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The resurgence of progressive education

The Progressive Education Association was officially disbanded in 1955 and except for the briefest mention in newspapers of record there was little evidence that anyone cared. Yet now, twenty-five years later, the ideals and philosophy that inspired more than three generations of American educators are experiencing something of a resurgence.

The reasons are obvious enough. After more than a century of increased specialization and fragmentation in American life, and intellectual life in particular, the loss of community and a meaningful sense of direction both for individuals and society as a whole has become painfully clear. The strength of progressive education was always that it could mediate the extremes of thoughtless and uncritical conformity to group standards, on the one hand; and on the other, the insane conviction of radical individualism that truth and reality are purely personal and subjective.

This is not to say that anyone is seriously suggesting that progressive education was perfect, or that it should be resurrected and applied intact to our present situation. Rather, the resurgence is one of vision, it represents a challenge to complete the task of earlier progressives and to critique and improve upon their achievements. Simply put, the task is to define and promote the idea of social democracy. The seminal contributions of earlier progressives to the design and institution of a system of public education that could help attain this goal have been well documented. But we can no more afford to canonize this work than to reject it categorically as wrongheaded or obsolete.

Earlier progressives had a tremendous faith in reform. They believed that if people could only get together and act collectively with intelligence to solve the specific social, political and moral problems of their age, there would be no need to choose between blind loyalty to tradition and the equally irrational alternative of wholesale no-holds-barred revolution. A stronger endorsement of public education would be hard to imagine. Not only did the progressives demonstrate a commitment to intelligence within the educational process, but to the belief that education must be conducted democratically, i.e., within a public setting where different types of people can meet in meaningful dialogue and critically discuss their interests and perceptions.

Unfortunately the voluntary and enlightened associations of social democracy envisioned by progressives were never fully realized. What developed instead was a world of factions and self-serving elites, a corporate and bureaucratic nightmare over which individuals, intelligent or otherwise, exercise little or no control. The 20th century has, indeed, been the age of the manager. To a significant degree we have lost both the will and the right to determine what is normal or desirable.

Are the progressives to be blamed for this? Was their insistence on competence as a precondition for responsible decision-making a casual factor which led to the emergence of the expert who now rules our lives so ruthlessly? I think not. It is not social democracy and public education which have produced our present problems, as some would have us believe. Quite the contrary. Here is where the ideals and philosophy of progressive education can once again be of great value. Social democracy must be created anew by each generation. The public schools with their emphasis on intelligence and inquiry are precisely the arena within which this process is best germinated. That recent generations have failed to maintain the integrity of our schools is beyond debate. But the fact remains that democratic processes are learned. They are not instinctive and, therefore, do not flower automatically. Either they are acquired through shared struggle and hard work, or they do not exist at all. Without a viable system of public education where the children of bankers and the children of plumbers learn to respect and communicate with each other, to work with each other for common ends that are mutually agreed upon and intelligently selected, a democratic society is impossible. John Dewey's faith should be our faith. Society can formulate its own purposes, organize its own resources and shape its own destiny only through effective education. The public schools remain our best bet.

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John Dewey and the ploys of revisionism

By Joe R. Burnett

This article discusses some of the ploys which might be used for arguing that John Dewey's social and political philosophy can be interpreted as an instance of needed revisionism in American thought.

What is meant, first of all, by "revisionism?" What I shall take it to mean is the modern tendency to reinterpret so-called liberal thinkers of roughly the first half of this century to show that they were in theory and practice illiberal. Specifically this would mean one or more of the following: that, while purporting or seeming to do otherwise,

(1) their work did not support any major structural shifts in the corporate democracy which prevailed during that time (and, indeed, this time);
(2) they supported an elitism, if not the traditional one; and/or
(3) they supported centralist social control of the great bulk of Americans—in short, they supported a formal or informal, centralized oligarchy.

Dewey was the nation's major liberal philosopher during the period, and he probably had the greatest intellectual influence of any liberal thinker. He is a tempting target for revisionists.

What it would take to show that Dewey really was a proponent of the structural status quo would be one or more of a number of things. One of these would be to show that his theoretical philosophy openly advocated the structural status quo. Another would be to show that the philosophy was so inconsistent or ambiguous that it could be used to almost any purpose. Still another would be that Dewey consistently took positions on practical issues which supported the structural status quo, even if his theory apparently required that he would act otherwise.

Now I think Dewey's theory is under attack on all three grounds; but, I further think that the revisionists are not aware that they should keep the attacks separate, for the attacks require different sorts of evidence and argument.

It is easy (but probably wrong), for instance, to view a few specific practices of Dewey, conclude that his theory must necessarily justify such practices, and then condemn his theory. Or, it is easy (but wrong) to become impatient with the scholarship necessary to fully grasp Dewey's socio-political philosophy, and "force" a rendering of it which leads to faulty interpretations of these practices.

Herein I concentrate particularly, but not exclusively, on what it is necessary for a revisionist to take into account if he is to succeed in showing that Dewey's social and political philosophy or theory supports or even lends itself to corporate, elitist centralism. I do not think the revisionist can succeed, but let us look at the case.

A Case in Revisionism

Why might a revisionist think he could succeed? If the critic approaches Dewey's philosophy with the idea that a political theory is basic to Dewey's or anyone's social philosophy, he might think so. Dewey's political philosophy, his theory of the forms of political power, will certainly appear wishy-washy if that is all one looks to. With few exceptions, Dewey rooted his political theory in a social theory of democracy. This is evident, although the reasons for it are not yet fully clear, in his early and middle works. There is, for instance, the classic passage in Democratic and Education, in which he gives us the two criteria which he says can be "extracted" from instances of community:

Now in any social group whatever ..., we find some interest in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association?*

Many student newcomers—but not only they, apparently—to Dewey's thought sense a major problem here: they notice that the criteria do not specify majority rule, a canon of democratic political thought. Dewey himself says that "... democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicative living."1 And this makes it fair to ask if there cannot be modes of democratic community or associated living which do not abide by majority rule. There obviously could be for Dewey; e.g., the family with parents dominant, the extended community and neighborhood with elders dominant, occupational and professional groupings with knowledgeable and skilled craftspeople dominant. These ordinarily are not examples of...
majority rule, but they can, if and when they are consistent with the criteria, be examples of democratic community. The criteria simply are technically non-specific about political forms.

If again, one is looking for political forms or power systems as basic, it equally can be noted that the political form of representative government is not explicitly sanctioned. Obviously the criteria demand participation and openness, but the form is left unspecified.

A third thing can mislead the unwary, and that is Dewey's heavy emphasis upon inquiry, the method of intelligence, and science. Not infrequently, Dewey speaks of the mission of science as being almost necessarily central to reconstraining a disintegrating American society. It is easy, and I think on a few occasions, warranted, to interpret him as meaning by 'science' the body of scientists and/or the social institution of science. If one makes this leap, and it is a leap in the context of the corpus of his writing, it seems easy to conclude that Dewey is advocating a scientific meritocracy.

There is another possible source for the view that Dewey "really" did not countenance more than a medium of participatory democracy. He sometimes speaks of the role of the citizen in a manner which seems curiously unqualified to the ardent democrat. Thus, he writes that:

The devotion to democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education.¹

"Laissez Faire Liberalism"

These, I think, are the major ploys which can be used to argue that Dewey's theory really is not democratic in any new sense, but simply another rendering of classic laissez faire liberalism--that is, with liberal intellectuals replacing the elite, the captains of industry and the other traditional socio-political interest groups of corporate democracy.

These arguments do not in fact "connect" with Dewey's theory, however. Perhaps the most striking way of showing this is by giving his arguments against making absolute such political devices as majority rule and representative government.

About the latter, Dewey maintains that it suggests or "contains about all that is relevant to political democracy."² But he views this political notion as having arisen out of the push and pull of people seeking immediate redress of ills wrongs or needs, rather than some cosmic sense of justice. The ethical defense of the notion lies rather in its use, under proper circumstances, for obtaining the quality and fact of community.³

The argument which is relevant in the case of representative government is most succinctly and clearly made by Dewey in the allied case of majority rule. If, like representative government, is one of the things he refers to as a political form of democracy, which was devised at a particular time in history to protect the values of community. He refuses to make it anything more than that, an historical provision, for fear that if, rather than what it is to protect, will become the important object. To do other-

wise would allow his philosophy to become a tool of what properly is called on occasion, "the tyranny of the majority." The more important thing is what comes before and after a vote:

... antecedent debates, modifications of views to meet the opinions of minorities, the relative satisfaction given the latter by the fact that it has had a chance and that next time it may be successful in becoming a majority.

In a word, what is more important than majority vote and majority rule is community before the fact of them and community afterwards!

The emphasis upon, or de-emphasis of, majority rule and representative government as forms of democracy, then, hardly suffices to question the centrality of the democratic notion in Dewey's philosophy.⁴

What then is his emphasis upon science, the institution and the society? Do they represent a meritorious class which merely is to substitute for the businessmen, the industrialists in a nonetheles centralized, corporate society? The question and its answers are so important to Dewey's social philosophy that I shall not apologize for quoting at length. In his discussion of an ideal society, which he referred to as the "Great Community," he did not foresee corporateness or centralization which could [i.e., should] dictate life in decentralized communities. The Great Community, he said,

... can never possess all the qualities which mark a local community. It will do its final work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience of local associations. The invasion and partial destruction of the life of the latter by outside uncontrolled agencies is the immediate source of the instability, disintegration and restlessness which characterize the present epoch.⁵

And, indeed, he traced part of the problem precisely to experts:

No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of a few. ... The world has suffered more from leaders and [expert] authorities than from the masses.⁶

Or again:

Rule by an economic class may be disguised from the masses; rule by experts could not be covered up. It could be made to work only if the intellectuals became the willing tools of big economic interests. Otherwise they would have to ally themselves with the masses, and that implies, once more, a share in government by the latter.⁷

Or, still again: "A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all."⁸

This should put to rest the idea that Dewey favored a centralized form of interventionist governmental control. It should put to rest the idea of corporate democracy. It should put to rest the idea of a meritocracy of experts or technocratic meritocracy.

The final part of this ploy, Dewey's occasional failure to qualify himself about the function of citizen determination of rulers and "rules" is easy enough to dismiss.
as important in his total writings. Generally the qualification of necessary citizen control is present if one will but pursue the discussion. In the instance cited earlier, wherein Dewey speaks of those "who obey their governors," one finds the qualification eventually forthcoming:

It is the aim of progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever social control means subordination to class authority, there is danger that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the status quo. And, speaking of citizenship, he says there is a required "... ability to judge men and measures wisely and to take a determining part in making as well as obeying laws."

Even stronger statements can be found, although perhaps few in Democracy and Education. But, if we turn to his greatest work on social and political philosophy, we read that:

... the current has set steadily in one direction: toward democratic forms. That government exists to serve its community, and that this cannot be achieved unless the community itself shares in selecting its governors and determining their policies is a deposit of fact left, as far as we can see, permanently in the wake of doctrines and forms, however transitory the latter. They are not the whole of the democratic idea, but they express it in its political phase. We have every reason to think that whatever changes may take place in existing democratic machinery, they will be of a sort to make the interest of the public a more supreme guide and criterion of governmental activity, and to enable the public to form and manifest its purposes still more authoritatively.

This discussion of the play of attacking Dewey's social and political theory of democracy should not conclude without emphasizing the point of departure which makes it mainly possible. I take that to be an erroneous construal of the political aspect of Dewey's thought to primarily inform the social aspect. It works just the opposite for Dewey. The social concept of democracy is a necessary determinant of the political. Ultimately Dewey has his eye on the qualities of community associations which can meet the two criteria which were cited. Such qualities are not forms of democracy, they are the facts of democracy. As he says,

Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a community. This clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.

The political problem is to determine how, upon given occasions of difficulty, to effect this fact and consciousness.

Finally, before shifting the analysis, one should recur to the notion of inquiry or method of intelligence. A condition for democracy in his (and, one is sure, our) time was widely diffused ability to be critically intelligent. The public requires this to rule itself, to select, inform, and judge those who will represent it. This is a necessity of the age, heavily determined by science, technology, and technological-industrial innovation. And, in this connection, one can say that it is a condition of the one form of democracy which does seem to be implicit in the social theory of democracy; viz., participatory democracy. To this point we will return.

Discussion Relevant to Literature

As part of this paper, I want to criticize one particular analysis of Dewey's thought, partly to show that the above discussion is relevant to the current literature, and partly to show that one need not expect the three types of play to be so neatly isolated as my initial statement might unintentionally have suggested.

The particular analysis is found in Walter Feinberg's, Reason and Rhetoric. Dewey is treated as one, although perhaps the central, figure in arguing a revisionist case; and, it is solely upon his analysis of Dewey that I concentrate. That I find this analysis very seriously flawed should not be taken to indicate anything pro or con about his general thesis or his analysis of other so-called liberal thinkers. The general thesis does, however, set the context for the discussion of Dewey.

The major oversight of progressive reform was a failure to fully understand the implications of its recognition that every social structure is an embodiment of a set of values and that the institutions in which these values are expressed have a strong influence on determining the desires and inclinations of the members of a society. That is, instead of a prolonged evaluation of the principles of social organization itself, the progressives insisted on evaluating institutions merely on the basis of their functional integration. One would expect to find that Dewey was excepted from this: "the major oversight of progressive reform;" for, if there is anything evident in the earlier quotes, for example, it is that Dewey did not make the mistake referred to by Feinberg. But Dewey is precisely the example chosen. Dewey, he writes,

... merely denied that the social interest was best served by the business establishment and proposed that institutions be altered so as to free technology from its control. His alternative was to change the position of the sciences and engineering establishments, for that of [the] business establishment assuming perhaps that as the interest of science was served so too would be that of society. Yet like the laissez-faire theorist, no criteria other than functional ones were established to judge whether or not the social interest was being served.

