of the official institutional domains.
- An emphasis on heterogeneous knowledge over rationality and the linearity of writing.

### Three lived levels

Andrew J. Weigert’s three interrelated levels of human existence and biography (1981):

- The daily routines of our patterns of thoughts, words and deeds.
- The social structures and social beliefs that normalize and legitimate some actions and routines and deem others abnormal and illegitimate.
- The underlying assumptions and basic principles of any human life.
Michael H. Wilson (1901–1985) was an artist and photographer who, in 1949, published What Is Colour? The Goethean Approach to a Fundamental Problem. Over time, this study became a highly regarded introduction to color, which marked Wilson’s key interest for the rest of his life. As the editors of this comprehensive set of his writings explain:

This question [What is color?] stayed with Wilson for the rest of his life. He pursued it from multiple perspectives beginning with the physiological aspect of color and progressing to the physical, philosophical, artistic, therapeutic and lastly spiritual aspects... Goethe’s Theory of Colours is by far the most cited work in Wilson’s writings on colour, and an important aspect of his lifelong occupation with the topic was to develop an understanding of Goethe’s colour research and its relevance for science, the arts, therapy, and spirituality. His early research on colour arose out of his interest as an artist and photographer... The second phase of Wilson’s research began when he joined the Physical Society Colour Group and started working with physicists in the field of colour science. This resulted in a series of publications—many in leading physics journals... Later in life, Wilson extended the implications of this research into the fields of art, therapy and spirituality.... (p. xvii-xviii).

This collection of Wilson’s writings includes 27 entries and demonstrates the profound impact that Goethe’s way of thinking and seeing had on Wilson’s work. In the sidebar, below, we present his lucid explication of the nub of Goethean science in which the central aim is to see the phenomenon in its wholeness.

**Goethean science vs. conventional scientific method**

In the remarkable essay, “The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject,” which he wrote in 1793 [see p. 13], Goethe describes, gently and with great modesty, the principles that he believes should apply to any work of scientific investigation. First and foremost is the quality we now call objectivity. The pleasure or pain, attraction or repulsion, the use or harm that in the first place relate human beings to the things of nature, must be allowed no influence on their judgement....

Objectivity, meticulous judgement, rigorous procedure, exchange of ideas and disclosure of results—these belong to any standards to the best precepts of scientific method. Where, then, does Goethe’s method differ, and why should it have been so completely neglected, even denied, by all the scientists of fame who followed him?

The success of the scientific method that had begun with Galileo two centuries earlier was that the phenomena of nature, particularly those of the inorganic world, were beginning to be described in terms of relationships of number and measure—relationships that could be expressed as natural law, accessible to reason, and independent of authority. Movements of bodies—falling, rolling, swinging, rotating—could be expressed and predicted in terms of distance, time and mass. Musical sounds were found to have measurable vibrations as their basis, expansion and contraction became a relationship of temperature, pressure, and volume. Colours became measurable components of white light, and so on.

These claims could be verified by experiment, and experimenting was open to anyone.... What could be more natural than to conclude that here was the kind of thinking that would unlock the secrets of the world, and what more tempting than to want to take nature to pieces down to the very last cog?

For Goethe, this attitude had no attraction. He had his own kind of acquaintance with Nature. He, too, saw that all the elements of nature are related, but he saw it in a different way. For him, nature was a unity, a oneness in which everything had its place. He did not look for the smallest unit out of which everything else was built up, but for the way in which everything was related to the highest, the ultimate all-embracing unity.

He saw moreover that the only way in which human beings can comprehend this unity is by first separating, differentiating, defining. Separating is the work of the intellect, whereas reassembling is the work of the intelligence, the reason.

The realization of this last point leads us to the heart of the matter. The discovery that we can take nature to pieces and find the most wonderful and beautiful relationships and proportions between the various parts is no evidence at all that the completed works of creation were put together from the elementary parts in the first place. In the world of living things,
we have only to follow the successive stages from seed to flower, from egg to chicken, to see that the reverse is indeed the case. Nature proceeds by processes of differentiation and selection. It is only human beings who must construct from the parts to the whole.

As earthly beings, we are so constituted that anything we create out of our own forces cannot be translated from idea to reality without going the stage of being “broken down” into elements of manageable size. It is the same with our knowledge. We first break down the vast natural events into separate processes, principles, and definitions that have been sufficiently “abstracted” for our intellect to be able to grasp them.

The almost universal failure, against which Goethe protested with such vehemence, has been the value to recognize that it is we who have made the separate pieces, whereas in nature everything is part of the unity, the totality.

We have broken nature into pieces, and have then pretended that the pieces, as pieces, had been there all the time. All the single concepts that constitute our scientific language, such as distance, time, mass, temperature, wavelength, frequency and the like, are concepts that we have created to be able to describe and to predict with accuracy the behavior of the things around us. And now we have got into the habit of talking about the world as if it really had been built up from these separate elements.

For Goethe, it appeared highly unscientific and quite unforgivable to pretend to “explain” something that one could see and experience, by means of something that one could not experience. The idea that behind the curtain of our often unreliable sense impressions lies the “reality” of the objective mechanical processes that can be measured and calculated, was foreign and repulsive to him.

His method was to use all his senses and all his presence of mind to observe, in patience and humility, the things he was interested in and from the things themselves to learn the kind of thinking appropriate to the study of them. He would experiment, observe, and modify the experiment into all possible forms and variations to perceive the kind of relationship that existed between the various elements of the phenomenon.

He would never forget that the experiment itself was his own deliberate creation, and not nature’s deed at all. He would find out which conditions were essential to the appearance of the phenomenon and which could be discarded. The relationships were certainly not arbitrary. They originated in the things themselves even though they had to be formulated in terms of human thought and speech.

Therefore, if he arranged before his mind’s eye all possible instances of the same phenomenon, it should eventually be possible for the essential nature of the phenomenon, the very kernel of it, to present itself to his consciousness.

The form in which he experienced this he called the “Urphenomenon.” It was an almost direct inner perception, which he called “higher experience.” His Urphenomenon was the same thing that the intellect would formulate as a law of Nature; but by refraining from making this formulation, and by allowing the Urphenomenon to speak for itself, he avoided the danger of arbitrarily importing a type of thinking, a theory that might not be in conformity with the nature of the phenomenon itself (Wilson, “Goetheanism and the Scientific Method,” pp. 203–06; originally 1955).

Michael Wilson, Two views in Skye. Watercolors, 1943: “The major theme in his life had been the understanding of light and colour... He developed a remarkably keen eye for observing and recording the ever-changing patterns and effects of sky and cloud, sunbeam and shadow, dawn and dust, and all the phenomena of the atmosphere.... His knowledge of clouds was put to a more intimate test when he took up gliding in the fifties. From his home in Clent he would look out to the westward every morning, where the ridge of the Longmynd can just be seen on the distant horizon, and he would read the sky to see whether it would be a good day for riding the thermals. If it was..., he would take his camera and soon be soaring on the air-currents....” (R. Brocklebank, “Epilogue,” p. 295).
**Book Note**


Sponsored by England’s Ruskin Mill Trust and Field Center, this exquisitely envisioned volume catalogues an exhibition of Goethe’s 1810 color theory (*Farbenlehre*) originally prepared for its 2010 bicentennial by recreating many of the color, light, and darkness phenomena described by Goethe. The original exhibition text was in German, for which editor Troy Vine has provided English translation. He has also added several essays by English contributors as well as several essays “deal[ing] with topics that have so far only appeared in German.”

Most broadly, the volume is organized around three themes: “Exploring colour”; “Understanding colour”; and “Applying colour.” The volume begins with over 60 exhibition entries, all superbly accompanied by explanatory text, drawings, and photographs. These items are followed by longer essays on Goethe’s color theory, including Goethe’s seminal statement of method, “Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject.” Other entries include “Goethe’s *Farbenlehre* from the Perspective of Modern Physics” (Johannes Grebe-Ellis and Oliver Passon); “Farbenlehre and Goethe’s Nonromantic Imagination” (Dennis L. Sepper); “Goethe’s Polemic as Therapy” (Troy Vine); and “A Model for Scientific Research? A Consideration of Goethe’s Approach to Colour Science” (Johannes Kühl and Matthias Rang).

This catalogue is a major contribution to phenomenological method, convincing illustrating how a phenomenology of the natural world—in this case the phenomena of light, darkness, and color—might proceed.

**Experience vs. idea**

The fact is that man delights more in the idea than in the thing, or rather, he only delights in the thing in so far as he presents it to his mind in an idea. It must somehow fit into his sense, his way of thinking. And he may lift his way of thought ever so far above the common level, he may purify it as he will; still, as a rule it is but an effort to bring a multiplicity of objects into some palpable relation, which is not strictly speaking theirs among themselves. Hence the prevailing tendency to form hypotheses and theories, terminologies and systems.…

Every experience, therefore, every experiment as such, is by its nature to be looked upon as isolated fact, and yet withal the power of the human mind strives overwhelmingly to unite and to connect whatever is outside it and within its ken. This being so, we can appreciate the danger we incur when we desire to connect a single experience with an idea already formed, or by single experiments to prove some relationship which is not merely a matter of bare fact but has already received, in its expression, the form and impress of the mind.

By such endeavours, theories and systems commonly arise, which no doubt do credit to their authors’ skill, but which if praised unduly or sustained to long quickly begin to hinder and to mar the progress of the human spirit which in some sense they assisted.…

A man so well deserving will not lack worshippers and pupils who will acquaint themselves with history and system, loudly admiring and to the best of their ability making the master’s way of thought their own. Sometimes a doctrine of this kind will gain the upper hand to such an extent that if you are bold enough to doubt it, you are held impudent and wanton. Then only later centuries will at last venture to approach the sanctuary, claiming the object of research once more for common sense, using a lighter touch, till they repeat of the founder of a learned sect what a wit once remarked of a great scientist: he would have been a great man if he had only invented less! ….

In living Nature, nothing happens that is not united with the whole. Granted that our experiences only appear to us as isolated facts and that the same applies to our experiments, this does not mean that they are in Nature isolated. The question only is, how do we find the real connection of these phenomena or these events? (Goethe, “Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject,” p. 130 in Vine; originally 1793.)
Light’s invisibility

These two photographs, right, illustrate an exhibit demonstrating the “Invisibility of Light”: “A beam of light, directed upward, remains invisible until a hand or another object is placed in its path. Light illuminates the object and enables us to see it. Light is itself invisible, but it makes objects visible. We could say that light enables sight.

“Inside the cylinder it is dark (right). When you place your hand inside, it is illuminated by light from below (far right). Without the presence of an object, you cannot tell whether the light is on or off.”

