Viewpoint

Values, politics and the schools

Who would deny that values are inherent in schooling or that politics plays an important part in the process of formal education? Yet as obvious as these facts would appear, many otherwise knowledgeable people would deny any essential connection between the two. While they might go so far as to say that schooling, now and in the past, has been frequently infected by political considerations, they would not see these considerations as either necessary or desirable. Thus, the way is cleared for those who would get down to the practical business of teaching, as if hesitating to consider the whys and wherefores of the case were some sort of crime against the young.

The most recent large-scale example of this can be found in the swing of American schooling to the political right. Educational research is now turning up results that support a more conservative social climate, just as in the 1960's it uncovered results that sustained an atmosphere of reform. It is no more accidental than educators are (rediscovering the need for "basic subjects" (to say nothing of moral training) and are bordering the importance of mental discipline and civility, than it was that a decade ago they found out (once again) that "flexibility" and "openness" are essential for sound psychological development and the emergence of an independent and critical mind.

It would be easy to despair, looking at the cyclical nature of these trends. Where normally we would like our values to dictate our politics, it seems that in this case the reverse is true. That is to say, the virtues we promote in the schools appear to be a mere reflection of prevailing political forces. Is there any hope founded on reason that it might be otherwise?

While there may be no simple answer to this question, we need not conclude that the situation warrants cynicism. In the first place, we should recognize the perennial tension in education between its adjustment function and its liberating function. On the one hand, education helps the learner to adapt to the world, to "fit in," so to speak. On the other hand, education works to free the learner from environmental constraints, to develop an inquisitive and critical intelligence that will generate an aptitude for change. An education that could not fulfill both of these functions would be hardly worthy of the name. Yet, in recognizing this, we are acknowledging a conflict which normally we can neither understand nor resolve in purely rational terms.

Living with these circumstances, what alternative do we have other than to trust the dialectical workings of the political process? Where we are unable to achieve a conceptual integration of the contradictory forces in education, where a philosophical synthesis is unattainable, we might still be able to bring about a political synthesis. This would demand, of course, that the political process be appropriately democratic, that political power be distributed and used in a manner that is scrupulously fair. But given this proviso, we might not only find practical solutions to practical problems, but, perhaps too, a basis for dealing with the philosophical perplexities that accompany our involvement in this wondrous business of education.

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Generic behavior and human conduct: Reflections on an educational dilemma

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No special clairvoyance is required to perceive that American education is presently in considerable disarray. The confusion is partly due to piecemeal attempts to respond to "outside" or nonprofessional critics, many of whom have urged that the schools become more flexible in their academic and curriculum requirements, make greater provision for individual differences, promote self-realization and self-identity, and give greater attention to moral and social values—in short, that education become less rigid and more humane. Equally vocal are those critics who would have the schools become primarily purveyors of skills and knowledge, go "back to basics," institute stricter scholastic standards, and establish more uniform criteria of achievement. Neoconservatives have called for various kinds of alternative schools, while neoconservatives have advocated more discipline and greater regimentation within the existing school structure.

But there is also a more "sophisticated" kind of confusion that emanates from among professional educators themselves, who are undecided between conceiving education as an art and conceiving it as a science—with all the ramifications that such a choice entails. To conceive education as an art is to recognize those "non-scientific" aspects of teaching and learning that have to do with theory, aims, norms and ideals that are continually created and reconstructed within the ongoing educational enterprise and that do not readily lend themselves to quantitative assessment. To conceive education as a science is to emphasize the kinds of predictability, uniformity and precision in teaching and learning that are characteristic of the "exact" sciences, of which physics is perhaps the paradigm. What is overlooked when the dilemma is stated in either terms is that education may be viewed as neither exclusively an art nor exclusively a science but as a combination of both, each contributing its proper share.

It should go without saying that the process of education is dependent upon the process of teaching, the process of teaching is linked with the process of learning, and the process of learning is shaped by the purposes for which it is designed. Despite the apparent relatedness of these factors, it is nonetheless possible to have been taught without being educated and to have learned to no purpose. One may, for example, have been taught how to use a screwdriver without the reason being called "educated;" or one may have learned a mathematical theorem that serves no purpose in one's daily life. Coalescence of teaching and learning with the ends that education is designed to serve precludes artificial fragmentation of the educational enterprise and allows for its being conceived as a whole. It is when teaching and learning become divorced from ends that problems arise. Notwithstanding, attention to the nature of learning qua learning is needed before its relationship to both teaching and education can be fully understood.

I. From Mentalism to Behaviorism

During the first two or three decades of this century psychology was struggling to shed its metaphysical garb in order to become a "true" science. It did not wish to remain, as its name implied, a "science of mind." The classical notion of education as a matter of intellectual development or of mind training simply wouldn't do, for mentalism was suggestive of nothing that was amenable to empirical investigation. The then-current dictum that only what was observable was a fit object of scientific scrutiny led psychologists to abandon pursuit of an elusive mind in favor of an almost exclusive concern with behavior. Ontological problems of being were dismissed by contending that whatever exists at all exists in some amount; and if it exists in some amount, it can be measured. Recognition that mental states are nearly always a reflection of bodily states—for example, that eye strain can cause a headache, that physical fatigue can diminish mental alertness, or that a severe blow on the head can cause amnesia—prompted psychologists to perceive that mind and body are not two separate entities, each operating under its own independent laws, but that they function interdependently. Attesting to such recognition was the rise of the whole field of psychosomatic medicine. Physiological psychology thus began to replace mentalistic psychology, and the notion of a mind-body dualism was on its way out. In its urgency to dispose of all traces of mysticism and metaphysics and move toward becoming a "true" science, psychology embraced the thesis that all human behavior was explainable...
in physiological terms. "The tendency to make psychology a study of behavior rather than an introspective analysis of mental states eventually made considerable headway and became known as Behaviorism."  

Instead of being an exclusively mental affair, learning was now understood as a process of physiological conditioning. It meant establishing neural connections by means of which a particular stimulus became associated with a "correct" response. Based upon the findings of the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, most conditioning experiments were performed on rats, dogs, cats, guinea pigs, chicks, and pigeons. Although John B. Watson is generally credited as being the founder of American behaviorism, most pioneer learning experiments in this field were performed by Edward Lee Thorndike, who set forth the thesis that learning was governed primarily by the Law of Exercise and the Law of Effect. The Law of Exercise accounted for the strengthening of stimulus-response (S-R) bonds through repetition; whereas the Law of Effect meant that neural connections were strengthened when a response was pleasant, weakened when it was not. Learning thus became a matter of conditioning the subject (the learner) to supply whatever response the conditioner (the teacher) deemed desirable. Mind was either ignored entirely or reduced to synaptic connections, and even purposes were regarded as merely mechanical. In Thorndike's own words:

I read the facts which psychologists report about adjustment, configuration, drives, integration, purposes, tensions and the like, and all of these seem to me to be reducible, so far as concerns their powers to influence the course of thought or feeling or action, to connections and readiness. Learning is connecting. The mind is man's connecting system. Purposes are as mechanical in their nature as anything else.

Intelligence, insight, understanding, intention and any sort of abstract or affective thought were placed in limbo, for they were not directly observable; while the conditioned response or the reflex arc as it came to be called, became the matrix of learning. Education thus became a matter of conditioning, which in some areas of learning amounted to no less than indoctrination, and the schools were expected to turn out prespecified products in much the same fashion as factories turn out automobiles.

II. Perception and Meaning

Behaviorism has undergone certain modifications since the days of Watson and Thorndike. Phrases such as "positive and negative reinforcement," "operant conditioning," "Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation," "aversive stimuli" and the like have been added to its vocabulary. What remain, however, are the notions that (1) all behavior is specific and identifiable in terms of its causal factors; (2) human behavior is essentially no different from nonhuman behavior except in degree of complexity; (3) human beings, like all other animals, lack freedom; and (4) choice is nonexistent.

What the behaviorist fails to recognize is that all human acts are whole, and not merely the sum of their separate parts. Fragmentation of human acts into their sensory stimulus, ideational and response components—all though tempting for analytic reasons—is both arbitrary and artificial. In so far as human acts are joined with and engaged in for a purpose, they are not simply motor responses to stimuli. The act of seeing, for example, is all one with purposiveness. The object seen is viewed in terms of its meaning, how it is interpreted, the purposes for which it may be used. To see is to-see-for-a-purposed. Viewing the Grand Canyon may mean for the tourist seeing-for-picture-taking purposes; the geologist may view it for the purpose of observing the erosive processes of nature; while Ferde Grofe's "Grand Canyon Suite" may represent its meaning to a composer of music.

No object or set of conditions constitutes a stimulus per se. It becomes a stimulus by being caught up in the process of ideation and response, of which it is an integral part. Stimuli are responses in their incipient stage. Nor are responses merely to stimuli; they constitute stimuli transformed, mediated by the motor phase of the so-called reflex arc. Response requires a reconstitution of stimulus, i.e., an assignment or reassignment of meaning. A stimulus responded to, acted upon, undergoes transformation in terms of the interpretation it is given. Nor can any object or phenomenon be considered a stimulus apart from the eliciting of a response or without its taking into account of the peculiar context in which it appears. A sudden, staccato sound is ordinarily perceived as a stimulus. It alerts us, it annoys us, it commands our attention. We attempt to locate and identify it, to determine whether it is cause for alarm. But if circumstances were such that what is ordinarily perceived as a loud noise is obscured by a steady drone of still louder sounds, it is unlikely that any observable response or motor activity would occur, in which case it would be unwarranted to call the noise a stimulus.

Listening to high-pitched notes being played on a piccolo might be pleasing to the ear of a flutist, and so might be judged as pleasant. A dog hearing the same high-pitched notes responds also, but not with enjoyment. It gives indication that the sounds are displeasing by whining or withdrawing. We are wont to say that the musician and the dog are responding differently to the same stimulus, thus dissociating stimulus from response. But is this truly the case? Are the musician and the dog actually responding to the "same" stimulus? Or, as in the first example, is the stimulus of calling something a stimulus contingent upon the presence or absence of a response and, as in the second example, is the nature of the stimulus part and parcel of the nature of both the response and the responder? As Spinoza once observed, "One and the same thing can at the same time be good, bad and indifferent; e.g., music is good to the melancholy, bad to those who mourn and neither good nor bad to the deaf."

If the synergetic relationship between stimulus and response is still not clearly seen, the question might be raised as to where a stimulus ends and where a response begins. If no satisfactory answer to this question is possible, the only conclusion to be drawn is that a stimulus is one with its response—just as a cause is one with its effect and an organism is one with its environment. In commenting upon the inadequacy of the reflex arc concept, John Dewey has written:

What we have is a circuit, not an arc or broken segment of a circle. This circuit is more truly termed organic than reflex, because the motor response determines the stimulus, just as truly as sensory stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the movement is only for the sake of determining the
stimulus, of fixing what kind of a stimulus it is, of interpreting it."

This is to say that a stimulus and a response are not separate segments of an arc but are reciprocal, each a determinant of and determined by the other. Instead of representing a linear progression, they constitute a circuit, in the language of Dewey:

The stimulus is that phase of the forming co-ordination which represents the conditions which have to be met in bringing it to a successful issue; the response is that phase of one and the same forming co-ordination which gives the key to meeting these conditions, which serves as instrument in effecting the successful co-ordination. They are therefore strictly correlative and contemporaneous.*

To suppose that a given stimulus always presumes a fixed response is to presuppose certainty where uncertainty may exist. To be confronted with an uncertain response—not to know how to respond—is to be confronted with an uncertain stimulus—not to know how to interpret it. A knock on the door ordinarily elicits the response of opening it. But if one has had a prior experience of opening the door to an intruder, both the stimulus and the response take on a character of indeterminacy. The qualitative nature of both is in question, and a choosing among alternatives is called for. Should the knock be interpreted as that of a friend (Stimulus A), in which case the door would likely be opened (Response A); or should it be interpreted as the knock of an intruder (Stimulus B), in which case the door would likely be booted (Response B)? Or are still other interpretations possible, which might call for still other kinds of response? As Dewey states it:

Generalized, sensation as stimulus is always that phase of activity requiring to be defined in order that a co-ordination may be completed. What the sensation will be in particular at a given time, therefore, will depend entirely upon the way in which an activity is being directed. It has no fixed quality of its own. The search for the stimulus is the search for exact conditions of action; that is, for the state of things which decides how a beginning co-ordination should be completed.  

To the nonplayer of the overly tired, a tennis court, racquet, and ball are not a stimulus to play tennis; to the nonsmoker, a cigarette is not a stimulus to smoke; to the satisfied, food is not a stimulus to eat. "...what makes some physical thing or trait a stimulus is the condition of the whole organism at the time, its needs and the kind of behavior in which it is already engaged."

III. Conditioning and Intelligence

The argument is sometimes advanced that human beings and the so-called higher animals have more in common than they have differences. Indeed, a strong case could be made for the contention that the physiological equipment of all mammals is basically the same. All engage in eating, sleeping, locomotion, procreation, living and dying. All likewise confront and resolve problems, i.e., are capable of exercising intelligence. Although nonhuman forms of animal life rely to a considerable extent upon inherited or genetically programmed behavior patterns, commonly referred to as instinct, it cannot be said that human behavior is without its instinctive component. For present purposes, instinct may be taken to mean those special kinds of behavior that are not a result of learning or reasoning but are native to a species—e.g., the web-building instinct of spiders, the nest-building instinct of birds or the storing-of-nuts instinct of squirrels. The fact that squirls have been observed to store nuts persistently even in regions where nuts are available the year round tends to discount the notion that such behavior is consciously purposeful or intelligently directed. It is not a result of reasoning or learning but is endemic to a species, which is largely what is meant by calling it instinctive. The human infant likewise displays such instinctive forms of behavior as crying, reaching and grasping, restlessness, yawning, sleeping, etc. The homely remark that a baby is a yell at one end and complete irresponsibility at the other is nonetheless descriptive of an instinctive rather than a learned behavior pattern. However sophisticated, however subtly or grandiloquently manifested in adult life through the media of art, philosophy, science and religion, it might be maintained that most human endeavors are but highly refined extensions of our inborn tendencies to seek pleasure and satisfaction and to avoid pain and annihilation.

The foregoing argument has its merits, but it also has its share of flaws. One of its merits consists in its compellingly simplistic explanation of human behavior in terms of analogous nonhuman behavior. Its major flaw lies in a confounding of the necessary with the sufficient conditions of human behavior. Physiological equipment is a necessary requirement for thought, judgment, choice, ideation and the like—just as concrete and steel may be necessary requirements for the construction of a building. But physiology itself does not constitute thought, any more than concrete and steel themselves constitute a building. It is what human beings are capable of doing with their physiological equipment that represents their distinctiveness, just as what they may have decided to do with concrete and steel constitutes the distinctiveness of a building. As Psychoanalyst Robert Stoller puts it, "Anatomy is not destiny. Destiny is what people make of anatomy." Nature furnishes the raw materials, but man creates the patterns. The fact that the physiological equipment with which we are born is a necessary condition for intelligence is no guarantee of how intelligent he will be. Exercised, intelligence is not an autonomous possession of human beings which manifests itself in vacuo; nor can it be written off as merely responsive behavior to environing situations. What role, then, does intelligence play in the behavioristic framework?

If, in the words of Dewey, "to act with an aim is all one with acting intelligently," it could scarcely be argued that to respond to the strongest stimulus is all one with responding intelligently. Lewis Terman once defined intelligence as the ability of an organism to adapt to a new situation. In his later years he said that he regretted having used the term "adapt," for it suggested passive response instead of active control. If choice is understood to mean deliberate selection of a preferred course of action, and if intelligent choice implies selection on the basis of considered ends in view, then the absence of choice-making ability is tantamount to the absence of intelligence. To put the matter differently, if by intelligence is meant the ability to choose discriminately among alternative courses of action, then to the extent that ability to choose is diminished or eliminated altogether, intelligence is likewise diminished or eliminated altogether. Whereas selective ability—or what Darwin called "natural selec-
tion"—is a common trait of all matter and all life, at the human level such selective ability has been sufficiently refined as to warrant the term choice, implying that particular kind of selectivity that is conscious, deliberate, reflective and undertaken for the purpose of realizing a foreseeable end. If by conditioning is meant the preprogramming of a response, then it becomes a substitute for deliberation, intelligence, and purposiveness. It leaves out of account the "inner being" of things and deals instead with external relationships only. If not to intelligence, to what do we resort in coping with situations for which we have no preprogrammed response?

As John Holt has rightly pointed out, "The true test of intelligence is not how much we know how to do, but how we behave when we don't know what to do." The young man who, having read a book on etiquette, began conversing with his girl friend by asking, "How's your mother and little things like that?" and who started his business letters with "Dear Sir or Madam as the Case May Be," may serve as a prime example of role learning but scarcely of intelligence. To suppose that conditioning will provide for acting intelligently requires either a redefinition of intelligence or acceptance of the premise that life presents no uncertainties. Moreover, it is conceivable that persistent conditioning can lead to chronic anxiety, flattened emotions, depression and feelings of guilt. Men have been conditioned in some cultures to believe that weeping in time of sorrow is an unmanly trait that should be suppressed. Conditioning an affective response deprives it of its genuinely emotional quality and substitutes instead only a shallow, overt kind of behavior. Joys and sorrows are not merely forms of behavior; rather, they are deep-seated emotions that may or may not manifest themselves in behavioral terms. Behavior is but the tip of the iceberg we know as self. To regard the tip as constituting the whole is to construct a human psychology that ignores all but the most trivial and overt elements of the nature of man.

To conceive man as primarily a responding organism is to cast him in a passive role. Such a conception relieves him of responsibility for his actions and excuses him for his failures, for he has been victimized by external circumstances or genetic endowment—or both. To conceive man as capable of exercising initiative casts him in an active role, responsible for the choices he makes. Both classical idealism and modern existentialism have attributed to humans a kind of self-sufficiency that permitted them to rise above the exigencies of circumstance. In the language of Milton, "The mind is its own place, and in itself/Can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." The human mind was thought to be autonomous, capable of rendering itself immune to external conditions. The power of humans through the inescapability of choice to become what they will themselves to be is echoed by Jean-Paul Sartre:

"If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be. . . . Not only is man what he conceives himself to be, but he is also only what he wills himself to be after this thrust toward existence."

"Condemned to be free," man is at every turn of his life confronted with choice, without which he is nothing. Such is the nature of the human predicament. Man becomes human at that point in his life when he realizes that from the burden of choosing, there is no escape. Whereas classical idealism and modern existentialism have conceived humans as largely self-determined and self-directed, behaviorism views them as other-determined and other-directed. What we are accustomed to calling selfhood is nonexistent. Since there is no self as such, it becomes nonsense to speak of self-realization, self-actualization, self-fulfillment, or self-control. What we are offered instead is a kind of mechanism that responds to extraneous factors, i.e., to causes outside our control. The self, in short, cannot act, for it is capable only of reaction—if, indeed, there be any such entity as self at all.

IV. Was Dewey a Behaviorist?

It was stated earlier that much of the present confusion in education is traceable to indecision as to whether education should be conceived as an art or as a science—or as both. The argument might even be advanced that science itself is an art in the sense that it is an artifact, i.e., a humanly devised, created or contrived means for dealing with phenomena. Matters of ethics and morality would certainly fall within the rubric of art so defined, for they represent human constructs rather than raw data. It is meant the whole gamut of human creations as distinguished from what exists in the natural world apart from human intervention, the argument takes on a semblance of plausibility. The so-called social sciences in general and psychology in particular might then be viewed from a different perspective and seen in a different light. Obsession with measurement and quantification might give way to concern for seeing life whole. It is recounted that Dewey, once found with a copy of the Psychological Review in his hands, threw it down, exclaiming, "I despise psychologists! They have no understanding of what science is. They think it has to do with measuring and counting."

To Dewey and other pragmatists, to be scientific in the true sense of the term is to be critical-minded, and critical mindedness is not limited to physical concerns but applies across the board. They viewed the term science in broader perspective than those who fail to see the woods for the trees, i.e., whose preoccupation with bits and pieces of knowledge prevents them from seeing life whole. Both Dewey and present-day behaviorists have rejected mentalism, or what Gilbert Ryle has called "the myth of the dogma of the ghost in the machine." Piecemeal and out-of-context reading of Dewey might even suggest that he embraced behaviorism, as when he wrote:

... instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; that meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification."

Context aside, does the above passage qualify Dewey as a behaviorist? The answer is that Dewey was a behaviorist in the sense that he rejected the notion of thought as an arcane process of nosis with no necessary issue in conduct, for he held that the whole purpose of thinking is to provide warrant for a given course of action. Behaving or acting he regarded as providing grounds for hypotheses. Behavior is not an end in itself but a means for testing the adequacy of a formulated course of action, for determining the justification of a theory by observing how it
works out in practice, Dewey was not a behaviorist to the extent that he joined theory with practice, thought with action, thus obviating any need for viewing reflection in isolation from behavior or behavior apart from reflection. Whereas behaviorism has little concern for reflection, to Dewey reflector was viewed as the indispensable means for rendering action intelligent and purposeful, thus preventing it from being random, accidental or blind; while action was seen as intelligent and purposeful only as it represented a consummation of thought.

