Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/eap

Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 2007 (includes "citations received," overview of the Architecture and Phenomenology conference, and essays by Christine Rhone, David Wang & Sarah Wagner).

Recommended Citation

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact cads@k-state.edu.
This *EAP* completes our 18th year. We enclose a renewal form and would appreciate prompt responses so there will be fewer reminders to send in the winter 2008 issue.

This issue begins with philosopher Dylan Trigg’s overview of the Architecture and Phenomenology conference held in May in Haifa, Israel. His summary indicates the wide range of interpretive possibilities that phenomenology offers architecture and allied fields. Next, writer and artist Christine Rhone describes her recent travels to Native-American sacred sites in Florida and suggests how a landscape that most people think of as “hypermodern” continues to house places evocative of much different times, life ways, and experiences.

Last, architects David Wang and Sarah Wagner propose a graphic outline for identifying the potential contributions that a phenomenological approach might offer the design disciplines. They identify four clusters of concern—phenomenologies dealing with: (1) individual human experience; (2) lived aspects of history and culture; (3) design process; and (4) lived aspects of sacredness.

**EAP/IAEP Chicago Paper Session**

We remind readers of the EAP paper session to be held at the annual meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) in Chicago, Monday, 12 November, 9 am-12:30 pm. We hope *EAP* readers in the area might consider attending. Presenters are: Thomas Barrie, Robert Mugerauer, Mark Rosenbaum, David Seamon, and Dylan Trigg. See the spring 2007 *EAP* for presentation titles and abstracts.

**We Still Need Submissions!**

We continue to be short material for future issues. Please consider contributing, whether citations, items of interest, reviews, or drawings. We particularly need essays!

*Left and p. 3:* Joseph H. Aronson’s striking drawings in Edmund N. Bacon’s *Design of Cities* (1967), which aimed, in part, to examine how individual creativity founded past developments in urban design, including Michelangelo’s remarkable transformation of Rome’s Capitoline Hill, shown here in completed form and, on p. 3, as the site was in 1538 before reconstruction. Michelangelo’s creation, says Bacon, “established more powerfully than any previous example the fact that space itself could be the subject of design.” Reprinted in Larice & Macdonald’s *Urban Design Reader*, p. 13 and p. 15—see “citations received,” p. 3.
EAP/IAEP Chicago Paper Session

EAP editor David Seamon would like to organize another symposium on Christopher Alexander at the next Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA) annual meeting, to be held in Veracruz, Mexico, 28 May—1 June. If any EAP readers would like to present a paper, either theory- or practice-oriented, please let Seamon know as soon as possible, no later than September 15.

Hillier Book Available On-line


This impressive follow-up to Hillier’s earlier *Social Logic of Space* [1984 and co-authored with Julienne Hanson] has unfortunately been out of print because of the reproduction cost of the work’s many color plates [see review, EAP, fall 2003]. Happily, Space Syntax Limited, with support from University College London, has created a free e-edition of the book with all colored images intact.

In his preface to this e-edition, Hillier briefly discusses conceptual and applied developments in space syntax since 1996. He writes:

…the real test of theory and method is application in the real world of projects and development. Here the contribution of Space Syntax Ltd. cannot be overestimated. Since its foundation as an active company offering spatial design and spatial planning consultancy…. it has tested the theory and technology on a wide range of projects, many of them high profile.

There are now a significant number of projects in which space syntax has exerted a key spatial design influence, including… the redesign of Trafalgar Square (with Norman Foster) and Nottingham’s Old Market Square (with Gustafson Porter), arguably the two most famous squares in the UK, both functioning in a new and highly successful way following their respective re-designs.

Other up and running projects include the Brindley Place development in Birmingham, Exchange Square and Fleet Place in London, and the Millennium Bridge, where space syntax showed not only how well the bridge would be used but also how strong and beneficial its long-term effects would be on the areas on both sides of the river. Equally interesting to space syntax are cases where aspects of space syntax advice were not followed, since in each case problems have appeared that were clearly foreseen by space syntax at the design stage.

Citations Received


Though focusing mostly on psychology as a formal discipline, the ten chapters of this volume provide useful discussion on the evolution of phenomenological philosophy as it has had relevance for conceptual shifts in the human sciences. The editors write in their introduction that “The fundamental theme of phenomenology in psychology is that we seize again the meaningfulness of our own lived experience.”


This book “explores the dense interweave between the sense of smell and architecture”; text includes interviews with architects, interior designers, and perfumers.


A useful contribution to the small literature on the lives of ordinary buildings and places. Discussion of the people who built and lived in the building and its relationship “to the changing social fabric of the Lower East Side.”


An argument for “people working productively and healthfully in buildings that meet human needs.” Includes design examples.