The criteria of democracy and the concept of idealized community provide precisely the principles Feinberg says are lacking. Further, the whole notion of an elitist meritocracy is, as we have seen, repugnant to Dewey. Still, Feinberg also could write:

Dewey was suggesting as did Plato before him, that the intellectual's place was within the
power structure, guiding the political leadership in the governance of society. Unlike Plato, however, who felt there were definable limits under which such a role should be assumed, Dewey expressed no limits, and no alternatives.\textsuperscript{19}

Now all of this is sheer error: Dewey flatly refused to make the functional arguments supplant his principles. Dewey's distinctions between social democracy (ethical and moral principles) and political democracy (forms of governing) is spelled out most thoroughly in The Problems of Man, particularly in the last three chapters; but, curiously, this is a volume to which Feinberg has no reference in Reason and Rhetoric, although he did make use of it in an earlier article which is partially incorporated in the book.\textsuperscript{20}

If one looks more closely at Feinberg's account of Dewey, he finds some other curious things which deserve mention. For instance, in two quotations from Dewey, Feinberg supplies italics without indicating that he has done so. In the first case, I judge that the effect is to make Dewey seem precisely to support functional arrangements rather than democratic principles. On the latter of these two occasions Feinberg even repeats, apparently for emphasis, just the passage to which he has added the italics-emphasis, again not noting the italics are his, not Dewey's. I quote both passages.

The Deweys' descriptive citation of the Gary School in Schools of Tomorrow provides some idea of the techniques that were available for this purpose.

They (the immigrant parents) are naturally suspicious of Government and social authority...and it is very important that their children should have some real knowledge on which to base a sounder judgment. Besides giving them this, the schools try to teach American standards of living to the pupils and so their parents. On entering school every pupil gives the school office, besides the usual name, age, and address, certain information about his family, its size, its resources, and the character of the home he lives in. This record is kept in the school and transferred if the child moves out of the school district...By comparing these with any family record, it is a simple matter to tell if the family are [sic] living under proper moral and hygienic conditions...If bad conditions are due to ignorance or poverty, the teacher finds out what can be done to remedy them, and sees to it that the family learns how they can better themselves. If conditions are very bad, neighborhood public opinion is worked up through the children on the block.\textsuperscript{21}

The second passage: Dewey reported...

...it is still possible for a scholar to speak out on the controversial side of an issue if he approaches the problem "in such an objective, historic, and constructive manner as not to excite the prejudice or inflame the passion even of those who thoroughly disagree with him." The intent of the statement is puzzling since clearly issues of academic freedom will never arise if prejudice or passion are not inflamed, but its effect is to place the burden of proof on the academic style of the intellectual dissenter even to the point of holding him responsible for the reactions of those "who thoroughly disagree with him." Presumably a passionate reaction was to be taken as evidence of some kind of efficiency in the presentation. After all, Dewey reminded his readers, the scholar "needs tact as well as scholarship."\textsuperscript{22}

Further, regarding this last passage, Feinberg does not note that Dewey goes on to qualify the importance and nature of "fact," Dewey saying that "fact" suggests perhaps too much a kind of judging diplomacy with the questions at issue.\textsuperscript{23}

There is another passage I think one must note, although there are others still.\textsuperscript{24} This one seems to "presume" on Dewey's intentions, however contrary to his democratic principles. In the context of a discussion of Dewey's account of evaluation and his ethical theory, Feinberg says:

Part of the appeal of Dewey's argument lies in its philosophical ambiguity. For not everyone would agree that ethical behavior and evolutionary progress are the same thing or that the latter should serve as the criterion for the former. Some would even find peculiar the suggestion that our most cherished acts of altruism, such as caring for the old are best judged as preparations for war or other survival activities. If Dewey were putting forth only a factual claim, then all that could really be said is that at certain times in human history, there may be fortunate coincidences between ethical acts and evolutionary processes. But of course this watered down claim did not really suit his purposes and it was useful for him to leave the ambiguous quality alone. On the other hand, to suggest outright that evolutionary survival was to be the criterion for ethical activity would have been to provide some clear guidance as to how an ethical claim might be objectively judged. Yet precisely because such a criterion can be challenged on other grounds, it was again best for Dewey to allow the ambiguity to stand. However, Dewey's claim does require some analysis.\textsuperscript{25}

The passages in Dewey that are in question do not indicate to me that Dewey thought his best purposes would be served by ambiguity; indeed, this claim about what Dewey found "useful" and "best" seems merely to "poison the wells" and prejudice the very analysis which, it is claimed, is needed.

Three Plays Illustrated

Now I think that Feinberg's analysis does illustrate the three plays. There is the attack upon Dewey's theory of democracy, which does not work because of a faulty statement of that theory. There is the attempt to discredit the practice of Dewey as not genuinely liberal or democratic in a number of instances, a discrediting which does not seem convincing in the particular cases dealt with here. Finally, there might be the suggestion that Dewey's theory is so confused or ambiguous that it could sup-
port about any twist and turn which Dewey wished to make. But, I find this unconvincing.

Whatever the case, any ploy of revisionism in Dewey's theoretical thought has to start with a clear recognition of what he fashioned in his mature social and political thought on democracy. One can refer to Platonic and Hegelian influences on the early and middle-years of Dewey, but the "bottom line," as youth today are wont to say, for Dewey resides in the mature, The Public and its Problems. Earlier I commented on the fact that one form of democracy seems to be implicit in his social conception of democracy. I deem it appropriate to quote him on that form, participatory democracy, as the bottom line of this paper. Any characterization of him as a centralist, elitist advocate of corporate democracy will be most convincing if it can deal with these words in their context:

The ballot box and majority rule are external and very largely mechanical symbols and expressions.... They are expedients, the best devices that at a certain time have been found, but beneath them there are the two ideas: first, the opportunity, the right and the duty of every individual to form some conviction and express some conviction regarding his own place in the social order, and the relations of that social order to his own welfare; second, the fact that each individual counts as one and only on an equality with others, so that the final social will comes about as the cooperative expression of the ideas of many people. And I think it is perhaps only recently that we are realizing that [this],....idea is the essence of all sound education.  

References

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1 Ibid., p. 101.

2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., pp. 30-34, 84-109.

5 Ibid., pp. 207-208.

6 One can see why Dewey might be a bane of political philosophers. They are apt to criticize him for having no developed theory of power or domination and, hence, no genuine political philosophy. The point, however, is that Dewey has a theory of social democracy to which, given its nature, political philosophy is secondary and, in a very real sense, from which it is derivative. One suspects that they criticize him for not having something as basic (power, domination, etc.) which, in the nature of the case, he wants to argue is not basic. Probably A.H. Somjee's The Political Philosophy of John Dewey (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968) is the most understandable of Dewey's basic position from the perspective of a political scientist-philosopher. Even Somjee seems to lament the lack of a completed or fully developed political philosophy on Dewey's part, however, as though this were Dewey's object. (Ibid., pp. 133-140, 175-178) His Chapter 4, "Dewey's Mature Political Philosophy," is highly recommended as background to this article. Also recommended is Wayne A.H. Loya, "Dewey's Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy," in Jo Ann Boydstun (ed.), Guide to the Works of John Dewey (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), pp. 131-165.


* Ibid., p. 209.


* Ibid., p. 207.

* Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 140.

* Ibid. Italics added.


5 Ibid., p. 149.

* Walter Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979). Feinberg says in a later work that he is not a revisionist, and that his "... major concern in examining the works of John Dewey has been to understand the way in which liberal principles have been molded by the situation in which liberal thinkers have found themselves. In so far as this has entailed a criticism of Dewey and other liberals, it is for the purpose of understanding ourselves and our reaction to the present situation." On Reading Dewey, History of Education Quarterly, 4, 4 (Winter, 1975), p. 395. I apologize for the fact that my criteria force upon him a label which he would rather not have. See his discussion in "Revisionist Scholarship and the Problem of Historical Context," Teachers College Record, 78, 3 (Feb., 1977), pp. 311-330.

* Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 250-259. Italics are Feinberg's.

* Ibid., p. 250.

* Ibid., p. 224. Feinberg has correctly pointed out to some of his critics that he never denied Dewey's concern for community. In one paragraph I wrote about Dewey's concern to have people able to recognize themselves as members of a community, each striving to enrich the lives of all. And I mention that Dewey also believed that if "the community was to be a democratic one... its members were not to be manipulated from above." Feinberg, On Reading Dewey, p. 401. His reference is to p. 495 of his "Progressive Education and Social Planning," Teachers College Record, 73, 4 (May, 1972), pp. 495-505. He also notes Dewey's concern in Reason and Rhetoric, But what kind of a concern can he be saying it is that Dewey has, if he is convinced that Dewey expressed no limits and no alternatives to the intellectuals' role in the power structure? One can take these two contentions, to paraphrase John Wilsom, to mean that when Dewey said he really believed in democracy and community, he meant that he did not believe in democracy and community really, For Dewey's equating of democracy and community, see the last question in Part II, herein.

* He does not there make the very strong charge, above, about the role of experts, but he does say: "In the last analysis his [Dewey's] concern for scientific intelligence is a statement of the need for experts in a highly complex technological society, and his appeal for democratic consensus is an attempt to create a citizenry that is able to see the wisdom of intelligence expertly exercised." Or, again:

One factor that separated Progressive educators from others was an expressed concern for the well-being and integrity of immigrant and racial minorities. At its best this concern mirrored the appeal for diversity that was an explicit part of Dewey's notion of community. At its worst it expressed the belief in experts, in authority, and in unity that was hidden in that same notion of community.


* Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 209-210. Italics are Feinberg's. Feinberg and Henry Rosenheim, Jr., use substantially the same quote in an earlier work (not in italics this time) in another work. After the quotation they remark: "If any parent had doubts about the validity of their instinctive distrust of public authority, Dewey's description of the role of the teacher..."
would surely have reassured them that their doubts were firmly based in reality. "Teaching for the Welfare State," in Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Eds.), Work, Technology, and Education (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 89. I do not think that this is an obvious conclusion except that the quotation ends where it does: had the paragraph in which it appears been concluded, the reader would have further read that:

From time to time an auditorium period is devoted to showing these maps and pointing out the good and bad features of the blocks and neighborhoods. Children always carry the news home to their parents, and parents and teachers are frequently asked for information. On one occasion some newly arrived family has moved from an overcrowded rear shack to a comfortable flat with the same rent because through the children they found out that their bad quarters were unnecessary. Because the school does this work to help, and as part of its regular program, it is accepted by the children and their parents as a matter of course. Information about improvements, sanitation, the size and condition of the houses, and rents, is given to the parents. If a block is poor a good block nearby where conditions are better and the rent the same is shown them. Thus the schools do not only teach the theory of good citizenship and social conditions, they give the children actual facts and conditions, so that they can see that what is wrong and how it can be bettered.


Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 228-229. Feinberg italicizes:


One of these is Feinberg's response to a passage in Dewey's Impressions of Soviet Russia. Feinberg quotes Dewey as follows:

Nowhere else in the world is employment of it [propaganda] as a tool of control so constant, consistent, and systematic as in Russia at present. Indeed, it has taken on such importance and social dignity that the word propaganda hardly carries, in another social medium, the correct meaning. For we instinctively associate propaganda with the accomplishment of some specific ends, more or less private to a particular class or group and correspondingly concealed from others. But in Russia the propaganda is in behalf of a burning public faith. One may believe that the leaders are wholly mistaken in the object of their faith, but their sincerity is beyond question. To them the end for which propaganda is employed is not a private or even a class gain, but is the universal good of universal humanity. In consequence propaganda is education and education is propaganda. They are more than confounded; they are identical.

Feinberg, Reason and Rhetoric, pp. 207-208. Feinberg then says George S. Counts "expressed a similar sentiment a few years later," and quotes Counts to the effect that, if progressive education is to "emanate itself," it must "become less frightened than it is today at the bogeys of imposition and indoctrination." Feinberg then remarks that "The appeal that the early phases of the Soviet experiment held for these educators was as much an indication of their essentially managerial philosophies as it was an expression of their ideas on social justice." Ibid., p. 208.

I am indebted to Paul C. Viola for pointing out that Feinberg errs in quoting Dewey to the effect that "They [education and propaganda] are more than confounded; they are identical." Dewey uses the term "identified," not "identical," which would make for a weaker case. Dewey surely could hold that the Russians "could incorrectly make an identification even if the two are not identical," John Dewey, Impressions of Soviet Russia (New York: The New Republic, Inc., 1929), p. 54. This and another passage in Dewey's work (ibid., pp. 81-82) deserve more extended treatment than I can give them here.

Soviet education at the community level did appeal to Dewey for a period of time, although even initially he distrusted Soviet ideology and was not certain about what might happen when the ideology came more directly to bear on communal practices. Ibid., pp. 57-58, 113-114, 120-123, 127. The appeal is one thing; but again, it is quite another to construe the quoted passage as saying that Dewey wanted or thought desirable an identification of education and propaganda. It hardly would be consistent with his other statements on education to say that his identification with propaganda "had appeal." See, for example, John Dewey, Character and Events, ed. by Joseph Ratner (New York: Henry Holt, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 517-521, 597-598, 776-781, and his The Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 37-38, 56, 82.

Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., use the same quotation (with the same error) in another work, introducing the quotation with: "Dewey's essentially ludatory description of Soviet education is perhaps indicative of his more general attitude about social control." At least equally, "Perhaps not," I think we can reply. Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., Work, Technology, and Education, p. 74.

One other point must suffice for this brief paper. Feinberg writes:

One of the schools that Dewey reported on in the latter part of the book [Schools of Tomorrow] was P.S. 26 in Indianapolis. P.S. 26 was an all-black school in a poor black slum. In view of the condition of the families in the neighborhood and the poverty that Dewey described, the school was carrying on some worthwhile programs and was tightly included. Dewey mentioned that the school was located in the "crowded district," the "Black East," the "colored settlement," and he observed that the school was not attempting to solve the race problem but that it was developing good citizens. If the experiment were to succeed, it would "mean a real step forward in solving the race problem." Yet the program that Dewey then described was strictly a vocational program, albeit a very grainy one. Dewey knew that the neighborhood served as a shop for the students. At a time when much black labor was unskilled or employed as farmhands, a program of skill development was an advance forward. Nevertheless, black boys learned how to cook and black girls how to sew.

It might be said in the context of the purpose of the Deweys' book that it is unfair to criticize Dewey for merely reporting on what was a splendid vocational program without commenting on the social conditions that made being a cook one of the highest aspirations of a Negro child. Yet in view of the somewhat mild, but nevertheless serious, criticism [that the Deweys made elsewhere in School and Society] of Montessori, it would not have been too much to expect a comment on the implications of a strictly vocational program for black children. A more serious shadow is cast over Dewey's evaluation of the experiment as he suggests its greatest value lies among the young Negro immigrant parents. If it was realism that guided Dewey's al-
Let us look at the larger section from *Schools of Tomorrow*. I have added italics.