V. Some Caveats re Social Engineering

Both behaviorism and pragmatism reject the notion of absolute human autonomy, i.e., the idea that human beings have some kind of inner will that enables them to cut themselves off from environing circumstances or past experience and to act in vacuo. There is a difference, however, between rejecting absolute autonomy and recognizing a degree of autonomy that provides for the exercise of intelligence in circumstances that are highly indeterminate and hence unpredictable in their outcomes. But whereas in the writings of Dewey the role of intelligence is nearly everywhere paramount, it is significant to note that virtually no mention is made of intelligence in the writings of the behaviorists. To Dewey, the learner is brought to maturity through the cultivation of critical, scientific intelligence. Every conception or the good is ultimately social, which is to say that it has to do with how we conduct ourselves in reference not simply to our own individual or selfish desires but to the general or social welfare; this, in turn, creates conditions whereby individual freedoms may be more fully realized. This is to say that an individual is no more or less free than the society in which he lives either restricts or protects his ability to exercise choice. Dewey likewise believed that scientific inquiry itself is a basically moral and social undertaking and therefore laden with moral and social obligations.

Except in a strictly biological sense, human nature is not given at birth; rather, it consists of those specific traits of character that have been deliberately cultivated through the medium of education. Human beings at birth are predisposed to act neither morally nor immorally. Moral conduct is learned rather than innate, and it is socially oriented rather than privately intuited. Nor is that kind of behavior that has been conditioned or indoctrinated in accordance with some set rules governing “propriety” worthy of being labeled moral, for it lacks the undergirding of reflective accountability. In Dewey’s thought moral intelligence is neither reified nor automatized. Rather than referring to a person as having, owning, or possessing intelligence, Dewey prefers to speak of an individual as conducting himself intelligently. Use of the adverbial form prevents viewing intelligence as a thing or entity possessed and shifts the emphasis to its practical issue, i.e., to its consequences in action.

Behaviorist B.F. Skinner, on the other hand, apparently rejects intelligence as an avenue to the good life. Distinctions between good and evil are to be accounted for in terms of positive and negative reinforcement. Whatever reinforces us positively—i.e., elicits a pleasant response—is good, moral and right; whatever reinforces us negatively—i.e., elicits an unpleasant response—is bad, immoral and wrong. The survival of good over evil is thus guaranteed in the scheme of things, for, according to Skinner, it is our “nature” to seek positive reinforcements and to avoid negative ones.” This sounds as though it is “natural” for human beings to seek what is good and to avoid what is evil. Reminiscent of the romantic naturalism of Rousseau, it implies some sort of built-in mechanism, instinctive moral sense, or Kantian “immanence” that enables man to select positive reinforcements and to avoid negative ones—the very thing that behaviorists have elsewhere denied in claiming that all behavior is conditioned behavior. Moreover, it fails to note that many experiences may be satisfying that are not at all moral, and that many others may be unpleasant that are not for that reason evil. Acts of brutality may be gratifying to those of sadistic inclination, but are they for that reason good? Acts of self-sacrifice and deprivation may be unpleasant because of the hardships they entail, but are they for such reason bad? As Max Wingo states it, “If we grant ... that goods are positive reinforcers ... how do we know that those things that reinforce us positively are really good—that is, that they are desirable and worthy of being prized and sought after?" The ultimate criterion that Skinner employs in determining the worth of a culture is survival. A culture survives to the extent that control is exercised over the behavior of its members. In view of the fact that few social orders can be elicited wherein greater control was exercised over the behavior of their members than that which prevailed during the Nazi regime, this appears to be a rather odd contention.

Perhaps Skinner had best confine his efforts to experiments with rats and pigeons. Where he undertakes to play social engineer, he is venturing into a domain that is alien to nonhuman animals, viz., culture. His social utopias convey no profound recognition of what Unamuno has called “the tragic sense of life,” but appear to be spun out of a cotton-candy kind of euphoria. Nor can his utopias in any way be regarded as guaranteed outcomes of the methods he employ; indeed, identical methods can be and have been used to produce and maintain human bondage. The notion that only “good” cultures survive—that is, that survival is the test for the worth of a culture—is belied by the fact that tyrannical monarchies, oligarchies and other forms of nondemocratic social arrangement have a far longer history of survival than does democracy. The power of choice which democracy prizes has always been interpreted as an ability to select freely among alternatives and to act accordingly. Only in situations where few alternatives exist is choice denied, as in the drudging life of the slave or the structurally limiting conditions of the prisoner, for such lives require no more than conformity to rules already laid down. At authoritarian political levels what in simple psychological terms has been called stimulus becomes the prod of brute force, and response becomes submission to the whip of authority. Although Skinner carefully avoids reference to tyranny, in rejecting all semblances of human autonomy, what he substitutes are external controls as formulated by “enlightened” social engineers—which amounts to a euphemistic phrasing of authoritarianism. That such a view is sharply at odds with a fundamental precept of democracy is illustrated in the following passage from Dewey.

Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only by education. But there is a deeper ex·

pansion. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of...
VI. "The Hypothesis That Man Is Not Free . . ."

Frequently overlooked in discussions of Skinner's brand of behaviorism is a key premise upon the warrant of which much of his psychological structure stands or falls. He states it as follows: "The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behavior." In the first place, it should be noted that this is a hypothesis, an assumption without proof, a provisional or suppositional statement, verification of which has never been established. In the second place, the assertion begs the question, for it requires us to assume the warrant of a statement that is itself open to question, viz., that scientific method is applicable to a study of human behavior only if it is first hypothesized that human beings are not free. This is equivalent to holding that scientific study is not only hampered but impossible where the object studied behaves unpredictably, thus violating humanly formulated laws governing its behavior. In the third place, despite inclusion of the word scientific, the statement itself is patently unscientific, for it flies in the face of a major requirement of all scientific propositions, viz., that they be in fact or in principle testable. Untestable hypotheses for this reason cannot be viewed as truly scientific. In the fourth place, application of scientific method to a study of human or any other kind of behavior would begin, not with a prejudgment—in this case, that human beings are not free—but with impartial inquiry. Indeed, not to do so would be the antithesis of scientific method. In the fifth place, the assertion is covertly prescriptive in its claim that the hypothesis must be accepted ("is essential") before study of human behavior can be undertaken, and so is hortatory rather than descriptive. It shows, to paraphrase Birrand Russell, that the premises of behaviorism, the more curious the conclusions to which it gives rise.

If human beings were not free to act in unanticipated ways, their behavior would of course more easily lend itself to study and prediction. What Skinner may be thinking is—to phrase it in the vernacular—that accepting the hypothesis that man is not free would make the study of human behavior a helluva lot easier. "Sit still! Don't move!" the professional photographer often says to his subject, meaning that the photograph will be clearer if the subject engages in no unpredictable movements. The portrait painter makes a similar request of his subject. This is suggestive of Michael Scriven's remark that "the logician's perennial temptation is to make the portrait neat and perhaps the sitter will become neat.""16 Just as it is easier to take aim at a nonmoving target, so it is simpler to study an object that "stays put." Whether it is of the nature of the object to stay put is conveniently ignored. Instead of beginning with disinterested inquiry into human behavior, we are asked to begin with an assumption about human nature that is not only unsupported by the evidence but, indeed, is denied by it. Even so exact a science as physics recognizes the indeterminacy of atomic particles, to say nothing of the questionableness of the cause-effect principle as an adequate explanation of natural phenomena. Moreover, theorizing about human nature is a different undertaking from studying human behavior and, if engaged in on a scientific basis, would properly follow rather than precede the latter.

Only a wholly static universe would be entirely predictable. Hence, predictability is related not only to simplicity and mechanism but also to fixity, not to mention its reliance upon an outmoded physics. If, as William James once observed, ours is "a universe with the lid off," if universal processes are charged with novelty and burgeoning with change, if life is an ongoing and dynamic affair, if novelty is in the scheme of things and not merely superimposed upon it, then a radically different approach to a study of human nature and life processes is called for. Mechanism needs to be supplanted by field theory, and prejudicial hypotheses by inquiry. To hold that it is essential that we begin a study of human behavior by hypothesizing that human beings lack freedom is equivalent to assuming without question that they have no ability to engage in acts of choice. Since the only kinds of choice that deserve the name are those that are freely undertaken, choice is essential to democracy, for the ability to choose without undue restraint and to act accordingly is precisely what is needed.

If there is to be a science of human behavior—and if it is to be truly a science and not merely an apologoetics—then it is obligated to divest itself of its biased premises in order to become descriptive, objective and impartial. Inquiry into the nature of human behavior will need to displace "the hypothesis that man is not free," for the former is open-ended, whereas the latter begs the question. The question, "Is man free to behave in unpredictable ways?" is thus bypassed; and the hypothesis remains undisturbed. This is not unlike saying that the hypothesis that ghosts exist is essential to studying their behavior, thus circumventing any question as to their actual existence. To begin with the hypothesis that man is not free demands corollary acceptance of human beings as capable of no more than responsive behavior—as devoid of choice, as deprived of any kind of self-control, and as essentially no different from nonhumans. Yet, even a trapped animal struggles to be free, just as animals in captivity are restricted in what they are free to do. As the noted primatologist Scott Lindbergh has observed: "Monkeys in zoos are like convicts. They have no choice in anything. And choice is essential to keep intelligence alive. Animals are like people. They need to be able to do things for themselves." To say that man's most prized possession is freedom may be to use figurative language. But it may be worth noting that such an assertion is more often made with greater fervor and understanding of its import by those who have experienced bondage than by those who have never been enslaved.

VII. Concerning Poets, Women, and Heroes

Are human beings responsible for what they do? What role does the self play in determining human conduct? Or are all human acts prompted by forces extraneous to themselves, and is the term self merely a metaphor? We shall examine these questions in greater detail in a later section. Suffice it to say at this point that to embrace behaviorism is to accept the thesis that selfhood is nonexistent. What we are accustomed to calling self is simply genetic endowment plus conditioning.
and has no existence of its own. Human beings are thus relieved of assuming any moral obligation for what they do, for instead of having chosen to do this or that, their behavior has resulted from factors over which they had no control. Neither saints nor sinners are responsible for their actions; hence moral acts are no more deserving of praise than are criminal acts deserving of condemnation. Nor are artistic accomplishments any more suitable objects of admiration than are diabolical schemes or objects of scorn. According to Skinner, "having" a poem, for example, is essentially no different from "having" a baby. Nor is it any different from a hen laying an egg. In each case it is simply descriptive of a natural phenomenon for which neither the pregnant woman, nor the "pregnant" poet, nor the laying hen is primarily responsible. The poet is no more deserving of acclaim for having written his poem than is the woman for having had her baby or the hen for having laid its egg. "Writing a poem," says Skinner, "is the sort of thing men and women do as men and women, having a baby is the sort of thing a woman does as a woman, and laying an egg is the sort of thing a hen does as a hen." We are able to discover the causes of our actions "by analyzing the genetic and individual histories responsible for our behavior." 

But suppose we were to choose a different cast of characters without altering one with Skinner's line of reasoning. Suppose we were to say that committing crimes is the sort of thing men and women do as men and women, becoming a prostitute is the sort of thing a woman does as a woman, and stalking prey is the sort of thing a wild animal does as a wild animal. And suppose we were to add that, just as the poet had no responsibility for writing his poem, neither can criminals or prostitutes be held accountable for their criminal acts or prostitution. In the case of the wild animal, Skinner's explanation will suffice. But this is precisely the point. The wild animal behaves as it does because it cannot behave otherwise; accordingly, it would be foolish either to praise or to blame it. It lacks developed powers of reflection, it lacks moral sensibility, it lacks ability to choose one course of action over another—and so concerning its behavior would be like condemning a tornado for its destructive force. Having committed the genetic fallacy, Skinner then proceeds to commit the fallacy of overgeneralization. To suppose that because man is an animal he is therefore nothing but an animal is to commit what the geneticist Sir Julian Huxley has called "the nothing-but fallacy," which results from an equation of all human traits with nonhuman animal traits. What we are being asked to accept is that, since nonhuman animals (or, to use Skinner's example, hens) are not responsible for what they do, therefore human beings are equally irresponsible for what they do. The flaw in this sort of reasoning might become more apparent if the argument were reversed, resulting in the conclusion that, since human beings are responsible for their actions, therefore nonhumans are equally responsible, in which case a sow could be arrested and brought to trial for the crime of devouring her young. One argument has about the same amount of credibility as the other—which isn't much.

Arguments against the thesis that human beings are absolutely autonomous in all their thoughts and actions constitute critical points. No phenomenon or entity is required to recognize that we are all times engaged in interaction with some kind of environment—be it physical, psychological, religious, cultural, social or whatever—and that previous experience plays a significant role in shaping present and future behavior. But it is one thing to acknowledge that prior experience is taken into account, is influential, becomes a contributing factor, or has a bearing in respect to our behavior, and quite another to hold that it predetermines our behavior. In rejecting human autonomy, what behaviorists do, in effect, is to substitute environmental autonomy. By casting the human being as a passive role of responder, they cast the environment (plus genetic history) in an active role of controller, overlooking the fact that object submission on the part of one or autonomous control on the part of the other is virtually never the case.

If we were to fall from an airplane without a parachute at a height of 16,000 feet, we would likely have lost control of our destiny, and the environmental field might be said to have taken over almost completely. In times of catastrophes such as cyclones, earthquakes and strikes of lightning, our powers of choice are temporarily minimized, and we are said to be at the mercy of the elements. But such instances are comparatively rare; they are far outnumbered by examples of man's ability to control the conditions under which he lives. Each time an engineer constructs a dam, each time a physician intervenes in the natural course of a disease, new and better means of communication and transportation are devised, human beings are playing an active role in shaping and controlling their environments.

The concert artist who holds an audience enthralled, the conductor whose every gesture conveys subtle nuances of interpretation to an orchestra, the writer whose literary genius captivates the reader, the actor or actress whose performance is acclaimed as brilliant—all are likewise in control of what they are doing, all are shaping and creating a special kind of environment. In such latter instances, the argument is not that they are absolutely autonomous, for they must enlist the cooperation of factors other than themselves. But they are nevertheless exercising a significant degree of autonomy in that they are creating, inventing, or bringing into being a different set of conditions than would otherwise prevail. Human beings both act upon and respond to their environments. The relationship between human beings and their environment is transactional rather than unilateral. In fact, it is this peculiar ability of humans to conceive and to actualize modifications of their environments that constitutes their uniqueness as human beings and thus distinguishes them from other species.

VIII. The Concept of Selfhood

Throughout our discussion the role that self plays in this transactional process still remains clouded, perhaps for the reason that the terms self and selfhood have yet to be clearly defined. Behaviorism would, of course reject the notion of selfhood, just as it would discount the existence of free will. Rejection of such terms as existences or entities, however, is not equivalent to their rejection as concepts. Behaviorism itself is a concept in the sense that it cannot be pointed to as "existing" anywhere. Notwithstanding, little is gained by dogmatically maintaining that the self exists or that human beings have free will, and letting it go at that, without bothering to clarify what is meant when such assertions are made. What, then, does it mean to say that the self exists? To exist is, in familiar terms, to have weight and occupy space. Obviously, the self cannot be so classified. To say that to exist means to
have temporal-spatial dimensions doesn’t help much either, for this would require that the self be locatable in time and space. The edge that the behaviorists have on those who understand the self to exist in some autonomous sense is that the notion of a hypostatized self is scientifically indefensible. And so the behaviorist confronts us with deciding between discarding the self as a discredited entity under the guise of scientific rigor, and holding on to it in the name of some sort of metaphysics. The fact is that we are not obligated to settle for either of these alternatives.

Just as water is not simply two parts of hydrogen and one of oxygen but is a liquid exhibiting properties quite different from either of its constituent elements, just as a child evinces qualities quite different from those of the parents who produced him, so the self displays traits of its own that are appreciably different from whatever forces may have contributed to its creation. The emergence of consciousness, moreover, suggests degrees of self-awareness and powers of introspection that neither genes nor conditioning can account for. What is called self emerges from the active interplay of human organisms with their environmental fields and especially from the interaction of human beings with their distinctively social environments. Self is neither a thing or entity possessed nor a mere metaphor; it is an emergent function, descriptive of the various ways in which humans both respond to and control the ambient fields in which they live, move, and have their being. Accordingly, self may be defined as a conceptual term denoting an individual’s peculiar awareness of his own existence in relation to the world about him, and especially of those unique traits that set him apart from others.

Similarly, free will is not an entity or metaphysical substance; nor is it autonomous in the sense that it exists in isolation from contextual circumstances. It is simply an ill-chosen term that needs to be redefined as the power to choose without unwarranted restraint from among compelling alternatives. Since no choice deserves the name that is not freely undertaken, it carries with it the burden of moral responsibility for the consequences for which it may lead. The fact that nonhuman animals give no indication of acting in any moral sense but behave on the basis of instinct, habituation, or conditioning necessitates the conclusion that morality is a uniquely human construct. Nor can any human act be dignified as moral except as it is an outgrowth of reflection, intention and consideration of the desirability of all its probable consequences.

IX. The Is-Ought Dichotomy—A Backward Look

Two final considerations are in order. The first has to do with an attempt to clarify the relationship between statements of fact and statements of value; the second concerns a neglected but much-needed distinction between generic behavior and human conduct. Pace David Hume and latter-day British empiricists and philosophic analysts, it has become fashionable to regard empirical assertions and valutational assertions as constituting separate universes of discourse—commonly referred to as the is-ought dichotomy. According to this view, factual (or synthetic) statements consist of assertions that can be empirically verified; furthermore, only empirically verifiable assertions may be considered to be propositions. The assertion, for example, “It is raining today” is factually true in so far as evidence can be cited in support of it, in so far as what constitutes evidence can be agreed upon, and in so far as the evidence is publicly demonstrable. When such conditions are met, the proposition would then compel the assertion of any impartial observer, i.e., it may be said to be true. A more technical assertion, like “E = MC^2,” would need to meet the same criteria, with the understanding, of course, that evidence in this case might be quasi-mathematical, and that “publicly demonstrable” would no doubt refer to its demonstrability to a community of qualified physicists. In neither case, however, could such propositions be judged as true on any such basis as intuition, feeling or any other sort of nonempirical “authority.”

The corollary of this view is that statements of value are of an entirely different order and are traceable to emotion rather than rooted in fact. They are regarded as “velar imperational utterances,” which is to say that they are either direct or indirect exhortations to action. “Close the window” is an obvious exhortation to act in a specific way, and so is neither true nor false. Sentences couched in the indicative mood may pass as assertions of fact; but if they conceal a value, an “ought,” or an imperative, they are said to be removed from the category of the synthetic. The judgmental assertion, “The welfare system of this country is in need of reform,” appears superficially to be a statement of fact. It is phrased in the indicative mood. It omits the word “ought” and seems to be an observation of fact, of a particular state of affairs. But what is actually being asserted, it may be argued, is not a fact but a feeling. What the assertion really says is, “I feel that the welfare system needs to be reformed,” or, “The welfare system ought to be reformed,” or, more directly, “Reform the welfare system!”

The judgmental assertion about the welfare system is, like all other judgments, reduced to no more than an expression of emotion. So conceived, truth assertions (propositions) are regarded as scientific and testable, while judgmental assertions (valuations) are regarded as emotive and untestable—and never the twain shall meet. In the words of A.J. Ayer: “...since the expression of a value judgment is not a proposition, the questions of truth or falsehood does not here arise...” Exhortations to moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or commands which are designed to provoke...action of a certain sort. Accordingly, they do not belong to any branch of philosophy or science. As for expressions of ethical judgments, we have not yet determined how they should be classified.”

If philosophy differs from science in any cogent way, the difference lies in recognition of science as largely descriptive and phenomenological and of philosophy as interpretive and judgmental. The philosopher is, as it were, an impressionist; while the scientist is a photographer. Although appropriate distinctions may be made, the mistake commonly made is to presume a gap or disparity between these two domains instead of viewing them as complementary. “How satisfying,” says Mr. Gradgrind in Dickens’ Hard Times, “is the possession of fact, which does away with any mystery surrounding our daily life!”—forgetting that to know all facts and possess no feelings is not to live at all. What does it mean to say that every where the paramount question, for no factual or descriptive statement has any significance except as it is interpreted in some way as assigned some kind of meaning. An out-of-context fact—i.e., a fact devoid of its bearing upon human interests and human concerns—
utterly meaningless. Thus, the assertion that Sanskrit was the ancient Aryan language of the Hindus of India, despite its factual accuracy, is infinitely less meaningful than that a close friend or relative has been seriously injured in an accident.

Like the stimulus of our earlier discussion, a fact has no intrinsic meaning. It assumes meaning when we judge or interpret it in some manner, value or devalue it, assign importance or unimportance to it, react to it in a particular way—which is to say that facts are what they mean. To speak of a value-free fact is to speak of a fact with no utter significance; for meaning consists in what Dewey has called "the emotion it stirs, the thought it sustains." The assertion "It is raining today" is understood in terms of what it means as distinguished from what it merely informs. It may mean that a proposed picnic will have to be canceled, or that crops will now have a better chance of surviving, or that an intended visit will need to be postponed, or any of countless other things, each of which is likely to be fraught with pleasure or frustration. Even so apparently dispassionate an assertion as "E = mc²" is modified and takes on meaning by virtue of its affective content. It may simply mean that mass and energy are interconvertible and summon visions of the benefits to be derived from nuclear fission. Or it may symbolize the atomic bomb, mushroom clouds, and the tragedy of Hiroshima, and cause us to recoil in horror. All of this is another way of saying that the moral, judgmental or valuational content of propositions is not something apart; on the contrary, it is precisely what endows them with meaning, without which they have no value or significance.