These geographers focus on the “geographies of social networks and related mobilities of travel, communications and face-to-face meetings.” The authors examine “five interdependent mobilities that form and reform these geographies of networks and travel”: (1) physical travel of people for work, leisure, migration, and escape; (2) physical movement of objects delivered to producers, retailers, and consumers; (3) vicarious travel through images and texts; (4) virtual internet travel; and (5) communicative travel through letters, telephones, text messages, and so forth.
An anthology of “41 selections illuminating the history, theory and practice of urban design.” Includes entries by Christopher Alexander, Clare Cooper Marcus, Jan Gehl, Randy Hester, Jane Jacobs, Christian Norberg-Schulz, Ray Oldenburg, Edward Relph, and William Whyte. Strangely, no selection relating to space syntax, which can fairly be called the most important development in urban design in the last 25 years. Drawing, left, is from the selection by Edmund Bacon—see p. 1.


Studying with Christopher Alexander from 1979-81, this practicing Israeli architect presents a wide range of building projects (well illustrated in photographs and plans) that she says are guided by a “phenomenological-holistic school of thought.” Oddly, all her citations refer to Alexander and none refer directly to environmental and architectural phenomenology, even though her title would suggest such.

Portugali illustrates her design process through one detailed example—creating a “memorial site for fallen intelligence servicemen,” which she designed in seven steps: (1) identifying the natural focal points on the site; (2) identifying the site’s main and secondary entrances; (3) marking paths to link activity centers; (4) marking activity centers’ boundaries and locating their entries; (5) marking built areas and building lines; (6) placing outdoor activity areas and paths and identifying focal points; (7) laying out buildings’ indoor spaces.

Architecture and Phenomenology Conference
Haifa, Israel, May 2007

Dylan Trigg

Trigg is a research student at the University of Sussex. His recently published The Aesthetics of Decay (NY: Peter Lang, 2006) examines, in part, the idea of the built environment as a testimony to events of past destruction. See his website at: www.dylantrigg.com, dylantrigg@hotmail.com. © 2007 Dylan Trigg.

GIVEN its scale and scope, the recent Architecture and Phenomenology conference in Haifa marks an encouraging confirmation of the renewed interest in phenomenology—a trend as evident in the recent writings of Jean-Luc Marion as it is in the context of applied architectural discourse.

In particular, the (re)turn to phenomenology is to be contrasted with an emphasis on the interplay of power, politics, and the gradual diminishment of place experience—a diminishment evident, above all, in certain strands of poststructuralism, critical theory, and what remains of postmodernism. Yet if the interest in phenomenology reflects the vacillat-
ing currents in intellectual history, then the role phenomenology plays in facilitating our understanding of the built and natural environment has a significance that exists outside the insular domain of academic fashions.

Indeed, the meeting of architecture and phenomenology amounts to more than a programmatic attempt to embrace an interdisciplinarity approach, vital though such an attempt is. Instead, the experiential dimension of architecture carries with it an implicitly phenomenological undercurrent, which, if removed, renders the practice and theory of architecture disembodied and abstracted from the interaction between person and world.

Likewise, phenomenology’s receptivity to embodiment, temporality, experience, and perception means that the question of place is not simply of tangential interest but rather forms a consistent layer present, implicitly or explicitly, in all phenomenological investigations.

*****

The challenge for a conference attempting to bring together phenomenology and architecture concerns the need to negotiate between theory and practice, whereby both find themselves situated in contextual and cultural circumstances.

Central to this challenge is the question concerning to what extent architectural design and practice can facilitate a meaningful absorption in our everyday lifeworld. The question is problematic, since it aligns architecture with a prescriptive relation to the built environment, so creates a tension with phenomenology’s onus on a non-prescriptive and descriptive attendance to appearances. To what extent design can precede experience, especially where the design is orientated toward the enhancement of our experience in the world, is thus a contentious point.

In fact, design and experience formed a critical axis for the conference’s major themes. Set over five days in the pleasing environment of Haifa’s Technion Institute of Technology, the conference included several noted speakers in addition to discussion panels of architects, philosophers, artists, and political scientists. I offer here an account of the main themes and conversations present throughout the conference.

*****

Following the preliminary introductions, the conference commenced with a broad if conceptually vague keynote paper by Dalibor Vesely, theorist and architectural historian at the University of Cambridge, whose central concern was the role the “real” plays in our experience and understanding of architecture. In using the term “real,” Vesely invoked a problem central to Husserlian phenomenology, namely, how the world of science and abstraction relates to the pregiven lifeworld—in Vesely’s terms a “latent world.”

Claiming that “purpose and spatial settings depend on the presence of the pre-existing latent world,” Vesely discussed how directionality, corporeality, and the unity of lived-movement correlate with a hermeneutic interpretation of the environment and counter the impoverishment of a method based solely on linguistic analysis.