Right: Photographs of hands-on demonstrations at the 2018 “Experience Colour” exhibition, held in Stourbridge, UK. Visitors could “discover the science of colour, find out how different colours affect us, and experience the power of colour.” Exhibits “investigated some of the most unexpected colour phenomena that still intrigue physicists today, colour appearances that deeply move us, and the effect of colour in our lives.” The exhibition included color demonstrations based on the work of artist and photographer Michael Wilson [see pp 11–12].
As EAP editor, I have consistently included work relating to Goethe’s way of science, which can be understood as a phenomenology of nature that offers one valuable means for fostering an openness toward the living presence of the natural world, including its animals. In part four of his essay on Goethean science [this issue, pp. 18-21], philosopher Henri Bortoft makes considerable reference to the remarkable Goethean research on mammals conducted by German biologist Wolfgang Schad. Originally published in English in 1977 as one volume entitled Man and Mammals, Schad’s study has recently been extended and updated as two beautifully illustrated volumes now entitled Understanding Mammals and carefully edited by ecologist Mark Riegner.

Schad’s aim in these two volumes is to render a Goethean phenomenology of mammals through qualities of animal form, appearance, and behavior. In the holistic biology that Schad presents, each feature of an animal is seen as significant because the whole is reflected in each part. The aim is to recognize the inner organic order in an animal in such a way that its individual features can be explained by the basic organization of the animal itself (Bortoft 1996, pp. 89-99). Schad’s interpretations offer stunning insights into the experiences and worlds of creatures other than ourselves.

One of the most intriguing results of Understanding Mammals is its returning to questions we asked as children but for which we never received satisfactory answers: For example, what exactly is a cat? What exactly is a dog? How are cats and dogs different and how are they alike? Why are leopards spotted but zebras striped? Why are giraffes’ necks long? Why do cows have horns but deer antlers? Why do beavers, otters, seals, and hippopotami live in water?

For contributing to a lived environmental ethic, Schad’s work is important because it provides an organized, accessible way for us as human beings to move closer to the worlds of other creatures. In this growing intimacy, we not only deepen our intellectual understanding of animals but also strengthen our empathy and emotional sense. We better realize the profound moral implications of Goethe’s claim that each animal is “a small world, existing for its own sake, by its own means. Every creature has its reason to be” (Goethe 1988, p. 121).

Here, we reprint Schad’s account of rediscovering “joy” in understanding animals and his interpretation of cats vs. dogs, a topic with which he introduces his chapter on “terrestrial carnivores.” We then reprint ecologist Craig Holdrege’s commentary on Schad’s work, first published in In Context, the newsletter of Holdredge’s Nature Institute in upstate New York.

—David Seamon

References

“Recapturing the child’s joy”
How much of the all-too-familiar world have we missed because we have not paid enough attention to it? In the end, we need both: delight in details and interest in the overall impression that comes to expression through them. Our goal is to recapture the child’s joy in each phenomenon…

Only when we deepen our perceptions in this way shall we once again be attracted to a weasel or a fox, a seal or a dolphin, as we rediscover their singular way of being (Schad, p. 47).
Cats and Dogs

The carnivores most familiar to us are the domestic dog (family Canidae) and cat (family Felidae). These two animals were tamed in ancient times: the dog from the wolf (Canis lupus) of the Near East even before 10,000 BC, and the cat from the Egyptian desert cat (Felis silvestris lybica) around 1,500 BC or earlier.

The cat’s senses of sight and hearing are remarkable. The long whiskers on its upper lip and above its eyes give further indication of its delicate sensitivity. The dog, in contrast, has developed one of the more typically duller senses, that of smell.

The cat’s sensitive constitution is also revealed in its paws, with their retractile claws, so different from the dog, whose limbs have become tools for running, with immovable claws.

The dog is not even strictly carnivorous; it finds a mixed, omnivorous diet most acceptable. If given only meat, it sometimes buries the bones to obtain a food that has decomposed and become richer in bacteria.

The wolf, too, tends to eat carrion, and both wolves and foxes, and especially coyotes, occasionally eat berries to supplement their otherwise all-meat diet.

All this is disdained by the cat. With the exception of milk, its taste runs to pure meat, rich in blood. Even its method of hunting is in keeping with its strongly developed senses: it prowls stealthily, then crouches motionless, with all its senses focused on its prey, and finally pounces with lightning speed. By contrast, wolves, as well as their descendants, the dogs, hunt by pursuit. Tirelessly, they drive their victim until it is exhausted and must surrender.

Cats hunt primarily with their senses, thus avoiding great physical exertion; dogs hunt with their limbs, powerfully activating their metabolism. Dogs and cats have thus developed polar modes within the “attack” behavior typical of all carnivores.

As any cat owner knows, cats are “individualists.” The European wildcat, for example, is not only shy toward human beings; it also avoids other animals in the woods. A house cat’s attachment to its house is often greater than its bond with its human companions.

Clearly, dogs are more dependent, more “loyal” and good-natured, and are often kept by people as a substitute for human companionship. Dogs inherited this instinct for life-long attachment precisely from their wolf ancestors, which live in the strong community of the pack.

Dogs can redirect this instinct toward their human masters, while cats, having inherited no comparable instinct, cannot. Anyone who has owned both these animals can easily recognize the constitutional difference between them: Cats manifest primarily the nerve-sensing organization; dogs, metabolic-limb processes. And yet in their supple agility, well-proportioned form, and moderate size, both are typical carnivores, shaped primarily by the rhythmic system.

In addition to the wildcat, we also find in Europe, and in North America, the lynx, a larger cat with a brush of elongated hairs on the tips of its ears, side whiskers, a rather short tail, and long, powerful limbs. The lynx often covers great distances in a short time; it also makes use of its limbs when capturing prey. In this animal, therefore, the feline type slightly approaches the canine form.

Among the dog-like animals, in contrast, we find a smaller form, the red fox, as well as other fox species, such as the New World gray fox, with its disproportionately short legs and long tail; these animals generally stalk their prey or lie in wait for it, thus representing a sense-oriented form among the canids. Foxes can climb trees, albeit with more difficulty than cats, and, as in cats, their pupils are slit-shaped. Thus the basic contrast we have discovered between the

sense-active cats and the metabolically-oriented dogs also exists even within the European members of each of these groups.

The red fox, compared with other European canines, has rather feline characteristics, while the lynx is almost dog-like among cats. Even so, the lynx, Europe’s largest cat, remains smaller than the wolf. Correspondingly, the red fox, the smallest of the European canines, is larger than the wildcat. This fact is quite significant for the biology of form, for ... size is dependent upon the relationship between sensory and metabolic systems. Thus, ... the very size of the different animals is indicative of the order inherent within the multiplicity of nature (Schad, pp.48–49).

Above: The contrasting placement of horns for the rhinoceros, wart hog, and bison. Note the bison’s horns are at the top of the head, whereas the wart hog’s horns are close to the mouth. In his animal studies, Goethe came to realize that the appearances of horns and other head protuberances were always related to the absence of certain teeth from the animal’s upper jaw. In his work, Schad examines this relationship in exhaustive detail (drawing from Schad, p. 362).
A World of Dynamic Connections
A Commentary on Wolfgang Schad’s Understanding Mammals
Craig Holdrege

Holdrege is the Director of upstate New York’s Nature Institute, a center for research in Goethean science, which most broadly can be described as a phenomenology of the natural world. This commentary was originally published in the Institute’s newsletter, In Context, issue no. 41, spring 2019, p. 9. The EAP editor thanks Holdrege and the Nature Institute for allowing the commentary to be reprinted here. craig@natureinstitute.org; www.natureinstitute.org. © 2019, 2020, Craig Holdrege.

Understanding Mammals is the fruit of biologist Wolfgang Schad’s many decades of research into the dynamic morphology of mammals. I’ve met many people whose eyes were opened by Schad’s work to a fundamentally new and exciting way of understanding the forms and characteristics of mammals. This was also the case for me. Moreover, he has inspired other researchers and helped them discover patterns in different groups of animals.

The first edition of Säugetier und Mensch was published in 1971, when Schad was 36 years old. An English translation, entitled Man and Mammals, was published in 1977. For many years, the work has been out of print and eagerly sought after as a rare used book. But Schad never stopped researching, and his ability to hold innumerable facts and then weave them into a meaningful, coherent picture is truly remarkable. In 2012, the new German edition was published—two volumes totaling 1300 pages! Truly, a lifetime achievement.

Now, through the tireless efforts of publisher John Barnes and editor Mark Riegner, we have an English translation that includes new material (Schad remains an indefatigable researcher at 83!) and many new illustrations. In the scope of its treatment of mammals and in the uniqueness of approach, the book is bound to become a classic.

Animal form is usually interpreted through a Darwinian (or better said, Neo-Darwinian) view of evolution. All characteristics, whether the color or patterning of the fur or the form of the teeth, are considered in terms of survival. How do the long neck of the giraffe, the flat tail of the beaver, the larger molars of a horse, or the horns of an antelope allow the animal to survive? The beaver’s teeth are good for gnawing wood, the large flat tail for swimming and as a paddle to slap against the water to alert other beavers about the presence of potential predators, and the high-set eye sockets for swimming inconspicuously with its head only slight above the water surface.

In a way, all these “explanations” make sense. But they are also quite speculative. Moreover, this way of looking leads us to mentally dissect the animal into different traits, each of which has its own type of survival value. The coherence and integrity of an animal dissolves into a collection of traits, and all its characteristics are considered solely as adaptations that secure survival.

Already long before Darwin, Goethe protested against trying to explain animal traits in terms of their utilitarian functions. He wrote, “we conceive the individual animal as a small world, existing for its own sake, by its own means. Every creature is its own reason to be… We will not claim that a bull has been given horns so that he can butt; instead, we will try to discover how he might have developed the horns he uses for butting.” This means that we need to study the characteristics of an animal in relation to one another and see if we can discover how they fit together with the context of the animal as a whole.

In this spirit, Wolfgang Schad studies animals. From childhood onward, Schad was a keen observer of animals. When he later studied Rudolf Steiner’s ideas of threefoldness in human being..., he formed a mental lens that allowed him to see patterns in animals that had hardly been recognized before. With this lens, he has been able to build up a comprehensive picture of the diversity of mammals.

A threefold pattern in mammals is perhaps most vividly displayed in the differences between rodents, carnivores, and hoofed mammals (ungulates). Of course, there are many other groups of mammals, and Schad shows how the lens of threefoldness can help make sense of some of this variety. Moreover, one can see recurring themes within the different groups that otherwise remain unappreciated.

Schad is not interested in fitting the diversity of mammals into a neat, rigid system. Rather, he explores what kinds of relations the lens of threefoldness allows one to see. And many notable and surprising connections show themselves in the 1300 pages of the two volumes. Few readers will study the entire book page by page. But once you work enough with the book to gain a good sense of what Schad means by threefoldness, you can begin to see and appreciate the nuanced iterations in different groups. You begin to move in a world of dynamic connections. Then you can select individual chapters about, say, bats or whales, and not only learn interesting details about these animals, but also have your eyes opened to connections you would have never noticed on your own.