Equally indefensible is the notion that valuational assertions are unrooted in or somehow disconnected from any empirically verifiable context, or that they in some way transcend experience. Judgments are properly rendered and valuations properly made only by taking into account existing situations, i.e., facts. What ought to be done in a particular circumstance depends upon what the case. "Ought" assertions are thus subject to criticism as to their warrant in much the same way as are synthetic assertions. To say, for example, that a street ought to be paved would be warranted only if the facts indicated that its present condition was unsatisfactory, that it had potholes that interfered with safe driving, that it had a heavy flow of traffic, etc. To say that a greater abundance of food is needed in a given area would be warranted only if the facts indicated that the particular area referred to was in short supply of food. That certain things are prized, valued and revered and that others are scorned, devalued and condemned is not only itself a fact but it is derived from fact, i.e., it is warranted by knowledge. Clean air is prized because of the fact that it is conducive to health, while pollution is condemned because it is known to contribute to respiratory disease. The growing of vegetables is valued because of the fact that their consumption is necessary to a balanced diet, while mosquitoes are decried because they are known to be harmful to health.

The traditional argument that an "ought" assertion is not deducible from an "is" assertion will no longer suffice, not because it is invalid but because it substitutes "slide-rule" logic for fruitful inquiry. It represents a holdover from an obsolescent alogistic or Aristotelian sort of reasoning which is rooted not in human experience and human affairs but in not much more than esoteric intellecction. To argue that there is utter no relationship between what is true and what is valued is not only unwarranted but untenable. As Dewey has observed, "The notion that valuations do not exist in empirical fact and that therefore value-conceptions have to be imported from a source outside experience is one of the most curious beliefs the mind of man has ever entertained." He goes on to say that at the present time the widest gap in knowledge is that which exists between humanistic and non-humanistic subjects. The breach will disappear, the gap be filled and science be manifest as an operating unity in fact and not merely in idea when science and non-humanistic science are employed in guiding the course of distinctly human behavior, that, namely, which is influenced by emotion and desire in the framing of means and ends; for desire, having ends-in-view, and hence involving valuations, is the characteristic that marks off human from nonhuman behavior. On the other side, the science that is put to distinctly human use is that in which warranted ideas about the human world are integrated with emotion as human traits. In this integration not only is science itself a value (since it is the expression and fulfillment of a special human desire and interest) but it is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations in all aspects of human and social life.

Joining of the factual with the valuational is not without its educational import. Although it may be argued that how learning occurs is a factual question, and that what is valued is a philosophic one, the two become inextricably intertwined when it is recognized that what is learned and how it is learned assume significance only in terms of ends or purposes. Of what value is such-and-such a learning? Thus overrides the question of how a particular kind of learning occurs or how it is best facilitated. Experimentation concerning the nature of the learning process may yield the conclusion that, given certain organism and a specific set of environing conditions, this is the way learning occurs. But such an assertion leaves untouched the larger question of whether a designated learning device ought to be used, or whether what is learned by means of it ought to be learned at all. It is becoming ever more apparent that an is-ought dualism is both tenous and stifling, suggesting as it does that a fact need have no relevance to value and that a value need have no referent in fact. Dissolution of such a dichotomy would bring about recognition of the scientific and the valuational as reciprocal rather than as disparate categories. It would join science of learning with philosophy of education in common cause by utilizing the knowledge that research supplies toward a realization of ends that are individually and socially defensible. It might even provide for the emergence of some sort of wholeness or coordinating principle that may enable us to regain our educational perspective.

X. Generic Behavior and Human Conduct—A Needed Distinction

It is commonplace that everything that exists is in some sense unique. No two atoms, no two flowers, no two snowflakes, no two sunsets, no two twins are precisely identical. In the animal kingdom it is the unique characteristics that various organisms exhibit that enable us to...
identify them as belonging to a certain species, notwithstanding the fact that they may share many traits in common with other species. By contrast, to say that every form of life and matter engages in some sort of behavior, or that behavior characterizes all that exists, is a loosely grandiose rather than a sharply definitive assertion, for it fails to account for any uniqueness among the entities to which it is applied. So used, the term behavior is all-encompassing, ranging all the way from the actions of subatomic particles to those of galaxies, from the actions of amoebae to those of human beings. What is probably being taken into account in asserting that all things behave is that movement of some sort is everywhere present—be it the slow progression of a glacier or the speed of light. When the term behavior is thus used, no distinction is made between behavior that is a result of an object's being acted upon (as the case of a glacier) and behavior that is self-initiated (as in the case of human beings). Such a view fails to differentiate between reactive and creative behavior. If, in reply to asking what does not behave, we are told that nothing exists that does not behave, then the term behavior ceases to have any definitive meaning, for it cannot be distinguished from nonbehavior. By way of analogy, if everything were wet, dry would have no meaning; or, if there were no darkness, light would have no meaning. Terms have meaning and thus are definable only as they can be differentiated from other terms.

Does this imply that the term behavior should be restricted to nonhuman forms of life and matter and that it is inapplicable to human beings? Does it mean that human beings do not behave? Does it discount the validity of a science of human behavior? Not at all. Human beings, along with all other living organisms and physical entities, do act in ways that may properly be termed behavioral, if for no other reason than that they engage in movement. But whereas all engage in movement, and whereas many human activities may constitute no more than movement, all such activities fall within the rubric of noninitiated or responsive behavior. In response to nutrients in the soil, rainfall, and conducive temperatures, a plant grows and blooms; in response to proper training, a dog obeys its master; as a result of the pressing of certain keys, a typewriter responds by producing typewritten words and sentences; in noticing the changing of a traffic light from green to red, a motorist responds by applying the brakes of a car. All such behavior is responsive, and responsive behavior is as characteristic of human beings as it is of nonhumans. But it will scarcely do to conclude that because human beings engage in responsive kinds of behavior, therefore all human behavior is responsive, i.e., that human behavior is identifiable in no other sense. This would be like saying that because machinery is used in the manufacture of automobiles, therefore all machinery is so used and is identifiable in no other sense.

Not long ago arguments about such issues as free will vs. determinism and heredity vs. environment dominated the educational scene. The unexamined assumption that exclusive attachment to one position or the other was our only option precluded consideration that a qualified acceptance of both positions was not only possible but reasonable. Behavior is thwarted and dogmatism creeps in when it is supposed that only one point of view is completely right and that any other is all wrong. The mistake that behavioralists make is to conclude that because so-called free will cannot be refuted, man is therefore not free, and so is incapable of choice. What is overlooked is that to choose is to engage in a kind of behavior, i.e., that choice has its behavioral dimensions. It is crucial to add, however, that a "choice" that has been predetermined is not a choice at all, for to speak of a "conditioned choice" is to employ mutually contradictory language. Thus viewed, selective behavior is not choice itself, nor is it the whole of it; rather, it represents but the observable tip or overt culmination of choosing. Whereas the existentialist would have us believe that we are always confronted with choice, the behaviorist would have us believe that we are never free to choose. Why not say that we experience some situations in which the possibilities for choice are virtually unlimited and others where they are severely restricted?

This suggests that in situations where individuals are relatively free to control, take charge of, or assume responsibility for their actions, the term conduct is used, and that the generic term behavior be applied in describing actions and movements that are merely responsive. One does not speak, for example, of atoms, worms, hens, dogs, trees or stars as in any sense conducting themselves, for their behavior is for the most part in response to forces over which they have virtually no control. Even here, however, it is important to add that an object itself is as much a determiner of its behavior as are external forces that play upon it. A marble and a wad of chewing gum may be placed on the same inclined plane. Both are in the same gravitational field. Yet each responds differently. The marble selects to roll, while the wad of gum selects to remain in place. Such selectivity is, of course, neither conscious, deliberate nor purposeful. It is simply illustrative that the nature of an object itself is as much a selector of its behavior as are the external forces to which it responds. Selective ability thus understood is characteristic of all forms of matter; whereas choice represents that peculiar refinement of selective ability that renders it reflective and purposeful, and that makes possible a realization of foreseeable ends. Accordingly, in so far as it suggests a significant degree of conscious, purposive self-regulation, conduct is a uniquely human trait and cannot be applied to any other form of life or matter.

We are often misled into denying the uniqueness of human beings by the argument that their biological and physiological equipment is essentially no different from that of their nearest nonhuman relatives, all of which display varying degrees of intelligence. But this argument misses the point, for the distinctiveness of human beings lies not in their physiological equipment but in the uniquely human ways in which they are capable of putting such equipment to use. As some geneticists maintain, human evolution is in a strictly biological sense has probably ran its course, but human evolution in terms of the development of moral and social intelligence has probably just begun. Mastery of the forces of nature outside us has outstripped our ability to master the forces of nature within us. We have succeeded to a terrifying extent in controlling our physical environment, but we are only beginning to learn the importance of controlling ourselves in a moral sense. This means, first, that man's future evolution will likely be in terms of developing and refining his intellectual, moral and aesthetic powers; and, secondly, that for the first time in human history the course of man's future evolution will be within man's collective power to control. This is neither an optimistic nor a
pessimistic observation, for it opens up possibilities for both dire and beneficial consequences. Impartially it places the burden of choice in regard to the kind of future world man prefers to live in squarely on man's shoulders; it places man in charge of his own destiny. Whatever outcomes emerge will depend upon how human beings choose to conduct themselves, and how they choose to conduct themselves will depend largely upon the kind of education to which we choose to expose them. How, then, should education be conceived?

To ask, What are the purposes of education? is to ask a meaningless question, for it assumes that purposes are ready-made, lying about, extant, waiting to be discovered. A better question to ask would be: In light of past experience, present conditions and future possibilities, how shall we best formulate the purposes of education? This is a perennial question. It needs to be addressed again and again, for as conditions change and as further experience is gained, purposes will be correspondingly modified; and suitable answers for one generation may be unsuitable for the next. This is not to advocate a wishy-washy relativism; nor does it mean that whatever ends have served us well in the past must be discarded simply because they are not new. On the contrary, it means that no educational ideal can claim exemption from periodic review, and that enduring values may as often be found worthy as innovations may be found wanting. Whether or not it reflects a paucity of educational thought, the fact is that most recent educational innovations have appeared in the form of teaching and learning devices. What is lost sight of when education is so narrowly conceived is that no teaching or learning device is worth its salt that divorces itself from the ends it is designed to achieve. Devices are by definition means, they are instrumentalities, and so they are not self-contained but are to be judged only in terms of whatever purposes they are meant to serve.

Behavior manipulation or conditioning cannot be faulted on grounds that it doesn't bring results. Massive evidence could be cited to refute such a charge. Indeed, much of human history is an account of the conquest for control of human thought and human behavior. But desired results need to be carefully distinguished from results that are truly desirable. What is merely desired may be based upon no more than impulse, caprice, habit or tradition, to say nothing of self-serving interests; while what is in fact desirable requires enlistment of powers of reflection, judgment and evaluation. Awareness of what is merely desired is shared by humans and nonhumans alike; but formulation of what is desirable is characteristic only of human beings, for it demands choosing among alternatives in regard to their long-range individual and social benefits.

Preoccupation with aids, devices and gadgetry has distracted us from attending to education's more important functions. Preoccupation with behavior manipulation has deflected our concern from the attitudes, values and ideals of the learner. As a result, we have prided not knowledge, responsibilty, and understanding but a semblance of them; we have forgotten that to live without purpose is not to live in any human sense at all. If, with Dewey, we hold that "the ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control"—and if such aim is taken seriously rather than as platitudinous—then preoccupation with behavior to concern for conduct is in order. Concern with reflection for its own sake divorces thought from its practical issue in conduct, while exclusive concern with behavior fails to provide for its being a culmination of reflection. Although all behavior may be regarded as in some sense controlled, final unique kind of behavior over which individuals exercise self-control and that is not exclusively shaped by factors extraneous to themselves is precisely what is meant by conduct.

Use of the term conduct has the advantage of distinguishing thoughtful, purposeful and morally sensitive activities from those that are merely accidental or habituated. Conduct requires acceptance of responsibility for actions deliberately undertaken as over against indifferent and merely responsive kinds of behavior; it represents a conjoining of reflection with action. In so far as self-control is not inborn, it is a crucial task of education to create, nurture and develop it in individually and socially productive ways. To learn is to grow in power of responsible decision-making; and to educate is to foster utilization of such powers in the intelligent conduct of life. All skills and knowledge are necessary means to this end.

Reference


6. Ibid., p. 247.

7. Ibid., pp. 245-246.


11. Frank P. Jones, in John Dewey: Recollections, to be published under the editorship of Robert B. Williams, Montclair State College. On the fiftieth anniversary of publication of The Psychological Review, Dewey's article on, "The Reflex Arc" was voted the most important contribution to psychology ever made in that journal.


The People Page

Wright Angles

by larry wright

Joey, do you ever get the feeling that we're just puppets on a big stage?...

Do you ever feel that we're all on strings and that some giant puppeteer is controlling us?

No.

NEITHER DO I.

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This article raises questions concerning the focus of research in teacher effectiveness.

Research in teacher effectiveness: A case of mistaken identity

by John Holton
The Ohio State University

A common sense notion in teacher education goes something like this: “to discover the things we ought to teach teachers, we need to discover those teaching behaviors which seem to make a difference in student achievement and student satisfaction and teach them to teachers.” As Francis Fuller and Oliver Bown have it in their contribution to the 75th NSSE Yearbook, we need to discover “what kinds of interventions by what kinds of interveners in what contexts elicit what responses from what subjects.”

These discoveries will be made by using the methods of empirical science. Empirical science, the wonder-working tool, which has discovered so much about nature, will produce the necessary information about men and society.

As Robert Merton describes them, the social sciences have as their goal the discovery of theory. This theory is defined as “clear, verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables.” The unspoken assumption in the search for theory in the social sciences is that human endeavors are similar to natural events and therefore can be reduced to the same sorts of laws and theories as natural events. The syllogism of this analogy is the notion that human behavior, like the behavior of molecules and atoms, is determined by external forces. Once all of the requisite conditions are met to boil the water, there is a high probability that the water will boil; once all of the requisite conditions are met for the student to learn, the student will learn. The task for the educational researcher, then, is to discover the requisite conditions for learning.

In teacher education, some researchers have been looking for those teaching behaviors which are associated with student gain and student satisfaction. One convenient compendium of such research is Dunkin and Biddle’s The Study of Teaching. In this work may be found discussion and summaries of some hundreds of observational studies of classroom teaching. While this book is a worthwhile contribution to the literature of teacher education, it suffers from the difficulties that seem to plague research in teacher effectiveness— inconsistent results. It is common to find entries like the following in the summary tables:

1) Teacher’s use of questions is unrelated to pupil attitudes, and, in contradiction, it is also found that higher teachers’ use of questions is associated with more positive pupil attitudes. (Dunkin and Biddle, p. 139).

2) Experimental treatment given to teachers is unrelated to the amount of pupil initiation. In contradiction it is also found that Experimental treatment given to teachers increases the amount of pupil initiation. (Dunkin and Biddle, p. 141).

3) Teacher indirectness is unrelated to cognitive level of classroom discourse. In contradiction it is also found that greater teacher indirectness is associated with higher cognitive levels of classroom discourse. (Dunkin and Biddle, p. 115).

The general explanation given by social scientists for problems has two parts. Dunkin and Biddle describe the methodological problems—problems of sampling, research design and the like—and hope that as more work is done, these problems will be lessened. The other part of the explanation is historical. We have not discovered Newtonian laws for the social sciences as yet because we haven’t been working at it long enough. In Merton’s words, “Between twentieth century physics and twentieth century sociology stand billions of man-hours of sustained, disciplined, cumulative research.”

It will be the purpose of this essay to suggest that some of the contradictory results in research on teacher effectiveness are rooted not solely in methodological or historical factors. Rather, it will be suggested, the contradictory results have their origin in a conceptual muddle which will not be resolved by methodological sophistication or by more investments in man-hours. The suggestion of the muddle is based on the work of Richard Taylor in his book Action and Purpose. It seems to me that Taylor provides us with a valuable insight into the nature of human action and purpose. His insights seem especially germane to discussions about teaching.

The Muddle

Science deals with facts. The theories of physical science explain relationships between facts. Heating a pan of water makes the water molecules move faster. (Or, when the pan of water is heated, the water molecules move faster.) In order for the scientist to create his clear statements about the relationships between the specified variables, he must be able to translate the verbal description into a factual description. Water becomes H₂O and heat becomes degrees Celsius. A statement about H₂O needs less inference than a statement about water. Low inferential statements mean that investigators can be more or less certain that they are dealing with the same quantities as other investigators. So much HCI (of a certain
The ability to reduce general statements to tangible quantities is crucial to scientific investigations. The social scientist who wishes to use the methods of empirical science must abide by its canons. Researchers in teacher effectiveness recognize this imperative. Investigators of "higher order questions" or "teacher indirectness" recognize that they must reduce these general statements to tangible quantities. The variables must become "low inference" variables. This is done by reducing the general statements like "higher order questions" to certain behaviors—to movements which signal "higher order question" or "teacher indirectness." In the Flanders Interaction Analysis Categories System, for example, one category of indirect teacher influence is described as follows: "praises or encourages students action or behavior. Jokes that release tension, not at the expense of another individual, nodding head or saying "uh huh?" or "go on" are included." Richard Taylor makes a distinction between human movements and human actions. Movements are events like the beating of a heart or the growth of hair. Such movements can obviously be reduced to tangible quantities. For example, it is known that the pH of normal blood ranges from 7.39 to 7.41. The CO₂ combining power (venous plasma) is 50-76 ml/100 ml of blood = 21 - 30 mEq/L. Taylor distinguishes such movements from purposeful human action. Unlike movements, human actions are goal directed. "My heart beats" describes a movement. "I am reading a novel" describes an action which is directed toward a goal—"I want to read the novel." My movements to get a book are means to my goal but they are meaningless in and of themselves. Actions have intentions behind them. Intentions cannot be discovered by observing one's movements:

They are notions that are read into a situation... and never concepts that are empirically derived from any situation. They are, in fact, derived entirely from one's own understanding of himself as a purposeful being. But one never observes—notes, notices, infers from signs—that he himself is trying to accomplish something, that it is striving toward an end or a goal. He sometimes knows that he is, but not that way."

Here then is the muddle. Events which may be purposeful—like teacher use of higher order questions—are treated as though they are simple movements. When an investigator reduces the concept of "higher order question" to its low inference movements, he misses the intention. Indeed, it is impossible for him to discover the intention no matter how careful he is to define and describe the movement. The contradictory results about higher order questions reported in Dunkin and Biddle might come from the undiscovered intentions of the teachers and the students in the studies. As recently as 1976, higher order questions were still giving investigators problems. Barak Rosenshine commented that "The lack of significant results for complex or higher level questions has puzzled all the researchers, and has led us to conclude that we need to rethink what is meant by types of questions and their effects."

A more careful definition of "higher order" questions in purely behavioral terms will never solve the problem of what a "higher order" question is. Of all human endeavors, language is at once the most human and the most dependent upon the intentions of both speakers and listeners. While much language "behavior" is little more than formulaic—we communicate with each other in unambiguous formulae—it is difficult to carry on much communication that is interpretable in terms of pure formula. A simple question when judged by its syntax (inversion of the subject and verb) may or may not really be a question. "Isn't it a nice day?" "Am I going to the store for a carton of milk?" Without an understanding of purpose or intentions on the part of the speaker (an understanding that does not come from empirical evidence), much language becomes an uncomprehensible verbal hash.

- The shooting of the hunters was terrible.
- My love is like a red, red rose.
- His sins were scarlet but his books were read.

The failure of translating computers perhaps exemplifies the problem of attempting to rely on purely behavioral information in the interpretation of language.

Does intention really make a difference to the common sense notion set forth at the beginning of this essay? What difference does it make if we can identify certain behaviors that seem to be associated with student success if we don't perhaps know what the behavior is?

It makes a great deal of difference. If one is going to operate by the canons of empirical science, one must operate by them. Unless a general concept can be translated into low inference behaviors, then it is impossible to know whether one has that behavior. So long as general conceptions about human behavior can only be partially translated (into movements rather than into actions), it is impossible to know what one is observing.

Consequences of the Muddle

The danger in all of this is perhaps in the premise that someday teaching will be based on research of the sort reported in Dunkin and Biddle. What if research continues to show no positive effects from higher order questions? Will colleges of education begin to teach their students to ask only factual questions (for which there is support in the research literature)? The focus of research in teacher effectiveness shifts over the years. In the 1960's research was looking for teacher effectiveness in terms of affect, indirectness and the like—the intentions of the time. More recently, research is "finding" that the best teaching is direct and carefully structured. Is the research simply reflecting once more the shift in intention in a country interested in "back to basics" and accountability? So long as we ignore human purpose, research becomes a mask, a cloak, a way to make desires into facts—desires which may be pure or foul. Science becomes dogma.
References
Dunkin, Michael J., and Bruce J. Biddle, The Study of Teaching, (New York, 1974).

Footnotes
4. Ibid., p. 139.
5. Ibid., p. 141.
6. Ibid., p. 115.
There is evidence that the study of curriculum faces newly-recognized issues.