While the resistance toward the reductionism of linguistic analysis is to be welcomed from a phenomenological perspective, Vesely failed to explicate sufficiently what was (admittedly) an “outline of the hermeneutics of embodiment,” concluding, instead, with a call to embodiment as the “third stage” in phenomenology. Since this conclusion was not fully articulated, I was not clear how Vesely’s supposed “third stage” in phenomenology differs from Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on embodiment or from several other key phenomenological thinkers, all of whom have taken the body as a central theme.

*****

The problem of what is “real” in architectural experience was a theme taken up in a more dynamic and convincing fashion by Antoine Picon in his paper, “Digital Culture and the Architectural Experience.” The question concerning the virtuality of experience, originally posed by Henri Bergson, has gained a degree of urgency in phenomenological literature, as methods of communication and interaction have fundamentally altered our interaction with the built environment, creating a sense of intimacy and distance concurrently.

Central to Picon’s contribution to this topic was the question of whether the digital detracted from the experiential dimension of space and place. Picon cited Kenneth Frampton as exemplary in positing a gap between genuine and digital experience and ar-
argued that, central to this claim is a suspicion of the digital as a simulated and disembodied experience, encoded with ulterior motives such as power and political control. Against this dystopian reading of technology, Picon presented the digital realm in a positive light, asserting how digital media can empower our architectural experience.

Using the example of being inside a car, whereby the world is framed as “intended unfolding,” Picon went on to discuss how driving affects the appearance of architecture, not only perceptually but also in kinesthetic terms. Building on this illustration, Picon suggested that the experience of the computer forms an analogue with that of the car: rather than diminishing our experience of the world, the computer and car, in fact, create new possibilities, where both facilitate a journey in time.

As proof of the manipulated spatio-temporality of digital media, Picon raised the issue of “zooming,” exemplified by GPS systems and, more vividly, by Google Earth. The significance of zooming, Picon argued, is that it creates a hybrid between the “abstract and the ultra-material.” For Picon, this hybrid is peculiar to the “new world of sensations and movements that we are entering today.”

Picon’s thinking on the co-existence of intimacy and distance, the concrete and the abstract, and the local and the global is to be welcomed for its refusal to stigmatize the digital at the outset. Instead, Picon presents us with the challenge of remaining open to the re-identification of experience, design, and materiality as a dynamic relation, and so urging phenomenology to become receptive to having its own borders reformed.

In contrast to Picon, Juhani Pallasmaa’s eloquent keynote lecture, “Selfhood, Memory, and Imagination,” marked a shift toward a classical analysis of the experience of architecture in terms of both presentation and content. Pallasmaa’s focus was the existential meaning the built environment plays in the formation and continuity of personal identity. The topic has a rich phenomenological lineage that invokes Bachelardian notions of memory, oneirism, and place as the embodiment of narrative. Beginning with this issue of narration, Pallasmaa argued that the power of place is such that the “terror of time” is transformed into a measurable and delimited experience. Because of this intimacy between lived place and measurable duration, Pallasmaa’s argument for the depth of architecture derives from a singular notion of the human being interacting with his or her environment. The benevolence of this vision is clear enough in Pallasmaa’s account of the sacredness of silence as revealing the unity of appearances and confirmed by his claim that “the real measure of the qualities of a city is whether one can imagine falling in love in it.”

On one hand, all experience of architecture is fundamentally taken from the perspective of the lived subject, so forming a relational whole. On the other hand, unless this relational whole retains a dynamic instability, the danger grows of pre-forming an experience of place in advance. Note, for instance, that the same benevolent silence that Pallasmaa experiences in place is experienced in Levinas as an anonymous, rather than human, presence: “The absence of everything returns as a presence, as the place where the bottom has dropped out of everything, an atmospheric destiny, a plenitude of the void, of the murmur of silence” (Levinas, 1987, p. 46). The point here is neither to undermine the unity of Pallasmaa’s vision, powerful as it is, nor to contest his experience, but simply to avoid treating place as an already-formed property we somehow “discover” in the world.

Next, Pallasmaa hinted at this dynamism through a consideration of fragments and ruins. In particular, he touched upon the discursive and vague formation of memory, whereby “my body remembers” what is otherwise forgotten. Such a line of thought is to be encouraged, insofar as the experience of place, especially liminal places, obliges us to become aware of our bodily and kinesthetic immersion in the world precisely through disrupting a habitual dwelling pattern.

Yet neither habitual bodily practices nor those which displace us from those patterns are complete in themselves. Both the familiar and unfamiliar, and the inside and outside must co-exist in order to form a whole. While Pallasmaa is clearly engaged with this co-existence of light and dark, there is a sense in which these dualities constitute a normative understanding of place.

So, when Pallasmaa speaks of how “the city dwells in me, as I dwell in the city,” the impression
of a “horizon of emancipation and imagination” co-incides with a definite image on what constitutes architectural plenitude. Such a disjunction between experience and value brings me back to the tension between phenomenology and architecture, and design and experience. Central to these divisions is the distinction between place and placelessness, the latter characterized by Pallasmaa as “flat and fabricated” spaces.