This book belongs in every good library. It will help animal lovers and educators gain a new way of looking at the diversity of mammals.
Seeing and Understanding Holistically
Goethean Science and the Wholeness of Nature—Part IV
Henri Bortoft

Bortoft (1938–2012) was a philosopher, physicist, and science educator who wrote Taking Appearance Seriously (2012) and the influential Wholeness of Nature (1996), which includes a much more thorough discussion of Goethe’s phenomenological method. The essay presented here was originally the last part of a paper for the conference, “Goethean Science in Holistic Perspective: Scientific, Ethical, and Educational Implications,” held at Columbia University’s Teacher College, New York City, May 20–22, 1999; the first three parts of this paper are published in the summer/fall 2018, winter/spring 2019, and summer/fall 2019 issues of EAP. Note that, in the original written version of the paper, Bortoft does not provide complete references. Here, we have added citations as available, but some works remain unreferenced. The paper is published with the permission of Jacqueline Bortoft. The editor thanks Stephen Wood for proofing and referencing assistance. © 2020 Jacqueline Bortoft.

When we are able to encounter nature “working and alive, striving out of the whole into the parts,” we come to see the whole reflected in the part because the part is an expression of the whole—literally a part-ial expression. When we look in this way, we really see the unity of nature as the dynamical unity of self-difference and, hence, in the mode of the intensive dimension of One. It is especially characteristic of what is living that, in philosopher Ron Brady’s succinct phrase, “It is becoming other in order to remain itself” [1].

Anyone can practice this way of seeing. For example, one can see a particular family of plants in its organic mode. It is an enlivening experience to observe the different members of a family such as the Rosaceae (rose, blackberry, strawberry, apple, and so forth) and realize they are One plant in the form of “multiplicity in unity.” How different this experience is from that of looking for what these different plants have in common!

A Phenomenology of mammals

Though Goethe’s way of seeing works satisfactorily with plants, one finds it intensified when looking at animals. Here, we turn to the extraordinary work of biologist Wolfgang Schad (2019) and ecologists Craig Holdrege (1998, 2003, 2009) and Mark Riegner (1993, 1998, 2008, 2013). Their research provides some of the best examples of the phenomenology of nature that we yet have. This work is rooted in a Goethean approach yet developed and presented with only minimal reference to Goethe. This distancing is important if phenomenological research on the wholeness of nature is to develop into a real science. What is not needed is making Goethe into some sort of romantic scientific hero, battling against mainstream Western science.

All the themes I have discussed here [see Parts I–III] are exemplified in these animal studies when seen in the light of “multiplicity in unity” rather than “unity in multiplicity.” Schad’s book works as a “template” for thinking in a new way. His perceptive, readily-understandable examples, facilitate a new movement of thinking. As one studies the book, he or she is astonished to see the wholeness of nature emerge in such a natural way that it seems as if it is there “in front of our very eyes” (but of course it is not).

Schad’s way of seeing is so clear that I’m convinced it makes a far better introduction to a Goethean phenomenology of nature than Goethe’s work on color that more often gets phenomenological attention [e.g., Bortoft 1996, pp. 212–36]. When we see nature “striving out of the whole into the parts,” via Schad’s example of mammals, we see in a way that is “inside out” to what is usual. We see how the whole enters into each part, which is therefore a part-ial expression of the whole [for more on Schad’s work, see this issue, pp. 15–17, this issue of EAP].

This way of seeing naturally leads to a dynamical classification of the mammals instead of the static “pigeonhole” classifications with which we are more familiar. The difference between a thinking arising from a “coming into being” and a thinking arising from a “finished product” is experienced vividly in Schad’s account, which leads us to discover intrinsic relationships among mammals that otherwise would not be recognized. As Schad explains,

Here, we witness the awesome inner logic of the organism and experience a diversity ordered in a living way and not merely schematized (Schad 2019, p. 4).

In Schad’s understanding of mammals, we see the phenomenological science of nature clearly—i.e., that it is phenomenological in Husserl’s sense because it returns to “the things themselves.” Schad’s work on animal wholeness also exemplifies Wittgenstein’s new kind of understanding (replacing explanation) that consists in seeing relationships—i.e., recognizing the way whereby things (in this case, mammals) “already stand in connection with one another” (the “grammar” of the mammals) [2].

Intrinsic relationships

The phenomenologist of nature sees the intrinsic relationships and necessary structures that, otherwise, would appear only externally as contingent facts. Holdrege’s research on the “whole organism” begins with Goethe’s remark that “Every creature has its own reason to be.” This phrase describes precisely what a phenomenological science of wholeness is about: giving attention to seeing the “idea” of the organism (in the same sense that we say, in practical life, “I’ve got the idea of it now”). In a similar way, Husserl used the term essence (Wesen) by which he meant not something
hidden behind the appearances or some supposed inner core but the characteristic way of being of something that presents itself directly in experience.

This is what Holdrege (2009) does so beautifully in his work on the sloth. He shows how the characteristic way of this creature’s being reveals itself through a range of manifestations so that “Every detail can begin to speak ‘sloth’.”

Phenomenology does not try to explain but to understand. It tries to catch sight of the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomenon (“its own reason to be”) instead of leaving the phenomenon and thereby explaining it by means of something outside itself. When we begin to see the whole animal, then each of its details is seen to be consistent with the characteristic way of that animal’s being.

For example, we see this characteristic way of being in the giraffe, a mammal that cannot be considered in isolation from other mammals if we are to come to experience the being-what-it-is. In other words, the giraffe must be seen in the context of all the other mammals within the order of ungulates. The most striking feature of the giraffe—its long neck—becomes intrinsically intelligible when one realizes that:

The tendency of ungulates towards elongation is carried to an extreme in a very particular way in the giraffe, which does not merely have a long neck. Rather, this length is mirrored in the formation of the rest of its body, especially in its very long legs (Schad 2019, p. 667).

When the wholeness of the giraffe is seen, every detail begins to speak “giraffe.” The long neck is now no longer seen as a contingent feature, an accidental development resulting from random variation and natural selection but as a necessary expression of the characteristic way of being that is the giraffe. This “elongation” is consistent with all the other necessary manifestations of the giraffe’s “being-what-it-is” so that one recognizes a coherent whole in which no detail is contingent. No longer is any creature just a bundle of accidental developments as claimed by current genocentric biology.

It is a consequence of the way that modern biology developed that the organism as such has disappeared from view to be replaced by genes as the fundamental units of life [3]. As a counter to this reductive, genetic view of organism, an alternative “organo-centric” biology—i.e., a biology of the whole organism—cannot possibly be overestimated. Even without considering the genetic factor, the conventional tendency among biologists is to see organisms in a mechanical fashion—i.e., as an aggregate of parts rather than an organism-as-whole.

One example is Holdrege’s study of the cow (Holdrege 2004, ch. 4), which demonstrates how the isolation of a single factor—milk production—leads to unhealthy practices that would be ended immediately if we saw the organism as a whole and not just an aggregate of traits and functions. When the organism is seen as no more than an aggregate of bits, then it seems quite natural, now that biotechnology is available, to simply change one part of the creature, independently of other parts. With genetic engineering, this piecemeal manipulation of organisms is commonplace. As Holdrege (1998, p. 230) concludes:

In this respect, the ignorance of the life of organisms in our day is staggering, and Goethe’s approach is needed more than ever.

One of the most significant values of Goethean science is countering this reductive, piecemeal approach to the natural world, particularly as one might facilitate research and education in Goethean phenomenology.

**Appearance and being together**

By facilitating a “coming-into-being” rather than assuming a finished product, Goethe avoided a metaphysical dualism without falling into the flatland of positivism. He avoided separating being and appearance, where being is “behind” the appearance, without reducing everything to “merely” appearance. Instead, appearance is the manifestation of being [4].

Goethe’s dynamical mode of consciousness is in tune with a development in thinking that has gradually developed over the last 200 years. There has been a shift away from thinking in terms of static endpoints. There has been a shift toward thinking in terms of coming-into-being.

This dynamical mode of understanding is illustrated in quantum physics, which has moved away from thinking in terms of entities in their finished state. One example is the development of so-called “elementary particle” physics, which provides an exceptional illustration of the need to think in a dynamical, transformative way. Physicist Werner Heisenberg never tired of pointing out that there really are no elementary particles comprising the ultimate building blocks of the universe or the ultimate constituents of matter. He maintained that our familiar language of “division” and “consists of” is highly inappropriate and obfuscates our understanding of the remarkable processes actually taking place. Experiments with high-energy machines do not show the fragmentation of matter but, rather, its dynamical unity. All the different “particles” that appear are in fact mutable forms of one another and self-differing forms in which energy-matter can appear.

What is observed in these revealing experiments should be seen in the manner of the dynamical unity of self-difference, producing “multiplicity in unity”—i.e., a mode of the intensive dimension of One. Instead of fragmentation, there is unity, albeit in a form that we weren’t expecting and therefore overlooked at first. On the other hand, when we say that such experiments are revealing the fundamental building blocks of matter, we project our thinking backward and see the situation back-to-front. In other words, we lose sight of the formative processes and only see instead the finished products—yet another instance of trying to reach the milk by way of the cheese [5].

**A dynamic phenomenology**

Instances of this dynamical way of thinking are not confined to science alone. In various ways, this approach is a hallmark of some of the major movements in twentieth-century philosophy, especially in the case of phenomenology.

The shift of attention from what Husserl called “the natural attitude” to seeing the taken-for-grantedness of that natural attitude has the effect that we catch (but not catch hold of) “the world” coming into being. We then see how “the world” is constituted in experience, whereas, in the natural attitude, we begin at the end with the world as independent object (what is “given”) and then try to explain experience in terms of the world (instead of understanding the way that the world is constituted in experience).
Beginning at the end, we ask how our experience “in here” is related to the world “out there.” Thus, we begin with the separation of subject from object, whereas in phenomenological seeing, we catch the coming into being of this separation. We realize that any representational theory of knowledge based on this subject-object separation ends in a cul de sac because it starts from the end and therefore gets things “back-to-front.” Any representational theory of knowledge is another case of milk and cheese.

A particularly good example of the dynamical mode of thinking typical of phenomenology is provided by Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneutics, which begins with the coming into being of meaning in the event of understanding (rather than beginning with meaning as a finished product in the author’s mind). By following the coming into being of meaning in the event of understanding, we discover that this experience takes the form of the dynamical unity of self-difference. When we see the way that Gadamer’s hermeneutics illustrates the dynamical unity of self-difference, we find the closeness to Goethe’s organics quite astonishing!

**Modes of counterfeit wholeness**

I end by emphasizing that the science of wholeness can take two counterfeit forms, the first of which is systems thinking, which ranges from Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s “general systems theory” (Bertalanffy 1968) to Ervin Laszlo’s “evolutionary systems theory” (Laszlo 1987). Whatever its specific formulation, systems thinking claims to be a science of wholeness. These formulations are a “mechanistic” counterfeit in the sense that, no matter how sophisticated, they ultimately fail to escape from the mechanistic paradigm they claim to counter—the so-called “Cartesian” or “Newtonian paradigm.”