The supervising principal of public school No. 26 in Indianapolis is trying an experiment unlike any other known to us in an effort to make his plant a true school; that is, a place where the children of his neighborhood shall become healthy, happy, and competent both economically and socially, and where the connection of instruction with the life of the community shall be directly recognized both by children and parents. Mr. Valentine’s school is located in the poor, crowded, colored district of the city and has only colored pupils. It is not an attempt to solve the “race question” for yet an experiment suited only to colored people. There is nothing in the school not entirely practical in any district where the children come from homes with limited resources and meager surroundings. A visitor, when leaving his school, cannot fail to wish that such ventures might be started in all our great cities—and in any community where people need to be aroused to see some of their needs including the fact that if they are to contribute to the best interests of the community, they must be taught how to earn a living, and how to use their resources for themselves and their neighbors: both in leisure time and in working hours. Mr. Valentine’s school is a school for colored children only in the sense that the work has been arranged in relation to the conditions of the neighborhood; these modify the needs of the particular children who are the pupils. Yet the success of the experiment would mean a real step forward to solving the “race question” and peculiar problems of any immigrant district as well. Mr. Valentine is not interested in illustrating any theories on these points, but in making up for what is lacking in the home life of the pupils; giving them opportunities to prepare for a better future; in supplying plenty of healthy occupation and recreation; and in seeing to it that their schoolwork reacts at once to improve neighborhood conditions.

Mr. Valentine’s school is really a social settlement for the neighborhood, but it has a decided advantage over the average settlement, for it comes in contact with all the children living within its district for a number of hours each day, while most settlements reach the children for only a few scattered hours each week. The school has a larger influence than most settlements because it is a public institution for which the people who use it are paying their share; they feel that their relation to it is a business one, not a matter of philanthropy. Because of this businesslike relation the school is able really to teach the doctrines of social welfare. In any settlement the work is always handicapped by the fact that the people who make use of it feel that they are receiving something for which they do not pay, that something is being done for them by people who are better off financially than they are. But giving a community facilities that it lacks for special classes and recreation through the public school of the district puts the work on a different basis. The school is really the property of the people of the district; they feel that they are more or less responsible for what is done there. Any wider activities that a school may undertake are, to a certain extent, the work of the people themselves; they are simply making use of the school plant for their own needs.

John and Evelyn Dewey, *Schools of Tomorrow*, pp. 151-152. My italics. (Feinberg’s reference is to p. 207 of this work, which I think must be incorrect.) One can say that Dewey refers especially to youngsters of Negro and immigrant parents, but is it not equally or more correct to say that he refers especially to “any district where the children come from homes with limited resources and meager surroundings”?

And, does the fuller passage indicate that Dewey is unmoved by a deep concern for all such children? I venture that Feinberg’s account does not do justice to what Dewey’s account and context provide. And I single out the passage for lengthy treatment because Feinberg, in four other publications, uses the passage in an almost identical manner, with even less context (although with reference back to *Reason and Rhetoric*) in at least three of them. See his “Progressive Education and Social Planning,” pp. 492-496; Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., *Work, Technology, and Education*, p. 90; Feinberg’s review, “John Dewey: Lectures in China, 1919-1920,” published in *Philosophy East and West*, XXV, 4 (Winter 1975); p. 368; and his “Educational Equality Under Two Conflicting Models of Educational Development,” *Theory and Society*, 2. 2 (Summer, 1975), p. 209, l. 17.

The final chapter in the Deweys’ *Schools of Tomorrow* (Chapter XI, “Democracy and Education”) makes it patently clear that they are not in any sense advocating or accepting class or racial education from the purview of democracy. Silent (perhaps overly tactful) they are about specific situations which would gall or infuriate us today, but they do not equivocate on democratic principles. Perhaps this is an appropriate place to give one of the more moving statements of what democratic principles required for all children: “What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unhealthy; acted upon, it destroys our democracy.” John Dewey, *The Child and the Curriculum and The School and Society*, with “Introduction” by Leonard Carruth (Chigaco, University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 7.

Recent studies show the American family is more resilient to massive societal changes than previously thought.

Family survival against the system

By David L. Angus

In the Fall of 1975, I began to construct a data bank which I felt, when completed, would permit the most comprehensive examination of the pattern of relationships between school performance and family background variables yet attained for any historical period. What occasioned this was the discovery of school records for the village of Dexter, Michigan, dating from the 1880s. Though I was aware at the time that analyses of school attendance patterns could be and had been performed using nineteenth century census manuscripts, the discovery of these school records immediately suggested the possibility of a much richer longitudinal examination of these patterns. Further investigation uncovered similar, but incomplete, records from the village of Chelsea, and, knowing something about the similarities and differences between the two villages, I began to conceive of a comparative approach which might permit the isolation of some of the factors in the school-family-community relationship attributable to a degree of industrialization where community size (degree of urbanization) could be held relatively constant.

This brief review essay is an outgrowth of the literature review which I have been doing prior to the analysis of this data bank, now nearly complete. I have isolated a theme which appears to me to be one of the more interesting ones in this literature, yet one that can be handled in a short session. The main idea, which I have tried to allude to in my title, is that recent scholarship has shown the family in America to be far more resilient in the face of massive societal change than we thought only a few years ago. The word “system” refers in a general way to the modernization process, more specifically to the tide of technological developments that transformed our lives so drastically and to the rapid growth of urban centers. To speak of families “against” this system, and of “survival,” is not to posit a family pattern that is impervious to these changes, but one that is certainly not the passive victim that it has been portrayed.

I will begin by trying to place this particular argument about the family in the context of our escalating contemporary debate. Then I will locate it within a narrower, but deeper, debate among scholars. Thirdly, I will review a few recent studies which sharpen the terms of this debate, and finally I will suggest some elements of a new framework from which we ought to view family development in this country.

Between April and June of this year there were five books published in the United States with identical titles. The title of these books was Family, and they were but a share of the over 40 books that have been published on the family in the last two years. Nineteen seventy-nine is to be the year of a White House Conference on the Family, though there is still a question as to whether this will ever be held. All the major news weeklies ran cover stories on the family in the past few months, and Psychology Today ran a symposium issue. Articles abound. Entries in the Reader’s Guide under the heading “Family” have soared from only 16 in 1975 and 1976 combined to 27 in 1977 and 23 in the first 8 months of 1978.

Perhaps the most significant indicator that the family is moving to the top of the charts is that many of our most noted “pop” sociologists have recently written a book or an article arguing some point of view about what’s happening to the American family. Among these contributions are Christopher Lasch (1977), Richard Sennett (1976), Urie Bronfenbrenner (1977), Amata Etzioni (1977), Robert Coles (1976), Michael Novick (1976), Nathan Glazer (1978), and Mary Jo Bane (1976). Miss Bane’s book typifies the family genre. Like Governor Brown on tax cuts, Ms. Bane is a liberal who changed her mind when she learned the facts. Starting from the premise that the family is rapidly collapsing and therefore government should invent new institutional structures to carry out its functions, she set out to document the family’s demise. She discovered instead that the family, though undergoing some important changes, is nonetheless a thriving and vital institution and that liberal governmental policy is perhaps the family’s chief enemy. She makes a plea for governmental restraint and for basing public policy on fact rather than fantasy.

Ms. Bane represents those who feel that the family is not in decline and that it is a good thing that it isn’t because we need the family to survive. This view contrasts with that of most Americans, who seem to believe that the family is in decline and that that is a very bad thing for our society. In the rising debate about the family, two other possible positions will also, no doubt, be represented. One is that the family is in decline and that’s a good thing because the family is really an anachronism in modern life. The other is that the family is not in decline but it ought to be because it is the chief barrier to mental health or the equality of women or some other social goal. This position has been represented by R.D. Laing (1971), David Cooper (1972), and for the radical feminists, Robin Blackburn (1969).

As disparate as are these positions, they nonetheless...
share a common thread, and it is this that links the more public debate to a scholarly debate that has continued for two decades. Borrowing an idea from D.H.J. Morgan (1975) of the University of Manchester, we will call this common thread “soft functionalism.” It is “soft” because it is implicit, not carefully worked out, and therefore not really debatable. It is “functionalism” because it absolutely assumes that the family should be seen as instrumental to some other end or purpose, usually the aggrandizement of individual personality or what has lately been called “narcissism.” Seen in this way, the family is or isn’t performing its critical functions and alternative “structures” need or needn’t be created to see that these functions are performed.

Among scholars of the family, it is functionalism that has held the “center” position for at least a half a century. In fact, family theory has been almost a showcase for functionalism. Morgan points out that the functionalist perspective “appears to have been more deeply entrenched in the field of the sociology of the family than in some other sub-disciplines.” Moreover, “functional statements are more likely to be presented as self-evident propositions in the study of the family than in any other area of sociology.” Some have felt, therefore, that functionalist theory could be put to its severest test by empirical research on the family.

Talcott Parsons (1956) stands almost alone as the prominent modern theorist on the family. His functional analysis is so sweeping that it touches nearly every aspect of family life. To briefly summarize his key points, he argues that the modern family is not facing dissolution but is merely experiencing the differentiation of its functions. Through a parceling out of these to other institutions, the family’s functions are reduced to two, namely the socialization of the child and the “stabilization of the adult personalities of the population.” Structurally, the family is seen as a unit of an “open, multilinear, conjugal system.” It is, of course, nuclear, and Parsons often refers to the “relative isolation of the nuclear family.” Internally, the family is seen as a four-cell matrix along two axes, leader/follower and instrumental/expressive. His description of the socialization process features a duality in which socialization is understood to move from the individual personality being prepared to assume an autonomous role and from the view of the internalization of a given culture as mediated by the family. The location of sex roles is also thoroughly discussed by Parsons, and in terms which send feminists up the wall. Males and females divide along the instrumental/expressive continuum. Can you guess who’s on which side?

**Some Limits Overlooked**

Parsons’ followers, as well as his critics, have often overlooked several important limits which he placed on the reach of his theory. It was not meant to be cross-cultural, not intended to include rural families, upper class families, or lower class families and the concept of nuclear family isolation was always qualified by the term “relative.” However, the influence of Parsons went much beyond those who had carefully read his theory. Those of us who passed through universities sometime between 1956 and 1970, absorbed a host of Parsonian images of the family stripped of these qualifications and expanded outward to encompass “The Development of the Family in the Western World Under the Impact of Modernization.”

According to these images, the family in pre-industrial society was a large kinship network that “located” the individual in his society. Households were also large and usually included three generations of lineal descent as well as assorted unrelated individuals. This family was thought of as the basic building block of society and was so recognized and protected in the law. In addition to procreation and socialization, the pre-industrial family was also responsible for producing most goods and services, taking care of the sick and the elderly, rehabilitating the criminal, providing vocational training to the young, and a host of other “functions.” With the coming of industrialization, all this changed. Perhaps it was the separation of the work place from the home that caused the greatest disruption. Whatever the main cause, the consequences are clear. During the 19th century the family became complicated and mobile. One by one its “functions” were “assigned” to other emerging agencies and with the loss of these functions went the capacity of the family to regulate and control the lives of its members. What the family lost the individual partially gained as concepts of individual rights and bureaucratically defined justice began to prevail. These changes to the family were particularly marked in the cities where poverty, overcrowding, disease and other assorted ills destroyed family life altogether for some groups. By the mid-twentieth century the family was thought to have no function beyond bedding and boarding the young until they could be spun out to form new pairs. By the seventies, marriage itself was thought to be obsolete and most children were presumed to be unwanted.

This scenario, of course, a straw man. Parsons wouldn’t recognize it. His main elements however can be found in countless books whose authors are expert on something other than the family, say “the modernization of the West,” or “modern social work practice,” or the “social contexts of schooling.” It was the wide dissemination of these images among the “educated,” then, that led to a two-pronged attack on Parsons, et al., in the early sixties.

The frontal attack on Parsons was led by Litwak (1965), Sussman and Burkam (1969). They contended that the modern family is not thought of as an isolated nuclear family but as a modified extended family. The basis for this was their discoveries that families—over middle-class urban families—maintained contact with and felt reciprocable obligations toward kinfolk, particularly their families of orientation. At about the same time, Michael Young and Peter Willmott published their study of *Family & Kinship in East London* (1962), which clearly established the importance of the extended kin network among British working class families. From these beginnings, a substantial literature on kinship in urban settings has grown. A discussion of this is beyond our scope here, except to observe that the debate on this side is not over whether such structures exist but over whether they are significant enough to throw over Parsons’ idea of the “relatively isolated nuclear family.”

The attack from the rear, so to speak, was kicked off by the Cambridge Family Study Group and in particular by Peter Laslett (1965), with the immensely important finding that the household in pre-industrial England was already nuclear and appears to have been so since the 16th century. This finding created a flurry of interest in family history and forced a reconsideration of the “origins” of the nuclear family in America. Beginning first with some excellent work on the colonial family and household structure, interest in family history has spread into the 19th...
and 20th centuries and has linked up with at least four other inter-related interests of this generation of historians: ethnic history, women's history, working-class history, and studies of social and geographic mobility.

Already, family history has made a major contribution to our understanding of what the issues are. Part of this contribution lies in simply sorting out the way we think and speak about families. An extended family and an extended household are two different things. A social group can have nuclear families and extended households or extended families and nuclear households, or both extended, or both nuclear. Family structures and family functions are quite different things as well. It's possible for structures to remain extremely stable over long periods of time while functions change dramatically. Family structures also pass through cycles, one phase of which can involve nuclear households, another extended ones.

The studies I wish to review do not reflect the whole gamut of contemporary interest in family history. I have limited myself to at least two ways; to the approximate time period indicated in my title, and to those studies attempting to test some facet of the general notions outlined above about the impact of industrialization and urbanization. While I do not pretend that this review is exhaustive, it would be extremely misleading to imply that for each type of study mentioned there are a dozen more that could be cited. This is in fact a limited literature, though one that is growing rapidly.

**Ethnic Differences in Family Patterns**

If the family is seen as a dependent variable in the social equation in which technological change and urban growth are thought to be the powerful determinants of all other social structures, one way to challenge this model is to look for variable family patterns where industrial/urban conditions are "controlled." This is one reason that considerable attention has been given to ethnic differences in family patterns.