Yet, if architectural experience is to retain an intimacy to appearances, as phenomenology urges, then questions concerning what architecture embodies, how personal identity is formed, and to what extent memory is a confluence between imagination and place must all be open to the absorption of otherness within the “human condition,” meaning that any such binary distinction between place and placelessness is fundamentally ambiguous.

******

The theme of identity and place was adopted in Robert Mugerauer’s rigorous talk, “The Double Gift—Place and Identity.” Divided into three parts, Mugerauer’s paper covered the neurophenomenology of the self, Jean-Luc Marion’s emphasis on the embodiment of the self, and finally Hannah Arendt’s account of the politics of place.

Beginning with a broad discussion on the topic of identity, the death of the subject, and the limits and disadvantages of a poststructuralist conception of the self, Mugerauer proceeded to give a neurophenomenological account of perception and colors before turning to Marion and the question of what is “given” to consciousness.

Building on Marion’s account of givenness, Mugerauer outlined the notion of the gift as involving an interplay between the receiver and the “gifted one,” so producing the singularity of identity and the “primacy” of the given. Above all, Mugerauer argued, is the gift of place. To speak about place as a gift that is given to us means making a distinction between the cognitive formation of an object arranged around a series of points and an appearance that, to cite Heidegger, manifests itself as a “referential whole.” Place is neither a geometric object nor is it equipment to be used. Rather, place is given as a scene of visibility which comes forward to the inhabitant, so underscoring the dynamism central to the built and natural environment. Place as an experiential totality is possible, since it is able to be received as a gift.

Mugerauer concluded by drawing on Arendt’s focus on the physical site of action, which has three dimensions: secure space, the balance between the individual and community engaged in ethical and political practice, and the temporality of place. Out of this threefold confluence, “our enacted perceptions and actions play a critical part,” urging an ethics of responsibility for what is given to us as a gift. This focus on Arendt’s phenomenology of public space is important, since it calls upon not simply the inseparability of being and world but the intimacy between self and other as both co-inhabiting the same space. Acting as a backdrop for our actions, the creation of a common world is a gesture toward a shared commitment to the creation of place.

The possibility of public life, then, is also a question of the design of a “space of appearances,” signifying a space which is receptive to the differences of individual identity. By invoking the spatial origin of politics (polis referring to the ancient term for “city-state”), Mugerauer’s discussion of Marion and Arendt offered a welcome refocus on the intersubjective responsibility of the present and the collective formation of public space.

******

Beyond the plenary papers I have overviewed here, a vast array of complex themes such as wilderness, memory, disability, trauma, globalisation, and ecology all contributed to an interesting series of parallel paper sessions.

Whether or not the conference succeeded in conceiving a “third generation” of architectural phenomenologists (after those of the classical and critical-theory incarnations) receptive to “current political, global, and social aspects,” as the conference’s Vice Chair Eran Neuman urged, remains to be seen.

What is certain, however, is that a fruitful relationship between architecture and phenomenology depends upon a rigorous and self-critical methodology in which both disciplines develop and maintain a commitment to listening to each another—a commitment for which the conference provided much fertile ground.
Everglades Pilgrimage

Christine Rhone

Rhone is a writer, artist, and translator interested in sacred geography and landscape symbolism. With John Mitchell, she has written Twelve Tribe Nations (Thames & Hudson, 1991) and has translated Jean Richer’s Sacred Geometry of the Greeks (SUNY Press, 1994). Her art has been exhibited in Europe, Australia, and the United States. rhonechristine@hotmail.com. © 2007 Christine Rhone.

The road takes me from the heart of Miami’s Little Havana, Calle Ocho, where a plaque on a street corner enshrines the Cuban domino park. Farther to the west, motels and strip malls give way to the edge of the Everglades and the first few people fishing in the canal. For many miles, it flanks the road, a straight wet cut through the glades that is a natural home for alligators.

I drive by the Miccosukee Indian Village, a nation closely related to the Seminole. The history of both is relatively recent in Florida. They are an amalgamation of native peoples from the Southern states who withdrew southward from the advancing European colonists. Many intermarried with runaway slaves. The last Seminole War did not end until 1858. Today there are six Seminole and four Miccosukee reservations in the state of Florida. Another Seminole nation exists in Oklahoma.