One key problem with systems thinking is that it sees things in isolation from one another and therefore ignores the ways in which things already belong together. Unaware of this intrinsic relationality, these theorists arbitrarily identify parts that are not really of the whole because they don’t belong [6].

**Holism** is the second counterfeit form of a science of wholeness. In contrast to systems theory, holism overreaches the whole in that, whatever form it takes, this manner of understanding always turns wholeness into something metaphysical. Often irrational, mystical, and pseudo-spiritual, this manner of holistic thinking typically rejects science and has too often been used as a front for prejudice and domination, the most egregious example being Germany’s National Socialism. Too often Goethe has been unfairly associated with holism, as in the “Goethe against Newton” syndrome. This association has done much to harm Goethe’s remarkable contribution to the evolution of scientific thinking.

I summarize the three contrasting approaches to wholeness via the diagram above. Note that in both counterfeit versions, the movement of understanding is away from the phenomenon as that phenomenon is in itself. In contrast, Goethe’s approach moves into the parts as they illuminate the whole. An authentic science of wholeness as exemplified by Goethe’s phenomenological approach should today interest all individuals who aim for a fruitful balance between the pitfalls of intellectualism, on one hand, and mystical pseudoscience, on the other.

**Notes**

2. See Part I for Bortoft’s remarks on Wittgenstein.
5. Bortoft draws on this phrase several times in Parts I–III of this series.
6. In Wholeness of Nature, Bortoft (1996, p. 290) writes: “[Systems thinking] tries to put together what already belongs together. Thus the intrinsic relatedness is not seen, and instead, external connections are introduced with a view to overcoming separation. But the form of such connections is such that they, too, belong to the level of separation.”

**References**


**Bortoft Lectures on-line**

Writer Simon Robinson has uploaded on YouTube several lectures that Henri Bortoft presented on wholeness at Schumacher College in the 2000s. These lectures are an excellent introduction to Bortoft’s thinking, including his understanding of Goethean science. The links are below.

There is also available a tape recording of Bortoft’s presentation at the 2011 J. G. Bennett’s *Dramatic Universe* conference; this link is listed below after the Schumacher links. Note that, in the early 1960s, Bortoft was a researcher under the direction of Bennett.

**Bortoft’s Schumacher lectures**

**Lecture 1:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=8&v=iGE12E2CcTo

**Lecture 2, Part I:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=1Tzx5EOWHe0

**Lecture 2, Part II:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=351&v=UmdLQMIV3KE

**Lecture 3:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=nsH6-n7BUtw

**Lecture 4, Part I:**

https://transitionconsciousness.wordpress.com/2018/12/30/the-henri-bortoft-lectures-day-four-part-one-2/

**Lecture 4, Part II:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCywGtSeWi4

**Lecture 4, Part III:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=thMjGQzhEN0

**Lecture 5, Part I:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LVxvP_S9zI

**Lecture 5, Part II:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLy14NKt0TQ

*Bortoft’s J. G. Bennett lecture*

https://soundcloud.com/seandotcom-1/du-008-henri-bortoft
Walking my dog Waffle is an essential, twice-daily activity. Typically, my wife Trisha leads, and I “pick up after.” Waffle is a “small” brindle English Mastiff. Yes, there are “small” Mastiffs, though the term is relative, since Waffle weighs some 140 pounds. We’ve had Waffle for five years and don’t really know his age because he is a “rescue” dog about whose background we know nothing.

Here, I describe one particular walk with Waffle, in which my attention of the world was suddenly altered. The weather changed dramatically as the wind picked up and the sky filled with clouds. It began to storm. Claps of thunder and bursts of lightning filled the sky. Rain poured down.

We weren’t frightened. In fact, I felt invigorated. No need to turn around, at least not yet. Instead of my usually being annoyed, angered, and wearied by the rush hour traffic paralleling the sidewalk, I was thrilled. Our pace quickened. Instead of the oppressive pall of auto exhausts, I saw only the beautiful panorama of the Rocky Mountain front range. Rather than noticing the hubbub of Denver traffic, I attended to the wetness of the rain and the sweetness of the air. There was only the sound of thunder and rain on the grass.

I want to delineate this experience via time, space, and movement. The time is a weekday, summer-afternoon rush hour in a large American city. Like many summer afternoons in Denver, the sky had clouded up. Rather than take our regular walk around the block, Trisha, Waffle, and I headed to “Inspiration Point,” an elevated city park about two miles from our home and a destination we have walked to many times, even though this park is surrounded by two busy interstate freeways and a third not far away.

As a space, the park includes a moderately trafficked loop trail slightly less than a mile long. Recently, we had avoided Inspiration Point because of smog that obscured the mountains and dirty vegetation sullied by pollution particles. Unlike many city parks, Inspiration Point is not irrigated. Its xeriscape conserves water and is beautiful, making a landscape described as “high desert.” Today, only the three of us are in the park. Ordinarily, the wind and rain disturb me when they intensify, but the gusts made me feel motivated and almost driven. The rain cleansed the vegetation, covered with twinkling droplets of water everywhere. I could see mountains in between the rapidly shifting nimbus clouds.

Our movement quickened. Instead of habitually strolling, we walked much faster, ducking the rain as best we could and reveling in an invigorating environment. I was aroused and excited: no hurry to return home because this surprising experience felt so good, on one hand, yet, on the other hand, triggered a sense of caution and self-preservation.

My description starts with the common event of dog walking. What I find remarkable is how such an everyday action happening in less-everyday circumstances can alter one’s sense of being-in-the-world. Very possibly every sunrise and sunset might render similar experiences, if only we were alert. Giving attention to day-to-day events like dog walking, as they actually happen, illustrates how consciousness and intentionality are not static, hypothetical constructs but rather, revealing, living illustrations of being-in-the-world.

A sad update from the author: “I’m sorry to report that Waffle passed away in the mountains on Sunday, November 3. We were visiting Red Feather Lakes, took a walk, and gave him treats. He lay down and died very peacefully. I guess that is how we all want to go.”
Countries are constantly redefining and reimagining the meanings of the past. Memorials, museums, and cemeteries are vehicles for such negotiations of remembering and forgetting. Such sites represent often conflicting and fluid social and political landscapes of memory. These places relate to colonial and post-colonial narratives of control, nationalism, and development. The representations of public national histories are, as White (1997, p. 4) argues, also acts of “mystification, silencing, and exclusion.”

At the same time, “inscribed spaces” like museums and cemeteries also have the potential to create meaningful relationships by engaging and transforming such accepted national narratives (Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2003, Wright 2005). Cemeteries are often more open, ambiguous spaces than those of museums, which may have controlled and regulated stories. Cemeteries inhabit an intersection of tradition, memory, and place, and can offer the potential for both renewal and critique (Donohoe 2014). The interaction of people and space in cemeteries is more likely to create uncertainties and heterotopias than within museum spaces.

As both a spatial and cultural category, however, the ambiguity, or “messiness” of cemeteries frequently contrasts with the vision of order imposed by political and knowledge regimes (Kusno 2016). Jakarta’s Taman Prasasti (“Inscription Park”) cemetery and now museum simultaneously represents and contests official regimes of order and the processes of messy ambiguity. Taman Prasasti embodies many of Indonesia’s current contradictions regarding its past and present and the meanings of memory and place.

Death, Development, & Cemeteries

In the burgeoning cities of Southeast Asia, available land for burying the dead is reportedly running out (Jakarta Post, March 12, 2011). Development has put pressure on urban green space, including cemeteries. One casualty of this development in Indonesia is Chinese cemeteries, many of which have been closed or relocated in urban and rural areas in the last few decades (Salmon 2016, Husain 2015). For example, a wonderful Chinese cemetery I visited in Yogyakarta, Central Java, was razed in 1998, relocated to a more rural area south of the city, and replaced by a new mosque on the Gadjah Mada University campus (Susanto 2008, Browne forthcoming).

In response to these changes, some entrepreneurs have developed “Memorial Parks” in countries such as The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Salmon 2016). These suburban memorial (or “heritage”) parks represent a hybrid form, combining a recreational experience for families with luxurious cemetery plots, in some cases for only Chinese burials, and in others for those of all faiths. A prominent example is that of San Diego Hills in the Jakarta suburb of Tangerang, which has sections devoted to different religions and a separate section for “Indonesian Heroes.” These new hybrid parks also reflect the trend in Indonesia toward packaged “culture” experiences, seen prominently in places like Taman Mini’s Indonesian ethnic culture pavilions (Hitchcock 2005).

Located in the heart of Jakarta, Taman Prasasti [photo, right] is a different kind of hybrid burial site dating to early colonial times. It reflects the tension between the regulating forces of a bureaucratic modernity and those of a more entropic, local sense of place. Taman Prasasti engages Indonesia’s current debates about its past, current priorities, and future. The site brings forward the question of which memories should be held and preserved or ignored and erased.

Currently, Taman Prasasti inhabits a liminal, indeterminate zone, partway between the stated desire for it to be a domesticated museum, on one hand, and a wild, untamed cemetery, on the other hand. This conflicting aim reflects a poorly implemented rationalist agenda, lacking the funding and vision of a “modern” museum.

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Nor does its spooky, unregulated atmosphere fit with an optic-friendly, bureaucratic vision for a modern, world-class city.

Most broadly, this initiative fails to engage with either the stories of the past or the uncanniness of graveyards and their intersubjectivity. The result is that the cemetery’s poetic potential is left untapped. Taman Prasasti is missing the opportunity to simultaneously educate the public and engage this important space in a dialogue about the meanings of the past and present.

**Taman Prasasti’s History**

The “invention” of non-church graveyards for interring the dead in European countries was primarily a nineteenth-century phenomenon, and in some instances was predated by those in their respective colonies. For example, in Calcutta, India, the first cemetery for British colonists was begun at the end of the eighteenth century (Buettner 2006), whereas in England such expansive, non-church cemeteries like the famous Kensal Green Cemetery in London was opened in 1833 (in Paris the iconic Pere-Lachaise cemetery opened in 1804).

In the Dutch East Indies, the Kebon Jahe Kober cemetery was officially established in 1797 in Batavia (now Jakarta) for Dutch East Indies (VOC) officials, the Dutch upper class, and other prominent Europeans, though burials had already occurred on the site beginning in 1795 (Messakh 2008).

This pattern was contemporaneous with similar developments in The Netherlands itself, where “countryside cemeteries” also began in the late eighteenth century as well, due to concerns about over-crowding in churchyard burial sites and issues of hygiene (Van Steen & Pellenbarg, 2006). Over the following 200-plus years, Kebon Jahe Kober became important not only for who was buried there but also for its eclectic mix of gravestones and markers, incorporating neo-gothic, classical, and Hindu-Javanese styles. Over the centuries, the cemetery has also undergone a number of significant transformations until becoming its present incarnation as the Taman Prasasti Museum.