Emerging foundations for curriculum theory

by Paul R. Klohr
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How can educational experiences be most effectively organized? How can we evaluate? Tyler and others who use this approach commonly draw on three foundational sources: the nature of the individual; the nature of society; and the nature of knowledge. A diagnosis of needs to arrive at the answer to the question of purposes analyzes data from these sources.

There are many modifications of this mode of theorizing, but in general, it leads to a rather clear-cut set of steps to be followed. The historical roots of this approach, as Kliebard has pointed out, run deeply into the curriculum development processes projected by Bobbitt and Charters in the early 1900’s. Fortunately for curriculum as a field of study, thoughtful criticism of this mode of curriculum theorizing has developed. The major point of the criticism is that the approach is fundamentally grounded in a technological rationale that is neither philosophical nor scientific. Nevertheless, any survey of the state of the field would still show this to be the dominant approach. In practice, it tends to raise a series of “how” questions. For example, practitioners who commonly enroll in a graduate course in curriculum come to that field of study expecting to get rather specific answers to specific questions of how to do this or that in their classrooms. A cellular, “interchangeable parts” framework for curriculum is assumed. Gemelin points out that historically this framework dates from the period following the Civil War.

A second, much smaller group of individuals Macdonald views as scientific curriculum theorists. This group follows the canons of science. In Macdonald’s words: “The purpose of this theory is primarily conceptual in nature, and research would be utilized for empirical validation of curriculum variables and relationships.”

Among the individuals who might be viewed as functioning in this way are Mauritz Johnson, George Beauchamp and Decker Walker. At The Ohio State University, Jack Frymier, James K. Duncan and John Hough worked with a basic scientific model for curriculum and instruction. Frymier’s efforts with the Annheurst School to develop a curriculum classification system is a good example of these individuals at work.

Finally, Macdonald calls attention to a third even smaller group of theorists—namely, those who “look upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual task which they maintain should be neither used as a basis for prescription or as an empirically testable set of principles and relationships.”

The interest of these individuals is to view curriculum phenomena in new and different ways with the expectation that such alternative perspectives will raise fresh sets of questions. In effect, they demonstrate what Dwayne Huebner has called attention to many times: the fact that theorizing in a mature field ought to reflect a range of different modes of inquiry. However, the influence of this view, although significant, is not widespread for there is still a predominant myth. This myth holds that many of the fields drawing on the social sciences—the study of curriculum for one—are passing through a kind of Dark Age, and that if we keep working hard to become “more scientific,” we shall emerge with a clear-cut set of laws that meet the criteria of physical science. All phenomena may then be quantified with more highly sophisticated measures.

This brief overview might lead one to believe that the curriculum theory field is largely constrained by con-
ventional approaches to theorizing drawing upon traditional conceptions of foundations. Such a view might be warranted were it not for some promising developments which do, indeed, suggest the possibility of a paradigm shift. In the view of some, these developments constitute significant breakthroughs. If there is to be a genuine shift, it is likely to come from the efforts of those Macdonald has placed in the third category.

Reconceptualizations of the Field

Chief among the efforts that have the potential for a basic paradigm shift has been a series of curriculum theory conferences and a curriculum journal devoted to curriculum theorizing to be published in the autumn of 1978. Involved in these is a loosely-knit group of individuals who have been called the Reconceptualists. Whether or not that term continues to be used is of little importance. One is reminded of Peter Schrag's use of the "New Romantic Critics" to describe certain of the critics of education in 1968 who had certain ideas in common despite their diversity. McNeil simply divides the current field into "hard curricularists" and "soft curricularists." In this two-fold categorization seems overly simplistic, overlooking some significant distinctions among the individual theorists. Whatever else is associated with the term reconceptualist, it seems clear that these individuals intend to work in the third realm that Macdonald identified—namely, individuals who conceive of curriculum theory development as a creative intellectual task with no attempt initially to make a direct relationship to practice.

The Reconceptualists, it should be noted, have no formal organization as a group, and in 1978, there is rather wide diversity among them. However, one can trace some of the events which have influenced their work. Such a tracing might well start with the Rochester Conference of 1973. One might also note some beginnings in the Radical Caucus of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development several years prior to 1973. At Rochester, James Macdonald, Maxine Greene, and Dwayne Huebner gave papers along with several other relative newcomers to the field. These papers were collected and published under the title "Reconceptualizing Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory" (McCutchan, 1974) which had also served as the theme of the conference. William Pinar, who called the conference at The University of Rochester, served as editor of the publication. He spoke of this work as a "reconceptualization" of the field and viewed the efforts as an example of Macdonald's third group of theorists.

The following year, 1974, Ricordan invited those who had been at Rochester to participate in a follow-up conference at Xavier University in Cincinnati. A number of the Rochester Conference participants again presented papers, among them, Macdonald, Greene, Huebner and Pinar. Michael Apple of the University of Wisconsin also gave his views, making public a divergent approach which had been identified at Rochester but not fully developed. For example, the papers by Donald Bateman and William Plicer anticipate Apple's stance.

Also in 1974, Pinar edited a collection of essays titled "Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists," which included works by Macdonald, Greene, Huebner and Apple as well as pieces by Kliebard, Gremin, Phinex and Mooney. Pinar recognized the divergence of views that had developed more fully since the Rochester and the Xavier conferences. In his organization of the book, he identified "political and methodological criticism" and "post critical" theory efforts. The autobiographical prefaces to the pieces written by Apple, Mann and Mooney also reflect a division. The question of which is critical and which is post-critical is not, in itself, significant at this stage.

The divergence is even more strongly underscored in the 1975 Yearbook of ASCD, edited by Macdonald and Zaret, "Schools in Search of Meaning" in which the editors write: "We felt we must call attention to political freedom, not simply existential freedom." The content of the Yearbook underscores a conviction that most curriculum theorizing has "backed out" of significant political implications. Pushed all the way, this issue turns up to be one of the individual vs. the collective.

Additional conferences were held in 1975 at University of Virginia, chaired by Charles Beegle, and the following year at University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee with Alex Molnar as chairman. In the autumn of 1977, Kent State University hosted a theory conference followed in the spring of 1978 by yet another at the Rochester Institute of Technology. In this latter conference, a special effort was made to refocus on some of the issues raised initially at the 1973 Rochester Conference.

As one reflects on these conferences and reads the papers presented, it would be easy to assume that a split is inevitable among those in Macdonald's third category, or in Pinar's terms, the Reconceptualists. Certainly, the 1975 ASCD Yearbook suggests such a split. In the realm of metatheory, the split often turns up to be one between the phenomenological mode of inquiry and critical inquiry that draws heavily on Marxian or Neo-Marxian ideology.

It is too early to know what will be the eventual outcome, but for this writer, two individuals seem to posit an alternative to such a split. Theodore Roszak and Richard J. Bernstein. Both transcend the dualisms that characterize those caught up in polarized positions. It is beyond the scope of this writing to explicate in detail the alternative metatheory of their respective positions. However, some aspects that underlie what might be viewed as promising "emerging foundations" for curriculum theory can be sketched. These seem not to distort the basic tenets of those who take differing positions within the Reconceptualist group.

An Alternative Metatheoretical Base

Theodore Roszak's identification of a third tradition which he calls "the personal" suggests something of the direction a resolution to the issue might take. He posits this in contrast to the "individual" and the "collective" traditions. This tradition, he asserts, draws on the thinking of Bierdyaev and Moulier in Europe and men like Dwight Macdonald in America. He cites Macdonald's essay "The Root is Man" as a good example of the expression of Personalist values.

Roszak stresses the significance of this theoretical stance in rejecting the materialistic dialectics of Marx and the equally encapsulating constraints of a capitalistic culture. He views as crucial the fact that this view has not crystallized into a systematic ideology:

Rather, they set themselves the task of being the Socratic conscience of revolutionary politics, a stubborn ethical sensibility that applied itself to all systems, all ideologies. The core of their political insight was this: that moral sensitivity will always be

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obliterated by a moral indignation that loses itself among masses and class identities. 

He develops, therefore, the idea of a mosaic of "situational groups" which are genuinely vehicles of "self-discovery."

In this sense, the historian Roszak seems to support what Bernstein intends when he proposes a meta-theory that will cut across the several modes we commonly posit, regardless of how we perceive them. He expresses the need this way:

What is required is a fundamental re-examination of the very categories by which we understand human action, and seek to relate theory to practice. The root issues concern the most basic questions about what human beings are, what they are in the process of becoming, and what they may yet become.

If we take Roszak and Bernstein together, we can finally say with Bernstein that we are not confronted with exclusive choices: either empirical theory or interpretive theory or critical theory.

Rather, there is an internal dialectic in the restructuring of social and political theory: when we work through any one of these moments, we discover how the others are implicated. An adequate social and political theory must be empirical, interpretive, and critical (italics in original).

If the individuals who are trying to reconceptualize the theory base for curriculum are to succeed, it seems clear some resolution of the issues which have arisen must be resolved. At this point, the proposals of Roszak and Bernstein offer a promise. But, one might ask, what does a possible resolution at the level of meta-theory have to do with curriculum—especially curriculum development in school situations? In this writer's view, it has much to do with a newly-emerging foundations base for curriculum as a field of study. If such, indeed, can emerge, a fresh and different set of questions regarding curriculum will result. These questions will differ markedly from the curriculum questions the conventional empirically-oriented theorist or the philosophical analyst have raised. Such questions will undoubtedly have significance for the applications we attempt in curriculum development. Much would remain to be done to bridge the theory-practice gap, but the rationale underlying what is done would rest on a more rigorous and defensible foundation.

Footnotes


8. Ibid., p. 235.
Are traditional foundational disciplines adequate to the educational experiences they analyze?

Moral education and moral choice

by George Dixon
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Most people concerned with moral education are familiar with the individual/collective dilemma in terms of two beliefs that seem to work in opposition to one another. On the one hand, we assert that actions which can be judged as moral or immoral necessarily involve individual choice. As moral agents, we can be neither praised nor blamed if we have no degree of control over our decisions and actions; one of the defining characteristics of actions that we call "moral" is just this fact of individual responsibility. Ethical theories which focus on this factor of individual responsibility and duty share a Kantian emphasis on the formal aspects of moral decisions.

But there is obviously more to moral decision than individual duty and private choice. We must also assert that moral decisions are influenced by circumstances outside the individual, circumstances that are connected with the time and place of choice, with specific rather than formal factors, with the history of the individual as it is situated between past experiences and expectations for the future.

Moralists of the utilitarian persuasion would, in fact, calculate just such factors to the point of explaining how an individual is most likely to decide a moral question. Their emphasis on the collective or social side of the relationship aligns them rather clearly with the methods and emphasis of the social sciences. It is in this apparent conflict between Kantian or formalistic ethical theories and the utilitarian or naturalistic counterparts that we find one source of difficulty for the moral educator concerned with the foundations of his field.

For example, if the moral educator looks to philosophy to clarify this relationship between individual choice and social influence, he finds that the problem gets worse before it gets better. Philosophers in the century, with a few notable exceptions, have regarded moral decisions as matters of private preference and individual feeling. They have preserved the necessarily individual aspect of morality, but only at the cost of putting most moral questions beyond reasonable discussion and public evaluation. The result for moral educators has too often been one of reducing their task to helping students clarify their individual values, and while this is a worthy vacation, it just begins to scratch the surface of the process of moral choice and value formation. For such clarification must ignore the social nature of morality; moral consensus becomes little more than the tabulation of private interests. After individual value preferences have been clarified, the teacher must indeed be ready to move on quickly to the next topic of discussion; modern subjectivist theories of morality offer little help on the tough issues that logically follow individual clarification.

The moral educator can turn to the social sciences for help in understanding how external factors condition moral choice. For the social sciences seem to concentrate on exactly those social or external factors that the values clarification approach tends to ignore. But that strength in explaining how and why people choose and act as they do derive to the social sciences at the own high cost for the conclusion that seems implicit in most social science research is that external factors determine individual decisions and actions; the moral responsibility that educators seek to enhance turns out to be an illusion. From a social science perspective, actions can be explained and even predicted, but in the course of such research we seem to remove the action being studied from the realm of morality. That is, we can hardly praise or
blame a person for "having made a choice" if that person has had a choice in the same way that Skinner's hen has had an egg.

So far in this analysis I have stretched the opposing poles of the individual/collective paradox, simplifying each position and ignoring those developments in philosophy and the social sciences which have worked to mitigate the split. Unfortunately, such developments tend to fall outside the mainstream of the various foundational disciplines, so that it is usually quite difficult for educators to get in touch with them. This seems to me to explain why those curriculum theorists called Reconceptualists often look outside mainstream social science and sometimes to disciplines like literature and art for redirection; they deliberately seek out researchers working on the fringes or crossing disciplinary lines in order to recontextualize problems that have resisted traditional solutions. Thus we might say that even though some philosophers and social scientists have begun to address the individual/collective paradox and have uncovered some promising directions for resolution, the paradox remains very much with us. And it proves to be especially debilitating in moral education, which has at its center the problematic relationship between individual choice and determining social circumstances.

One philosopher and social theorist whose recent work may be helpful to moral educators is Jurgen Habermas. For a variety of reasons, his work is not generally known in this country, although it is widely read in his own country of Germany and throughout Europe.

Habermas' work is admittedly difficult, especially for those with a philosophical background in the Anglo-American tradition of empiricism. Moreover, those works by Habermas that have been translated into English for the most part do not address educational questions directly. His most widely known work, Knowledge and Human Interests, is in fact a critique of positivism. And the education-oriented essays of Toward a Rational Society focus on problems of the German educational system during the 1960's and thus resist quick application to educational problems in this country.

But perhaps it is this very foreignness that makes Habermas' work significant to the problems of ethical theory and moral education. For with his philosophical roots in Continental philosophy, especially in the works of Hegel and Marx, Habermas has been able to bring new light to the individual/collective paradox that has defied so many Anglo-American researchers. This is not to say that Habermas avoids or rejects philosophers and researchers in our tradition; he has, in fact, been influenced by philosophers as diverse as the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce and the British analyst John L. Austin. He is also conversant with social science research from Max Weber to Jane Loevinger and Lawrence Kohlberg.

In fact, the one translated essay by Habermas that directly addresses the problem of educational foundations is a critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory of cognitive moral development.1 That theory, which has gained some popularity among moral educators, posits six stages which form a hierarchy of qualitative-distinct ways of deciding moral questions and, thus, of guiding moral action. On the basis of 20 years of investigation, Kohlberg has found that a child passes through a number of discrete and invariant stages of moral development, moving from an ego-centric basis for decision through a later adherence to social conventions to a more reflective or "post-conventional" stage. (See Chart 1) As we might expect from Kohlberg's labels, most people reach the third or fourth stage of cognitive moral development and remain there for most of their lives. Only a few, Socrates or Jesus or Martin Luther King, for example, seem to attain the broad universal principles of Stage Six.

On the basis of this theory, Kohlberg has developed an approach to moral education that pushes students to higher levels of moral development, primarily through the use of ethical dilemmas. Thus, a student at Stage Two is presented in classroom discussion with a fictional ethical situation that demands a more comprehensive analysis than is available within Stage Two reasoning. For example, a student is asked to formulate a course of action for an impoverished husband who is tempted to steal the expensive medicine his wife needs to survive. Such a fictional situation helps the student to realize that individual needs and desires may conflict with or be over-ridden by agreed-upon conventions. Kohlberg carefully sets up the terms of each fictional dilemma so that the student is forced to look beyond his stage of moral development in order to arrive at a satisfactory resolution. The student may be forced to move from an ego-centric Stage Two decision to a Stage Three fear of punishment or towards a Stage Four refusal to show disrespect for the laws against theft. Confronting these dilemmas and examining possible resolutions is supposed to foster the cognitive development of students in relation to these ethical questions.

We should note how Kohlberg defends this approach from the twin dangers of indoctrination and subjectivism. First, his approach concentrates on the form of the moral judgment rather than the content; it also demands a classroom atmosphere of dialogue and mutual respect. This emphasis on form and interaction among students and teacher lessens the likelihood the teacher or the student's peers will impose their moral decisions on the individual student and thereby deny him the opportunity...
to make his own moral choice. Secondly, Kohlberg contends that the greater comprehensiveness of the latter stages of his hierarchy provides an objective progression in the structure if not in the content of ethical judgments and moral explanations. Thus the value neutrality or subjectivity of the values clarification approach, for example, is replaced in Kohlberg’s curriculum with a formal objectivity.

There is much more to Kohlberg’s theory of moral development, and much of it is helpful and convincing. But one quickly notices the Kantian emphasis in Kohlberg’s theory, especially as it focuses on the cognitive factors involved in moral decisions and actions. Kohlberg has indeed preserved individual choice through the various stages of moral development, but seems to ignore those factors that seem external and non-cognitive, factors that have been analyzed in great detail by the social sciences.

Kohlberg’s justification for proceeding in this manner is that the cognitive aspects of moral development are the most important factor we have so far discovered. He would admit that non-cognitive and utilitarian factors influence moral decisions, but he holds little hope for connecting internal and external factors, or individual and social perspectives, beyond the limited connections now made in Chart I.

So, as valuable as Kohlberg’s research and interpretations have been, we are still left with the unresolved dilemma of individual choice in a world that is unavoidably social. We have not been able to approach the strict standard that Robert Paul Wolff sets forth in his analysis of Kantian ethics:

... an adequate foundation for moral theory requires some coherent way of understanding men’s actions both as causally determined, predictable, natural events and as rationally initiated, policy-directed actions. None of the familiar dodges, relaxations of the conflict, or reinterpretations designed to dissolve the problem will do.... If any sense is to be made of responsibility and action, then one and the same bit of behavior which can be explained physiologically, predicted statistically, and brought within the scope of a scientific theory must also be capable of being consistently understood as issuing from the autonomous action of practical reason.9

But this is precisely the challenge that Habermas takes up in his reconstruction of Kohlberg’s theory. He

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**Chart I**

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adds to the developmental psychology emphasis of Kohlberg's work a sociological dimension, one that relates the six stages in the process of socialization. By thus drawing on the work of George Herbert Mead and Talcott Parsons, among others, Habermas moves Kohlberg's theory from a monologic basis to a dialogic basis. Another way to describe Habermas' direction is in terms of the social contract theory that underlies so much of our social and political thought. Habermas would pose two questions of the familiar social contract theory that has its counterpart in Kohlberg's Fifth Stage: 1) How do moral agents entering into a social contract become responsible agents in the first place? and 2) How do the interests of individuals combine to constitute universal principles, that is, how are ethical universals formed?

From a historical perspective, both questions can be traced back to Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics. Both point to the weakness in Kohlberg's theory, and in formalistic ethics generally, namely, their static and individualistic foundation. But what is most important here is that Habermas calls our attention to the dynamic and social nature of moral development. He brings to Kohlberg's theory much-needed sociological insights into how we become aware of ourselves as agents acting in the world, into how we come to see the interaction of intentions and consequences in our actions, and of how we gradually recognize norms and the conditions for applying those norms to our decisions and actions.

Once again we must note that Habermas' reconstruction is a detailed and complicated critique, as one can see from the various columns in Chart II. But his broadening of Kohlberg's base gives moral educators a better theoretical foundation for their work in schools, one that moves beyond a static conception of already-formed individuals aligning themselves with already-established moral principles or stages. As a result, a student's question about why he can't follow his private value position and cheat on the next test need not create a crisis in the moral education curriculum. In fact, from Habermas' perspective, such a question would provide the opportunity to consider a number of important ethical issues. Rather than avoid the issue, a teacher could advance the discussion by asking the student to consider the nature of conventional classroom rules against cheating, the tension that usually exists between private interest and social welfare, and the role that the teacher often fulfills in the classroom as enforcer of society's rules and regulations.

Admittedly, these topics may prove hazardous for the moral educator. In the first place, the teacher's own role is likely to come under the scrutiny of his students. Secondly, these topics are sure to provide the teacher with more puzzling moments than are likely to occur within the supposedly neutral values clarification curriculum. The teacher might even find that simple questions, like those about cheating, lead finally to discussions concerned with things like the function of testing in the schools, a topic that seems complex no matter how advanced one's stage of cognitive development.

This last example points, however, to an additional benefit of Habermas' approach. That is, Habermas is able to posit a Seventh Stage of moral development, one that moves beyond a Kantian base in universalized duty to a basis in moral and political freedom. This base is dialogic and social rather than monologic and subjective. At this stage, we have more than the formal goal of Stage Six to serve as an end point for our theory of moral development. We can now consider the consequences as well as the form of our moral deliberations, we can take into account factors like human needs and welfare, and we can finally add a certain degree of content and specificity to ethical theory and moral education.

To sum up, we might say that Habermas wants to consider social and external factors without reducing ethics to a utilitarian calculation; at the same time, he wants to preserve individual choice without adopting the abstractness of ethical formalism. His efforts certainly need greater development and application, but they do offer us a view of moral education that avoids the subjective and inconsequential flavor of so much of what passes as moral education. In contrast, Habermas' reconstruction provides a basis for taking moral education seriously. It not only offers us a compelling explanation of the interactive nature of ethical universals and the interplay between individual autonomy and social constraints, but it accounts for those conditions that surround moral education and ultimately moral choice.

Notes

1. Kohr, Paul R., "Emerging Foundations for Curriculum Theory" (This issue)
Moral education requires rigorous and extended thought, study, analysis.