Every year the Miccosukee put on a weeklong festival with arts and crafts stalls, alligator wrestling, pumpkin frybread, dancing, and pow-wow drumming. Tiger Tiger, the Miccosukee rock band, always makes an appearance. Often, Diamond Go-Sti visits from Georgia. He is a full-blooded Cherokee who speaks with a deep Southern drawl. After working in retail for decades, he threw it all in to become an educational consultant, putting on programs about Native America for schoolchildren, mainly in the Georgia school system. Diamond’s mission is to start with the youngest pupils. Stereotypes run deep. Much controversy surrounds the use of American Indian mascots for sports teams like the Washington Redskins. [1]

*****

My next stop north is Indian Mound Park in Englewood, a county-maintained site with a habitation mound some 100 feet wide, 320 feet long, and six feet high. Live oak trees draped in Spanish moss top the mound, with a winding nature trail and signs identifying different plants. Excavations south of the mound have revealed many burials and pottery shards, indicating that trading flourished and habitation began as early as 900-1000 A.D, a century that marks the Englewood Culture period, so named because of the uniqueness of pottery designs.
Spanish Point, near Osprey, is a 30-acre preserve listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Its sheltered cove and peninsula are ideal for a fishing village. For some 3,000 years, aboriginals used the whole site continuously. The mounds they left are among the few surviving Archaic Period middens, dated to 2150 BC. One burial mound was in continuous use from about 300 to 800 AD.

The first people to claim private ownership of the property were the Webb family, who settled in 1867 under the Federal Homestead Act and built their home on the peninsula’s highest point, a shell mound that was probably a platform for a temple or chief’s residence. In 1910, Mrs. Palmer, the widow of a Chicago magnate, bought up much of Sarasota County and turned the site into her winter estate, building elaborate gardens and an elegant mansion. Today Spanish Point belongs to a heritage association, which charges visitors an admission fee.

The next point on my pilgrimage is Madira Bickel Mound, at the southern tip of Tampa Bay, on Terra Ceia Island. This was the capital of the Tocobaga Indians, who lived in some 20 villages when Hernando De Soto first landed nearby. This site includes temple and burial mounds in a ten-acre park that is maintained, signposted, and freely accessible, the first archaeological site to become a Florida state monument.

The Prine burial mound was in use from roughly 800 to 1500 AD and has been greatly disturbed and excavated. Now reduced to a height of two feet, it extends 40 feet in diameter, less than half the original size because of 20th century road building. A winding path leads to the temple mound, which features on the northwest side a curved ramp and state-made step rising 20 feet to the top. The summit is flat and enclosed with a wooden fence. Native vegetation covers much of the mound, softening the scars left by excavation and potholes. [3] Somehow, the orientation and position of this mound still make it a good place to sit and meditate.

The next day I travel to St. Petersburg where friends have arranged for a tour of the private portion of the Anderson-Narvaez Mounds at Jungle Prada. In 1528, with 600 men, Panfilio de Narvaez allegedly made landfall nearby, beginning an eight-year expedition to Mexico at the end of which only four men survived. As he went, he brutally inflicted harm on the native peoples, setting a precedent for future Indian-Western explorer relations.

I leave the relative affluence of the coastal area and swing inland east to Arcadia through citrus groves as far as the northern edge of Lake Okeechobee, then turn south into the Brighton Seminole Indian Reservation. Stop for coffee at the casino-restaurant. Mostly tourists, a few natives. Ordinary families. One or two very obese people and slot-machine sounds like mechanical laughter coming from the adjoining casino.

Later trying to get a good view of Lake Okeechobee (thinking I might find a picturesque lakeside vista) I chance down a little side road that, as it turns out, passes a Correctional Facility and further on come upon a scene of blatant rural poverty, an assembly of old mobile homes and shanties. It reminds me somewhat of a poor village in south India but without any goats or temples.

Trying again later for my illusory lakeside vista (perhaps imagining I am in Italy), I come instead upon a gigantic Wal-Mart, a single store comprising an entire shopping mall in itself, with people who look like migrant workers sitting around the foyer, some in cowboy hats and boots.

Fifteen miles west of Lake Okeechobee, Ortona Indian Mound Park near La Belle is the scene for the local community’s Annual Cane Grinding Festival, featuring Bluegrass music and sugary desserts. Although its Native-American remains are among the most visually reduced, they are also among the most culturally impressive. Parts of two canoe canals, 20 feet wide and four feet deep, run through the park and continue for a total distance of three and four miles respectively, the longest human-made prehistoric waterways still existing in eastern North America. These canals form a triangle with the Caloosahatchee River as the base and the lost village of Ortona as the apex. The town covers about two square miles and includes complex earthworks, mounds, causeways and a dug pond 450 feet long.
Knowledge of the Ortona people is scarce. According to archaeologist Robert Carr, they may have been the ancestors of the Calusa, who occupied southwest Florida, and the Mayiami, who lived south of Lake Okeechobee. The Ortona inhabited the area from about 700 BC for at least 1500 years, their culture peaking between 200 and 700 AD. Carbon-14 tests date the canals to about 250 AD, significant because it connects Ortona to the mound-building Hopewell culture of the Ohio River Valley.