Many Europeans and Americans are buried alongside Indonesians in the cemetery, including the reform-minded Olivia Raffles, first wife of Thomas Raffles, the governor-general of Java during Britain’s brief (1811–1815) rule. Others include Pieter Erberveld (ca. 1660–April 14, 1722), a Eurasian accused of plotting to overthrow the Dutch VOC and executed (and vilified by the Dutch with a gruesome monument); the Chinese-Indonesian Soe Hok Gie, a political activist, writer, and lecturer; the archeologist W.F. Stutterheim, best known for his excavations in Central Java; F.H. Roll, the founder of the first medical school in Jakarta for the training of Indonesian doctors; and J.L.A. Brandes, a philologist and lexicographer of important ancient Indonesian manuscripts.

**Ghosts of the Past**

The growth of the mega-city of Jakarta since independence has been haphazard and messy (Abeyesekere 1987). This messiness contrasts with Indonesia’s modernization goal, which during the 1966–1998 New Order era sought to impose a particular way of seeing (Kusno 2016) onto public spaces—a political strategy of control designed to relegate the more unruly urban spaces to the margins of society. This messiness, with its marginal sites, story fragments, amnesias, and silences takes on importance in the processes of city-work (Pile 2005). In addition to its spatial fluidities, the everyday emotional and even grief-work of a city is always in process amid the anxieties and desires of its residents and the plasticity of time. Such work, involving spatial tactics of “resistance” to narratives of power (Certeau 1984) often includes mobility and detachment from rationalized spaces.

These spaces of indeterminacy include those involving relations with the dead and the past in general, implicating memory, place, and tradition.

In Indonesia, the dead often have a way of leaving ghostly traces in the present. One of these ways is through the common practice of gravesite vigils that are held regularly on Thursday nights and other propitious times throughout Java (Browne 2007, Pemberton 1994). The dead, especially saints and prominent political figures, are believed by many people to be able to confer blessings (pangestu) to the living.

People may visit the graves of famous and powerful people, such as that of Senopati, the founder of the Central Javanese Mataram dynasty in Yogyakarta. These visitors ask for help with everything from healing from illness, paying school tuition, fertility problems, and business success (Browne 2007).

Many ghostly presences also linger from the long Dutch colonial occupation of Indonesia, with its uncountable traumas and injustices. These presences intermingle with those of the repressive post-colonial era in the urban landscape. The most prominent among these many post-colonial traumas is the killings of half a million or more suspected Communists and others in Indonesia following the aborted coup attempt of October 1965 (Roosa 2006). Since the fall of Suharto and the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, the city is also now haunted by the ghosts of pembangunan (development), with “an abundance of skeletons of unfinished buildings” (Pratiwo and Nas 2005, p. 79).

The ghosts of the past speak to experiences of loss, destabilizing time and space, and the attempts to rationalize a coherent modernist narrative. These ghosts haunt the margins and indeterminate spaces of the city, as well as the sites of traumatic experience (Kusno 2003). In interaction with human agents, they create hesitancies and encourage a “wanton speculation” (Holoway and Kneale 2008, p. 308). Tim Edensor (2005, p. 829) argues that marginalized urban sites “seethe with memories,” where ghostly presences cannot be expelled. This is in contrast to rationalized

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museum and heritage sites that try to banish ambiguity.

As a transitional and indeterminate site, Taman Prasasti is haunted not only by those who are buried there but by those who are no longer there, by the spirits of those who work and visit the cemetery, and by those collective experiences of loss. It is a liminal and ambiguous site, where efforts to discipline and control its narrative are contested by its wildness, haunting memories, and uncertain experiences.

Memory & Forgetting in Indonesia
Cemeteries are places of forgetting as well as remembering, through deliberate human choices as well as various processes of entropy. Choices about what is worthy of remembering may allow other things to be forgotten (Donohoe 2014, p. 147). Colonialist-era spaces such as cemeteries can be uncomfortable reminders of an oppressive past. After independence, colonial markers of remembering, whether used to glorify or vilify (as with the Erberveld “monument”), gave way to post-colonial narratives of national development and identity and deliberate tactics of forgetting.

Discourses of nationalism and development often create emotional and temporal distance from such colonialist markers. These ruptures, however, never provide a complete break, as there are always contingencies, conflicts, and leakages of the past into the present. As Latour (2009, p. 142) phrases it, “The global is always part of local histories.”

The perception and experience of place seem especially porous in cemeteries (Casey 2009). They invoke a diverse range of meanings in and outside the material space they occupy, engaging post-colonial dialogues with the past, present, and future with local meanings and global flows. They are ongoing historical processes, public forms of knowledge created in part by the participation of those who visit. These spaces help to shape historical knowledge and the narratives of empire, liberation struggles, and national development. They are also spaces of physical deterioration and change, and sometimes of preservation and re-classification.

Decisions about remembering and forgetting are not permanent. Organized around artifacts and institutions, new fissions, fragments, and priorities emerge through time, and narratives are reworked. Decisions to remember come with emotional and social freight. Whether to engage in meaningful dialogue with the past and its associated traumas or to support a sanitized silence in service of modernity and control, these choices are political and cultural (Kusno 2003). For instance, Indonesia has only recently begun, through personal accounts and various artistic forms, to modestly acknowledge and debate the echoing silence imposed by the New Order regime following the widespread atrocities of 1965–66.

Given this violent history, memorials and cemeteries can be sites of ambivalence and anxiety, engaging with ongoing national dialogues about the past. In some instances, these sites are subject to regulating and revisionist policies of state control, and in others are left more open to subjective renderings and experience. In Indonesia, these considerations include articulations of “tradition” and its legitimation narratives (Pemberton 1994), the lack of urban green space and available burial sites, and the desire to create “pedestrian spaces” to attract domestic tourists.

Situating Taman Prasasti
Indonesia declared its independence from The Netherlands in August 1945, and the history of Taman Prasasti since illustrates its varied, contingent status. The site was used as a Christian cemetery until 1975, when it was closed to prepare for construction of the Central Jakarta mayoralty office (Messakh 2008). At that time, some remains were removed by relatives, and others were moved to South Jakarta’s Tanah Kusir cemetery. Only 1200 of the 4200 gravestones present at the time were selected to be kept in the new site (Messakh 2008).

In 1977, the site was reopened and inaugurated as the Taman Prasasti museum, with its area reduced from the original 5.9 hectares of land to 1.3 hectares. In addition to the gravestones and markers that have been preserved, there are also some curious additions, such as a replica of a seventeenth-century hearse and the original coffins of Indonesia’s first President and Vice-President, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta.

This transformation from colonial-era cemetery to national museum is a modernist attempt to rationalize and decolonize Taman Prasasti and to domesticate its wildness to create a more docile rhetorical space (Wright 2005). This move is consonant with other efforts to modernize public
spaces in Indonesia under the general rubric of development. These efforts are often only partially realized, however, and may result in half-finished structures or lip-service “successes.”

At Taman Prasasti, this rationalist discourse is undermined by the ambiguity one experiences when visiting, with unexpected encounters with the past and present. The cemetery is located off a busy corner in north Jakarta, inconspicuous and largely invisible unless one is looking for it. The transition from the street into the cemetery is palpable. Walter Benjamin (1999) evokes the metaphor of “threshold magic” for the liminal transition from more rationalized spaces into indeterminate ones, and the sense of possibility that “something” might happen.

This is true when leaving street congestion and emerging into an ambiguous space like Taman Prasasti, with its minimal signage and lack of prescribed circuits. After paying a nominal entrance fee, I was free to wander the grounds however I wished (and I was the only visitor for most of the time). During my visit, I sensed no unifying narrative or theme—only partial stories and questions. The lack of organization invites a meandering visit rather than a prescribed experience. The lack of official staff, with only a few maintenance workers and grass cutters occasionally in sight, encourages an openness of interpretation.

This indeterminacy and engagement of the senses, with the lush and overgrown vegetation and unexpected monuments and other memorials, ignites the imagination. There are many possible paths in the cemetery, and sensory attention is dispersed. There is also a multitude of non-human life forms that have agency (Latour 2005), including trees and overgrown vegetation, and swarms of small mosquitoes and other insects, along with the haphazard built environment. This low-lying area is also subject to the annual flooding that afflicts Jakarta during the rainy season.

These porous boundaries constitute “leakages” (Ingold 2012) that contest the museum’s official purpose and narrative. The excess of meanings available in the cluttered look and feel of the cemetery invites visitors to fantasize and create their own stories of an imagined past. The sensory excess leads to a relaxation of the observer’s gaze and can produce involuntary associations, memories, and story creation—a kind of magical aura (Benjamin 1999) that resists strategies of control and order (Edensor 2005).

In many ways, my visit to Taman Prasasti mirrors a common experience in Java, where official attempts to control and rationalize public life are undercut by leakages from the physical and social environment. Centuries of colonial and post-colonial repressive governments have led to a divergence between official and lived realities. Official policies and development narratives are often so at odds with experiences of messiness on the ground that they take on a dream-like quality (Pile 2005, Benjamin 1999). Empty declarations of “progress” and modernity are made for the sake of appearance, while no resources or unifying vision or plan are in place or even intended to be implemented, creating heterotopic and dissonant spaces.

These modernist impulses to reintegrate the disjunctive fragments of city life are subverted by the clutter of marginal spaces—what Attfield (2000) describes as the “wild dimension” of objects. Residents and visitors to such sites of messy indeterminacy become subjective co-creators, experiencing a sense of “wild Being” immanent in such perceptions (Casey 2009). Various processes of entropy, whether from human or non-human actions, also take their toll on the material culture of such places, including graffiti and vandalism, suggesting the lack of a coherent, meaningful integration narrative about the cemetery’s place in Indonesian society, as well as inadequate security (Bastian 2012).

As Certeau (1984, p. 83) has argued, memory is a transformative narrative practice and thus is potentially subversive in its subjectivity. Such uncertainty allows people to be in dialogue with places and co-create meanings, articulating a poetic geography. These geographies store up the kind of “rich silences and wordless stories” that Certeau (1984, p. 106) says destabilize political strategies of control. This indeterminacy of experience invites an urban imaginary, a juxtaposition of the strange and familiar, and an engagement with the spirits of place (ibid., p. 135). Official impulses to restore and control, to establish cultural orthodoxies, are continually at odds with these heterodoxies of the past. The challenge for city planners is how to balance needs for security, social cohesion,
and shared stories with the need to dialogue with such ambiguous spaces.

**Ambiguous Spaces & Containment**

Taman Prasasti embodies some of these contested narratives of preservation, of the heritage and culture industry, and of globalization. The museum’s director, Hendra Handoyo, is quoted as stating that “One of the reasons we are undergoing renovation is to dissipate the spooky ambiance and create a more museum-friendly environment,” with the hope of attracting local tourists (Bastian 2012). The museum’s negotiation of the past’s meanings, however, is haphazard and lacks clarity. Despite its museum status and stated goals, Taman Prasasti retains a sense of wildness and lack of order. While the new agenda of the museum is one of containment of the wild aspects of the cemetery, its presentation remains one of “clutter” and uncertainty.