A paper by Virginia Yans McLaughlin (1973) on the Italians of Buffalo, 1900-1930, challenges the idea that the increased opportunities for women to work outside the home associated with industrialism alters power relationships within the home and ultimately leads to "family disorganization," specifically the female-headed household. Utilizing census manuscripts and welfare records, Yans McLaughlin found that, unlike the women of some other ethnic groups, "Buffalo's South Italian women ... expressed and acted upon, a decided preference for occupations which permitted minimal strain upon their traditional familiar arrangements (p. 138)." The vast majority of Italian women with children had no employment outside the home, and of those who did most had part-time work as members of family groups. She determined that in spite of irregular male employment and the frequent temporary absence of the father from the household, female-headed households made up an astonishingly low 4% of 2,000 first-generation families and that the Italians were the least likely ethnic group to apply for welfare due to neglect or desertion by a family head (p. 141). Coupling these findings she concluded that "South Italian values played an important part in determining family work patterns," and that "the family acted as an independent variable (p. 138)."

Louise Tilly (1974), an expert on the rise of out-of-household employment of women in 19th century Europe, took Yans McLaughlin to task for one of her claims. Pointing out that married women often served as domestics in Southern Italy, she said, the answer to why women were not servants in Buffalo lies not in Southern Italy, but in the economic and social structure of Buffalo (p. 454)."

Tilly accepts, however, the general notion of familial acting as an independent variable.

In another study of Buffalo's ethnic groups at an earlier time period, Laurence Glasso (1977) looked for differences in the life cycles and household structures of the Irish, the Germans, and the native-born whites. Using the 1935 New York State Census manuscripts, he found that differences between the three groups of males: were chiefly related to economics, that is to occupations and home ownership, while women's differences were reflected in household structural cycles. For example, he found that "despite high fertility rates and longer periods of childbearing, Irish families were not substantially larger than native-born families (p. 137)." The reason for this is that Irish families sent their children, particularly their girls, all for prolonged periods of domestic service, some as early as 11 years of age. German girls also served as domestics but for a shorter period, and they married earlier. Glasso suggests that these life-cycle differences represented functional adaptations to the urban-industrial environment in that they regulated family size, provided opportunities for girls to acquire some savings toward setting up their own households, and most importantly served as an effective acculturation for the ethnic girls who then taught the new behaviors to their children before they overcame within the reach of the school.

Modell and Haraven (1977) have added a great deal to this notion of a flexible household size reflecting adaptations to industrialism through a careful and imaginative study of boarders and lodgers in Northeastern cities in the late 19th century. By the 1890s, the practice of taking in boarders, while fairly common, had produced a spate of moralistic condemnation, particularly from Progressive housing reformers who spoke of the "lodger evil." Modell and Haraven show, through life-cycle analysis of census materials and comparisons with an 1891 U.S. Commissioner of Labor Report on working-class family budgets, that the taking in of boarders correlated well with the loss of income as older children left home. To quote their key finding,

"Boarding in families in industrial America in the late 19th century was the province of young men of an age just to have left their parents' homes, and was an arrangement entered into and provided by household heads who were of an age to have just lost a son from the residential family to an independent residents. ... It was, [in other words] a social equalization of the family which operated directly by the exchange of a young-adult person and a portion of his young-adult income from his family of orientation to what might be called his family of re-orientation—re-orientation to the city, to a job, to a new neighborhood, to independence (p. 177).

They concluded by saying, "the family was not fragile, but malleable." In attacking the practice of boarding, reformers were attacking "an institution that not only was a sensible response to industrialization but, in cushioning the shock of urban life for newcomers, was decidedly humane (p. 183)."

A further instance of testing fairly directly the impact
of urbanism on the family pattern of a particular group is Elizabeth Pleck's (1973) study of black family structure in late nineteenth century Boston. Using primarily the federal census manuscript of 1880, Pleck calculated the percentages of one- and two-parent households by place of birth (North vs. South) and used as surrogates for urban vs. rural, literacy, and occupation. Testifying to Franklin Frazier's observation that "family desertion among Negroes in cities, appears, then, to be one of the inevitable consequences of the impact of urban life on the simple family organization and folk culture which the Negro has evolved in the rural south," Pleck found that two-parent households were more prevalent among migrant and rural born heads of household. She also found that the one-parent household was more strongly related to illiteracy of head than to other variables and that despite all categorical differences and despite the strong concentrations of black household heads in the unskilled and service jobs (87%), two-parent households dominated by a ratio of 8 to 2.

A very similar study of the black family in Atlanta of 1880, by William Harris (1976) presents figures that are comparable to Pleck's. The ratio of two-parent to one-parent households was 7 to 3 for blacks and 8 to 2 for whites. When occupation of head was controlled, the ratio of nuclear to expanded households was almost identical for blacks and whites (75% to 25%), though the black expanded families included a much higher percentage of "augmented." School attendance rates, with occupation controlled, were also shown to be fairly similar to black and white children, though Harris did not present these rates in relation to household structures. Harris points out that black families were in no way "matrifocal" in 1880, and on the whole they were more like white families than they are today. These are but two examples of the substantial amount of work being done on the nineteenth century black family, all of it supporting the idea of a structure not unlike that of other groups at the time.

One of Parson's slogans regarding his functionalist theory of the family was that it did not apply to upper class families. The reason for this is that Parsons knew it to be well established that families whose wealth is based on ownership of property and the control of capital recognize a broad range of financial rights and duties among kin. Litwak and Sussman were trying to expand on this loophole by showing that middle class family members also recognize helping obligations within what is referred to as a modified extended family. This line of attack has also been opened up by family historians who are looking at ways in which family relationships penetrated business activities up and down the whole spectrum of entrepreneurship.

An example is Sally and Clyde Griffin's (1977) study of the businesses in Poughkeepsie, New York, in the three decades after 1850. Using a variety of sources but primarily the credit reports prepared on Poughkeepsie firms by the R.G. Dun & Company, foreman of Dun and Bradstreet, the Griffins looked at business turnover, partnerships between relatives, the passing of businesses from father to son or other relatives, the reliance on relatives for loan collateral or outright capital, and other forms of family involvement in business. They report that within a general climate of insecurity indicated by persistently high business mortality rates, entrepreneurs often sought to minimize risk and stabilize business activity by relying on family members in a variety of ways. They also found, however, that in contrast to Landes' portrait of the family-owned firm in France, "The majority of business arrangements between family members in Poughkeepsie appear to have been expedient and temporary, designed for immediate profit or protection of individual property (p. 147)." Thus the main point to be derived from the Poughkeepsie experience is not that family-rooted values such as honor and reputation successfully competed with the more individualistic values of profit and property and that family relationships were seen to be more trustworthy than those outside the family. This quite modest affirmation of family viability is almost exactly what is meant by Litwak and Sussman's concept of the modified extended family.

Sennett Study Flawed

The one study of the family which appears to most closely conform to the title of this paper is Richard Sennett's Families Against the City (1970). I do not rate it highly among the studies I have reviewed because it is flawed both methodologically and conceptually. In brief, Sennett's theme is that as middle class families replaced wealthier families in the section of Chicago called Union Park (1872-1900), some clear characterizations of middle-class family life were revealed in the census manuscripts, street directories and assessment accounts of this period. Middle-class families are shown to be mother-oriented, insistent, isolated and privatist. What's more, males raised in these highly protective environments are found to be less "successful," less upwardly mobile than males raised in the roughly 10% of the households Sennett classifies as extended.

The conceptual errors in Sennett's analysis are frequent and serious. For example, he fails to distinguish between an extended family and an extended household, he completely ignores even the possibility of extended kin relationships in the neighborhood, he does not distinguish between extension and augmentation. His entire chapter on "The Stages of Family Life" is flawed by his failure to recognize that you cannot carry out life cycle analysis from a single census of a particular neighborhood, especially one that is atypical of the city by design. There simply can be no basis in his data for such statements as "In almost all families, by the time the sons left home they had also married (p. 102)." There are lapses of logic as well. At one point Sennett raises the possibility that family extension might be a temporary phenomenon, an aspect of life-cycles rather than a permanent categorical difference. He then rejects this idea on the astounding basis that elsewhere his data show differences in mobility rates, residential patterns and inter-generational relations between the two forms (p. 77)! In short, Sennett's book is a novel posing as an empirical study. As a novel it's not bad.

In still another approach to the issue of the effect of industrial processes on the family, Haraven (1977) has studied Manchester, New Hampshire during the first quarter of this century. Founded by the Amoskeag Corporation as a textile mill community in the 1830s, it was still controlled by the company in the 1860s. During the period studied, the largest group in both the mill and the town was the French Canadians, who had begun to arrive in the 1870s. Using company employee files, marriage and insurance records, and oral interviews, Haraven found both the worker's families and the corporation to be flexible institutions whose relative strength vis-a-vis the other flu-
ized over time. "The family was most effective in making an impact on work patterns in two areas: (1) it facilitated the adjustment of its members by acting as a labor recruiter, a housing agent, and as a source of support in critical life situations, and (2) it exercised its own controls, even if limited ones, against the corporations by encouraging labor turnover, by influencing the job placement of its members, and by affecting job control in the daily routine of work (p. 193)."

John Bodnar's (1976) oral interview study of Slavic peasants who migrated to industrial settings puts forth a challenging hypothesis. He argues that "urban-industrial society nurtured behavior patterns such as limited horizons, familial cooperation, fatalism, and anti-materialism which were as functional for proletarians as for peasants." In the working class neighborhoods into which Slavic peasants settled "pre-industrial behavior neither disintegrated nor simply endured. It may have been reinforced." Bodnar shows that while many aspects of Slavic life, such as the roles assumed by individuals within families, appeared to be unchanged, they were altered in subtle ways. For example, within the family, which remained a strong patriarchal structure, the mother assumed the position of fiscal manager. Further, among peasants, "tribal" loyalties were essentially village loyalties. These were both transformed into loyalties to larger, regional or national allegiances and were also strengthened. Bodnar's idea, then, is that there were substantial continuities between pre-modern, peasant life and the particular strata of urban-industrial life which Slavic peasants sought out in this country which were more powerful than the litany of discontinuities we are more familiar with.

By now it should be clear that these "revisionist" images of the family in industrial America do not aspire to substitute a new rigid paradigm for the now discarded paradigm of the older modernization theorists. Haraven warns that "revisions of the stereotypes of family passivity and breakdown in the industrial process" is already engendering new extremes. The filiopietism which has been emerging over the past few years tends to exaggerate the strength of the immigrant or working-class family and its autonomy as an institution. For the time being, we are without a single comprehensive theory of the family that can take account of the seemingly endless variety of family forms which family historians are discovering. The most important implication of all this for educational theory is that we should consider the many ways in which our notions of secondary socialization, social mobility, and other aspects of school-family-community relations are built upon false images of the family which we have latched onto and taken for granted.

From 1880 to 1930, the American family resisted the social currents swirling around it. It did not succumb, neither did it triumph. It did however survive, and for better or for worse it is surviving still.

NOTES
2 See Newsweek, 31:633 (May 15, 1976). The conference has been postponed until 1981.
5 The British anthropologist Peter Firth published material on kinship networks in Britain as early as 1956, but this appears to have been much less influential than Young and Willmott's work. Firth, ed., Two Studies on Kinship in London (London: London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 15, 1956).
7 In response to Glazer's assertion that "the negro today is like the immigrant yesterday," Harris suggests that the far more relevant historical question is "why the todays of black Americans are so much like the yesterdays?"

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The extension of formal schooling to groups formerly excluded from it is one of the most striking developments in modern history. The experience of Western Europe and the United States in the last 200 years suggests that mass education provides one of the principal foundations of economic development, and modernizers throughout the rest of the world have tried to duplicate the achievement of the West in bringing education to the masses. Faith in the wonder-working powers of education has proved to be one of the most durable components of liberal ideology, easily assimilated by ideologies hostile to the rest of liberalism. Yet the democratization of education has accomplished little to justify this faith. It has neither improved popular understanding of modern society, raised the quality of popular culture, nor reduced the gap between wealth and poverty, which remains as wide as ever. On the other hand, it has contributed to the decline of critical thought and the erosion of intellectual standards, focusing us to consider the possibility that mass education, as conservatives have argued all along, is intrinsically incompatible with the maintenance of educational quality.


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When Common School principles were put into action, results were not as expected.

The Uncommon Common School

By Sally H. Wertheim

Equality of educational opportunity is one of the current slogans educators espouse. To provide all children with a sense of community through the same education was one of the original purposes of the American Common School. According to historian Lawrence A. Cremin, the common school was to be common for all people, publicly supported and publicly controlled. This statement reflected the ideology of the educational leadership of the times, who were a confident elite trying to apply a set of principles inculcated by family background, education and a sense of civic responsibility to a newly enfranchised citizenry. They were well meaning and motivated by concern for their fellow man. However, they were not always able to achieve their goal of community because when their common school principles were put into practice, the result was not what had been expected. The very people for whom the common school was created were discouraged from attending because they felt excluded from the environment which was created.

This study will attempt to show, through documentation found in the twenty Ohio educational periodicals published prior to the Civil War, that this occurred in Ohio, one of the new frontier communities which was very active in the quest for a common school, as were other states at this same time. Following the Revolution and reflecting the principles advocated in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, it became apparent to the leadership group in Ohio that formal schooling was an appropriate means to achieving the ends espoused by the Founding Fathers. Ohio was a new frontier community which, with the passage of the Bill to establish a State School Superintendent in 1837, tried to put these goals into practice.

As communities formed in the West, social stratification seemed to occur. Certain wealthy people in important business positions assumed community leadership and were advocates of reform movements. Many of the men who published and edited the educational journals were part of, or aspired to become, the ascending leadership group on the frontier. For example, Asa D. Lord, who edited several educational journals, served in educational administrative positions, and was a doctor by training. Another editor, John Hancock, of the Journal of Progress, was part of an old aristocratic American family, being the grandson of John Hancock. William Gogginhall, one editor of the Ohio Journal of Education, was also descended from an old New England family and served in governmental posts and as an editor of other periodicals such as the Genius of the West.