I spend a couple of hours slowly exploring the deserted park, following my intuition and feeling, searching for an inner attunement to the ancestors. The only signposting is some faded numbers on clearings, left over from when part of the park was a campground. After the Ortona people disappeared, other Indian nations used the place until about 1500 to 1650, the time of the Spanish incursion.

Eight miles away at a lonely crossroads stands a state historical marker for Billie Bowlegs III, who lies buried in the Ortona Cemetery. The marker reads, “...a patriarch of the Seminole Nation. A true friend of the white man and a faithful representative of his own people.” His dates are 1862 to 1965, an impressive life span, born the year of the Homestead Act granting acreage to Anglo settlers. He died 13 years before the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, meant to extend the “freedom of religion” part of the U.S. Constitution to Native Americans (for many decades, ceremonies such as Sundance were illegal). [4]

As the days roll by, my memory sifts and sorts the images of this journey. I feel that I have traveled somewhere that is not on a map but somewhere toward the center of a diagrammatic figure. This figure is made of two lines intersecting at right angles. The horizontal line is a continuum of space-time—the vertical, a continuum of matter-spirit. The horizontal line equates with traveling on the outside, in the physical world, to places and people ancient and modern. The vertical line relates to traveling on the inside. At their juncture is a single point. There one finds re-orientation, an imaginary Orient or East, which signifies both a new way of seeing and a new sense of rootedness.

Notes
2. B. D. Voegelin, South Florida’s Vanished People (Ft. Myers Beach, FL, 1977).
This paper proposes a “map” of phenomenological studies relating to the design disciplines. This map is needed because phenomenology, although often invoked by designers, tends to be difficult to define. The word is often conflated with creative spontaneity or with indeterminate feelings associated with sensorially stimulating locales—for example, Fay Jones’ Chapel in the Woods or Steven Holl’s St. Ignatius Chapel, come to mind.

In what follows, we first define phenomenology’s philosophical roots. The four quadrants of the map are then explained step by step with illustrative examples from the literature.

In what follows, we first define phenomenology’s philosophical roots. The four quadrants of the map are then explained step by step with illustrative examples from the literature. We conclude with thoughts on the map’s (and phenomenology’s) uses and limitations. Additionally, it is obvious that we can only cite representative works. It is hoped that the categories and examples proposed might stir readers to make more connections and to fill in the map with other examples.

**Phenomenology as Immediacy**

Phenomenology emerged at the dawn of the 20th century as a response to the hegemony of “scientific method” with its requirements for analytic description, taxonomy, and experimentation. The critique was that this Cartesian vetting of experience can only yield knowledge of a reduced kind. A more immediate engagement with phenomena, understood equally as knowledge, was needed.

It was largely in response to this need that Edmund Husserl first proposed the intentionality of consciousness in his *Logical Investigations* (1901) and *Ideas* (1913). Husserl held that there already exists a subject-object unity at the level of consciousness prior to a Cartesian definition of a thing (e.g., “this is a house”). In this way, he sought to bridge the Cartesian dichotomy between observer and observed.

Martin Heidegger, whose early work drew from Husserl, connected phenomenology to the Greek *phanesthai*, meaning to reveal or unveil. This emphasis is important because, in the many ways “phenomenology” has come to inform a wide range of
inquiry, a common thread in all cases is the axiom that phenomena have an existence prior to their description by means of language, and so the only access to them is by a spontaneous phanesthai.

This background sketch is already enough theoretical material to inform design in multifaceted ways. To this end, from our survey of the literature, our map consists of four quadrants summarizing the main areas of phenomenology in relation to design inquiry. These quadrants are as follows:

1. individual phenomenology;
2. phenomenology of history and culture;
3. phenomenology of design production;
4. phenomenology related to metaphysics.

As figure 1 indicates, the lines between the nodes, both orthogonal and diagonal, are sliding scales along which extant works in the literature can be situated. As well, the regions in between the lines are fields within which appropriate extant works can be mapped. The common denominator to all these regions is the immediate, or spontaneous, experiences previous to propositional constraints imposed upon them by conventions of communication.

1. Individual Phenomenology

Individual phenomenology involves the immediate subjective engagement of a person with his or her surrounds. This approach is mapped at the lower left pole on the map. This was primarily the focus of Husserl and Heidegger. From this starting point come many of the now-established technical terms of phenomenology: Husserl’s intentionality of consciousness, Heidegger’s being-in-the-world and Dasein (“there being,” or “being there”), and Merleau-Ponty’s flesh-of-the-world (chiasm).

Christian Norberg-Shulz was largely responsible for translating this material—mostly from Heidegger—into the realm of architectural theory, though he did not get the translation quite right. Heidegger’s phenomenology does not reserve “phenomenological experiences” as those only encountered in heightened sensualized places (like Rome). Heidegger’s Dasein—being-in-the-world or “thrown-ness”—describes the immediate phenomenological experiences of all persons, regardless of locale.