Containment efforts such as with the Taman Prasasti museum can only be partial at best, subject to the interpenetrating rhythms of weather, nature, and disjunctive human actions of politics, vandalism, and neglect (Mels 2004). Currently, the museum directors seek to close down the contestation of meanings and to sanitize the wilderness in favor of an “educational” narrative suitable for Indonesian school-children.

This attempted purification and taming of the cemetery’s “wild being” is not so easily achieved, however. The ambiguity and uncertainty of wilderness have ways of continuing their porous journeys. The lack of funding for the museum paradoxically works against its stated purpose of ordering the cemetery for a more official narrative purpose, instead inviting a more elusive and less controlled imagination of space and time (Massey 2005).

In addition, this porosity creates an openness to chance and the possibility of surprise, as visitors are thrown back onto their own subjectivity (Donohoe 2014). Museum visitors continue to be confronted with many possible meanings and paths, both literal and imaginative. In such places, memory is unstable—a palimpsest of decaying fragments and shadows of the past (Donohoe 2014). Such uncertainty recalls Latour’s argument that, while modernism is good at breaking with the past, it is not effective at inhabiting the present (Latour 2009, p. 144).

As an “Inscription Park,” Taman Prasasti evokes a poly-temporal sensibility and is an example of writing the past and the future common in Javanese forms of representation (Florida 1995). As Jedlowski (2001, p. 30) points out, the past is “constantly selected, filtered, and restructured in terms set by the questions and necessities of the present.” Latour (1993, p. 76) suggests a similar idea: “It is the sorting that makes the times,” or what is kept and what is rejected influences our sense of the past as well as helping to shape the future.

In this sense, the current rhetoric of sanitizing Taman Prasasti speaks simultaneously to the continuing distancing from the traumas and colonialism of the past as well as to an imagined future where history and culture are packaged and displayed in sanitized and controlled environments.

**Possible Futures**

As with many cemeteries and other spaces of memory and historical contingency, the tensions and contradictions embodied in Taman Prasasti reflect this moment of non/modernity. The current official vision of Taman Prasasti is anti-poetic, seeking to create a sanitized, rationalized atmosphere for local school groups and a seeming erasure of the more wild and overgrown aspects, to make it “less spooky” and encourage local rather than international tourists (Bastian 2012). This approach obscures the reality that containment, with its accompanying sense of place, embodies both clutter and order (Atfield 2000). Even well-ordered museum sites can’t completely banish ambiguity and uncertain experiences, as wildness tends to find a way in (Edensor 2005).

Yet partial erasures, through the moving of gravestones and the neglect and desultory maintenance of others, have markedly altered the site. Only fragments of these prior stories remain. This important historical landmark is in danger of serious degradation. Many wonderful and historically important gravestones are damaged or missing (Bastian 2012).

Taman Prasasti as a significant place of remembering seems to lack a meaningful preservation constituency. The museum is chronically under-funded, with minimal cleaning and restoration, and is vulnerable to environmental damage in Jakarta’s regular floods. There are also not many visitors, at least at the time of my visit. The official attempt to use the cemetery to bolster a national narrative of linear development and growth is belied by contingencies on the ground, its lack of a cohesive vision, and the inevitable leakages of materials and affective atmospheres through time and space.

If such a rationalist containment narrative isn’t possible, what are the possibilities for Taman Prasasti to become a more relevant site for dialogue about Indonesian historical memory? Nirwono Joga (cited in Messakh 2008), who has
studied Taman Prasasti, argues that it has the potential to be a major center of cemetery studies in Asia. But it lacks an integration of its historical importance with contemporary Indonesian life. The opportunity, always difficult for regimes of power to embrace, is to engage in a dialogue that enables a poetic geography rather than merely a literal, politically favorable one.

**Engagement with Place**

The future of Taman Prasasti seems uncertain. The stated goal is to create a modern, discontinuous and disciplined narrative, erasing bothersome fragments and ghosts, and discouraging participatory remembering (Edensor 2005). Yet despite these efforts, Taman Prasasti remains an ambiguous space. A potential alternative to the imposition of a sanitized, under-funded, and vandalized space where important history is being lost and ignored is to allow possibilities to emerge from the participation of planners and visitors with the environment itself, embracing the ambiguity of what Holston (1999) calls the ethnographic present. Donohoe (2014) argues for an engagement with place that encourages attentiveness to the ambiguity of the encounter and its possibilities amidst the politics of the time.

Applied to Taman Prasasti, these ideas could help revitalize and renew the meanings of the past, while encouraging a critical inquiry of received ideas. For Taman Prasasti, urban planners could engage the city and nation in a dialogue about the cemetery, its history, and its potential as a site of learning, creating a meaningful sense of place. This dialogue could recognize the desire to utilize history-rich spaces for education purposes, while embracing the affective power and generative force evoked by such places.

The anxieties of excess meaning and ambiguity are uncomfortable for city planners and museum directors. But the benefits of fostering an open dialogue regarding Indonesia’s past can be both educational and transformative. Taman Prasasti is currently isolated from its social environment and lacks in narrative power and the ability to globalize the local. An alternative to a completely rationalized museum-like space or a wholly overgrown and largely neglected and unvisited cemetery would be to embrace its ambiguity and create a more balanced, meaningful dialogue and experience.

**References**


**Captions for Photographs**

p. 23: Entrance to Taman Prasasti on Jl. Tanah Abang 1, Jakarta, Indonesia.

p. 24: Tomb of Pieter Ererveld, with its gruesome skull “monument.”

p. 25: Seventeenth-century hearse replica.

p. 25: Skull carving on tombstone.

p. 26: A more “regulated” section of the cemetery.

p. 26: Ground-level view of the cemetery ambience.

p. 27: Crying lady” statue and grave marker.

p. 27: Graffiti on one of the mausoleums.
This list of twenty-three definitions of phenomenology was originally compiled by the editor of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology, as part of a special 30th-anniversary issue of the journal. Akihiro Yoshida, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Tokyo. This translation is also available at Yoshida’s blog: http://yoshidaakihiro.jimdo.com/. Japanese translation © 2020 Akihiro Yoshida.

1. Phenomenology is the study of human experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience (Sokolowski 2000, p. 2).

現象学は、人間経験の研究であり、また、もろもろの物事がそのような経験の中において、また、そのような経験を通じて、われわれに、それら自身を現前させるもろもろの仕方の研究である。

2. Phenomenology is the study of phenomena as experienced by human beings. The primary emphasis is on the phenomenon itself exactly as it reveals itself to the experiencing person in all its concreteness and particularity (Giorgi 1971, p. 9).

現象学は人間存在によって経験される諸現象の研究である。その第一の力点は、その現象自体にあり、その現象の総ての具体性と特殊性の中で、それを経験しつつある人間に対して、それ自体が自らを露わにするがままに、正確に研究することにある。

3. Phenomenology takes its starting point in a return to the “things” or “matters” themselves, that is, the world as we experience it. In other words, for phenomenologists, experience must be treated as the starting point and ultimate court of appeal for all philosophical evidence (Brown and Toadvine 2003, p. xi).

現象学はその出発点として、「物事」あるは「事物」そのものへの或る帰還に、一一種、われわれが経験するがままの世界に、一一種置く。言い換えれば、現象学者たちにとっては、経験を、あらゆる哲学的証明の出発点と最終法廷として扱わなければならない、ということである。

4. Phenomenology is the study of experience, particularly as it is structured through consciousness. “Experience” in this context refers not so much to accumulated evidence or knowledge as to something we “undergo.” It is something that happens to us and not something accumulated and mastered by us. Phenomenology asks that we be open to experience in this sense (Friesen, Hendricksson, and Saevi 2012, p. 1).

現象学は経験の、特に、意識を通して構造化されるものとしての経験の、研究である。この脈絡においては、「経験」とは、蓄積された証拠あるいは知識を指すというよりも、われわれが「受ける・経験する（undergo）」或ることを、指している。経験とは、われわれに起こる或ことであり、われわれによって蓄積されたり、修得されたりする或ることではない。現象学は、この意味での経験に対してわれわれが開かれていることを求める。
5. The aim of Phenomenology is to describe the lived world of everyday experience. Phenomenological research into individual experience gives insight into, and understanding of, the human condition. Sometimes it “languages” things we already know tacitly but have not articulated in depth. At other times, quite surprising insights reveal themselves (Finlay 2011, p. 26).

6. Phenomenology is best understood as a radical, anti-traditional style of philosophizing, which emphasizes the attempt to get to the truth of the matters, to describe phenomena, in the broadest sense as whatever appears in the manner in which it appears, that is as it manifests itself to consciousness, to the experience. As such, phenomenology’s first step is to seek to avoid all misconstructions and impositions placed on experience in advance, whether these are drawn from religious or cultural traditions, from everyday commonsense, or, indeed, from science itself. Explanations are not to be imposed before the phenomena have been understood from within (Moran 2000, p. 4).

7. As a method, phenomenology serves to remind us of the significance of the full range of meaning of human experience, including taken-for-granted assumptions, values, and perceptions often forgotten about in analytic frameworks. In attending to pre-thematic ways of being-in-the-world, phenomenology helps to comprehend human behavior in its fullness (Stefanovic 2015, p. 40).

8. Phenomenological method is driven by a pathos: being swept up in a spell of wonder about phenomena as they appear, show, present, or give themselves to us. In the encounter with the things and events of the world, phenomenology directs its gaze toward the regions where meanings and understandings originate, well up and percolate through the porous membranes of past sedimentations—then infuse, permeate, infect, touch, stir us, and exercise a formative and affective effect on our being (van Manen 2014, p. 26).

9. Phenomenology is an attempt to understand from the inside—and not to dismiss or criticize from the outside—the whole spectrum of experience which we generally call “reality” (Vesely 1988, p. 59).
10. Phenomenology never purely coincides with lived experience in itself, but by probing its ultimate horizons and seeking to grasp the englobing sense of what appears within them, renders lived experience anew. The subject matter is the intelligibility of lived experience, which phenomenology realizes essentially, and it is in rendering this “intelligibility” that the faithfulness of phenomenology to lived experience lies (Burch 1989, p. 195).

現象学は生きられる経験それ自体と純粋に一致することは決してない。しかし、その（生きられた経験の）究極のもろもろの地平を探求し、それらに現れるものに全体としてのまとまりを与える意味（englobing sense）を把握することを求めて、生きられた経験を新しく甦らせる。その主題は、生きられた経験の「理解可能性」であり、それを、現象学は本質的に実現する。そして、この＜理解可能性＞を与えること、その中にこそ、生きられた経験に対する、現象学の忠実さが在るのだ。

11. Phenomenology seems to take the ground away from under our feet, while at the same time giving us the sense of being where we have always been—only now recognizing it as if for the first time. It’s hard to catch hold of it because it’s like trying to catch something as it’s happening and which is over before we can do so. It can perhaps best be described most simply as “stepping back” into where we are already. This means shifting the focus of attention within experience into the experiencing of it. So if we consider seeing, for example, this means that we have to “step back” from what is seen into the seeing of what is seen (Bortoft 2012, p. 17).