As the frontier began the process of urbanization, this leadership group feared the actions of the others and sought to use the common school as a means of institutionalizing their ideas for these groups. It will be shown that the purposes of education advocated did not meet the needs of these other groups, such as the immigrant, the Catholic, the poor, the workingman, women, and blacks, who were themselves becoming an integral part of the society and expected to attend the new common school.

The question might be raised whether the common school in its sincere desire to provide a sense of community by advocating the same type of education for all people in order to eliminate differences, accomplished the opposite. It often alienated these groups by expecting them to become like the majority group. Albert Picklet, editor of the Western Academician and Journal of Education and Science wrote:

"But the majority, under any circumstances, must be limited in the intelligence. The stronger, therefore, the reason, that profound knowledge should be extended to as many as possible, so that by intermixture in society with those of other acquisitions—their knowledge may become diffused—their habits of investigation, and their integrity by such intercourse, be worked into the minds of the mass, and become a part of their thoughts and mode of action. The attainments of well balanced minds exert great influence over those less fortunate, the greater the number of well-educated the wider will be the reach of sound reasoning and correct principles of conduct."

Oh how simple it all seemed to Picklet who was seriously stating what he and most of his contemporaries believed the schools could do. His intent was to create a system which would successfully achieve the dream of a melting pot.

The ideas which created the common school movement emerged and took root during the period known as the era of the common man when Jacksonian democracy was the rule and mobocracy, as a result of the new privileges, was feared by many.

Daniel Aaron noted that when the West was first settled, conditions of equality prevailed, but in the 1830s and '40s, slums, paupers, and class distinctions as well as societies, private clubs, and other outward manifestations..."
of a class differential came into being. This was the situation on the urban, rather than rural scene. In urban localities striking disparities in wealth and diversity of occupations sharpened class lines earlier than in less populous districts. Aaron stated:

... the myth of a unified equitarian western community must be dismissed. The urban West, as well as the urban East, presents a bewildering and complex pattern of cliques and pressure groups, social, political, and economic, sometimes resisting each other, at other times working together for the common good. The dynamic which keeps the society ever moving is money and property, and the financial elite, the merchant and their professional helpers are also the social and the political elite.1

James Hall, an observer of this time writing about the West in 1839, cited the factors which differentiated the classes. He felt the resources of the country were controlled by the business community, "embracing all those who are engaged in the great occupations of buying, and selling, ... exchanging, importing, and exporting merchandise, and including the banker, the broker, and the underwriter." This view was underscored by Tocqueville in writing of his observations of America. He cited as reasons the fact that money in a democratic society was of greater importance because it could obtain cooperation of others and served as a natural scale by which the merit of men could be measured in the absence of all other material and exterior distinctions. The classes, as differentiated by wealth, moved in different circles. They may have come together for business purposes, but those of the upper echelon sent their children to private schools, married them off to social equals, occupied positions of prominence such as those of bank directors, supported the Presbyterian and Episcopalian churches, and served on school committees.8

Cincinnati Society Characteristic

Aaron noted the distinctions which occurred in Cincinnati society from 1819 to 1836 as characteristic of the other urban centers of the times and set up an interesting division along so-called class lines, warning that these divisions ever remained flexible, except perhaps in the case of the blacks. He described the upper classes as the business element and professional men such as doctors, clergymen, editors and teachers, whose position often depended upon the status of the people they served. The majority of the population comprised what he called the lower middle class and the lower class. These included clerks, skilled workmen, storekeepers, minor tradesmen, transients, poor immigrants and the semi-skilled (as the Irish deckhands and draymen). "And at the bottom, forming a kind of lowest helot class and exploited by all, are the hated, disfranchised blacks." Sometimes there was a merger between classes as the structure was not absolute. "In sum then, men in America ... are arranged according to certain categories in the course of social life: common habits, education, and above all, wealth, establish these classifications.8 In essence the mercantile class presided over urban affairs, for the urban development produced the stratified society and "the notion of equality, though perhaps powerful in the countryside, did not prevail in the towns."19

The ideas advanced in support of education reflected the dominantly conservative ideas of the new rising class. Aaron pointed out that the conception of educated man was:

... one which harmonized especially with the aims and interests of a commercial and 'pecuniary' culture. Education ... was a discipline which inculcated the recognized assumptions of the status quo, or rather the assumptions of the mercantile and land owning class.16

Education was designed to preserve the ideas of the status quo and though the people were committed to an idea of progress, it was the progress of Meyer's "venturous conservative." Historian Rush Weller, in discussing the concept of progress at that time, thought of education as "... a great engine against 'depotism,'" intended only to preserve the present structure of government and society, albeit with some minor changes.17 Progress was to be a continuation of the present and educators of the times such as Horace Mann stressed the need for the schools to build a consensus of values. the values of the group who were promoting the schools.

Schools Safeguard of Freedom

What were the values of the society and what did they envision the purposes of the common school to be? In theory the common school was to be a common equalizer that would homogenize all people from diverse backgrounds. This was a need created along with the new republican government and the freedoms it granted to diverse groups. The permanence of civil institutions depended upon educating the youth, otherwise there was the danger of losing control to the many heterogeneous groups of Anglo-Saxons, Germans, and French and half-breeds which made up the population of the West. It was noted that the ideas of the immigrants should be "remodeled" by the school. There was interest in maintaining the government in its present form for "permanency of our institutions presupposes capability for intelligent public action on the part of every member of the community." and in order to secure this, the youth must be educated to preserve existing institutions in their purity. Schools were expected to safeguard democracy and keep the republican form of government from becoming corrupted by outsiders.18

Sound educational training provided a means of social control of the child. There were attitudes of fear of the masses for Tocqueville in meeting with Timothy Walker, an Easterner visiting in Cincinnati, noted Walker's concern with the power being given the masses.18 Reverend B.P. Aydelott, in an address before the closing session of Woodward College and High School in Cincinnati in 1836, stated his fear of the less-enlightened and the poor whom he termed "working classes" that and hope the teachers would guard them from "apologies of destruction." This was an argument used to gain support for the common school movement, for if the poor could be controlled by the educational system, then it would be far less costly than caring for them later as criminals or paupers. Reverend Dr. Humphrey noted that the schoolmaster's affect was for eternity because he was dealing with the plastic minds of the pupils. By making the pupils good, they would curb their waywardness as adults and would fit well into the society. The school had to act upon the young, demanding strict subordination to
prescribed rules and duties. Education would diminish atrocious action and evil, and as a result, legislation would become milder, religion would be purified from superstition and the society would be improved by the educated. Education was looked upon as a form of social insurance to be paid for as a preventive against crime, vice and pauperism. Free universal education, according to Asa D. Lord, editor of the Ohio Journal of Education, was to be the "best insurance which can be effected upon property, and the surest guarantee for the safety of property, reputation and life."

Another great concern was preventing corruption with sound moral education. This was the beginning of the conflict between those who advocated direct religious training in the schools and those who professed a need for non-sectarian moral training. Part of this battle took place in Massachusetts between Horace Mann, who advocated Bible reading without note or comment, and the group who wanted sectarian religious training in the public schools.

Schools Not Just Intellectual Training

In Ohio, the concern of the people was with the question of moral principles as part of educational training. There was concern expressed that the intellectual needs of the children were being attended to, but that their affective or spiritual culture was inadequate. There was emphasis placed upon development of the whole mind, body and spirit with education promoting loyalty to parents, good institutions, good government and to heaven. It was important to keep the passions in check and to provide youth with discipline using stern principles of religion and morality when children were young. Moral education took precedence for it was noted in The School Friend that, "we are free to say, unhesitatingly, that we consider a right education of the heart to be infinitely more important than any degree of pure intellectual education."

In addition to political, moral and social purposes, it was noted in The Universal Educator that the schools were still expected to "cultivate all the powers and faculties of mind ... to an equal standing with those of their fellow beings who possess the greatest degree of knowledge, wisdom and goodness."

It was hoped that the schools would produce good learners, not necessarily learned men. The intellect was created not to receive material passively, but to use its powers to observe, reason, judge, contrive and be active in acquiring truth, through inquiry. While development of the intellect was deemed important, advice was often given against "premature mental effort to be the real cause of very much of the evil which is charged against study itself." It was argued that too much study could be injurious to health, monotonous and irksome. It was even suggested that schools were being promoted to keep students from the employment market, and that shorter sessions should be the rule. Reverend Edward Thompson felt that "genius is more frequently a curse than a blessing. Its possessor, relying on his extraordinary gifts, generally falls into habits of indolence, and fails to collect the materials requisite for useful and magnificent efforts."

Another of the primary objectives of the school was to teach the youth to labor efficiently by instructing them in the principles of business. A differential was drawn between those who attended the colleges and academies and those who sought a livelihood as laborers. The school was to assist in making the individual productive both to himself and to the society. The schools would produce laborers, industrious shop-keepers, prosperous and wealthy mechanics, and honorable merchants. They would then become influential citizens and act as stimulants to prosperity.

So regardless of the diversity of the student's background, aspirations, ideas, or personal values, the philosophy of education of the first half of the nineteenth century was to prepare the student morally, intellectually, vocationally, socially, and politically to fit really into the ideal of community for the society which was being built. The plan was to take all these students, but provide them with the kinds of schooling to ensure social democracy. The common school was designed for the major social group and was, in reality, an uncommon school. Evidence to this effect can be found in the many ways the different groups were viewed and how the programs in the schools were designed for them. In planning education for all, the needs of such groups as the Black, the Indian, the woman, the Catholic, the Jew, the poor, and the immigrant were often overlooked in the zeal to provide community for all. This problem was even recognized by Marcellus F. Cowdery, a noted leader of the times:

"It has certainly failed during the last fifteen years, of commanding general confidence, and of meeting the wants of our increasing population ... while it affords encouragement to the acquisition of knowledge to a majority of the children of the State, it neither aims at the proper education of all, nor provides means adequate to the accomplishment of this object."

Educational views expressed about these minority groups provoke insights into how they were viewed. This becomes obvious in noting how the poor were viewed. John Pickett, expressing his concern for the poor, questioned what would happen, "unless the hand of charity is extended to their aid."

Many journal articles talked about the lower classes in derogatory ways. Asa D. Lord noted that the number of illiterates had increased since 1840 and attributed this to the influx of foreigners, "many of whom are known to be deplorably ignorant; it is unquestionably true that a large portion of our youth are either orphans, or the children of those who have no just views of the importance of education ..."

He went on to affirm that these types of people allowed their children to leave school whenever they could go to work and those that stayed caused trouble in the schools. Stereotypes of the poor were also perpetuated. For example, it was noted that "sloth and refinement had to be advanced in the schools to prevent the homes of the poor from being a receptacle of filth ... " Poverty and crime were almost always equated, and evil habits were traced to a lack of instruction for those "whose natural mental powers have been smothered for want of civilization."

Education a Solution

It was felt that education could be the solution for the problems of the poor. Missionary approaches were directed away from distant lands and to "our dear neighbors who are wretched and destitute ... whereby school ... takes the poor, the unfortunate, the vicious, instructors and clothes them; teaches them practically that it is better to be clean and honest than dirty and vicious, ... and starts them on a virtuous line of life ... " To promote the
of a class differential came into being. This was the situation on the urban, rather than rural scene. In urban localities striking disparities in wealth and diversity of occupations sharpened class lines earlier than in less populous districts. Aaron stated:

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EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Problems Developed

As the schools developed, evidence began to appear that there were many problems the schools encountered as they tried to provide a common school experience. Merle Curti, in his study of an American frontier community, noted that many did not participate in the formal educational process because some lived in remote sections, were language barriers for the foreign born, a lack of interest on the part of parents, and that poverty played against education. Though Curti's study was of a small community, many of his conclusions paralleled ideas which were discussed in an article in the *Ohio Journal of Education*. This article dealt with enemies of the common school, placing them into three categories, (1) those unwillinig to be taxed, (2) those unwilling to have their children associate with the vulgar and rude, and (3) those who wanted their children instructed in sectarian religious forms. Asa D. Lord wrote about the disinterest in making repairs to buildings and improving existing facilities. He also discussed the subject of irregular attendance; and in other articles statistics were quoted which showed an absentee record of 20 percent of those enrolled in the Cincinnati schools. By 1860 certain statistics showed that less than half of those eligible to attend schools were enrolled. Such variables as illness, bad roads, and the lack of shoes kept many children from the schools each year.

Perhaps some of this disinterest existed because the schools were not serving the needs of all the groups for whom they were intended. The leaders of the common school movement believed in and supported the concept of a school common to all people, where a common educational program could advance common values and aspirations of a democratic society. This did not provide an opportunity for education in terms of different individual's particular needs or values. The concept of providing for community was not fully realized for certain groups.

Though the leadership group was well-meaning, even they recognized that they did not achieve what had been intended. The Ohio public school system was never able to provide true equality of educational opportunity for all—it served only one class. Its problem has been and still continues to be that it is a common school, with common goals trying to create a community for a society whose needs are not necessarily common. Until it begins to provide for the diversity of the population through purpose and program, it will encounter difficulty in achieving its goals. The uncommonness of the common school will continue to preclude the possibility of equality of educational opportunity, now as then.

FOOTNOTES

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EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A critical look at ‘creative needs’ and ‘mental health’ as goals in art education.

Goals for Art Education

By Mary Ann Stankiewicz

Art education shares some goals with general education. For this reason, art educators can benefit from critical analysis of educational goals by philosophers of education. The reverse may also be the case; some examinations of art educational goals may have value for general education. This paper is an attempt to look critically at “creative needs” and “mental health” as goals in education, specifically art education. Although my examples of goal statements will be taken from writings in the field of art education, similar goals are found in general education. Three conceptual analyses by philosophers of education will be used in this examination: Boyd Bode on the concept of needs in education; R.S. Peters on mental health as an educational aim; and J.P. White on the concept of creativity. This paper will not only suggest some problems with a certain sort of educational goal but also point to some relationships between philosophical analysis of educational goals and curricula.

One common goal for the teaching of art in public schools states that children have certain needs, including the need to be creative. These needs must be met so that children will develop into fully-functioning, mentally healthy adults. In this goal, three notions, human needs, creativity, and mental health as an aim of education, are linked in a means to ends relationship. While these notions are often found in art education, they are not limited to an education. The notion that one goal of education is to meet children’s needs was frequently espoused by Progressive educators during the 1920s and 1930s. A more contemporary example can be found in the British Plowden Report, which brought the notion of “the open classroom” to the attention of educators. The Plowden Report proposed planning education in terms of children’s needs, some of which are listed below:

- Children need to be themselves, to live with other children and with grownups, to learn from their environment, to enjoy the present, to get ready for the future, to create and to love, to learn to face adversity, to behave responsibly, in a word, to be human beings.