But even a casual reading of Norberg-Schulz’ Genius Loci makes clear this is not what he had in mind. For Norberg-Schulz, phenomenological experiences come much more readily in (what can be regarded as) special places, such as Khartoum or Prague or Rome. [5] Francis Viölich’s analysis of four towns in Dalmatia is exemplary in illustrating a Norberg-Schulzian approach to comprehending a locale. [6]

The churches by Holl and Jones, mentioned at the outset, can be mapped at this pole, in that they certainly stir heightened sensual experience. These can be architectural (formal) illustrations of what can be regarded as a Norberg-Schulzian “phenomenology of special places.”

Emphasis on special individual experience can be seen in the works of Steen Eiler Rasmussen [7] and, more recently, Juhani Pallasmaa. [8] Both writers situate phenomenological possibility in the experiencing subject—both by way of the senses—rather than in external locales.

In this way, phenomenological experience is restored more to a universal possibility (rather than just indexed to certain places). Gaston Bachelard also falls into this group; but, rather than basing phenomenological possibility on the senses, he looks to memory. [9]

Perhaps even closer to Heidegger in accuracy is Clare Cooper Marcus’ method for accessing the inmost feelings of residents toward their homes. This work returns to recognizing that Heidegger’s being-in-the-world is an immediate reality for all persons regardless of locale. Cooper Marcus invokes this philosopher as the wellspring for her thoughts:

…I attempted to approach this material via what philosopher Martin Heidegger called ‘pre-logical thought’. This is not ‘illogical’ or ‘irrational’, but rather a mode of approaching being-in-the-world that permeated early Greek thinkers at a time before the categorization of our world into mind and matter, cause and effect, in-here and out-there had gripped … the Western mind. I firmly believe that a deeper level of person/environment interaction can be approached only by means of a thought process that attempts to eliminate observer and object. [10]

2. History & Culture

G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of absolute spirit giving “shape” to discrete cultural periods is another category of phenomenology. The wellspring work here is
his early *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), in many ways the key to comprehending all of Hegel’s philosophy. Absolute spirit is an unreflective (and hence self-revealing) corporate *geist* motivating all cultural processes, subordinating individual identities even as it spawns “world historical individuals” along with the empirical shapes of material culture.

Clearly not a phenomenology of individual subjective experience, Hegel’s theory profoundly influenced analyses of communal realities. This is represented by the lower right pole of the map. Hegelianism revolutionized analyses of political history and process and greatly informed how stylistic periods in art and architecture can be explained.

The work of such major art historians as Jacob Burckhardt and Heinrich Wolfflin are indebted to Hegel in this regard. [11] As for architecture, the manifesto spirit of early modernism—from Loos to Sant E’lia to Le Corbusier—would not have been what it was without Hegelianism.

Hegelian phenomenology also resonates with structuralist theory, the idea that systems of cultural meaning—such as language (de Saussure), familial roles, myth, even cuisine (all Levi-Strauss)—are self-defining and self-transforming within cultural systems. This is essentially a *phanesthai* point of view at the scale of cultural process.

A good illustration is Grant McCracken’s “Diderot Unities and Effects,” the theory that individuals and social classes immerse themselves within a certain band-width of material objects to define their social identity—the Diderot Unity. BMW automobiles go with Rolex watches and less so with Timex watches, for example. And when a differing object of meaning is inserted into a static unity of objects of meaning, things (read: styles) can radically change—the Diderot Effect.

Architectural history can be assessed through this unity-effect dialectic. When the English theorist A. W. Pugin (1812-1852) promoted a “Christian” architecture, by which he meant revival of the Gothic style, he was stirring a sense of national identity. [12] More recently, Daniel Libeskind defended his use of zinc panels on his Jewish Museum by saying they were “Berlin-like.” [13]

Both of these are examples that appeal to a corporate *geist* as the basis for design action. The cases can be regarded as Diderot disruptions seeking to change static Diderot unities of communal opinion. These two examples illustrate how phenomenological process can be discerned in literature or built forms usually not grouped under this heading.

### 3. Design Production

The phenomenology of design production is located at the upper left pole of the map. It is curious that the process *itself* of design does not receive more explicit attention as a phenomenological process in the literature. But works in which this fact is implicit abound.

Peter Rowe’s *Design Thinking* is one example. Rowe documented the give-and-take decisions of three design teams in “real time.” [14] As well, Donald Schon’s theory of reflection-in-action can be situated in this region. [15]

Again, these works are typically not regarded under the umbrella of “phenomenology,” but because they presume design production as a *phanisthai* sort of emergence, reason for including them on the map should be clear. Rowe, for instance, writes of the “interior situational logic [of] the decision-making processes” (italics added). Or, he argues that any on-the-ground explanation of those processes needs to “go beyond matters of procedure” [16]—which is to say, prior to conventionalized methodologies.