Values clarification and moral education

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Suppose you are a teacher, counselor, parent or friend and you have a student, client, child or friend who is having problems. Reflecting on those problems, you decide that they involve one or more of the following symptoms: apathy, flightiness, uncertainty or indecisiveness, inconsistency, drift, overconformity, dissentiouousness or role playing. How can you help the person? What approach would be appropriate?

The Values Clarification movement offers an answer to this question. In their book Values and Teaching, Raths, Harmin and Simon claim that people with these problems are often not helped as they could be. The reason is that this set of disorders is neither intellectual nor emotional in nature. Most of our helping activities involve either counseling people with emotional disorders or teaching people who need to gain some form of knowledge. Raths, Harmin and Simon maintain that the cause of this set of problems (apathy, etc.) is neither an emotional nor an intellectual problem but a values problem. The reason people have these symptoms, they maintain, is that they are not clear about their values. In a world of change and future shock, in a world of competing value systems and pervasive relativism, in a world witnessing the breakdown of family and church, Raths, Harmin and Simon believe that many people suffer from the lack of a workable set of values, and that these symptoms (apathy, etc.) are due to this fact. Given this analysis, then, what is needed is neither teaching nor therapy but help in values clarification.

To provide this help, Values and Teaching and other books on values clarification (VC) offer (a) a theory of the valuing process and (b) many different activities, and guidelines for devising activities, which will help the teacher-parent-counselor friend engage in values clarifying activities with the person needing help (which may be oneself).

I want to focus on the question of how values clarification should be considered in relation to moral education, so I will give just a brief summary of VC theory and practice. What is important for VC is not the values one has but rather the process whereby one arrives at these values. In fact, values are defined as what one arrives at after going through a certain process. VC is both relativistic and subjectivistic. It is relativistic in that it claims that there is no one set of values which is true, valid or right for everyone in all situations. And it is subjectivistic in that it claims that there is no basis for evaluating standards of right and wrong apart from what the individual believes — i.e., right or wrong are a function of what the individual believes to be right or wrong. VC is different from some subjectivisms in holding that it is important that one follow the right process if one's values are to be valid. But, given that one has gone through the right process (values clarifying), whatever decisions one makes regarding right and wrong are correct. So all the emphasis for VC is on the valuing process. Essentially, VC involves activities designed to get people to follow the proper valuing process.

That valuing process, according to VC theory, involves seven aspects or steps. (These are discussed extensively in Raths et al. in many other VC publications.) To arrive at a "good" value, one should use a process that includes: Choosing freely, choosing from among alternatives, choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative, valuing and cherishing, publically affirming and acting upon our choices. Only if something satisfies these seven criteria is it a value. VC then is a set of activities designed to get a person to engage in a certain form of decision making which, it is claimed, will result in the person's having clear values and thus become more "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic and proud" rather than showing those symptoms we noted at the beginning (apathy, etc.).

Furthermore, VC is a theory about how values education ought to be carried out, and since values education includes moral education, it is also a theory about how moral education ought to be carried out. It is here that I find the most serious problem with VC. What I want to do in this paper is to present a view of moral education which is inconsistent with certain features of VC and which, I will argue, can solve a problem which arises for VC but cannot be settled as long as one holds on to certain assumptions to which VC is committed. Let me first lay out that problem as it exists for VC and then show how a different view of moral education, one that rejects the subjectivism of VC, can solve the problem in a way that is consistent with the basic objectives of VC.

I will state a fairly long quotation from the book Values and Teaching to illustrate how the problem arises for VC and also illustrate that VC is in fact concerned with moral education (so its proponents cannot sidestep my criticism by denying that they are concerned with moral education). The interchange I will quote is one that might occur in a class where the teacher is committed to VC but also to enforcing certain behavior rules, in this case a rule...
against cheating on tests. The tension arises between these two objectives because according to VC theory, the proper valuation process requires that one choose freely from among alternatives. But how can the student choose freely from among alternatives if some of the major alternatives are ruled out ahead of time by the teacher?

Teacher: So some of you think it is best to be honest on tests, is that right? (Some heads nod affirmatively.) And some of you think that dishonesty is all right? (A few hesitant and slight nods.) And I guess some of you are not certain. (Heads nod.) Well, are there any other choices or is it just a matter of dishonesty vs. honesty?

Sam: You could be honest some of the time and dishonest some of the time.

Teacher: Does that sound like a possible choice, class? (Heads nod.) Any other alternatives to choose from?

Tracy: You could be honest in some situations and not in others. For example, I am not honest when a friend asks about an ugly dress, at least sometimes. (Laughter.)

Teacher: Is that a possible choice, class? (Heads nod again.) Any other alternatives?

Sam: It seems to me that you have to be all one way or all the other.

Teacher: Just a minute, Sam. As usual, we are first looking for alternatives that there are in the issue. Later we'll try to look at any choice that you may have selected. Any other alternatives, class? (No response.) Well, then, let's list the four possibilities that we have on the board, and I'm going to ask that each of you do two things for yourself: (1) see if you can identify any other choices in this issue of honesty and dishonesty, and (2) consider the consequences of each alternative and see which ones you prefer. Later we will have buzz groups in which you can discuss this and see if you are able to make a choice and if you want to make your choice part of your actual behavior. That is something you must do for yourself.

Ginger: Does that mean that we can decide for ourselves whether we should be honest on tests here?

Teacher: No, that means that you can decide on the value, I personally value honesty; and although you may choose to be dishonest, I shall insist that we be honest on our tests here. In other areas of your life, you may have more freedom to be dishonest, but one can't do anything any time, and this in class I shall expect honesty on tests.

Ginger: But then how can we decide for ourselves? Aren't you telling us what to value?

Sam: Sure, you're telling us what we should do and believe in.

Teacher: Not exactly. I don't mean to tell you what you should value. That's up to you. But I do mean that in this class, not elsewhere, necessarily, you have to be honest on tests or suffer certain consequences. I merely mean that I cannot give tests without the rule of honesty. All of you who choose dishonesty as a value may not practice it here, that's all I'm saying. Further questions anyone? (Values and Teaching, pp. 114-115.)

The class may not have any more questions, but I certainly do. Why do we and the authors find this situation strange? Why do we all feel that it requires explanation? Well, clearly, because on the one hand we tell students that they must make their own value judgments and that these are valid, while on the other hand we tell them that those judgments are not valid (that the teacher will not respect them), in that, if they make the "wrong" choice, they will not be permitted to act on that choice in the teacher's class and will have to suffer certain consequences. While Raths et al. believe that they can dissolve the paradox by drawing a distinction between imposing values and imposing "... behavior rules that are not defended as values, but merely as devices for protecting individuals and groups against pressure from others," I do not believe that they are successful.

I cannot now develop fully my reasons for thinking them unsuccessful. Basically, I would suggest two reasons. First, the objective of VC is to recognize, in fact, to delimit the autonomy and dignity of the person making the choices. It seems to me, however, that to impose rules without even trying to justify them is to impose what's been called "moral authoritarianism" on the child and to fail totally to respect the child's dignity. The second reason for not accepting the solution is practical: In fact, the teacher is telling the student what value to hold. By telling the student, "I'm going to force you to do this," one is sending a signal that the child receives as a signal about what is, in an objective sense, right. That is, to enforce behavior rules is, in effect, to contradict the VC commitment not to tell the young what values they should choose.

Thus VC theory is stuck with a real paradox: Despite principled grounds for not imposing values on others, it must accept the common sense requirement that children cannot be allowed to do whatever they want or choose, and hence that sometimes the strong decide what the weak will do, which amounts to the strong telling the weak what values they should choose.

Can VC solve this problem? I suggest that to do so it must give up subjectivism but can maintain its objective of avoiding moralizing and indoctrination. To give up subjectivism will clearly require significant reworking of its basic value theory.

Let me begin my discussion with some basic distinctions among kinds of values. When we think about values (or, as I would prefer to say, about an individual's normative principles, that is, principles or beliefs concerning what he ought to do), it is useful to distinguish two kinds. First, we can recognize "good life values." These are our beliefs concerning what it is reasonable or proper to do in the pursuit of our own well-being, our own self-interest. For example, the following bit of practical reasoning—reasoning concerning what one should do—exposes one of Charlie's "good life values." Suppose Charlie decides to go out on a date with Linda because "he will have more fun with Linda than with anyone else." This line of reasoning reveals that one of Charlie's normative principles, one of his values, is that it is reasonable to do that which will give one the most fun. To state it more precisely, Charlie may believe something like this: "Ceteris paribus, one is better off having more fun than less." Any such value, one which acts as a guide to the agent's own good life, I call a "good life value."

But not all values are of this kind. Many normative principles do not tell us how to achieve the good life but
rather place limits, restraints, on our pursuit of our good life. They are "other-regarding" rather than "self-regarding." Referring back to the previous example, suppose that Charlie is again considering whether to go out with Linda, but in this case he is married to Nancy. So now he may reason thus: "I should not go out with Linda, even though I will have more fun with her than with anyone else, because I am married to Nancy." Analyzing this bit of practical reasoning indicates that while Charlie is not rejecting the normative relevance of the fact that something will give him a lot of fun, he finds that there is an overriding principle which puts constraints on his having fun. While the fact that it would be the most fun continues to be a reason to date Linda, the fact that he is married to Nancy gives an overriding reason not to date Linda. We can state the normative principle involved, the "value," like this: "The fact that some action will violate one's marriage agreement is reason against doing that action, even if doing it is in one's best self-interest." Such a value or normative principle, which puts a moral limit on one's pursuit of one's self-interest, I will call a moral value.

Thus there can be said to be two kinds of values, those of self-interest, which serve as guides to a person's wellbeing, and those of morality, which indicate when and how rights of others limit one's pursuit of one's own wellbeing. It should be noted that these categories need not be mutually exclusive. What is best for me may be perfectly compatible with my moral duty. But in many cases moral values will function as higher order values, overriding those of self-interest. There is nothing per se wrong with Charlie's going out with Linda, however, the reasons for doing so are outweighed in this case by the moral obligation which Charlie has undertaken in respect to Nancy.

I want to use this distinction to get at the causes and cure of the paradox of VC. The paradox, to review, was this: VC maintains that it is wrong to tell the young what they should do, to impose values on them, yet it also recognizes the need to impose behavior rules which, however, turns out to be an arbitrary imposition, given VC value theory, and which willfully involves telling the young what their values should be. Basically, I will suggest that the paradox arises because VC is mistaken in believing that moral values are subjective. If moral values are in some sense objective and rational, then they satisfy a necessary condition of their being teachable; if they are subjective, they cannot be taught. If they can be taught (as opposed to inculcated or indoctrinated), then we may legitimately do so; and if they are objective and ground in good reasons, then we may even require students to follow them as behavior rules, even when they disagree with or do not yet understand the reasons for them.

I start with the claim that moral values are not purely subjective, but are in some sense objective. This is a major issue in moral philosophy, and I can only outline my position here. Let me begin by granting what seems correct in VC value theory. There are many values which are in some sense subjective. About these one can say, as does VC, that if one goes through the right valuing process, then the value that one has at the end cannot be considered incorrect. For example, should I have beef or chicken for dinner? Should I work the day or evening shift (assuming my family obligations do not make a difference)? Should I read novels or go to movies for entertainment? In many cases such as these, there is no right answer other than what one would come to after going through a careful process of value clarification. These values might be called "pure procedural values," by analogy to Rawls' conception of pure procedural justice, for unlike other values, there is here no independent criterion for the correct outcome.

But for most moral values there is such an independent criterion. One ought to be honest or tests as a rule. If one comes out to a different conclusion, even if one has clarified the value in the technical VC sense, one is mistaken. One ought to refrain from killing people on the street in cases not involving possible exceptions such as war or self-defense. If after the student has clarified her/his values, she/he values killing people on the street, the student has made a mistake. In fact, not even all self-regarding values are pure procedural values. It's quite possible for me to go through the proper values clarifying process and be mistaken. For example, I may decide that I should spend all my time in college playing basketball and not studying. But even if I have clarified my values in the proper manner, this may be a terrible mistake. Thus I suggest that most values are not subjective in the sense that VC suggests but are rather in some sense objective.

To explain this notion of objectivity, let me refer to the work of William Frankena. Frankena argues that morality is a social institution, something that exists prior to the individual and also continues on after the individual, but which also depends for its validation on the recognition by individuals, as they become morally autonomous, that it is a reasonable system, that one ought to take the moral point of view. Frankena says:

Now morality... is, in one aspect, at least, a social enterprise, not just a discovery or invention of the individual for his own guidance. Like one's language, state or church, it exists before the individual, who is inducted into it and becomes more or less of a participant in it, and it goes on existing after him... Morality... is also largely social in its origins, sanctions and functions. As first encountered by the individual, at any rate, it is an instrument of society as a whole for the guidance of individuals and smaller groups. It makes demands on individuals that are, initially at least, external to them... If they come to disagree with the demands, then, as Socrates thought and as we shall see later, they must still do so from the moral point of view that has somehow been inculcated into them.

Having explained how morality is larger than the individual, now it has its base in society, Frankena goes on to explain how morality nevertheless involves the autonomy of the individual.

However, morality... also has a more individualistic or protestant aspect. As Socrates implied and recent philosophers have stressed... morality fosters or even calls for the use of reason and for a kind of autonomy on the part of the individual, asking him, when mature and normal, to make his own decisions, though possibly with someone's advice, and even stimulating him to think out the principles or goals in the light of which he is to make his decisions. Even as a social institution of life, morality is thought of as aiming at rational self-guidance or self-determination in its members.

Thus morality, the system of moral controls in society, is objective both in the sense that it is a creation of the
society and not of the individual and in the sense that it depends ultimately on the fact that as members of the society achieve maturity, they come to recognize autonomously the validity of the system.

While there may be different rules in different societies, this need not imply societal ethical relativism, and it surely does not imply individual ethical relativism or ethical subjectivism. Since VC's subjectivism seems to be based on relativistic views of morality, a few words about relativism are in order here. Whether or not there are different rules in different societies, the purpose of moral rules is the same, to provide a system for resolving conflicts of interest. Differences among societies, like disagreements among individuals within the society, can be accounted for by (a) differing conditions and/or beliefs about the conditions, and (b) differing levels of insight into the principles of morality and the effects of different sets of rules.

(a) If one society believes that babies are healthier if nursed and another believes that they are healthier if bottle fed, it may be thought right to bottle feed in the latter society but thought wrong to do so in the former. But this disagreement does not prove ethical relativism. Perhaps because of other conditions, it is healthier to nurse in one society but not in the other. Then, though on one level of moral rules we can speak of "cultural relativism," this is not really accurate because at a more basic level both societies are using the principle, "Feed young babies the way that will make them most healthy." Or it might be the case that one or the other society is mistaken about what mode of feeding makes babies the healthier. In that case also we do not have relativism but a situation in which one society's moral rules are based on mistaken factual premises.

(b) Societies may have different moral rules because of different levels of moral insight. Thus, segregation and other forms of racial discrimination were approved in parts of the United States until Martin Luther King, Jr. and others forced us to recognize that this could not be morally justified. Such a recognition would be impossible if relativism were true. Consider the approach of South Africans when criticized for apartheid. They do not appeal to ethical relativism—they do not say that it just happens to be wrong in the United States but right in South Africa. They grant certain moral principles but then argue that conditions are different in South Africa, and thus different derivative moral practices are justified. Or, they maintain that racial discrimination is morally proper and that Americans are mistaken in thinking it wrong. Thus, we need not jump to ethical relativism, let alone ethical subjectivism, when confronted with differences among individuals or among societies concerning what is right and wrong.

Next, if morality does in fact have this objective basis, it would seem that it can be taught and not merely imposed or indoctrinated into children. For as Frankena points out, morality must ultimately be based on the autonomous acceptance of it by the members of society—i.e., they must rationally and freely recognize the basis of the morality and adopt the rules for themselves. Further, it is through this individual analysis and appropriation that moral progress must be made, as individuals discover discrepancies between the purposes of morality and the present rules and principles by which it is expressed. So it does not follow that, if one has a definite theory of morality in mind, one must fall into what the VC theorists fear, the heavy "moralizing, inculcating, and indoctrination" that dominated values education before World War II and, in its extreme form, led to the horrors of the Nazi regime.

The objective of moral education, then, must be to teach students (a) the current state of the art in one's society, the current beliefs about what is right and wrong and (b) the art itself—how to criticize and evaluate the morality of society and develop one's own morality. The first objective shows the content of moral education: One does not ask each child to re-invent the wheel, and neither does one ask each child to re-invent morality. The second objective shows the way in which morality respects the dignity and autonomy of the individual: One does not teach physics as a set of revealed truths, but rather one aims to get the student to understand and validate the physicists' reasoning. Likewise, one aims to get the student of morality to understand and validate the moral reasoning of the society.

Establishing that morality can be taught and not merely imposed or indoctrinated enables us to solve the paradox of VC. For the paradox arises in precisely the kinds of cases we are talking about: Cases such as that involving honesty on tests are cases in which "common sense" requires that rules of behavior be enforced, and they are also cases involving moral values. So I would conclude that it is not common sense at all but really the institution of morality which requires that these rules be enforced. And if what I have said about moral values is correct, then we can avoid the paradox of VC. If we believe that there is an objective basis for morality, that the demands of morality can be justified, then we can justify imposing the relevant behavior rules on the child without arbitrary authoritarianism. For (a) if the rules are correct, then the child ought to follow them whether he/she understands them yet or not, and we can tell the child that is why these behavior rules are being enforced. And (b) if morality is in fact a social institution, then to fail to enforce it with children is to fail to discharge our responsibility to society. So once we recognize that morality is objective, we need not feel so sensitive about imposing rules, e.g., against cheating on tests. We solve the paradox of VC by seeing that good theory does not rule out imposing these rules.

But these results take us beyond merely resolving the paradox of VC. For if they are correct (and what I have done is to lay out an alternative view of morality, not prove it), then a real form of moral education is possible. Moral education in the sense we described it, teaching the young both the content and the rationale for the institution of morality, is impossible for VC, since everyone must discover or create or arbitrarily decide to prefer his/her own set of values. But with the view presented here, we can have a real moral education, for we can teach the student what it is that morality requires and also why this is required and how to evaluate critically and autonomously those requirements.

If VC does not recognize the nature of moral values, it will hardly be likely to do a good job of teaching morality, except incidentally. The school teacher and the parent must recognize this limitation to VC theory and practice. One cannot be, in principle, nondirective and client-centered if one is to achieve moral education, for there is a definite subject matter for the young to learn. It should
not be left to chance that the student will learn it through values clarification. Nor should students be given the impression, as VC would, that it is totally up to them whether they should value honestly or dishonestly. Of course, it is up to them in the sense that if I am to respect their autonomy, I must not impose some normative belief on them. But it is not up to them in the sense that whatever they decide is equally correct. I have outlined a view of morality which I believe is right and which fits an ordinary notion of morality better than does VC, as is shown by the fact that the non-subjective view avoids the paradox of VC.

A word about the sense in which we say that it is possible that the individual can make a wrong decision: To say that it is logically possible that the individual's decision is wrong or mistaken is not to say that I or anyone can ever know indubitably that the decision is wrong. It is to say that if you think you have made the right decision and I think you have made the wrong one, one of us must, logically, be mistaken.

Finally, this is not to say that one cannot use any of the VC activities for teaching morality, nor is it to forget that there seems to be a set of "good life" values for which the VC emphasis on valuing process rather than specific outcomes seems to be appropriate. Many of the VC activities are excellent for raising issues and for stimulating the reflection that must take place. Insofar as the techniques provide a way to stimulate interest, to reach students where they are, to broaden perspective and increase consideration of alternatives and consequences, insofar as the techniques encourage one to go beyond thinking to acting on and affirming one's values, they are valuable for moral education as well as for other forms of values education. But moral education must go much further. Moral education requires rigorous and extended thought, study, analysis, and it also requires recognition of objectivity in moral values. Since VC provides neither of these, the moral educator who relies solely on values clarification will be making a serious mistake.

Footnotes:

1. Values clarification is very popular right now in American education. Its guru is Sidney Simon, and among the high priests are Howard Kirschenbaum, Merrill Harmon and Leland W. Howe. The movement claims apostolic succession from John Dewey through Louis E. Raths.

2. Following are some of the basic sources: John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939) is claimed to be the source of the value theory which VC adopts. VC theory is most fully laid out in Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmon, and Sidney Simon, Values and Teaching (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968). Other writings by main figures include Sidney Simon, Leland Howe, and Howard Kirschenbaum, Values Clarification (New York: Harcourt, 1972); Sidney Simon, Merrill Harmon, and Howard Kirschenbaum, Values Clarification: A Critical Perspective (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1973), and Howard Kirschenbaum, Values Clarification (San Diego: University Associates, 1976).


1. The term ethical subjectivism has a number of meanings. Sometimes it refers to the view that right and wrong are a function of some feeling of the agent—an action is right if I feel a certain way about it. I will use the term in a somewhat different sense: Ethical subjectivism is the opposite of ethical objectivism; that is, it is the view that there is no standard for determining right and wrong apart from what an individual believes to be right and wrong—whatever an individual believes about the rightness or wrongness of an action is correct (true) because that is what he believes.

2. There is, I believe, a serious theoretical difficulty here for VC: What is it that one has after these steps? What is it that satisfies these criteria? Is it an attitude? a belief? a pattern of behavior? a feeling? However, I will not pursue this line of criticism in this paper.