Writing on creative needs as a goal for art education reached a zenith during the 1940s in the work of such authors as Natalie Cole, Victor D’Amico, and Viktor Lowenfeld. However, this same goal can be found in the work of earlier art educators, for example, Margaret Mathias. Mathias had served as elementary art supervisor in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, and as Director of Art in the Public Schools of Montclair, New Jersey. She also taught summer sessions for Kindergartens and first grade teachers at Columbia Teachers College. Mathias was an early proponent of a Progressive philosophy in art education who advocated meeting children’s needs through art. She declared that art teachers should make children’s art needs their first concern. One sort of art needs were creative needs:

This drive to respond to experience we call creative power. At one time creative power was thought to exist in only a few people. Now we believe that every one has creative power. And, further, the psychologist shows us that every one must have opportunity to create if he is to have wholesome development. When we think over our own experience, we realize our satisfaction in making something which we ourselves have thought of, and for which we feel responsible, and which we are able to carry through to completion. This satisfaction we recognize as one of the highest and most dependable of human enjoyments.

Therefore, our first and most important reason for teaching art is to help each individual develop his creative power.

In Mathias’ terms, art is the response to experience through materials, a definition derivative of her mentor John Dewey. Mathias distinguished two sorts of creative needs: a drive to respond to experience and a desire to make things. Together these constituted “creative power,” a notion taken from the writings of Arthur Wesley Dow. Not only does our creative power give us enjoyment, but according to psychology, exercise of creative power is necessary to healthy growth. Therefore, the development of creative power is the most important goal of art education.

Creative power is, according to Mathias, a human need. But, what do we mean when we talk about “needs”? Boyd Bode in 1938 pointed out that what we call “needs” are the same as wants or desires. The label “need” was used in Progressive Education to legitimize certain wants. Bode asked how one determined which wants ought to be legitimized as “needs,” and concluded that, given conflicting wants, a decision was best made in reference to an end within the context of a program or philosophy. Thus, an educator who begins the process of curriculum de-
development by looking at student "needs" is working backward. The correct place to begin, according to Bode, is by asking about the ends of education.

Given Bode's analysis of the concept of needs in education, we can see one problem with Mathias' statement of a goal for art education. She conceived of creative power as a human need and began curriculum development from this "need." Since the need is only legitimate in terms of some end, Mathias is merely talking about children's desire to create unless she makes reference to some end and to a framework within which such desires might be legitimized as needs. One end met via creative power is enjoyment: Making art and looking at art are satisfying and via creative power as a human need began development from this "need." Since the need is only legitimate in terms of some end, Mathias is merely talking about children's desire to create unless she makes reference to some end and to a framework within which such desires might be legitimated as needs. One end met via creative power is enjoyment: Making art and looking at art are satisfying and enjoyable activities according to Mathias. While we might all agree on the enjoyment to be found in such activities, most of us would probably hesitate before recommending enjoyment as the principle aim of education. Certainly, we want the student to enjoy learning, but teaching a subject with only the goal of enjoyment seems frivolous in these days of "back to basics." However, enjoyment is not the only end served by the creative needs. Mathias tells us that psychologists have shown creative needs necessary to healthy development. Teaching art as a means to healthy growth seems, at first glance, a sounder goal than art for enjoyment.

II

Generally, a psychologist focuses his interest on mental development. The result of wholesome mental development is a state referred to as "mental health." Thus, Mathias has legitimized creative wants into "creative needs" within a psychological framework with mental health as an aim for education. R.S. Peters has analyzed the concept of mental health as an aim for education, so let us refer to his discussion. 8

Mental health as an educational aim is just one aspect of the modern trend of looking to science for values, according to Peters. "Mental health" appears to offer a norm which might function as a goal. In Peters' analysis, "mental health" refers to the development and regulation of wants in a realistic, undistorted, and comparatively conflict-free manner. The psychologist who holds "mental health" as a norm is not telling us which wants are worth satisfying, but rather that wants should be regulated to some extent so that conflicting wants can be avoided. Most of the qualities psychologists list under the heading "basic needs" are of the sort described above and can be subsumed under rationality or mental health; the notion of self-actualization is slightly different. 9

The concept of self-actualization is found in the writings of Abraham Maslow, a psychologist whose work has influenced humanistic education. According to Maslow, the hierarchy of basic human needs has as its base physiological needs which must be met for survival of the organism. The hierarchy moves upward to safety, love, and esteem needs, and is topped by the need for self-actualization.10 Maslow's definition of a healthy individual is one who has met all the basic needs of "a man who is thwarted in any of his basic needs may fairly be envisaged simply as a sick man." 10 Self-actualization, the need to "become everything that one is capable of becoming," is met by very few individuals according to Maslow. 11 Perhaps this lack is due to the complexity of self-actualization: components include more efficient perception of reality, spontaneity, ability to center on problems, quality of detachment, and creativeness, among others. 12 Maslow's hierarchy of basic human needs might be visualized as a flight of steps. Only the human being standing on the top step, who has met all his basic needs can, according to Maslow, be considered mentally healthy. Since art education offers opportunities to meet one's creative needs, art education claims a share in meeting the educational aim of mental health.

To Peters, self-actualization implies more than mental health and the satisfaction of basic needs; it implies growth, extending the self toward goals higher than subsistence. Thus, it seems odd to include self-actualization as a necessary part of mental health, as Maslow did, since we can have mental health without self-actualization. As Peters writes, "though people may be missing a lot that they might find satisfying if they don't devote themselves to art, music, and good causes, it is odd to describe them as mentally ill." 13 Certainly we do not usually limit the state of mental health to the few individuals who are self-actualizing according to Maslow.

From Peters' analysis we can see that "mental health" is not a sound goal for education, suggesting as it does the regulation of some human wants at a minimum level necessary for functioning within some system. Asserting that education should seek to develop people who can maintain a state of mental health is a negative counsel which ignores the function of education in the transmission of culture, according to Peters. Education is neither medicine nor therapy. "The main function of the teacher is to train and instruct; it is not to help and cure," writes Peters. 14 Even speaking of social improvement as a goal for education does not logically imply individual mental health. Although society, as a whole, may not be able to regulate wants, individuals within that society may be rational. And, vice versa, although each individual may possess rationality, to assume that the group possesses rationality is to commit the fallacy of composition. 15

If meeting human needs is not sufficient as a goal for education, and "mental health" also falls short, can the goal of developing creativity serve as a sound goal for art education?

III

The writers of the Plowden Report, like many other educators, assert that children want to create. Many art educators, for example, Margaret Mathias, have claimed creativity as their special domain. The artist is, after all, the paradigm for the notion of creation. 16 Aestheticians often speak of art as creation of a new world, a new reality, or a new realm of possible emotions. The artist gives this new world form through various media. Like the adult artist, the young child draws, paints, or models when supplied with appropriate materials. Thus, the art educator who supplies the child with crayons, paints, paper, and clay and who encourages the child to make pictures and clay figures will often tell you that his/her goal is to develop the child's creativity.

From Bode's analysis, we know that "creative needs" can be distinguished from simply wanting to create only within a framework with some end in view. From Peters' analysis, we know that if the end which legitimizes meeting creative needs through education is a concept of mental health as an aim for education, then we have some problems. If "creativity" is part of "mental health," that is, if all human beings must be creative in order to function at a level of rationality, then developing creativity cannot serve as an educational goal. It is merely a standard for

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minimum functioning. If, on the other hand, "creativity" is more than a norm such as "mental health," then it may logically serve as a goal for education.

J.P. White in his analysis of "creativity" suggests that a paradigm case of creativity would be Einstein as a scientist or Dostoevsky as a novelist. In either of these cases, "creativity" refers to some sort of product, not to some inner state. If Dostoevsky had left no record of written work, we would find it difficult to evaluate him as a creative person. The product is creative, not in isolation, but within some field of endeavor with certain standards, according to White. The standards are necessary in order to determine if the work under consideration is impressively different from the average range of works in that field. We do not usually speak of the designer of a production line car as an exemplar of creativity, but we might well point to the designer of the Bricklin as an example of creativity in automotive engineering.

"Creativity" seems to function in two ways, to describe and to evaluate. In White's analysis, "creativity" is more than minimum performance in some area. Therefore, developing students who can do outstanding work in science or the arts might well be a viable goal for education. If we were to talk about a person displaying creativity, not in the arts or in science, but in regulating their wants (what Peters described as mental health), then we would, given White's analysis of the term, have to be talking about functioning at an impressive level. The person who displayed creativity in regulating wants would have to go beyond minimum functioning. Thus, creativity cannot logically be a necessary part of a minimum standard for mental health, but it might serve as a goal for education.

IV

When we return to Mathias with the information garnered from our three philosophers of education, we can elucidate her goal of meeting children's creative needs. First, these "creative needs" are wants. Children want to respond to experience and to make things. Second, these wants are legitimated as "needs" only in terms of some end within a context. "Mental health" cannot function as an educational end because it is merely a negative counsel, describing minimum rational functioning. Developing curricula which provide children with opportunities to make and to respond so that they can be mentally healthy confuses education with therapy. When the desires to make and to respond are set in a context with "creativity" as an end, the situation changes. "Creativity" implies going beyond a minimum performance; it implies a product which is impressive when measured against some standards. "Creative power" in art education, then, would imply making art that is impressive when evaluated by standards within the art world. "Creative power" in response would imply a sophisticated ability to react to experience rather than a naive response.

Mathias may be correct in saying that all people want to make things and to respond to experience. Her use of "creative" legitimizes these wants, not as a means to mental health, but as a means to artistic performance and appreciation at an impressive level. All people may be able to make art and to appreciate art, but not all will do so impressively when judged according to the standards set by various theories of art. The implication of White's analysis of "creativity" is that only some people can be called creative in any given field. Thus, Mathias contradicts White if she seeks to make everyone a creative artist.

If creativity, as White has analyzed it, is a goal for art education, then certain consequences follow. First, students need opportunities not only to make art and to respond to art, but also to learn standards for achievement in art. Thus, art history as the study of past artistic achievements, art criticism as the study of current standards in art, and aesthetics as the study of values in art would seem appropriate in a curriculum with the goal of developing creativity. Second, the art educator should certainly try to help each student become creative, but not all students can achieve that goal. Third, curricula which focus on self-expression, permitting the student to make whatever he/she wants without any standards would seem to be, not paradigms of creativity in art education, but rather misunderstandings of the concept. A parallel conclusion would seem to apply to education in general. Creativity may be a viable goal, but curricula which ignore standards of achievement and permit students to "do their own thing" with no provision for evaluation cannot logically claim to be developing creativity.

NOTES

1 Quotation marks around a term denote discussion of the concept.


13 Ibid., p. 57.

14 Ibid., p. 46.

15 Ibid., p. 192.

16 Ibid., pp. 153-170.


18 Ibid., p. 102.


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Roots of traditional progressivism still offer the best basis of building a sound view of education.

Educational theory in the remainder of the century

By Jerome A. Popp

As we enter the 1980s it seems appropriate to reflect upon the nature of our inquiry—as it was, is, and should be in the future. I want to suggest that it is time to seriously reconsider the tenets of educational progressivism. I will not be suggesting that we simply identify educational progressivism as it existed in the first 20 years of this century and restate it in the last 20 years; what I hope to show is that the roots of traditional progressivism still offer the best basis for building a sound view of education for now and the future. It behooves us to view our work as growing out of traditional progressivism and toward a neopressivism.

1 The Present Scene

At this time we can look around and find: “humanistic education”—the “hands off” view of pedagogy and schooling—wobbling without a clear direction. Perhaps its followers have made their points and are now at a loss as to what to do next. This is plausible, for humanistic doctrine is philosophically thin, lacking the comprehensiveness or penetration to support prolonged action. I shall return to this view in the third section of the present paper.

The transmissionist or impositional view—humanism’s historical adversary—seems to be healthy with educational technology, i.e., the technology of pedagogical imposition, continuing to attract great audiences. The brutishness of imposition reflected in the Hoosier’s School Master’s reading, riting, and ‘rithmetic taught to the tune of a hickory stick, seems to be in vogue again in “back to basics.” It seems to me that the transmission view with its ever-present technology is presently in position of the greatest momentum with regard to schooling and school policy-making. If we educators allow the present trend to fulfill itself we can expect to find impositional theory dominating the 1980s.

Optimists will say that humanistic education is less noticeable at present because many of its principles have become internalized by the establishment. Yet anyone who is at all sensitive to the notion of logical consistency must doubt this; how can humanistic principles be internalized by teachers who are taking more and more of an educational technological view of things?

If impositionalism is to continue to dominate pedagogical practice, then we must be prepared to accept its consequences. In modern social life, more than any other time in human history, imposition is met with resistance. Conceptually, imposition and resistance are reciprocal notions. When you are imposed upon, you resist; when school children and young adults are imposed upon they resist. The transmission theory and its impositional practice clearly identifies imposition. We are less familiar with its reciprocal resistance. But let us examine it.

Resistance can take two basic forms: active and passive. Active resistance attempts to disrupt the imposition, weakening its impact. Passive resistance allows imposition to manifest itself but seeks to lessen its impact by giving it no target. In school, active resisters are “discipline problems,” while passive resisters are “motivation problems.” School authority knows how to deal with active resistance. But passive resistance is enigma. Passive resistance draws no punishment, just ignore. Yet, passive resistance has its price—it’s boring.

Recent attention has focused upon the use of drugs by secondary, junior high and even elementary students. Is it not possible that through the use of drugs the docility required by transmissional imposition becomes bearable? As far as I can determine, no drug usage studies exist which consider the type of pedagogy as an independent variable. Yet, is it not plausible that drug usage is rendered effective given the impositional nature of the schooling environment? This is a significant area of empirical research which, as I see it, deserves our attention in the 1980’s. If, as I am suggesting, drug usage is patterned according to pedagogical imposition, then this alone is evidence against impositionism in schooling.