現象学は、われわれの足下から地面を取り去るように思われる。しかも、その際、同時に、われわれがその時まで常にあった存在の感覚をわれわれに与えながら、そうする、・・・ただし、今や、その感覚をあたかもまるで初めて気づきでもしたかのようにそうするのだ。現象学をしっかりと掴むのは難しい、というのは、それは、あたかも、或る起こりつつある物事を、われわれがそれを掴まえることが出来る前に、既に過ぎ去ってしまっているのに、捉えようとするのに似ているからだ。たぶん、最も簡潔には、われわれが既に居るところへと「（びょんと）跳び下がる」とこととして、記述できるだろう。このこととは、＜経験の中に在る＞注意の焦点を、その経験の中に移すことを意味する。それゆえ、この事は、たとえば、見ることを考察しているならば、われわれは、見られている「事」から「跳び下がって」、見られている事を「見ること」の中へと、入って行かなければならないことを意味する。

12. Phenomenology recovers the order of truth as residing in things. It is not hidden, it does not lie under or behind or beneath things, and hence does not require Depth Theory to winkle it out. It is what is manifest (what shows) in things and how. If this is very obvious (as it must be) it yet requires a particular way of seeing and understanding in order to grasp it, for it can simply be no-seen at all (Scanell 1996, p. 169).

現象学は、物事の中に住むものとしての真理の秩序を取り戻す。それは真理の秩序は隠れて居るものではない。それは、もろもろの物事の、下に、あるいは後ろに、あるいは直下に、横たわっては居ない。それゆえ、それを見まうのには深層理論を必要とはしない。それは、もろもろの物事の中に露わになっている（露わにされている）事であり、また、露わになる「仕方」である。もしこのことが分かり切ったことであるとしても、（そしてそうであるに＜違いない＞のだが）、それを掴むためには、或る特定の見方と理解の仕方を要するのである。というのは、それは、簡単に見ることが可能では全く無いからだ。

13. Phenomenology: The disciplined struggle “to let be,” to let being appear or break through (Buckley 1971, p. 199).

現象学：「在らしめる（to let be）」、存在を現れさせる、あるいは、[隠れた状態の隙間から]姿を現わさせる、訓練された闘い。


現象学 お互いに離れている場合でさえも、（実は）既に一緒である（＝共属する）ものごとを、集めて一緒にすること。
15. Phenomenology: To let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself (Heidegger 1962, p. 58).

16. [Phenomenology] adopts no standpoint and provides no single direction of approach. [It] informs us simply that something we experience is to be disclosed, and this in turn means that it must somehow be hidden from us, though it may be superficially familiar. Phenomenology thus reveals itself as a gentle, responsive way of thinking. It tends to become what it studies. It is the method of imposing no method (Relph, 1983, p. 201).

17. Phenomenology invites us to stay with “the experience itself,” to concentrate on its character and structure rather than whatever it is that might underlie or be causally responsible for it…..[Phenomenology] facilitates a return to experience, to awaken in us a sense of its importance by demonstrating the founding role of experience in our conception of the world, however sophisticated that conception has become through the advancement of the natural sciences. In striving to awaken us to our own experience, to the phenomena through which our conceptions of the world is constituted, phenomenology seeks to awaken us to ourselves, to make us alive to our existence as subjects who bear a kind of ultimate responsibility for that conception (Cerbone 2016, p. 3).

18. [Phenomenology entails] letting things become manifest as what they are, without forcing our own categories on them…[T]he very essence of true understanding is that of being led by the power of the thing to manifest itself…. Phenomenology is a means of being led by the phenomenon through a way of access genuinely belonging to it…. Such a method … is not grounded in human consciousness and human categories but in the manifestness of the thing encountered, the reality that comes to meet us (Palmer 1969, p. 128).

（現象学は）立場を採らず、唯の一つの接近の指示の提供さえもない。（現象学は）われわれが経験している或る事が露わされるべきだということを、われわれに、単に、告げ知らせるのだ。そして、そのことが次に意味するのは、それ[経験されている或る事]は、表面的にはよく親しまれているかも知れないが、[実は] 何らかの仕方でわれわれから隠されているに違いないということ、である。現象学は、したがって、秘かで物思いがよい或る思考方法として、その姿を露わに示す。現象学は、自らが研究する物事に成る傾向がある。現象学は、[何らかの決まった]方法を押し付けることをしない方法である。

現象学は、われわれを巻き込んで「経験そのもの」と共に留まらせようとする。つまり、[現象学は] ひょっとしたらその経験の基礎と成っているかも知れないこと、あるいは、経験に対して因果的に責めを負っているかも知れないことよりも、むしろ、その経験の性格と構造に集中させる。・・・[現象学は] 経験への帰還を促進し、われわれの世界概念において、われわれの経験が果たすべき役割を明示することで、経験のもつ重要性の或る感覚をわれわれの中に目覚めさせる。その場合、もろもろの自然科学の進歩を通じて、その世界概念が如何に洗練されたものになって来ているとしても、そのことに惑わされずに[そうする]のである。現象学は、われわれを、われわれ自身の経験に対して目覚めさせようとするので、つまり、もろもろの現象を通してわれわれの世界概念は構成されたが、その諸現象に対して目覚めさせようと[一方では] 努める。[その努力の中で、他方では]、現象学は、われわれを、われわれ自身について目覚めさせようと努める。つまり、あの世界概念の構成に対して一種の究極的な責任を負っている主体としてのわれわれの実存[生き方と在り方]に、われわれ自身を気づかせよう（目覚めさせよう）と努める。

[Phenomenology entails] letting things become manifest as what they are, without forcing our own categories on them…[T]he very essence of true understanding is that of being led by the power of the thing to manifest itself…. Phenomenology is a means of being led by the phenomenon through a way of access genuinely belonging to it…. Such a method … is not grounded in human consciousness and human categories but in the manifestness of the thing encountered, the reality that comes to meet us (Palmer 1969, p. 128).

（現象学は必然的に以下のことを伴う、すなわち）、もろもろの物事に、それらがそれで在るところのものとして明示的となるに任せること。しかも、それは、それらの物事にわれわれ自身の範疇（カテゴリー）を押し付けることをしないで、そうすること。真の理解の本質そのものは、その物事の力によって、その物事自体を明らかにさせるようにさせることである。・・・現象学は、その現象に真に属している或る接近の道を通して、導かれる方法である。そのような方法は、・・・人間の意識とか人間の範疇とかに基づいているのではなくて、出会われた物事の、われわれに会いにやってくる現実の、明示性に基づいているのである。

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19. Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence of perceptions, or the essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a philosophy that puts essences back into existence and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of [human beings] and the world from any standing point other than that of their “facticity” (Merleau-Ponty 1962. p. vii).

20. Many aspects of Husserl’s formulation of phenomenology endure as central themes, including his catch cry “back to the things themselves” (Zu den Sachen selbst), which expressed the idea of the avoidance of metaphysical speculation, the attempt to gain a presuppositionless starting point, the use of description rather than causal explanation, and the attempt to gain insight into the essences of all kinds of phenomena (Moran 2001, p. 353).

21. Phenomenology: The excavation of human experience, first, in terms of particular persons and groups in particular places, situations, and historical moments; and, second, as this excavation engenders a self-conscious effort to make intellectual and emotional sense of what that experience reveals in terms of broader lived structures and more ethical ways of being, willing and acting (Seamon 2008, p. 15).

22. Our relation to the world is so fundamental, so obvious and natural, that we normally do not reflect upon it. It is this domain of ignored obviousness that phenomenology seeks to investigate. The task of phenomenology is not to obtain new empirical knowledge about different areas in the world, but rather to comprehend the basic relation in the world that is supposed by any such empirical investigation…. The world is, as Merleau-Ponty writes, wonderful. It is a gift and a riddle. But in order to realize this, it is necessary to suspend our ordinary blind and thoughtless taking the world for granted (Zahavi 2019, p. 67).

世界に対する、われわれの関係は、あまりに根本的で、あまりに当たり前で、自然である。そのため、われわれは、普通は、それについて反省することができない。この等閑（ないがしろ）にされた当たり前さの領域こそが、現象学が研究しようと努める領域である。現象学の課題は、この世界における様々な分野についての新たな経験的知識を獲得することではない。そうではなくて、むしろ、如何なるそのような経験的研究によっても想定されていよう、この世界における基本的な（我々と世界との）関係を把握することである。・・・世界は、メルロー＝ポンティが書いているように、驚きに満ちている。それは、贈り物であり謎である。しかし、このことを悟るには、世界を当たり前だとしてしまう、われわれの通常の盲目さと考えの無さを、留保することが必要である。
23. [The aim is] making evident an essential distinction among the possible ways in which the pregiven world, the ontic universe [das ontische Universum], can become thematic for us. Calling to mind what has repeatedly been said: the lifeworld, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical or extra-theoretical. The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Waking life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world and of oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing [erleben] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world.

The world is pregiven thereby, in every case, in such a way that individual things are given. But there exists a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of the lifeworld), though together the two make up an inseparable unity. Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the lifeworld) are “given” as being valid for us in every case (in some mode or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon. Each one is something, “something of” the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon.

On the other hand, we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without particular objects of consciousness, it cannot be actual [aktuell]. Every object has its possible varying modes of being valid, the modalizations of ontic certainty. The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists within such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. This difference between the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally different correlative types of consciousness for them (Husserl 1970, pp. 142–143).