10. An important technique of VC is not to stay very long on any issue, to stimulate thought and reflection and then move on. Raths et al. say: Caution: many teachers do not end value-clarifying discussions soon enough. Cut them at the first sign of dullness. What is usually effective is a few sharp questions, some silence for students to use for private mulling, a few student comments, and then cut. (Values and Teaching, op. cit., pp. 115-116.)
Higher grades may not be synonymous with higher ranking.

The role of the school in reforming society structures

by Walter P. Krolikowski
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Educational innovations continue to be in the news. As long as the American public voices its dissatisfaction with the progress of its children and as long as the American schools remain a uniquely effective vehicle for getting ahead, school personnel will continue to experiment. We have recently received reports on two such experiments, and phenomenally extensive and expensive ones at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois and another on the progress of those students who beat out Allan Bakke for admission to the medical school at Davis, California. Both are worth pondering.

In October, 1977, Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver issued a summary report on special support programs at the Chicago Circle Campus. Since 1968, the University of Illinois has recruited and admitted over 5,000 minority students for special programs: the Educational Assistance Program, the Native American Program, the Latin American Recruitment and Educational Services program, and the Confederation of Latin American Students. Special orientation programs, advising and tutorial services and special course were specifically designed for these students. In addition to the usual federal and state monies available to all needy students, approximately $5 million has been spent since 1968. Surely, a large scale effort.

In November, 1977, Donald L. Reidhaan, general counsel for the University of California, reported on the present status of the 16 students who had been admitted in preference to Allan Bakke in the medical school of the University of California at Davis. The experiment here lay in admitting a special group of students, traditionally excluded from medical schools, rather than in devising special aids for them.1

We shall discuss these reports at the end of this article. But it is important that we lay a groundwork that will help us come to grips with these and other examples of structural reforms that extend far beyond attempts to help this or that individual.

Efraim Shmueli has pointed out that liberal intellectuals may react in one of two ways to the need for reform; they look for a change in social institutions or in the individual:

Historically the liberal intellectuals fluctuate between two orientations. The one is directed toward perfection of man by eliminating the social, economic and political sources of evil. The intellectuals of this group are structure-oriented. The second orientation attempts to purify the human qualities of reasoning and behavior by moral exhortation or other educational techniques in the hope that the economic, social and political institutions will gradually become manifestations of universally accepted humane intentions.2

The second group of liberals, of course, would say that changing individual men is precisely the way to effect changes in society; many educators belong to this camp.

We will begin by analyzing certain features of the contention of the first group. There are several reasons for choosing this starting point. The profound changes and the increasing rate of social change push social scientists and educators to look for quicker and more efficient methods of bringing about in a planned fashion, desirable social changes.

Changing society is not like changing individual men. Society is more than the men who are its members. Since society consists of patterns of interacting and interconnecting structures, changing society entails changing the structures of society.3 Now this is no easy task. If psychologists despair of changing the individual, social scientists despair of changing society. Most of society's structures have survived centuries of effort to abuse them, on the one hand, and to reform them, on the other. The origins of most instruments of society are hidden in prehistory; their continuing presence is taken for granted, and they change with what Charles Sanders Peirce would call "secular slowness." For all their variations, primary institutions, like forms of the family, property ownership, subsistence economy and social mobility, have been extraordinarily impervious to change.4

Changing society through changing social structures, then, has been adopted not because such an approach is intrinsically easier than changing individuals. Indeed it seems equally, if not more, difficult. But it has the advantage of offering an alternative to personal reform, one which offers hope of greater effectiveness, simply because of the scale on which it would operate, at a time when time itself is at a premium.

Finally, this approach is congenial to some educators. Educators, beginning with Plato, have been
tempted to be hyphenated kings. Academic people are often tempted to think that one social structure in particular, the school, is precisely the best instrument to bring about these reforms, less risky and "dirty" than direct political action and more likely to make an impact than the writing of treatises. For these and other reasons, the idea of the structures of society deserves close analysis. If educators are serious, and I think they are, confusion of thought and purpose is to be avoided. "Full speed ahead!" is a legitimate cry only when goals have been clarified and agreed upon and means are clearly available and commensurate to the task.

For educators, the idea of the reform of the structures of society can function in three different ways, as one among many objectives of the educational enterprise; as a criterion for choosing one set of actions, possibly educational but possibly not, over another; or as a criterion for improving the educational enterprise. Historically, schools have purported to have and have had different objectives or goals. Self-realization, life-adjustment, vocational preparedness, the cultivation of intelligence, citizenship education, and the reform of society—separately and in tandem these objectives have influenced theorists and practitioners alike. If the last of them is taken seriously as an objective, two presuppositions are worth uncovering. It is assumed that the school is an apt instrument of reform, but it is not assumed that the school itself needs reform. In other words, such a reformer might say: "There is nothing wrong with schools; what is wrong with society will ultimately be corrected because the schools are preparing reformers of society."

When the idea of reform functions as a criterion for choosing one set of actions over another, different assumptions are operative. It is not assumed that the school is an apt instrument of reform, nor is it assumed that the school itself needs reform. Let me explain.

If we think of the structures of society as the institutions of agriculture, business, government, industry, and intelligence; and if we ask ourselves how we can most effectively participate in the reform of society, we are asking which of these institutions is in need of reform and what actions on our part will bring about that reform. We may say that agriculture needs reform or business or several or all of them. Further, we may ask whether our action through one or more of these institutions is the best way to reform society. It may be that we will judge rather that personal action outside these structures will be the most apt instrument of reform. In all of these cases, we are asking, among other things, where we should stand in relation to these structures. Several alternatives are possible. Should we run for Congress of the United States, accept a position with Inland Steel, work for IBM? Then we would be working toward reform within the structure itself. Should we seek a position on the staff of a national magazine, work for a lobbying group or a pressure group? Then we would be at some distance from the structure, and the reformers we support would have to come about through the mediation of an informed public or ingroup we had aroused. Or shall we operate within the framework of the school and attempt to form men and women who will be the agents of change? Then we are farther removed from the action of reform itself, but ultimately we might have greater success than if we were participating in the daily skirmishes. From this perspective, the idea of reform reduces itself to the question: At what remove should we act? The answer may but does not necessarily involve the school. Even if we decide that the schools offer the most effective point of departure, there are still two possible tactics open to us. We can say we do not know what the future will bring and, therefore, that we do not know how the structures of society should be reformed. If we prepare young men and women well through the instrumentality of a general education, they will know what to do when the time comes for adult action; and they will be eager to do it. Or, secondly, we can say that the structures of society need or will need this or that particular reform and we can prepare students explicitly to solve those particular problems.

Let me offer examples of these two approaches. Marx and Engels' program in "The Communist Manifesto" is an example of the first. After nine points that refer most properly to the industrialization of the nation and the collectivization of agriculture, Marx and Engels add a tenth: "Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labor in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc." Although the program does not lack all specification, it is still quite general and, in the main, formal.

An example of the second might be Lenin's plan, as described by Professor Pavel A. Kashutin, Rector of the Lenin Teachers' Training College in Moscow:

"Therefore, along with industrialization of the nation and collectivization of agriculture, Lenin's plan for a socialist society advanced, as the third important task, the carrying through of a cultural revolution. Lenin pointed out that in the given case the matter concerned a radical turn in the spiritual life of the masses: shaping up an attitude towards property as belonging to the people and towards work as not being forced, but of being free and creative for the benefit simultaneously of one's self and society; remodeling of the world outlook of the people, and instilling to a greater degree in their minds the psychology of collectivism, friendship and mutual assistance, and, finally, involving broad sections of the working people in running the state."

Lenin's program spells out objectives with a degree of specificity beyond that of Marx and Engels. It is at least conceivable that similar objectives could be stated for the reform of the structures of American society and that students' education could be planned in function of these objectives.

Thus would run the second of three possible interpretations of the reform of the structures of society; reform would serve as a criterion for action, a criterion for selecting one instrumentality over others. But the concept of reform may also function as a criterion of self-improvement. Here too, assumptions are operative. It is assumed that the school needs reform, but there need be no assumption that other structures in society require reform nor that the school is an apt instrument for the reform of those structures. Here the reformer is inward-looking.

From the perspective of the school as an ongoing structure of society in need of reform, we have already answered the question of our distance from the structure. We are within one of the structures, and we assume it is
an important structure either in itself or in relation to other structures. We are not asking about the school in relation to the reform of society, at least not directly. The question, “How can we improve school?” can be subsumed under the larger question, “How can we improve society?” but it need not be. Either question assumes that improvement is necessary. The status quo is to be abandoned. New procedures must be devised and implemented. Some experimentation is, therefore, called for.

Abandoning the tried and true but inadequate is the very hallmark of reform, and it is simultaneously a justification for experimentation. Since the concept of experimentation is as loose as the concept of reform, the possibility of confusing confusion is quite real. For this reason, a brief analysis of the way the idea of experimentation functions in this context is necessary.

III

I would suggest that there are at least three different meanings of experimentation. First, an experiment can be instituted to demonstrate on a small scale; and therefore as economically and prudently as possible, an improvement, which would then become the norm for practice generally. The whole intent of such an experiment is to replace what is presently being done. Inherent in such an experiment is a note of threat to the establishment way of proceeding.

Let me offer an example. The Chicago Public High School for Metropolitan Studies, like Philadelphia’s Parkway School, is such an experiment. Opening in February, 1970, with about 150 students and presently enrolling about 350 students, Metro attempts to give a representative group of Chicago high school students an educational experience which exploits the students’ interests and abilities and the learning opportunities available in the Chicago area. It attempts to furnish a new and flexible curriculum model, a new school architecture—a “school without walls”; a new administrative model—the democratically run school. It is at once a positive affirmation of the ways school ought to be operated and a polemic against the way schools are presently run.

Other experimenters are intent on a different catch with their nets. Present procedures may not be doing an effective job for a certain population. Some young men and women, let us conjecture, are incapable of profiting from the present program for academic, psychological or financial reasons. An experiment could be launched, then, to help this group of students. For example, a group of sixth graders, who most probably would be unable to attend high school specializing in science programs, might be placed in an intensive pre-high school program. This kind of experiment might benefit students otherwise incapable of going down a track of science studies. And it does not threaten currently established programs in any way.

Still other experimenters may simply be looking for interesting alternatives to accepted procedures. For example, I play a solitaire game. Four cards are laid down face up. If there are two cards showing of the same suit, the lower of the two is discarded. Then four more cards are laid down. Winning the game is exceptionally difficult, for the player must end up with the four aces alone. Recently, I have tried to lose rather than win, always, however, obeying the rules. I take the seemingly more unintelligent alternative when alternatives are available. I have found that I do equally well, no matter how “intelligently” or “stupidly” I play the game. For chance factors are much more important than any other. Similarly, an experiment may show that an alternative is no better or no worse than the established procedure. What we may have thought of extreme importance turns out not to matter very much. In other words the null hypothesis is confirmed. The net result may be that we loosen up and relax. Alternatives may turn out to be equally good (and equally bad).”

Carl Bereiter, in a paper presented at the December, 1970, meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, reported that he has been able to identify many unteachable areas of learning; by which he means that some things “are either not learned or are learned just as well with or without teaching.” It is his contention that productive thinking skills; concepts and principles, other than in science and mathematics; arithmetic reasoning or problem-solving; reading comprehension; appreciation of literature, art, music, as distinct from knowledge and preference; composition skills, such as organization, clarity, and style, as distinguished from the mechanics of writing; and citizenship or socialization to the prevailing norms—all are unteachable in his sense. In other words, young men and women will or will not learn these skills and attitudes no matter how much or how little the schools attempt to teach them. If his conclusions successfully resist criticism that will probably be proposed, they exemplify the third meaning I am proposing for the word experimentation: alternatives that make no difference. For whether the school teaches these materials or not, the student will have the same chance of acquiring them. Note too the implications of this meaning of experimentation for reform; some reforms have, similarly, no positive or negative impact. They neither speed up nor slow down whatever changes are occurring.

IV

Bereiter’s work offers a convenient transitional bridge to the constructive part of the paper. Before attempting to show the relative worth for the teacher of the differing meanings of reform, I shall essay an explanation of the fact, for which Bereiter gives evidence, the “unteachability” of certain skills. Explaining why what teachers do may sometimes make little or no difference may prepare the ground for other and larger questions such as why “planned change” may on occasion be no more effective than unplanned change.

I would hypothesize that the self-activity of students is probably as important in the learning process as chance is in my game of solitaire. Let me explain why I think such may be the case.

Charles A. Curran has expounded a theory of teaching which turns the ordinary conception of the teacher-student relationship around.

The teacher in our viewpoint should be seen as a client . . . not as a counselor. It is the student who must act as a counselor and who should understand the teacher if learning is to take place. The teacher, like the client, is in deep need of being understood, and to be received and accepted by the student at the intellectual or emotional level of his struggle for creative communication. Reversely, the student is not, in this conception, in the client-patient role but rather in the counselor-therapist role. The teacher who is creative is suffering with ideas that are well
up within him and that he needs to express and have understood. It is the student who can be in the therapeutic position of understanding and genuinely relating to the teacher as he unfolds, often with painful intensity, the ideas that he is invested in. The teacher comes to his students like a client coming to a counselor. He, the client, speaks, and the students, like counselors, listen carefully, try to understand, nod encouragement, reflect what he has been saying, ask questions and show their understanding of the teacher-client. If he has been understood, the session has been successful. He goes away happy.

This model of the teacher-student relationship is not unique to Curran. Although Israel Scheffler is by no means using Curran’s metaphor of an inversion of the usual conception of the counselor-client relationship, he is conceptually quite close when he writes:

To teach, in the standard sense, is at some points at least to submit oneself to the understanding and independent judgment of the pupil, to his demand for reasons, to his sense of what constitutes an adequate explanation. To teach someone that such and such is the case is not merely to try to get him to believe it as he, for example, is not a method of a mode of teaching. Teaching involves further that, if we try to get the student to believe that such and such is the case, we try also to get him to believe it for reasons that, within the limits of his capacity to grasp are our reasons. Teaching, in this way, requires us to reveal our reasons to the student and, by so doing, to submit them to his evaluation and criticism.

If Curran’s model and Scheffler’s analysis are persuasive, certain questions arise. Why do students put up with a teacher? Why do they accept him as their client? They are not being paid, as the ordinary counselor is. I conjecture that they accept him because they “love” him. Plato’s insight into the erotic relation of teacher and student seems to me to point to a necessary condition for a flourishing teaching-learning situation. Out of love students are willing to sit long hours listening to the teacher and trying to understand him.

But why do students love the teacher? Perhaps the students love the teacher because he is attractive and compatible. Beyond these personal and unpredictable reasons, I would guess that students love their teacher because the teacher represents, indeed is, the adult world, the world out there waiting to be explored, the great beckoning unknown, the offer of infinite riches. Curran, from his psychological point of view, conjectures that the teacher, by communicating himself in trust to others, is, in opposition to the death-wish, choosing and affirming life. Students are attracted to the life-chooser. There is an additional reason, too. The teacher offers some distance from the adult world. He is a critic who sees that “world he is” in relation to an ideal of what the world might become, of what he, the world-embodied teacher, might become; of what the students before him might become.

The normal end-result of the student-teacher relationship is that students understand the teacher. They do not necessarily end up loving what the teacher loves, doing what the teacher does, even becoming the world that the teacher is. The basic reason this condition prevails is that students are independent, self-activating beings over whom the teacher has no ultimate or even intimate control. What students accept from the world or accept of the ideal depends on themselves. Possibly for this reason the teacher and his methods make little difference. How students come to understand the teacher depends on themselves, just as how the counselor understands his client depends on the counselor’s ingenuity and patience. Just as the counselor does not imitate his client’s mode of life, so students do not necessarily imitate the teacher’s mode of life. It is true that parents often feel uncomfortable sending their children to teachers of a social class, and with political and religious beliefs, different from their own. But should they? The name of the teaching game, well played, is freedom.

As a consequence, if the teacher is intent on reforming the structures of society in a pre-determined way, it is likely that teaching is a relatively ineffective way to bring about reform. If, on the other hand, the teacher is intent on reforming the structures of society but without a pre-determined ultimate plan or objective, teaching may be a relatively effective method of reform.

V

This hypothetical explanation of the relation of student and teacher has, then, led us to choose the less rigidly structured approach to reform. What further implications can be drawn on the basis of this analysis? A review seems to be in order.

Proposing that one of the objectives of the school is the reform of the structures of society assumes that the school is an apt instrument of reform. If the self-activity of the student is as important as I have suggested, “apt instrument” needs specification. The school’s effectiveness will be mediated through the autonomous, largely unpredictable (pace B.F. Skinner), and future activities of the students.

Second, the school as an instrument of reform is committed to working at a third remove from the structures themselves. The universities as a moral community have had a measure of effectiveness in influencing political and community decisions, but the elementary and secondary schools to my knowledge have had little influence. The teachers, through their national and local organizations and through union activity, have, in some small measure, been effective, but teachers are not the schools.

Third, it seems preferable, because more realistic, for the school to aim at general rather than specific preparation of its students. Not only the autonomy of the student calls for this approach; the rapidity of change in the social Problematic mitigates against specific preparations for specific problems. For the solutions to these problems, short-term instruction in paraelerucational institutes or workshops seems likely to be more effective.

Fourth, nothing that has been said would close out any of the three forms of experimentation. Each seems to have its own strengths and weaknesses.

VI

Let us now return to the two cases we began with. How successful have they been? Norman Cantor, a university vice chancellor for academic affairs and a noted medieval historian, summarized the findings of the report:

“Groups of students with comparable ability made the same academic progress whether enrolled in special support or regular support programs at the University of
money was spent practically no effect. Although the survey has been challenged by James Griggs, director of the minority group aid program and president-elect of Malcolm X College, the two statistical sociologists from Urbana insist on the validity of their findings.

Reporting on the Davis experiment, Donald L. Reidhaar used practically the same words as Norman Cantor but to quite different effect: "I don't think there is any significant difference in the rate of their (the 16 minority students) success and that of non-minority students." One of the 16 has been named by his classmates 'most likely to succeed' and won the Senior Class Award. At Davis, the 16 who were not comparable to the other students admitted on the basis of the usual traditional criteria, were comparable on the basis of their performances in medical school.

The contrast is great. In the first case special efforts were taken, efforts that do not seem to have helped. In the second case no special efforts were made to offer extra help to those who were admitted because of their minority status, and no special help seems to have been needed. We are, as we frequently are in human affairs, in the presence of a paradox: Do something extra and it does not help; do nothing extra and it helps greatly.

The projects at the University of Illinois have brought about no great changes in society. It is not even clear that they were instituted to change anything except the university itself. But surely these projects were begun because educators at the University of Illinois saw a great need for internal reform. As experiments they were preceded by no pilot study on a small scale. They were full-blown projects intended to help a group of students traditionally considered unsuitable for college work. But it has turned out thus far that the experiment is empirically seeking nothing more than an attractive alternative to more traditional techniques. Nothing revolutionary has eventuated. In this instance, the Berlitz claim seems substantiated.

The new admissions policy at Davis has, however, far-reaching implications. Although not yet realized, great changes in the medical profession can be expected. A group of people traditionally barred from a profession, at least in such numbers, have doors of opportunity open to them. A reform in school policy may very well bring about substantial reforms in the professional sectors of society. The decision at Davis to open its doors to many more minority students on a quota-like basis led to an experiment that has paid off, an experiment whose implications have yet to be fully spelled out. One such implication may well be that the traditional criterion of academic excellence is a needlessly exacting criterion. Students with lower achievement scores in academic subjects may be as successful in medical (and other professional?) school as those with higher scores. Higher grades may not be synonymous with higher ranking. If this conclusion stands against the criticism it inevitably invites, it will indeed create not only a reform but a revolution in that social structure called the American school.

Footnotes

1. For information on these two programs I have relied on the October, 1977, Summary Report of Research Memorandum No. 77-3, "A Study of Special Support Programs at the Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois," by Ira W. Langston and E.E. Oliver; and on reports by Mitt Freudenheim and by Fred Mann which appeared in the Chicago Daily News for November 14 and 15, 1977.


3. I will not attempt to justify this statement, which has become almost a commonplace. For a justification, see Neil J. Smelser, "Processes of Social Change," in Neil J. Smelser (Ed.), Sociology: An Introduction (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 687-726. Nor do I find sociologists, generally using "structures" to refer to institutions with some lasting power, guilty of the same systematic ambiguities in their use of "structures" as educational theorists. Joseph S. Lukinsky, in his article, "Structure" in Educational Theory, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2 (1970), 15-31, discerningly spells out the difficulties of "structure" as a slogan is encountered in educational writings.

Possibly one of the difficulties educational theorists and other social theorists are encountering with the word "structure" is that it implies the status quo and "changing the structures of society" therefore entails a contradiction. Erich Fromm's distinction between structure and order can be helpful perhaps in persuading theorists to disavow identifying structure with order. From Fromm, order allows only mechanical changes which in no way threaten the present style of life. Bringing under law and order are threatened by the spontaneous and free aspects of life, but they are not threatened by purely mechanical changes which allow for adjustments that reduce conflict and make more secure the status quo. On the other hand, men who find the status quo under any terms intolerable usually react to this mechanical stance by over-reacting; freedom comes to involve anarchy and licentiousness, the "absence of tradition, absence of structure, absence of plan." Fromm would posit between the "death" of order and the anarchy of license that structure, analogous to the structure or system inherent in any biological organism, which precisely allows the organism to interact creatively with its environment. See Erich Fromm's article in Summehill: For and Against (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 262-263.