2. The Transmission View of Schooling

There has always been with us, from Protagoras to Gagne, a transmission view of pedagogy and schooling. If one asks the average adult or undergraduate, “What are the purposes of the school or teaching?” one invariably receives a traditional transmissionist account of the ends of schooling. This tradition is quite strong and dominates, as near as I can tell, the thinking of the typical person. Yet, transmissionism has not remained static and was noticeably modified at the midpoint of this century. For this reason it is best to review transmissionism in two parts: traditional and modern.

Traditional Transmissionism

In the time of the ancients, there were established cultural facts and values into which children could be initiated. Since the content transmitted was stable and noncontroversial, the initiation process seemed straightforward. By the late nineteenth century, John Dewey
challenged this process. His classic Democracy and Education and his equally important Interest and Effort in Education, both published in the second decade of the twentieth century, constituted formidable opposition to straight transmissionism.

The end of transmissionism, (i) a body of knowledge and skill, and (ii) standards of conduct, whether pursued by the "Effort Theory" (or formal discipline) or the "Interest Theory" (or sugar coating the bitter pill) was attacked by Dewey in the classic argument that the object was assumed to be apart and alien to the developing child, and that all experience with children denied this assumption. As an alternative view, a new view of schooling was propounded—progressive education.

While Dewey's arguments keep traditional transmissionism on the ropes for the first third of the twentieth century—i.e., it was never knocked out—the extreme child-centered wing of the Progressive Education Association undermined his attack. After all, if the project of study was part of the child's nature, why not keep hands-off and let things unfold according to nature's plan? Dewey's attack on the impositionism of the transmission view ironically cleared the way for permissivism. Dewey, of course, was attacking both impositionism and the romantic hands-off approach when he claimed "psychologized" the child. Yet when one reads his words today, the attack upon the impositionism of transmission thinking seems to receive the heaviest blows.

Modern Transmissionism

At midcentury Ralph Tyler laid out his curriculum technology and it received a strong positive response. There had been earlier transmissionists who sought efficiency, but by Tyler's time there seemed to be less opposition. Tylerian technology sought to improve outcomes by improving means.

A decade later The Process of Education appeared, which of course originated the "structure of the disciplines movement" in curriculum development. If we could clarify the ends, the means would follow. Aim for the basic structure, and children will be released somehow to become little scientists and mathematicians. Child psychologists were out and Ph.D.'s. from the disciplines were in. It is as if the arts and sciences professors had finally won over professors of education, and they walked with arrogance through the captured public schools.

Yet things did not go as predicted. In 1971 Bruner, in "The Process of Education Revisited," took it all back. I believe I would be quite satisfied to declare, if not a moratorium, then something of a de-emphasis on matters that have to do with the structure of history, the structure of physics, the nature of mathematical consistency, and deal with it rather in the context of the problems that face us."

If Einstein could ask Newton's forgiveness for being right, Bruner should have asked for Dewey's for being wrong.

While the structure of the disciplines movement has faded in science and mathematics, it is somewhat alive in philosophy. From Kohlberg's moral development theory and Lipman's Philosophy for Children movement, one expects to find some teachers viewing value and moral education the way the structure of the disciplines teachers viewed their subjects. I am not claiming that Kohlberg or Lipman and their theoretical associates are "Jonnie-come-lately's" to Brunerism. This is not the case. But I am concerned that some users of these ideas may fall into the same view as the earlier Brunerites: namely, some may come to view their task as trying to get the student to discover or build the basic structures of moral reasoning like math and physics were supposed to be built. Whether we should have moral curricula, or what form they should take is not my point: only want to warn against making the same mistakes contained in the structure of the disciplines approach—thinking that curriculum and materials are all that are required, while ignoring educational psychology and teacher effectiveness research.

By the late 1960's, behaviorism and educational technology (actually pedagogical technology) were growing strong. As the structure of the disciplines movement faded, the void in the foundations of transmissionism was filled with behaviorist technology. Transmissionism was back to looking at its means again with the ends becoming of less concern. Philosophers will consider the behaviorist version of transmissionism its most acceptable form, for it emphasizes individual differences in its principle that what is reinforcing for one may not be so for another, and for its emphasis on positive reinforcement and banishment of punishment. At present, behaviorism seems alive and well. I shall return to it later.

3. The Romantic View of Schooling

An alternative to the transmission view, romantic permissivism, views childhood as complete in and of itself, requiring not active intervention but protection from intervention. Intervention is equated with "imposition." The earlier forms of romanticism and its unfolding view of human development are familiar. Romanticism is often accused of being based upon a biological growth metaphor, but this is inaccurate for there was no metaphor intended. Currently the romantic conception of pedagogy has taken two forms: "humanistic" education and developmentism.

Humanistic Education

Humanistic education, as it is erroneously labeled, is said to derive from third force psychology. Maslow has led the way with Rogers contributing somewhat, and Combs influencing curriculum theory. Maslow is a neo-Aristotelian with selfactualization as the Final Cause for persons; philosophically this brand of determinism will simply not wash. It leads to all sorts of binders such as confusions over the meaning of "can" and "ought," and the role and nature of free choice. His "hierarchy of needs" grounds his straight line determinism, making the evaluations of alternative directions unnecessary. In surely one of his most absurd moments he equates the development of a child with that of a flower and kitten. I will not embarrass you with an analysis of this absurdity.

K.P. Morgan once referred to Schwab as the Pied Piper of Curriculum theory, but I have another candidate: Arthur W. Combs. As he recently put it, "The Humanistic Movement ... is a revolution in human thought, a necessary occurrence in the sweep of human events." We, of course, do not know the historical scope of this enlightenment. But it seems to be third force enlightenment. As he sees it, we are faced with a choice between two systems of thinking: one open, one closed. We are at the fork in the road. We, in education, always seem to be at a fork or a crossroad; actually, I think we are, and have been
Developmentalism

The word 'development' under Piaget's influence has taken on a special meaning. 'Development' suggests to most educationists 'developmentalism'. The latter is a hybrid form of innatism. Piaget is a neo-Kantian. Kant viewed the mind as innately structured in his doctrine of synthetic a priori truths. Piaget objects claiming that Kant was talking about the most mature minds. But these structures are not in place at birth. Rather, they develop in three or four distinct stages.

But why do they develop? Children encounter experience and sooner or later become disequilibrated. Their cognitive structures do not move well at explaining experience. This does not depend on individual purposes. Disequililibrium is solely biological—a dysfunctional organism—environment relationship.

How do these structures develop? Through assimilation and accommodation equilibration is reestablished. Assimilation is the process of coming at experience. It is what the person can do or make of the environment. Accommodation is what the environment makes of the person. Through accommodation one modifies one's structures, producing more adequate assimilations. Empiricists erred, according to Piaget, believing that accommodation could go on without its complementary assimilations. Kant erred in the opposite direction by focusing on assimilation and omitting the point that accommodation was also going on. We might say that Kant discovered assimilation processes through his trying to accommodate rationalism and empiricism thinking, while Piaget discovered accommodation by trying to assimilate both Kant's thinking and children's thinking.

Philosophically, Piaget is a neo-Kantian committed to synthetic a priori truths. Within contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of mind this is untenable. He ignores the synthetic and analytic functions of beliefs. I believe that this omission is generated by his rejection of human purpose and his complete dependence on biology as the basis of knowing. The issues here are historically wide and philosophically deep, and cannot be settled in this or any other short paper. All I want to establish is that Piagetian theory is based upon a rationalist conception of mind. Serious educational theorists should not commit to Piaget's views or suggestions without careful philosophical analysis of Piaget's basic assumptions. The further analysis of Piaget has to be a high agenda item for the 1980s.

4. Traditional Progressivism

Under Dewey the progressive alternative took its basic shape. As I read him he sought to give a systematic, comprehensive, consistent account of the student, pedagogy, curriculum content, and the school and its social context. In other words, he envisioned educational theory as giving an account of four factors, which may be thought of as follows:

![Diagram of educational considerations]

To ignore any one of these four was to court disaster.

But how can these factors be approached theoretically? Dewey's account of educational theory was based upon three fundamental theoretical factors: education, democracy and inquiry. Again I will present a bit of geometry.

Education is, of course, the highest value by which all else is to be evaluated. The criterion of growth is the theoretical absolute by which all else is measured. This, by the way, is what the psychological humanism of the 1970s was in its feeble way trying to get at but could not because of its ignoramus of philosophy. Education was achieved, according to Dewey, by inquiry or on the personal level and democracy on the social level. Only under the conditions of democracy is adequate inquiry possible; but this was not the argument. Only under democratic conditions could the criterion of growth be fully achieved. Democracy frees both education and inquiry. Democracy provides the social conditions for education, which frees inquiry, which allows for the reconstruction of experience, i.e., education.

Through philosophical analysis, Dewey tried to elaborate the nature of these three theoretical factors. Many of his writings are well-known, but it seems, poorly understood. If I may be so brash to criticize a few

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lines his over thirty books and thousands of papers, I want to suggest that his weaknesses are to be found in two areas; one of which I give him no responsibility—in fact he contributed very positively to it, and another which I attribute to him great responsibility. The first of these is educational psychology. Dewey was not practicing science yet he gave it many important ideas. At Dewey's time educational psychology was just emerging under Thorndike who was, of course, a transmissionist. No educational psychology was on the scene which was based upon operative assumptions. Dewey was developing the progressive theory, but he could hardly be expected to develop it in all areas.

The second weakness in progressivism was of his making. In his desire to put together all that was separate he went, in my view, too far in his account of inquiry. As Chuck Brauner observes, before 1911 Dewey viewed inquiry as being of two pieces: one which served practical purposes and one which served scientific purposes. But by 1929, "Dewey welded those two approaches to experimentation into a new approach to the idea of a discipline of education." Contemporary logic questions the sagacity of this approach. Some philosophers of science want to render asunder what Dewey sought to put together; theoretical and practical wisdom. As I shall argue, this approach has warrant. In current educational research there is a good deal of interest in separating theoretical and "evaluation" studies. This distinction by the way has been much clearer than the old basic/applied distinction over was.

5. Sources of a Neo-Progressivism

Stated negatively, the transmission and romantic views give us an impetus to seek alternatives. More positively, the weaknesses in traditional progressive thinking are at present remedial. Contemporary psychology and philosophy, in my view, offer possibilities for reconstructionist progressivism. As Ryle once said of Hume, many have mistaken his footsteps for his destination, one could also say this of Dewey.

Psychological Sources

Psychological thinking during the golden age of progressivism was bifurcated into behaviorism and what Dewey called "psychologizing" the child by various forms of animism. Behaviorism has continued to grow reaching full maturity under B.F. Skinner. G.H. Mead once commented that behaviorism was part of the "stimulus for a pragmatist philosophy." There has always been an affinity between behaviorism and pragmatism; however, the two parted company on the question of the role of human purpose and the related notion of consciousness in explaining behavior. Pragmatism viewed behaviorism as too narrow and hence incomplete.

Within the development of psychology, there has developed an alternative form of behaviorism which departs from the basic tradition from Watson to Skinner. Bandura's "Social Learning Theory" represents a refinement of Tolman's "purposive behavior" which was itself a psychological theory more in line with progressivism. I believe that Bandura's approach to psychology offers a scientific study of behavior which is based upon a metaphysics which is consistent with the earlier progressive views of human nature. Furthermore, I believe that Bandura's views offer us a scientific view of learning and experience which can provide for the development of a progressive theory of education. The earlier progressivism's educational psychology was adumbrated but never developed into an ongoing area of scientific inquiry.

I am claiming that Bandura provides us with this actualized inquiry. Thus, a soft spot in traditional progressivism is presently remedial. Bandura's Social Learning Theory bolsters progressive thinking and fills a gap which Dewey had to accept—but which we no longer have to.

In his recent book, Social Learning Theory, Bandura briefly discusses the alternative conceptions of social interaction. This attempt seems to clarify the nature of social interaction as it functions as a basic metaphysical framework for his scientific endeavors. He claims that, "behavior, other personal factors, and environmental factors all operate as interlocking endeavors. He claims that, "behavior, other personal factors, and environmental factors all operate as interlocking determinants of each other."

A valid criticism of extreme behaviorism is that, in a vigorous effort to avoid spurious inner causes, it has neglected determinants of behavior arising from cognitive functioning. Because some of the inner causes involved by theorists over the years have been ill-founded does not justify excluding all internal determinants from scientific inquiry.

Bandura is attempting to broaden the behaviorist framework by opening the metaphysical locus standi to the existence of "internal" factors without explaining behavior in terms of antecedents as various innatist theories do. He is searching for an organism-environment relationship which is not one dimensional as are both environmentalist and antecedent accounts. Note how this view is congruent with the hyphenated reality view held by Dewey. That is, Dewey rejected both the innalist or antecedent view, and the radical environmentalist view of how behavior is explained. Innatism locates the determinants of behavior within the organism, while environmentalism places these solely within the environment. Dewey argued that behavior is best explained by appeal to, and the analyses of, the relationships which form between the organism and the environment of that organism. Consciousness is one of these relationships between an organism and a part of the environment or "situation," as Dewey called it. Purpose is another. It seems to me that it is precisely this explanatory methodology which Bandura and his associates are investigating.

My purpose here is not to review and critique Social Learning Theory from a progressive point of view. All I want to do is to indicate how this theory enhances traditional progressivism. My argument is stronger, however, than simply showing the theoretical compatibility of Bandura and Dewey. Social Learning Theory is worthy of our attention for other reasons.