Another group of works are those connecting “deep structure” with design. Drawing from the work of Noam Chomsky, students of deep structure posit innate frameworks within human cognition giving shape to external forms. Broadbent argues for *a priori* categories within which all built forms fall (pragmatic, typologic, analogic, canon). [17]

Both Thomas Thiss-Evensen’s and Bill Hillier/Julienne Hanson’s work also assume deep structure; Thiss-Evensen using the term *archetype* [18] and Hillier and Hanson the term *syntax*. [19] Insofar as these reveal (read: *phanisthai*) patterns of design behavior, these theories address the phenomenology of design production.

In a previous article in this journal, Wang and Keen contributed to this region of the map by using Husserl’s intentionality of consciousness to explain the design of a house. [20] The article exemplifies how the sliding scale of the map works. We noted earlier that Husserl’s intentionality of consciousness basically concerns individual subjective experience.
The full scope of his *Ideas*, however, sets individual experience in context of how corporate intentions work to produce built forms. Wang/Keen is situated on the map to reflect this indebtedness to Husserl even as the article pushes more toward the upper left pole as it focuses primarily on design production in lieu of subjective experience per se.

4. Metaphysics

In elevating immediate experience, phenomenology often interfaces with religious themes, and this is the fourth pole of the map, at the upper right. For sake of breadth, we use the term “metaphysics” in the sense of that which is beyond the physical. From the standpoint of design, this usually brings the focus to “sacred space,” variously defined.

Mircea Eliade is often the thinker invoked as having defined this term. Richard Lang, for instance, analyzes the phenomenology of the threshold through the lens of Eliade’s division between the sacred and the profane. [21] Eliade’s theory of sacred space, however, is of much larger scale, positing that the very possibility of an inhabited world is based upon a process of sanctifying (separating) from an *a priori* chaotic condition. [22]

In this respect, Eliade’s theory returns almost full circle back to Heidegger’s formulation of the four-fold (earth, sky, mortals, divinities) in his *Building Dwelling Thinking*. [23] Heidegger holds that dwelling itself has the quality of separating from—or making a clearing in—a previously amorphous space, and that quality is the quality of the four-fold.

It is important to note that metaphysical experience, as defined here, seems to make the experience of time elastic, even as it renders experience of a location special. Sometimes the literature looks to Hans-Georg Gadamer for theoretical explanation of this phenomenon, particularly in his theory of how “festival” interprets special experience as always-present experience. In the words of one commentator:

… the ordering of time occurs due to the returning of the festival. In this manner our temporal being is given rhythm through festivals, whether we are expressively aware of it or not. In a festival it is clear that those who participate… are embedded in a play that goes beyond their subjective choice, activity, and intending. Who would ever want to ‘objectify’ a festive mood? [24]

In this fluidity, Heidegger’s emphasis upon individual subjective experience has a way of morphing into communal experience.

In the way of built forms, one is reminded of the work of (or more precisely, the testimony of) the Abbot Suger (1081-1151) in his renovation of the St. Denis Cathedral in the 12th century. Motivated by the Platonic tradition, Suger sought to transform the existing structure into one filled with “… wonderful and uninterrupted light … pervading the interior with beauty” [25] and “[urging] us onward from the material to the immaterial.” [26] The result of his efforts contributed to the beginnings of Gothic architecture.

Closer to home, we can again cite Holl’s and Jones’ works under individual phenomenological experience. It is in the nature of phenomenological fluidity that that which is special in individual subjective experience can also become a kind of festival-as-presence when instantiated into architectural form.

Conclusions & Limitations

In eschewing the propositional, phenomenological studies have elevated many facets of human experience to the level of rigorous knowledge (or at least to the level of rigorous academic consideration of these facets as knowledge). This approach is useful for the design disciplines in that these domains stress the spontaneous, the creative, and the aesthetic—all resonant with phenomenology’s emphasis upon *phanesthai*.

The map proposed here aims at an objective mapping of the extant literature as well as built forms that have connections to this way of assessing experience. We propose the map as an objective tool; we do not promote any portion of its contents as representative of our own convictions about the nature of knowledge or experience.

The map’s usefulness lies in its ability to clarify extant domains of phenomenological inquiry even as it provides a chassis upon which additional works can be mapped or additional conceptual linkages made, proving its interdisciplinary value in the process.

As for the limitations of phenomenology, perhaps the idea of a map itself is a critique. Without this propositional tool, we would have more difficulty sorting out all this material that eschews the restrictions of propositional knowledge. And so we ought
not to elevate phenomenological inquiry to a totalizing position.

Notes
3. We must note here that the examples cited for the map are by definition illustrative and not exhaustive; one goal of proposing this map is to invite further mapping of the extant literature.
16. Rowe, op. cit., 1, 2, 37.
Figure 1. A Map of Phenomenology for the Design Disciplines