10. Some features of Metro are experimental in this sense as well as in the first meaning.

11. Mayer reports that in some learning situations there are "no significant differences in learning or posttest performance on retention or transfer" between groups who have learned materials in what would be considered a normally intelligent sequence and those who have had the same materials presented to them in a "scrambled" way. See Richard E. Mayer, "The Sequencing of Instruction and the Concept of Assimilation-to-Schema," *Instructional Science*, 6 (1977), 379.


17. It may be suggested that as a matter of fact children do not love their teachers. We hear much of the difficulties compulsory schooling involves. Against their wills, children are compelled to go to school. Teachers are the masters; children, the slaves. A love-relationship between master and slave is simply a sick relationship.

It may be of some interest to note Aristotle's position that master and slave, so long as they love the same things, can be friends:

The part and the whole, like the body and the soul, have an identical interest; and the slave is a part of the master, in the sense of being a living but separate part of his body. There is thus a community of interest, and a relation of friendship, between master and slave, when both of them naturally merit the position in which they stand. But he reverse is true (and there is a conflict of interest and enmity), when matters are otherwise and slavery rests merely on legal sanction and superior power.


18. Obviously, this formulation does not mean to deny the possibility of a predetermined plan methodologically, only substantively.

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The greatest danger to education is the threatened loss of professional freedom.

Goal-digging

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There is a pathos that characterizes the current movement toward establishing uniform standards in education, be they tests for promotion and/or graduation in the schools or the proposed core curriculum for Harvard undergraduates. As with a Greek tragedy, the end is foreordained; what we are not certain about is how the plot will develop.

One can't help wondering why it is that Americans are so attached to the idea that the best way to cure a social illness is to set goals rather than eliminate underlying causes. Perhaps we are victims of a history of almost unrelieved success in confronting challenges like a continent, Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, the moon. Contemporary reflections of this national tendency to attack our demons head on are affirmative action goals to redress employment imbalances, a Humphrey-Hawkins bill3 to put a percentage goal on unemployment and a "back-to-basics" movement replete with specific educational goals.

The difficulties associated with implementing promotion or graduation requirements based on standardized tests have become almost immediately apparent. Witness the outcry when nearly half of Florida's high school seniors failed a graduation test this past year and when a proposed New York State graduation exam was rejected as far too easy and, therefore, of no academic significance. As one might have guessed, an examination of some rigor would prove to be politically unacceptable, and one politically acceptable would be viewed as academically impoverished. A Catch 22!

Nonetheless, it may be too much to expect politicians not to respond with legislation in order to appease a public they perceive as full of resentment about economic pressures and the increased difficulty of "making it" in a world of decreasing opportunity and affluence. And perhaps it is too much to expect the man in the street, whose own education left much to be desired, to be sophisticated about such matters as education for life in a democracy, the dismal history of efficiency movements in education, the relationship between means and ends and the distinction between test performance and competence. But those directly responsible for educational policy and curriculum development should know better. What is especially sad about the performance objectives and accountability movements is the number of their supporters to be found among school administrators, curriculum directors and professors of education. No doubt some of this support is politically inspired, but some of it derives from a sincere belief that these movements will serve the cause of education.

I propose in this short essay, therefore, to question the three principal benefits which proponents claim for standardized testing and accountability systems, viz., (1) efficiency, (2) the development of competence, and (3) a greater sense of responsibility on the part of students and teachers. At the risk of seeming contentious, if not perverse, I should like to argue instead that the systems may well be inefficient, produce incompetence and result in a lowered sense of responsibility.

Efficiency

The argument that the educational system should be made more business-like or "scientific" is intriguing to many critics of education. Education has been labeled America's largest "industry." The costs per annum are in the neighborhood of $140 billion. It is understandable that a public nurtured in a business climate and accustomed to the visible fruits of scientific investigation and technology should seek some proof that it is "getting a dollar's worth of education for a dollar spent." That the difference between producing an Apollo and "producing" a moral agent should not have occurred, however, to so many anamorphed of the business or science models is difficult to comprehend. However that may be, it might be of some value to examine some of the myths associated with business efficiency and to say something about the history of efficiency movements in education.

Business efficiency is ordinarily associated with a centralized, hierarchical, institutional structure, where decisions from the top are implemented by subordinates who have little or no role in the decision-making process. This model of human organization has, of course, many historical precedents, including the Church and the military. Its most pristine form is the factory system. Many critics of education look with dismay on the relatively decentralized character of the educational structure with extensive power in the hands of local school boards and with curricular decisions largely made by individual teachers. It is no surprise, therefore, that state departments of education are growing more powerful. And it is no surprise, given political realities and a traditional business mentality, that legislatures and even mayors like Koch of New York and Young of Detroit should seek greater control in running the schools. Education, apparently, has become too important to leave to educators.

There is, however, a considerable body of literature which puts into question the assumption that the hierarchical, centralized, institutional model, even for business, let alone for education, is "efficient." Much depends, of course, on the definition of the word. But if we should accept the criteria of business efficiency to include such matters as productivity, quality of product, absenteeism and employee turnover, it would appear that the evidence
indicates that the decentralized, participatory model of institutional organization may be more efficient. For support, one can point to the studies of McGregor, Hartzberg and Schumacher, as well as those frequently cited in Working Papers and the World of Work Report. As for education, we should have learned from Callahan’s Education and the Cult of Efficiency about the inefficiencies that attend applying traditional business management techniques to education. Nevertheless, Santavaya’s warning that an ignorance of history dooms us to repeat it goes unheeded. As an accountability atmosphere moves in to education, a noticeable increase is occurring in administrative costs both in terms of the amount of time expended in non-productive activities on the part of teachers and the personal costs incurred in the attempt to satisfy those who control the purse that monies are well spent. In Detroit, for example, the recent decrease in enrollment has been shown to correspond with a decrease in the number of teachers but an increase in the number of administrative and ancillary personnel. And The Chronicle of Higher Education reports a similar state of affairs in higher education. Those of us engaged in the educational enterprise are, of course, not surprised. My own stock joke is that teachers will soon spend 50 percent of their time accounting for the other 50 percent.

In addition to the question of institutional efficiency, there is the matter of educational efficiency. Proponents of standardized testing argue, of course, hopeful that its implementation will ensure satisfactory levels of attainment for most students, particularly in so-called basic skills. This problem has been the subject of much speculation. There is no need to go over that ground. However, history should tell us something. And if the English experiment of the late 1800’s with a model similar in many respects to that which is being put into place in almost every state of the union is any indication, we can expect what Alan Small has described as a “disaster.” Although the English plan called for payments to teachers based on pupil achievement, a kind of performance contracting system, which has fallen into bad repute in this country, its emphasis on uniform testing for specific objectives and some sort of accountability was almost identical to that currently advocated. Quoting J. Kay-Shuttleworth, an education critic of the day, Small notes:

“The (system) has constructed nothing; it has only pulled down. It has not simplified the administration... It has disorganized the whole system of training teachers and providing an efficient machinery of instruction for school. These ruins are its monuments. It has not succeeded in being efficient, for it wastes the public money without providing the results which were declared to be its main object.”

Responsibility

Much of the literature on uniform standards is devoted to the problem of making teachers (and students) more efficient and competent through some form of accountability. Whether the accountability system takes a contractual form, where teachers are to be held accountable for certain performance levels on the part of students, or whether it takes a consensual form, where teachers become part of an “ecosystem,” a total educational community, is of little consequence. In either case, the professional freedom of teachers is restricted. The classroom door is to be kept closed no longer. Teachers must be prepared for inspection. Such a situation makes Bertrand Russell’s view about the necessary independence of the teacher almost quaint:

The teacher, like the artist, the philosopher, and the man of letters can only perform adequately if he feels himself an individual directed by an inner creative impulse, not dominated and frightened by authority.

The greatest danger to education posed by the current performance movement is the threatened loss of professional freedom. Not only, as I suggested earlier, will restrictions be imposed on teachers by a standards program

that the appropriation of the term “competence” by advocates of “performance-based” education will go down in educational history as a brilliant strategy. By opposing the standardized testing movement, one is automatically labeled a foe of competence and a friend of all that is wrong with education. A familiar political device—but effective nonetheless.

In human affairs, situations rarely repeat themselves, and “right” answers are contingent. Therefore, competence—what Dewey called “executive efficiency”—rests principally on such qualities as theoretical understanding, objectivity and independence of judgment, and its development is influenced much more by the methods used in education than by predetermined goals. Insofar as an educational program focuses on a set of objectives to be satisfied as efficiently as possible, it limits the use and development of intelligence on the part of both teacher and student and, therefore, is productive not of competence but, rather, of incompetence.

Objections are raised to this idea on the assumption that means and ends are separate matters, that any number of methods might be employed to arrive at particular objectives. But one cannot have it both ways. If the attainment of certain goals defines educational success, and if efficiency is an overriding concern, methods become prescribed; methods employed will necessarily be those which most efficaciously produce the goals regardless of their impact on competence. That fixed educational standards may be deleterious to the development of competence was repeatedly pointed out by Dewey and no more eloquently than in the following passage in Experience and Education:

What avail is it to win prescribed amounts of information about geography and history, to win ability to read and write, if in the process the individual loses his own soul; loses his appreciation of things worthwhile, of the values to which these things are relative; if he loses desire to apply what he has learned, and, above all, loses the ability to extract meaning from his future experiences as they occur?"
tend to make teachers less competent by virtue of the constraints applied to the use of their own intelligence as well as that of their students, but such a program will also tend to make teachers less responsible. That an accountability system should depress rather than enhance responsible action may appear to be an anomaly, particularly since the terms "accountable" and "responsible" are so frequently used synonymously. But there is a crucial difference between the terms, and recognition of that fact can have a significant impact on educational policy.

In ordinary discourse, we mean by accountability the holding of someone to account for the fulfillment of certain standards, a rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's. We are accountable to someone for something. On the other hand, responsibility is predicated on satisfying personal standards, rationally arrived at, to which one has a commitment. One may be said to have a sense of responsibility, but it would be odd to say one has a sense of accountability. Responsible action is intelligent action; action taken to satisfy the demands of others is unintelligent action. As Plato observed, to the degree a person does another's bidding, he is a slave, and, therefore, acting unintelligently.

Insofar as unintelligent action is irresponsible action, we can expect an accountability system to lead to various forms of irrational and antisocial behavior, particularly lying and cheating. And, in fact, this is exactly what has been occurring. In order to protect their flocks, teachers teach for the test, they ask academically slow students not to appear on the day tests are to be given; they fudge test results, and they spend time almost exclusively on what they will be held accountable for. All this should not be surprising, any more than it is surprising that malpractice suits are forcing physicians to practice defensive medicine with its attendant medical and economic inefficiencies. Any society or social organization which depends on surveillance inevitably corrupts its members, and an educational accountability system designed to enhance competence will in fact do just the opposite: it will kill the one quality that ensures competence—a sense of responsibility which when present makes accountability unnecessary and when absent makes accountability impotent.

Footnotes
1. For an interesting description of the Harvard proposal, see the Saturday Review, April 1, 1978.
2. I have often thought goals are the opiate of the people. One of my favorite quotes with regard to the emptiness of goals is a statement by R.S. Peters: "The Puritan and the Catholic both thought they were promoting God's kingdom, but they thought it had to be promoted in a different manner. And the different manner made it quite a different kingdom." See Authority, Responsibility, and Education (New York: Atherton Press), 1966, p. 95.
4. See, for example, Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise and The Professional Manager; Frederick Herzberg, Work and the Nature of Man; E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful. The World of Work Report is a monthly published by the Work in America Institute, Inc.
7. John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books), p. 49. Echoing Dewey, Roger Farr, Associate Dean, Research and Evaluation, School of Education, Indiana University, writes in connection with the recent drop in SAT and ACT scores: "It might . . . be appropriate to couple the concern about SAT and ACT scores to a concern about whether the recent emphasis on the basics at the lower grade levels is starving out the kind of conceptual teaching of reading that the college entrance exam measures at the higher levels . . ." See "Is John's/Mary's Reading Getting Worse?" Educational Leadership, April, 1977, p. 526.
9. I am reminded in this connection of an interview with a defecting Russian mathematician which was reported in the Humanist several years ago. To the question, "What is the prevailing ethic in Russia," he answered, "Lying. Everybody lies."
If present-day dissidents are to reclaim the belief that values are best conceived empirically, they should begin by considering the imposition controversy as a possible dispute over the means to be used in schooling.

The politics of values

by P.L. Smith
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The period of the 1930s was one of extreme turbulence in American life. Capitalism seemed to be impotent in the face of massive economic collapse. Even democracy was being challenged. It looked to many as if personal freedom were incompatible with the demands of equality. The realities of the twentieth century were forcing the American tradition of liberty to give way to group conceptions of human rights and responsibilities. Matters appeared even worse with the loss of faith in reform. The 1920s had shown the futility of the earlier progressive movement and revealed liberalism as an ally of the status quo. For those who rejected the established order and wished to hasten its passing, radical action was the only acceptable response.1

Such was the atmosphere in which the founders of progressive education were forced to confront a long-standing anomaly in their thought. Can virtue be taught, or must it somehow be imposed? Progressive educational thinkers were never quite clear or consistent in trying to answer this question. On the one hand, they recognized that values were important and that education must foster the good; but, on the other hand, they did not think that it was ever wise to force others to accept a particular value orientation.

The Normative Thrust of Progressive Education

More precisely, the founders of progressive education revered democracy as a way of life and saw deliberate education as the most effective means for transmitting democratic values in an urban industrial society. When asked why they so revered democracy as a way of life, progressive thinkers had a ready answer. They believed that it supplied the necessary and sufficient conditions for scientific intelligence, or, put in negative terms, for non-formalist thinking. And what was the value of non-formalist thinking? Progressives believed it was twofold, both instrumental and intrinsic. It was instrumental in solving practical problems and thereby contributing to human survival. It was intrinsic in contributing to human welfare and improving the quality of life. This belief in the inherent value of scientific intelligence is rarely understood or appreciated by the critics of progressive education. But those who conceived the movement were convinced that the ultimate value in non-formalist thinking and, thus, in democracy itself, as a way of life, was found in the fact that it created and developed the capacities to think and to experience human emotions. Without these capacities, human beings are essentially the same as other living things. But with them, they are unique; they possess the necessary tools for deliberately converting the hostile forces of nature to human advantage. And of even greater significance, these powers of mind have intrinsic value because they provide the source of human culture and the foundations of human dignity. Progressive thinkers were humanists by inclination and naturalists by philosophy. Given their convictions and their belief that the realization of human mental potential was tied to democratic living by empirical necessity, it is easy to understand the normative thrust of progressive education.

However, accompanying this thrust was abhorrence of indoctrination. Regardless of motivation, progressive thinkers eschewed all forms of imposition. Here, too, they had a reason. Indoctrination or imposition was seen as contrary to democracy. In so being it stifled the growth of scientific intelligence. And this, in turn, had the dual effect of decreasing the chances of survival and detracting from the quality of life. By itself, the rejection of indoctrination or imposition in the educational enterprise of schooling may not seem incompatible with the acceptance of a normative thrust in schooling. But there was a kicker in this mix.

Progressive educational thinkers rejected the Aristotelian idea of development from within. They were unanimous in the belief that the cultivation of human nature was not enough. On the progressive view human nature is virtually created by nature's forces; and if it is to be created intelligently, it must be understood and controlled by the only source of intelligence there is, man himself. But if there is no guarantee, if, indeed, it is unlikely that human beings will develop in desirable ways without human control of the process of development; and if the individual or individuals being educated cannot be expected to possess the capacities to understand or control this process, at least at the start, as virtually everyone, including progressive thinkers, will admit, now in the world can indoctrination or imposition be avoided; assuming, of course, we should all develop in desirable ways?

Progressive Education in the Limelight

The failure of progressive education to provide a clear and decisive answer to this question represents a serious soft-spot in its theoretical posture. So long as progressives were on the offensive, attacking the enemy, "traditional education" or "formalist educational thinking," this soft-spot was hard to detect, and was easy to avoid even when recognized. Supporters believed that the opposition had a strong ideological hold on public thinking, and that this hold had to be broken before the progressive alternative could be completely spilt out. But by the 1920s the victory was pretty much won. Traditional education was in considerable disarray, at least theoretically. The immediate effect was to produce an intellectual vacuum. Theoretical issues were simply

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not seen as important. People were intellectually free to think pretty much what they liked. So long as they were doing something and claimed guidance from some rationale, they were effectively left alone to function as their own philosophical critics.

But the press of events soon brought this period to an end. And the 1930s were to change the role of the progressive tradition in American life. Eyes were no longer solely on the opposition. There were real and serious problems to be faced, problems that threatened the welfare of everyone. If what had been accepted therefore could not provide solutions to these problems, people were ready to consider alternatives. The mood was at least congenial to the practical examination of new ideas. Where old ways would not work, new ways would be encouraged. What could be better for the type of education that was founded on the philosophy of experimentalism?

But with this newfound status came critical examination, and, more specifically, self-examination by proponents who were at last put on the spot to produce on their own terms if their theories of education were to be finally accepted. It would have to meet the test, theoretically as well as practically, that the realities of the depression. Progressive education was finally on the hot seat. If it had weaknesses, they would soon be apparent. And once apparent they could not be ignored. Progressive educational thinkers began to polish up their ideas in order to present a defensible, unified and effective front to a beleaguered and eager, but still demanding, public.

The Official View on Imposition

The progressives were soon to discover that on the question of imposition they could not present the type of front they desired. Indeed, there arose a controversy that revealed the aforementioned soft-spot or anomaly in their thinking. There was, it should be said, an "official position" on this issue, but it could hardly be described as acceptable to everyone, or even acceptable to the majority of those who shaped opinion in progressive education.

The official view was the one given by John Dewey and supported so admirably by Boyd H. Bode and William H. Kilpatrick. Dewey claimed that education need never rely on imposition, even when concerned with life's basic orientation. He agreed that education must work to transmit the values of democracy, and must thereby foster particular dispositions about and towards reality, but he insisted, nonetheless, that school learning could be purely experimental. Teachers could avoid indoctrination and still be effective.

Indeed, indoctrination was seen as an obstacle to effective schooling in a democratic society. In a democratic society effective schooling provides a democratic orientation to life. Indoctrination either fails to give any orientation at all, or else brings about an orientation that is inherently undemocratic. According to this official view, a democratic orientation to life can only be provided by means that are themselves democratic. Indoctrination was believed to be anti-democratic; it was said to hinder personal development and destroy the roots of genuine community. With this position, there was virtually no hope that schooling under indoctrination could effectively foster understanding and acceptance of democratic dispositions.

Why were supporters of this official view so adamant in relating educational means to educational ends? The answer is not hard to find, although it is amazing how few have found it. In the first place, they justified a democratic orientation because it contributed to mental development. If in the process of acquiring a democratic conception of reality there was no advancement of mental capacities, as there surely would not be under conditions of indoctrination, then supporters of the official view would have been less enthusiastic about democracy as a way of life. But in the second place, and more importantly, they did not believe that a democratic orientation could be acquired save through intelligence. Democratic dispositions were said to be founded on intelligent self-selection. While they may contribute to mental development, they also presuppose intelligence in both their understanding and acceptance. With a democratic orientation we can foster mental growth; but only by reaching a certain point in mental development can we acquire a democratic orientation.

Dissenters from the official view saw this position as paradoxical. But supporters would say that it only appears paradoxical if we assume that things exist prior to relations, that is, only if we presuppose that intelligence and a democratic orientation must exist independently and before they are interconnected. But in fact, supporters would say, this is simply not so. Both come about as a result of an evolutionary process wherein the reality and character of each is a result of its transactions with the other. Here, democratic values and mental capacities are assumed to be mutually dependent. Each is a necessary condition for the other. As we become more intelligent, we are made increasingly aware of democracy as a way of life, and as we come to see democracy as a way of life, we are, by that very fact, made more intelligent. Each is instrumental for the other as well as being an end in itself. A democratic orientation creates an atmosphere essential for mental growth. But mental growth must attain a minimum plateau before a democratic orientation can be had.

Dewey was not at all bothered by this apparent conflict. He saw the process of transmitting a democratic orientation as necessarily rational. In being rational it fosters mental growth. A person is required to engage in practical action, that is, action with a practical purpose, and to undergo the consequences of his own behavior. Experiences are to be more or less unbridled. Imposition or indoctrination of any sort was seen as a retarding agent. Indeed, it was in great measure because of its reliance on the authority of the teacher that progressives were opposed to traditional forms of schooling. Imposition and indoctrination stifled educational aims. They suppressed mental potential and made it impossible to foster democracy as a way of life. Progressives holding the official view were surely not going to allow it in their own educational scheme.

The Dissenting View on Imposition

Other progressives saw it differently, however. They believed the official view was mistaken for the same reasons liberalism in politics was mistaken. It assumed that rationality could be a fundamental force in the world; that progress was directed by the human mind step by step, and that the advancement of individual and social welfare was gradual and required no quantum leap of faith.