Skinner, in his behaviorist analysis of ordinary language (About Behaviorism, 1974), admits the existence of reflective thinking but claims that it is covert behavior which is modeled on overt behavior. "The words used to describe covert behavior are the words acquired when behaving publicly." Skinner also claims that the observation of covert behavior is easy but does not tell us just how this is to be accomplished. For all of his careful analysis of many terms used in and around psychology, he says very little about covert behavior. Skinner's push for logical completeness seems to be having the effect of revealing an incompleteness in his theory, and possibly opening up radical behaviorism to the arguments of traditional progressivism. Behaviorism is thus by no
Philosophical Sources

As I have already indicated, I believe that the main weakness in Dewey's philosophy was his movement in logic away from his earlier distinction between practical and epistemological ends for inquiry. His holding to the ultimate value, growth, in no way undermines the warrant for separating two distinct kinds of thinking. Obviously we expect that theoretical thinking will observe the criterion of growth (growth in theory); but it is also possible to view practical inquiry as also respecting the criterion of growth—thus, producing practical growth. It will be remembered that in Experience and Education Dewey argued that no other requirements need be added to the notion of growth to justify or warrant a line of development; the criterion of growth was both necessary and sufficient. This argument—the argument from education or growth—separates Dewey from the maladjusted or antecedent views of educational theory, neo-Aristotelian like Maslow and neo-Kantians like Piaget, and clearly establishes an alternative orientation or framework for educational theory. My point is that while the criterion of growth is both necessary and sufficient for judging the worthwhileness of any line of development, it does not make any line of development the only warranted one. Development can take many legitimate forms; that is, whether a child decides to become a physician, a teacher, a nuclear engineer, or an administrator, the criterion of growth is satisfied if and only if what one learns or what habits one forms allow for continued growth. This is not a philosophy of specialization. The professions, at present, are all reviewing themselves and finding that they have interpreted their roles too narrowly. Dental students are, for example, being told that they do not work solely on teeth, and that they must consider how the patient thinks and feels. The practice of dentistry requires the continued growth in the techniques of dentistry of course, but it also requires growth in the knowledge and understandings of one's patients' environmental situations.

Within the context of educational inquiry, the criterion of growth can be adhered to without forcing all inquiry into one methodology. Theoretical and practical inquiry are distinguishable, and this distinction does no violence to the foundations of pragmatism. In fact Dewey's failure to retain this distinction led him to describe in his Sources of a Science of Education, 1929, a methodology which was quite inhibiting to the growth of the science of pedagogy.

In several papers I have tried to show that some of the arguments from philosophy of science aimed at the middle of induction have great significance for how we view our work in education. The arguments given by Levi and Maxwell—which I shall call the Levi-Maxwell thesis—make it very clear that empirical goals or methods require methods quite different from those required for the successful pursuit of practical goals. Since I have reviewed these arguments within the context of pedagogical research elsewhere, I will here only briefly describe this approach.

What Maxwell succeeded in doing was to show us now to deal with the problems of selecting and modifying a metaphysical framework within which empirical science may be profitably conducted. Maxwell argues against Kuhn and Popper holding that it is possible to reconstruct our assumptions about rationality in light of our research experience with them. He specifies the rules for so doing in his "metamethodology." These rules grow out of his view of science as aim-oriented; or in Levi's words, "the aims of inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences." Thus, for both Lev and Maxwell, science must constantly be re-evaluating its goals or ends in light of scientific experience with them. Maxwell goes beyond Levi, in showing us how metaphysical assumptions are necessary for, but controlled within, scientific inquiry.

It is clear from this literature that Levi and Maxwell are working with a means-ends analysis of science, and are properly seen in the tradition of pragmatist philosophy. They have developed a neopragmatist analysis of scientific inquiry. Their arguments have a fairly direct bearing upon the direction and foundations of both empirical educational research and philosophy of education. Since progressivism in educational theory historically rested upon pragmatist conceptions of psychology and philosophy, and since there is warrant to claim that the Levi-Maxwell thesis offers a neopragmatist foundation of scientific inquiry, I believe that there is reason to hold that the foundations for a neo-progressive philosophy in educational theory are at this time in place rendering a neo-progressive view of education and schooling readily producible. The required neo-progressive philosophy is now in place.

5. Conclusion

I have tried to show the serious educationalist that there are good reasons to give attention to a neo-progressive theory of education. Ideas rooted in Dewey and enhanced by current research in psychology and philosophy provide the raw materials for us to begin to carve out a new conception of schooling for the 1980s which is worthy of a nation which has given leadership to the world in both science and democracy. The conditions are such that to view the earlier progressivism as nothing more than history reflects an ignorance of both the past and the present. The future which this ignorance can write is not worthy of us. The intellectual elements are at hand to allow us—if we are really desirous and willing to make the great effort—to recast the schools, teaching, studying, and administration into forms where children and young adults will want to go to school, study, and inquire; where teachers will want to meet their classes and tell their medical and legal counterparts that they are public school teachers; where principals and superintendents will smile at their students and teachers, and not be asking whether more armed guards are required to walk.
their halls, where parents will see the schools they pay dearly for at centers for inquiry and not the narcotics market place. I put it to you that these things can be; but we, the educational theorists, will have to let them be through our coming to grips with what the present offers us.

Notes
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Origins of the Modern School System

The demoralization of education took place for two reasons: to provide the modern state with enlightened citizens and to train an efficient work force. In the nineteenth century, political considerations predominated; educational reform went hand in hand with the broadening of the suffrage, the disestablishment of religion, and the establishment of republican institutions. Like these other innovations, the common school system grew out of the democratic revolution, which created a new type of citizenship based on equality before the law and limited government—a "government of laws, not men." The model citizen of early republican theory knew what his rights were and defended them from infringement by his fellow citizens and by the state. He could not be fooled by demagogues or overawed by the learned obsessions of professional wise men. Appeals to authority left him unimpressed. Always on the alert for forgery, he had, moreover, enough worldly wisdom about men's motives, understanding of the principles of critical reasoning, and skill in the use of language to detect intellectual fraud in whatever form it presented itself.

Review

History: neat and messy


There are two sorts of history, neat and messy. Neat history has no rough edges. It is the history that is presented in Charleston Heston movies, James Michener novels and introduction to the history of education texts. From neat history we learn, among other things, that the Roman Empire fell because of its moral turpitude, that the American West was settled by lusty men and women, and that although Vittorio da Feltre (1378-1446) "stands as an example of the best-educated worldly and Christian humanist; he had too little knowledge of science to be considered Promethean." It is pleasant history to read because it confirms for us facts we already know. And, as in the last example cited, if we did not know it before, we have a new fact formulated neatly and conveniently packaged for later reference, as well as fact that fits nicely into what we already know. Is it not a given that it was not until the Scientific Revolution that Western man could be truly Promethean? Neat history, in short, is homogenized history. All events and persons can fit into a few pigeonholes and labelled appropriately. Good kings always bring about civic improvements, codify the laws, and balance the exchequer. Bad kings always dissipate themselves, bankrupt the treasury, and precipitately die of a surfeit of something.

Messy history boils over with human activity and with the ambiguous fact: In messy history we find the virtuous Roman higermugger with the absolute Roman, the savior of the West who got along with the Native Americans and a Vittorio da Feltre in whose school at Mantua "scientific instruction was thought of as indispensable to a liberal education." Messy history does not lend itself to multiple-choice tests because the exceptions are plainly present—both the Victorian and the un-Victorian Victorian may appear in it. Now messy history is not simply a compendium of facts in which chaos reigns. The test of messy history is variety,. . . the events and persons of history were each unique, individual, indistinguishable, different from us, and yet . . . all history is human history, that is to say, intelligible, communicable within broad limits, popular in the ideal sense of the word. Unfortunately, since the days of the too-much-maligned Ellwood P. Cubberly, history of education has tended to be neat. The rough corners are knocked off of the tale of education and we find that, among other possibilities, the history of American Education has been a straight-line progression of clear-eyed men and women who have endeavored to create the democratic school of today (c. 1939), or that American Education has shown how the capitalist system has consistently exploited the poor (c. 1969). An exception to this affinity for neat systematizing is Frederick Rudolph's Curriculum: A History of the American Undergraduate Course of Study Since 1636, which was written at the request of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education. Professor Rudolph attempts to think historically about the undergraduate curriculum since "that time long ago, when a peculiarly self-demanding band of alienated Englishmen got themselves a college almost before they had built themselves a priory." The book has many virtues for someone interested in American education. The writing is stylish and the treatment of the subject is catholic—for example, we find both the famous Harvard and the obscure Eckerd College here. But the virtue that I would most like to celebrate is Professor Rudolph's sense that the strange and the familiar may appear together on the historical stage. He will make sense of what he can but not hide that which he cannot. "If the world does not always make sense," he tells us, "why should the curriculum?" He warns us early on what we may expect as we accompany him in the history: "Thinking about the curriculum historically presents many problems and requires a willingness to accept surprise, ambiguity, and a certain unavoidable messiness."

Let us take a single instance and consider the dilemma that general education has posed for the college curriculum over the last hundred years. Rudolph's account does not resolve the problems of general education into a simple conflict—as, say, between the sciences and the humanities. Rather, we find that the difficulty in the college and university curriculum is associated, among other things, with conditions found in the general culture, in family, church, and community. The difficulty also includes the insatiable ignorance of scientists who seemed not to care to participate in the design of general education programs because "they had carved out prestigious territory of their own" in the curriculum and could afford to ignore their poorer brethren from the humanities. The difficulty even includes the "absence of agreement on the knowledge that should define an educated person." The formula of general education as set forth in a variety of ways during the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's "ran counter to the country's style. Theory outdistanced an earthbound imagination. Yale in 1823 and Harvard in 1945 did not speak the language of the country which they addressed. They might have been 'right,' but truth was beyond authority. It was a function of process, investigation, and experience. General education, on the other hand, was not an expression of the dominant culture. It spoke for a counter-culture that acted as if it were the culture, it was an expression of the 'establishment.'"

Perhaps this brief look at one part of Professor Rudolph's book demonstrates one of the virtues of neat history. Because it sanitizes experience into a few easy categories, it seems to suggest solutions. At the conclusion of the neat history of education already cited, we find the following predictions about the future of education in the United States. The predictions are based...
on the assumption that a particular educational practice will solve certain educational problems:

An "avenue of progress will be in the scientific understanding of what constitutes and sustains human learning, ... The scientific study of the processes of learning and teaching have already brought a new phase of technology into being in the teaching-learning machines. ... "Within the curriculum, at all levels, from primary grades through college and university, it can safely be predicted that there will be increasing opportunity for students to study independently... The emphasis will be on learning how to learn, how to assess information, how to establish inferences, and how to judge critically... Subject matter will also gradually lose its sectarian quality, its specialization in exclusive compartments.""1

On the other hand, the messy variety of history by giving us events, movements of opinions along with their antecedents and concomitants of all varieties, makes solutions to problems appear in a different light. There is an important benefit in this. Where neat history transforms human activity and institutions into a kind of clay to be molded and modeled according to some formula, the messy variety captures the quick-silver nature of those same activities and institutions. If we were dealing with clay we could shape things according to our desires—add a little here, remove some from there; we could quite literally be Formalists. But quick-silver is quite another and less tractable medium. It shimmers and dances. The very act of touching it causes it to slip into unpredictable forms. Our problem therefore is not to shape or model but to find balance among forces and circumstances, and to recast our conceptions to keep them in accord with the ever-changing facts of our experience.

In this sense, then, messy history's virtue is in its formative effect on its reader. "Let man read history and he is not more sure, but wiser. As Travelyan says, 'When a man has studied the history of the Democracy and the Aristocracy of Corcyra [in Thucydides]... his political views may remain the same, but his political temper and his way of thinking about politics may have improved, if he is capable of receiving an impression.'""2 Professor Rudolph's Curriculum is readable and messy—messy enough to be of use in the best sense of the term.

References

4 Barzun, op. cit., pp. 56.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Ibid., p. 12.
8 Ibid., p. 1.
9 Ibid., p. 243.
10 Ibid., p. 255.
11 Ibid., p. 243.
12 Ibid., p. 251.
13 Beck, op. cit., p. 137.

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Review

Major education issues addressed


Since February of 1972, the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education has commissioned, and the American Association for Higher Education has published, a series of reports on major issues facing higher education. Through summarizing and synthesizing the literature on topics under study these reports are designed to present the reader with an understanding of the current issues and recent developments related to higher education.

Recognizing that a research report is very seldom the topic for a book review, this work by Mortimer and Tierney appears to be an exception to that rule. *In the Three “R’s” of the Eighties: Reduction, Reallocation and Retrenchment*, the authors address several of the major issues which face higher education in the coming decade in a fashion which makes this manuscript required reading for faculty, administrators and other policy makers. Writing in a concise and analytic fashion, Mortimer and Tierney review the predictions on the decline in college student population in the 1980s and the implications of such a decline for institutional finance, programs and staffing.

In the first major section of the report the authors review the environment of postsecondary education in the 1980s. An analysis of projections on the traditional college-age population and institutional attempts at identifying alternative markets of “other” student populations is presented. Using these demographic data the authors present an analysis of the impact of enrollment decline on institutional revenues and expenditures. Particular attention is given to the overall impact of enrollment decline on income from tuition and fees and enrollment-driven state support, formulas and the need for alternative sources of revenue to offset the decline in enrollment-based support. The role of federal funding and private philanthropy are addressed as well as the distinct problems of public and private institutions.

The analysis of trends in institutional expenditures draws upon the work of other authors in the field and includes the impact of inflation on institutional costs, the problems created by the labor intensiveness of the education industry, and long-range financial equilibrium problems facing institutions of higher education.

The section of the manuscript which makes the most important contribution to the literature on prospects for the future of higher education in the 1980s is entitled “Reducions, Reallocations and Retrenchments.” In addressing current and future crises related to staff relocations, reallocations and retrenchment due to enrollment decline and financial constraints the authors provide descriptions and analyses of both present policies which have been adopted by institutions and case study examples of institutions which have implemented reduction or retrenchment activities. A significant contribution of this section is the descriptions of alternative actions which are available to institutions facing retrenchment challenges. While many institutional leaders view financial exigency as the raison d’etre for retrenchment activities, the authors cite this terminology as little understood and over-utilized. Rather than grasp at panaceas definitions of what an exigent institution is the authors present several case studies of institutions and systems of institutions which faced retrenchment decision-making in order to provide the reader with the philosophical, political, educational and financial precursors of the retrenchment, reallocations, and retrenchment decision-making. A brief analysis of the AAUP policy statements on reduction and retrenchment including legal as well as constitutional implications, provides a fitting, although too concise, summary of the issues faced in times of retrenchment.

In the Summary and Conclusions section, Mortimer and Tierney set forth a series of nine statements, or recommendations, which have implications for understanding and dealing with the uncertainties for post-secondary education in the next decade. For those attempting to gain an initial perspective on the alternatives available to colleges and universities in meeting the twin influences of declining enrollments and diminishing resources this publication is a recommended text. It is well written and easy to understand, but of more importance it provides the reader with a wealth of reference sources for further study.

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