* [その目的は、]このあらかじめ与えられてある世界存在者の総体が、われわれにとって主題になりうるさまざまな可能な様式の本質的区別を明証的にすることである。繰り返し述べてきたことを思い起こすならば、生活世界は、その世界の中に目ざめつつ生きているわれわれにとって、いつもすでにそこにあり、あらかじめわれわれにとって存在し、理論的であれ理論以外であれ、すべての実践のための「根幹」となる。世界は、目ざめつつつつに何かの仕方で実践的な関心をいたっている主体としてのわれわれに、たまたまあるときに与えられるというものではなく、あらゆる現実的および可能的実践の普遍的領野として、地平として、あらかじめ与えられている。生とは、たえず、<世界確信の中に生きる>ということである。<目ざめて生きている>とは世界に対して目ざめているということであり、絶えず現実的に、世界その世界の中]に生きている自分自身を「意識している」ということであり、世界の存在確実性を真に体験し、現に進行しているということである。

そのさい世界は、その時どき他者それぞれの事物が与えられているその与えられ方の中で、いつもあらかじめ与えられている。しかし、世界意識と事物意識（最も広義の、しかし、純粋に生活世界的意味においての）とのあいだにはその意識の仕方において、原理的な区別が存する。もっとも他者では、この両者は分かちがたい統一をなさってもいるのかが、事物や対象（つねに純粋に生活世界的意味に解された）は、われわれにとって、そのつど（存在確実性の何らかの様相において）妥当するものとして「与えられて」いるのが、しかしそれらは原理的に物として、つまり世界地平のうちにある対象として意識されるという仕方でのみ、「与えられて」いるのである。それぞれの事物は何ものかであるが、それはわれわれにたえず地平として意識されている世界「に属する何ものか」なのである。

他方この地平は、存在する対象に対する地平としてのみ意識されており、特に意識された対象なしには現実的に存在しない。それぞれの事物は、それぞれの妥当の可能的変移相、つまり存在確実性の様相化の可能的変移相をもつ。他方、世界は、一個の存在者、一個の対象のように存在するのではなく、唯一性において、すなわちそれに対しては複数が無意味であるような唯一性において、存在する。あらゆる複数とそこから取り出される単数とは、世界地平を前提にしているのだ。この世界の中の対象と世界そのものとの在り方の差異が、この両者にそれに応じた根本的に異なる意識の仕方が指定することになる。（Eフッサール、1974年 『ヨーロッパ諸学の危機と超越論的現象学』細谷恒夫・木田元訳、中央公論社、199-200）

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**Postscript [English translation follows]**

Akihiro Yoshida

**Postscript [English translation follows]**

Akihiro Yoshida

ここに掲載する「現象学の定義２３」（英語原文と邦訳）は、その蒐集編集者であるDavid Seamon教授のご好意により、吉田章宏が邦訳し、広く日本の読者の自由で開かれた活用に提供することが許されたものです。現象学を、多種多様な人間科学研究において活用を志す研究者と実践者、また、そのような活用による研究と実践の理解を望む研究者と実践者にとって、そもそも「現象学とは何か？」という理解は重要です。しかし、その理解は、実は、多種多様でありうることが、ここに明瞭に示されています。この多種多様性は、一方では、現象学の多面性が、他方では、現象学の開放性が、示されています。もちろん、この場合を、混乱を生む混沌と見るか、発展を導く豊饒と見るか、肯定するか否定するか、批判し排除するか、総ての統合を希求するか、その見方もまた多種多様でしょう。この情況は、歴史的に、現象学の発展の初期においても見られたようです。そして、さらに、他の諸学問においても、例えば、数学においてさえ、見られることがあるのです。そして、その事情と情勢をめぐる自由な議論自体もまた、現象学の発展を希求する実践者と研究者にとって、また、多視点性を重視する現象学の深化と発展にとって、有益であることが期待されます。現象学研究者の方々には、それぞれの定義執筆者の世界を豊かに生き生きと想像することにより、また、それぞれの原著者の世界に赴き、原著作を探求することにより、ご自身の現象学の世界を豊饒化する手掛かりとする可能性も、開かれています。
た、「定義23」は、現象学の教育における、生きた教材とすることもできましょう。David Seamon教授により提供されたこの「定義23」が、現象学に関心を抱く皆さまのご参考となり、それぞれの実践と研究と教育に示唆するところがあり、一方で、深化と厳密化を、他方で、自由化と解放化を、共にもたらすことを願います。そしてこの「日本語版」も、そのような発展の一契機となることを、邦訳者として、心から希望いたします。そして、さらに、いつの日か、日本における現象学的な研究者と実践者の方々による「定義」への挑戦も、夢見ます。

2019年秋、邦訳者 吉田章宏 東京大学名誉教授、Ph.D.

Postscript Translation

Akihiro Yoshida

The EAP entry, “23 definitions of phenomenology,” has been generously permitted, by the original compiler David Seamon, to be republished here, including the original English phrasings and their Japanese translations. I translated these definitions from English into Japanese; they are offered here to all Japanese readers, including researchers and students, for their free and open use. Whether to study and use phenomenology as a method or to live and love phenomenology as a life, the understanding of the question “What is phenomenology?” is vitally important.

This understanding, however, is multi-perspectively varied, as is to be observed in the range of meaning offered by the “23 definitions of phenomenology.” This multiple variety can be understood as expressing the diversity of phenomenology, on one hand, and the wealth of phenomenology as a whole, on the other. Naturally, this situation could also be understood multi-perspectively as, for example: (1) to be negatively criticized vs. to be positively approved; (2) To be worried about as a confusing chaos vs. to be welcomed as an enriching diversification; (3) to be integrated to include all in one family, vs. to be discriminatively determined either to be welcomed or to be ostracized for maintaining the purity of phenomenology, and so on.

Here again, the views will be multi-perspectively varied.

This situation, however, is not particularly characteristic of current phenomenology, which is used in many disciplines, even mathematics. Thus, the free and open discussions, and even heated debates, on the problematic situations themselves hopefully could make a positive contribution for the development, in depth and width, of phenomenology. After all, does not phenomenology, with its use of free imaginative variation—one of its major original methods—intrinsically treasure multi-perspectivity? Practitioners of phenomenology, to enrich their own lived-worlds, might/could/would/should vividly imagine the tacit implications of each of the 23 definitions for their own lived worlds. These practitioners might initiate active explorations into the works and worlds of the respective writers.

Thus, the “23 definitions” could be adopted as living instructional material in the educational practices of phenomenology. Hopefully, these “23 definitions” might help advance phenomenological research in both ways—to strengthen rigor, on the one hand, and to liberate openness and fruitful diversity, on the other.

As translator of this “Japanese version,” I sincerely hope that my translation might contribute in its own way to further the development of phenomenology both in Japan and in the world. And, I cannot help but dream of a similar set of “definitions” offered someday by Japanese phenomenological researchers and practitioners.
Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology
(from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4])

Questions relating to phenomenology and related interpretive approaches and methods:

- What is phenomenology and what does it offer to whom?
- What is the state of phenomenological research today? What are your hopes and concerns regarding phenomenology?
- Does phenomenology continue to have relevance in examining human experience in relation to world?
- Are there various conceptual and methodological modes of phenomenology and, if so, how can they be categorized and described?
- Has phenomenological research been superseded by other conceptual approaches—e.g., post-structuralism, social-constructionism, critical theory, relationalist and non-representational perspectives, the various conceptual “turns,” and so forth?
- Can phenomenology contribute to making a better world? If so, what are the most crucial phenomena and topics to be explored phenomenologically?
- Can phenomenological research offer practical results in terms of design, planning, policy, and advocacy?
- How might phenomenological insights be broadcast in non-traditional academic ways—e.g., through artistic expression, theatrical presentation, digital evocation, virtual realities, and so forth?
- What are the most important aims for future phenomenological research?
- Do the various post-structural and social-constructionist criticisms of phenomenology—that it is essentialist, masculinist, authoritarian, voluntarist, ignorant of power structures, and so forth—point toward its demise?

Questions relating to the natural world and environmental and ecological concerns:

- Can there be a phenomenology of nature and the natural world?
- What can phenomenology offer the intensifying environmental and ecological crises we face today?
- Can phenomenology contribute to more sustainable actions and worlds?
- Can one speak of a sustainable lifeworld?
- What is a phenomenology of a lived environmental ethic and who are the key contributors?
- Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a role in caring for the natural world? For places? For lifeworlds broadly?
- Can phenomenology contribute to environmental education? If so, in what ways?
- Can there be a phenomenology of the laws of thermodynamics, especially the second law claiming that all activities, left to their own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities? Are there ways whereby phenomenological understanding of lifeworld might help to reduce the accelerating disordering of natural and human worlds?

Questions relating to place, place experience, and place meaning:

- Why has the theme of place become an important phenomenological topic?
- Can a phenomenological understanding of place contribute to better place making?
- Can phenomenology contribute to a generative understanding of place and place making?
- What roles do bodily regularity and habitual inertia play in the constitution of place and place experience?
- What are the lived relationships between place, sustainability, and a responsive environmental ethic?
- How are phenomenological accounts to respond to post-structural interpretations of space and place as rhizomatic and a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)?
- Can phenomenological accounts incorporate a “progressive sense of place” argued for by critical theorists like Doreen Massey?
- Can phenomenological explications of space and place account for human differences—gender, sexuality, less-ableness, social class, cultural background, and so forth?
- Can phenomenology contribute to the politics and ideology of place?
- Can a phenomenological understanding of lived embodiment and habitual inertia be drawn upon to facilitate robust places and to generate mutual support and awareness among places, especially places that are considerably different (e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or regions)?
- Can phenomenology contribute to mobility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic spaces, the places of mobility, non-spaces and their relationship to mobility and movement?

Questions relating to architecture and environmental design and policy:

- Can there be a phenomenology of architecture and architectural experience and meaning?
- Can phenomenology contribute to better architectural design?
- How do qualities of the designable world—spatiality, materiality, lived aesthetics, environmental embodiment etc.—contribute to lifeworlds?
- What are the most pertinent environmental and architectural features contributing to a lifeworld’s being one way rather than another?
- What role will cyberspace and digital technologies have in 21st-century lifeworlds? How will they play a role in shaping designed environments, particularly architecture?
- What impact will digital advances and virtual realities have on physical embodiment, architectural design, and real-world places? Will virtual reality eventually be able to simulate “real reality” entirely? If so, how does such a development transform the nature of lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and architecture?
- Can virtual worlds become so “real” that they are lived as “real” worlds?

Other potential questions:

- What is the lived relationship between people and the worlds in which they find themselves?
- Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-consciously? If so, how? Through what individual efforts? Through what group efforts?
- Can a phenomenological education in lifeworld, place, and environmental embodiment assist citizens and professionals in better understanding the workings and needs of real-world places and thereby contribute to their envisioning and making?
- Is it possible to speak of human-rights-in-place or place justice? If so, would such a possibility move attention and supportive efforts toward improving the places in which people and other living beings find themselves, rather than focusing only on the rights and needs of individuals and groups without consideration of their place context?
Published digitally twice a year, EAP is a forum and clearing house for research and design that incorporate a qualitative approach to environmental and architectural experience, actions, and meanings.

One key concern of EAP is design, education, policy, and advocacy supporting and strengthening natural and built places that sustain human and environmental wellbeing. Realizing that a clear conceptual stance is integral to informed research and design, the editor emphasizes phenomenological approaches but also gives attention to related styles of qualitative research. EAP welcomes essays, letters, reviews, conference information, and so forth. Forward submissions to the editor.

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Exemplary Themes
- The nature of environmental and architectural experience;
- Sense of place, including place identity and place attachment;
- Architectural and landscape meaning;
- The environmental, architectural, spatial, and material dimensions of lifeworlds;
- Changing conceptions of space, place, and nature;
- Home, dwelling, journey, and mobility;
- Environmental encounter and its relation to environmental responsibility and action;
- Environmental and architectural atmospheres and ambiances;
- Environmental design as place making;
- Sacred space, landscape, and architecture;
- The role of everyday things—furnishings, tools, clothing, interior design, landscape features, and so forth—in supporting people’s sense of environmental wellbeing;
- The progressive impact of virtual reality on human life and how it might transform the lived nature of “real” places, buildings, and lifeworlds;
- The practice of a lived environmental ethic.

For additional themes and topics, see the preceding page, which outlines a series of relevant questions originally published in the 25th-anniversary issue of EAP in 2014 (vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4).

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