Having been thoroughly radicalized by the 1930s, progressives who criticized the official view simply did not
believe that the recognition of goodness, or what was most desirable, was a process that was characterized by rationality. And later in the decade, when they witnessed the rise of fascism, they had further confirmation they were right. There were limits on rationality in the educational enterprise of schooling. Dissenters concluded from this that the normative thrust of the progressive’s educational plan cannot always rely on intelligence. In order to achieve his aim the progressive teacher must sometimes employ tactics that are not themselves congenial to rational student choices.

Progressives like George S. Counts and John L. Childs saw the process of understanding and accepting an orientation to life, including a democratic orientation, as requiring something like religious insight. And when the process represented a change from one orientation to another, it required something like religious conversion. But in neither case is intelligence enough by itself. Basic democratic truths, like basic truths generally, can only be seen through faith, at least in the beginning.

Take the propositions that define the democratic outlook. We say, for example, that people are politically equal, that every adult person should have one, but only one vote. And we say this because, among other things, we believe people are equal morally as well, and that the political realm is one wherein moral considerations must bear. Counts and Childs saw these beliefs as much like church dogma. They were true, and every democrat could see why they were true, but they could not be demonstrated empirically as formal arguments or scientific judgments, especially to the young or the immature. To be committed to them morally and emotionally, even to understand them intellectually, we must somehow transcend rationality. While it may in fact be rational to accept a democratic orientation and to reject any orientation that is not, the acquisition of democratic dispositions is a complicated extra-rational affair, it is rarely itself rational. The pedagogical distinction between what we accept rationally and what is rational to accept is the same as the distinction some say is part of the philosophy of science, the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of verification. Once we see that a proposition is true or false, we can set about to formulate a rational demonstration. But the recognition or insight itself cannot be explained in procedural or rational terms.

The progressives who dissented from the official viewpoint believed that the problem of education was to get students to understand and accept democracy as a way of life, and that this was a process of discovery which went beyond the bounds of intelligence. They valued rationality and thought it important for education to foster mental capacities, but they believed rationality would be valued and mental capacities would be fostered after a democratic orientation was established, not before. Acquisition of the orientation, they said, did not require rationality, and indeed, was sometimes hindered by an overemphasis on reflection and choice. How, then, was education to fulfill its normative thrust? Through imposition, of course. That is, by a process that recognized the complicated extra-rational factors that bear on our conceptions of reality and our acceptance of basic values.

The Controversy as a Bogus Dispute

Progressive educational thinkers never fully resolved this dispute. And it remains something of a soft-spot in their theoretical posture. Must it remain a soft-spot forever? I, for one, do not think so. In the first place, it looks to me as if the dispute were more apparent than real. Those who supported and dissented from the official view can easily be seen as talking past one another. And if they were, they might well have been in agreement and not known it. In the second place, the official view rests on a naturalistic conception of value, such that the official view is correct if and only if this conception is sound. The theoretical posture of progressive education can be freed from vagueness and contradiction so long as its conception of value can be presented as a clear and defensible philosophical doctrine. On the first point could we not say that neither party to the dispute fully understood the other? Moreover, might we not account for this failure by the fact that the contending sides did not fully understand their own position, or at least were unable to enunciate it clearly? But, of course, we cannot say either of these things unless we know what it was each side meant to say. From our present vantage point, however, it seems rather obvious. However difficult it was to formulate or express their ideas in the original situation, it looks now as if one side to the dispute, those holding the dissenting view, wished to discuss what we should teach and the other side, those who advanced the official position, wanted to talk about how we should teach. In most cases the two concerns are quite distinct, although, admittedly, the more one pushes at their differences the harder it is to tell them apart. We all know, for example, that the way we teach affects what we teach; our instructional techniques have consequences too. By teaching in a certain way, we may foster attitudes like tolerance or intolerance, and these are surely legitimate curriculum concerns.

Unquestionably, it was because progressive educational thinkers were reluctant to make a separation between curriculum and instruction that the parties to the imposition controversy continually talked past one another and failed to formulate their particular views in a clear and decisive manner. In refusing to make the distinction absolute, they were making a conceptual point that was far in advance of the thinking in their times. But in sometimes acting as if the distinction could never be made, they fell victim to an internal dispute that cost them dearly in public support. They were unable to present a unified front. Instead of an intellectual perspective that could be linked to educational practice, people saw the extremes of emotional slogans like those they associated with political confrontation.

For this reason it is unfortunate that progressives seem never to admit a distinction between the ideas of curriculum and instruction. Although it may always be relative, it is still quite clear within its limits. What we teach is one thing, how we teach is quite another. We might explain the imposition controversy as an unsuccessful effort to deal with both concerns at once. Dewey and other supporters of the official view usually understood imposition, and always understood indoctrination, as having to do with how we should teach, with instruction or manner of instruction. Dissenters from the official view, like Counts and Childs, understood these ideas in terms of what we should teach, with curriculum, or the aims of education.

Supporters of the official view would sometimes make a distinction between imposition and indoctrination. They would define imposition as the normative thrust of education and indoctrination as a strategy, albeit inst-
fective, one might employ to realize this thrust. Thus, they would admit that the former was unavoidable and consider it desirable when conceived as a curriculum theory aiming to provide a democratic orientation, and they would repudiate the latter as a scientifically unsound and morally undesirable theory of instruction. As a theory of instruction they would say that it cannot transmit a democratic orientation, and, furthermore, that it retards mental growth.

On this analysis Counts was right to say that imposition was unavoidable, but wrong to conclude that the choice of what to impose is the only educational choice to be made. For the conditions of imposition, or how we impose, makes all the difference in the world. Whether it be restricted or generous, authoritarian or free, whether facts and values are instilled dogmatically or explained and submitted to the independent judgment of students makes the difference between what is and is not taught. This is not to deny that it is often hard to distinguish in practice between what and how we impose, and thus to separate the ends of curriculum from the means of instruction. But still there is a distinction at work here. And the occasional reluctance of some progressive educational thinkers to equate imposition with indoctrination was a recognition of this distinction must be made.

Nonetheless, it is true that supporters of the official view generally saw this distinction as Counts saw it i.e., as a distinction without a difference. Progressives were easy to convince that the point at issue lacked practical significance and was, therefore, unworthy of intellectual support. We can see the reluctance to separate ends from means, curriculum from instruction, as a source of confusion in progressive education. And as a source of confusion it can be seen as an explanation of the imposition controversy. This is not to say that the parties to the imposition controversy were insensitive or unsympathetic to each other’s concerns. It is simply to say that the official view on imposition was a view of instruction, and that the dissenting view on imposition was a view of curriculum, and that the means-ends doctrine subscribed to by both parties made it difficult to specify their respective concerns. The confusion that came about was not a lack of understanding of the two sides in the dispute to communicate clearly, or, for that matter, for each side to fully understand its own position.

We need to be clear here ourselves. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with the means-ends doctrine in progressive thought. Undoubtedly, it is one of the more, if not the most, significant philosophical insights of our times. But the doctrine only claims that the separation of means and ends is relative and not absolute, it does not deny the distinction itself. Participants in the imposition controversy seemed often to forget the difference between a relative distinction and no distinction at all. But is it not obvious from what we know of their work as a whole that these progressive educational thinkers held to a distinction between curriculum and instruction, albeit a relative one? To insist they wanted to abolish the distinction altogether simply does not make sense. To say, as the progressives did, that decisions of the one sort affect decisions of the other sort, or even that decisions of the one type might entail decisions of the other type, is not to assume that the decisions are one.

The imposition controversy was by and large a bogus dispute. Those who argued for the official view did not mean to imply that teachers should be neutral on critical questions of the day. They recognized that neutrality would deny the normative thrust of progressive education. Surely no one could show they were indifferent towards the inculcation of values, or lacked a commitment to the promotion of a democratic orientation through formal education. It may well be that they saw a democratic orientation, like happiness, as best achieved if not directly pursued. And in this there might have been a genuine difference with their critics. Their critics wanted to do the good by the most direct means. They proceeded immediately to teach democracy and hoped to foster mental capacities indirectly as a by-product of democratic living. But with the official view there was a tendency to begin by fostering mental capacities and then to teach democracy, or even to let democracy teach itself as a result of exercising intelligence. It was as if supporters of the official view believed that doing well, or achieving excellence or perfection in conduct or in practical actions was a more worthy goal than doing the good, at least as a proximate objective. Doing well, or doing a good job, as opposed to doing the good, seemed to be held out as a more reliable guide for achieving moral perfection than that supplied by the motive to do what was morally right. But this emphasis on mental capacities does not deny the acceptance of a democratic orientation as a moral ideal. It only indicates the strategy adopted by those who accepted the official position. One is no less committed to democracy as a way of life simply because he believes it is most likely to become a reality if pursued by a roundabout route.

Correspondingly, dissenters from the official view did not want to claim that education was merely a process of shaping beliefs or conditioning behavior. They accepted restrictions on manner of teaching. The normative thrust of education must employ moral means. Although they emphasized teaching a democratic orientation over the development of mental capacities, they accepted the latter as a goal of equal prominence, at least. Their emphasis, too, was one of strategy, not moral priority. They simply did not believe that education could realize mental potential in a decadent society and that education for a democracy must temporarily precede individual development. But they never meant this to be interpreted as a lack of respect for personal integrity. After all, they accepted the means—ends doctrine too. They acknowledged the intrinsic value of mental life, and knew the manner by which it was fostered could never be ignored altogether. And they agreed with supporters of the official view that in order to be justified, a democratic orientation to life must have instrumental as well as intrinsic value. And, furthermore, they believed that in a just society we must all be able to satisfy our spiritual as well as our material needs. By maintaining this belief, they recognized that the quality of life was as important as life itself. They, as well as supporters of the official view, wanted to foster intelligence. And why was intelligence valued? Not simply because it provided the mechanism for self-direction and control, but because it was a source of enjoyment as well. In the end, both sides to the imposition controversy accepted the same educational goal— to free the mind from the forces of nature that created it.

The Commitment to Ethical Naturalism

There is one last matter to discuss. In many respects it represents the most important issue of all. Undoubtedly, it deserves considerable attention, more than we will give

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it here. Still, enough can be said in brief to illustrate the essential point. On its face, it is simple enough. Even if the imposition controversy was more apparent than real, it did demonstrate the commitment of progressive educational thought to ethical naturalism and to the theory of value inherent in ethical naturalism.

Dewey and the supporters of the official view were quite clear on this. They argued that values were objective natural properties and that they could only be known through the intelligent analysis of experience, that is, through reason and empirical investigation. This bears on education in a most crucial manner. It implies literally that students cannot acquire and/or understand a democratic orientation to life unless they engage in practical action and reflect on their resultant experiences.

At times dissenters from the official view did not seem to recognize this requirement. Where they expressly repudiated it, the only explanation can be that they failed to recognize, or would not accept, the theory of value which underlies ethical naturalism and defines its basic tenets. They sometimes, perhaps inadvertently, took a subjectivist's position. They would say, in effect, that values have no referents at all, that they are a creation of the human will or a function of perception. At other times, they would presuppose the first tenet of ethical naturalism, that values are objective natural properties, but deny the second, that they can only be known through the intelligent analysis of experience.

In either case, however, imposition is essential, not only in regards to curriculum, but in regards to instruction as well. Since values are defined as having no source, no referents, other than human will, there is no role for intelligence to play in their detection or justification. They are arbitrary, and if the educator wants to transmit them to students, he must use the means of imposition. Where subjectivity reigns, intelligence has no place. The teaching of subjective reality requires non-rational means of instruction.

Even if subjectivity is denied, even if the first tenet which underlies ethical naturalism is assumed, non-rational means of instruction must still be employed so long as the second tenet is not also accepted. For even if we assume that values are objective natural properties, we severely limit, or even exclude, the role of intelligence in their acquisition if we deny the capacity of the individual to know them through practical action and reflection on resultant experiences. It is necessary to use imposition as the means of education whenever and wherever we wish to teach something to someone who, for any reason whatsoever, cannot grasp or understand what we want to teach through the exercise of intelligence. Values that cannot be understood through intelligence would be like concepts, postulates or axioms that the student was not mature enough to understand. If they are to be taught, they must be imposed by non-rational means and only later, perhaps, be seen by the student as rational or necessary.

On this point the official view on imposition, and any view implied by it, can only be correct if the theory of value which underlies ethical naturalism is a sound philosophical doctrine. Otherwise the view supporting imposition as a theory of instruction as well as a theory of curriculum would represent a necessary condition for effective teaching. But if the theory of value which underlies ethical naturalism was unsound, it would do more than undermine progressive education. It would pretty much discredit progressive thought generally, because progressive thought itself is based on this theory of value. Progressive education would be inherently defective because progressive educational theory would be inherently defective. And progressive educational theory would be inherently defective because the philosophy on which it was based would presuppose a false conception of value. On the other hand, if this conception of value was sound, progressive education would receive, perhaps, its strongest support.

Suppose we were to look at the imposition controversy as a dispute over the means of education. In fact it was not, but it could have been. And if it had been, it would have represented a genuine and profound disagreement. The controversy would not have been limited to educational or political differences, but would have included a philosophical dispute over the ontological and epistemological features of values. Whether the official view, or any view implied by it, could have won would have been contingent on the merits of pragmatism itself. Without being fully aware of it, dissenters from the official view issued a challenge to the whole of the progressive movement. During this century ethical naturalism has been constantly on the defensive. If present-day dissidents of the progressive tradition are to reclaim the belief that values generality, and moral values in particular, are best conceived empirically and most readily acquired through experience and intelligent action, they would be well advised to begin by considering the imposition controversy as a possible dispute over the means to be used in schooling. If they can show that progressive education brings out the best in people without relying on imposition, they will reestablish, and not just reaffirm, the faith of their intellectual ancestors.

Footnotes

3. This distinction is, of course, an old one, dating back at least to the time of Aristotle. But its application and force in this context was made apparent to me by my friend and colleague John E. Hough; but here again, only after considerable effort on his part. Perhaps, the same could be said of the distinction between curriculum and instruction itself.
We should rethink accountability in terms of what the student needs as a person.

Some characteristics of being accountable

by Louis E. Barrilleaux and James C. Carper
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Few proposed “reforms” in education have been as voluminously written about, frequently spoken about, or as intensely debated as the subject of accountability. Critics condemn the concept as “inhumane,” while zealots proclaim it as the latest “panacea.”

A salient feature of the recent movement has been the lack of general agreement on the meaning of “accountability.” Indeed, the term is frequently used in a highly abstract manner that suggests a political purpose. For instance, advocates assert that the “public” is the entity to whom the educator is to be held accountable. This “public” is presumed to have a common point of view, value system and set of expectations. The concept may not be as clear as its advocates claim when implementation is to occur in a pluralistic community. This results in misguided expectations, unreasonable resistance and unanticipated consequences.

People working in the field of human services need to know more about the use of accumulated knowledge. But to follow current thought in a mechanical way would destroy the sense of caring, empathy and genuineness which our work in human services has shown to be valuable. So rather than adding operational prescriptions, the writers speak to the issues that observations, studies, and experiences have raised about accountability.

1. To what extent is the distinction between education and schooling important? That there is confusion between “education” and “schooling” is obvious. As Americans, counseled by professional educators, heaped many and varied expectations on the schools over the past one hundred years, there emerged a tendency of view most learning outcomes as a direct result of formal instruction. This phenomenon has escalated the confusion between “education” and “schooling.” Important informal learnings were assumed to be outcomes of schooling.

Despite current questions concerning the validity of this assumption, the escalation continues. So let it be fully recognized that today both public and private institutions of schooling represent the aspirations of people who hold increasing concerns for outcomes over which the schools have marginal influence and control, such as more development, political sensitivity, and economic success.

Some essential learnings occur only outside the formal structures; schooling is still not all of education. As a possible necessary pre-condition for clarifying school accountabilities, is it not appropriate to first articulate realistic social policy for education? The issue for our society becomes, “Who is accountable for education?”

2. To what extent is accountability consistent with the work culture of simple, absolute institutions? Long ago, McGregor distinguished between the X and Y assumptions which one may hold about the basic nature of the “average human being.” With the set of X, one assumes that people inherently dislike work; they prefer to be directed and closely supervised and avoiding responsibility. Research does not support the set of X assumptions. Even in under-developed regions, these assumptions are largely ineffective today.

Can we avoid using accountability concepts as though they were strong frameworks put up to help weak and dependent people to function effectively? We ask ourselves, “How can we avoid, in the practice of accountability, the enhancement of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which there are two kinds of people: the elite with intelligence, ambition, psychological maturity, creativity (like us) and the masses who are lazy, irresponsible, interested only in money, needing direction and psychologically ill?”

The principles of institutional accountability are now extending beyond fiscal and legal connotations to include intellectual, attitudinal and other aspects of schooling. In this context, is holding an institution accountable the same as holding an individual accountable? How can conditions for complex ethical choices be satisfied by a collection of people? Given the charge that “Schools have failed,” is the accountability movement an attempt to avoid individual responsibility by assigning it to an institution as a surrogate conscience? If accountability includes an ethical component and only individuals are capable of ethical choices, can an institution be held accountable?

3. To what extent are participants in the ‘schooling’ enterprise accountable for results? As professionals in the field of human services, we cannot assume responsibility for the behavior of our subordinates, clients, or students but only that we have behaved with them in ways that are defensible.

We desire responsibility for the things that we do. On the basis of research, theory and experience we assume responsibility for being increasingly able to give reasons why we do what we do, and we must be even more personally responsible for our own behavior. Of ourselves, we ask, “How can we somehow guarantee our professional services with greater specificity and presumptions of ‘goodness’ without digging ourselves into a hole of guaranteeing results—the equivalent of assuming responsibility for the behavior of others?”

No one in a helping profession is likely to assume responsibility for a result over which he has no control. It is ludicrous to attempt holding him answerable for a result if he is unwilling to assume responsibility.

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While it is possible to extend, give, or delegate authority to others, an individual cannot be made responsible; he must be willing to assume it. The establishment, then, of what service an individual agrees to be answerable for is perhaps the logical conclusion of the accountability process. The fundamental issue may become, "What kinds of controllable results can we expect participants in the "practice of schooling" to be distinctively answerable for?"

4. To what extent does the movement sharpen the destructive conflict between humaneness and accountability? Clearly, there are two conflicting philosophical positions now operating and directing demands on schools. While leaders are being called on to make an accounting for the time, money and energy poured into their institutions, there is an opposing force to make schools more humane with great stress on spontaneity, flexibility and creative experience. All participants in the schooling enterprise are demanding more autonomy for themselves—consistent, of course, with a work culture characterized by increased ambiguity and recognition of the importance of developing independently strong people.

In schooling, one alternative over the other is unacceptable. The execution of skills alone is emasculating, while "love" and neo-humanism alone are not enough. How can we assist in the resolution of the accountability—humaneness forces? Is this conflict our base of opportunity as mature human service professionals?

May we begin by rethinking accountability in terms of what the student needs as a person, rather than what is the public wants—which is often defined in self-serving economic and social terms? The principles and techniques that are now being heralded as new are derivatives of those that captured education during the early decades of this century, although the labels have been updated. The consequences of those early procedures are well-documented.6

5. To what extent is the accountability movement and the condition of schooling an appropriate pairing of solution and problem? In education, practitioners tend to deal with "solutions" first; minimal attention is given to the analytical aspect of solving problems. This inability to find functional problems and communicate them to others is a serious obstacle to improvement.

Educators have a reputation of being a source of answers. The public demands a close correspondence between questions and answers, and schools are generally not allowed or required to adopt a problem finding stance to obtain resources for improvement. Consequently, little or no relationship may exist between what reformers say needs to be done and the problem as perceived by those who must implement an "improvement" program.7

The interest in accountability, as it is currently expressed in the quantifying of outcomes, might lead to disastrous effects. Those who most enthusiastically promote accountability as a lever for improvement are accustomed to mechanistic models which have been useful to engineers, economists and business firms. Some school problems do yield to mechanistic analysis. But when it is people with whom we deal, and when the goals we seek are complex human attributes, mechanistic models may be of less help.

How can we, then, account for our greater aims in the current movements? Can we avoid the small scale suggestions of mechanistic models? In fact, are we sufficiently secure about the nature of the fundamental problem to adopt the accountability model as the wise solution?

6. To what extent are we able to specify the necessary preconditions under which accountability might be a viable process? The following is offered as a beginning:8
   a. The special function of "schooling" is agreed upon and objectives are clear. (This assumes the larger task of identifying the components of the "educational" configuration.)
   b. Schooling outcomes are within the power of the accountable persons to control.
   c. Individuals and groups negotiate the conditions and results for which they agree to be held answerable.
   d. Standards for quality are clear and measurable.
   e. Particular plans of action are focused upon the achievement of particular students.
   f. Professionals at all levels of the schooling hierarchy are accepted as experts in the various phases of the learning and management process.

As the current advocates of accountability become genuinely concerned, they will talk more about the problems of recruiting intellectually mature people into the field of teaching, the kind of education that teachers need to be culturally literate and the kind of preparation and continuing support that educational managers need. And we would, therefore, hear less about fearfully monitoring teacher performance, auditing student outcomes, and technological aspects of the movement.

Footnotes
4. For examples and discussion of this point see James S. Coleman, "How Do the Young Become Adults," Review of Educational Research, 42 (Fall, 1972), pp. 431-439.
10. For additional discussion of this point see Broudy, pp. 123-148.