Avant-garde: The Convulsions of a Concept

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Abstract
The current status of the «avant-garde» provokes many questions, which include both inner-artistic matters and matters of history and society commonly associated with Marxist or reception-oriented thinkers. The convolution of questions cannot be disentangled; efforts to confront the dilemmas of the avant-garde cannot abstract from matters of commodification, recent reception, or the complex dialectic of «classical» and «modern.» The essay deals with the most recent manifestations of avant-garde aesthetic impulses. It emphasizes the historical and social aspects of German theorizing in contrast to purely formalist or ahistorical conceptions commonly found elsewhere. It insists that such «materialist» theory does greater justice than formalist conceptualizations to the proverbial connections of «art» and «life.» It tries to integrate the present phenomenon of proliferating theory into the theoretical exposition, as a characteristic trait of the current situation. It warns against abandoning the subversive content of classical modernism in the course of developing a theory of post-modernism.
An eerie calm hangs over the concept of the «avant-garde.» At a time when an «Avant-garde Hair Centre» (British spelling of «centre») might well be the latest addition to your neighborhood suburban shopping mall, the concept seems to survive in the general consciousness only as a distant, mocking echo of its original destructive impulse. At a time when some non-representational art—Klee or Mondrian paintings—adorns calendars, that original impulse pitifully reappears in a shadowy form, only to be ridiculed by the relentlessly commodity mechanisms of late capitalism. Those mechanisms resemble a gigantic vacuum cleaner which sucks up everything within its imperious reach, only to dump it out again into the garbage can of consummatory obsolescence: a mixture of schlock, dirt, fuzz, and what used to pass for «art.» What Walter Benjamin once called the «eternal return of the New» is sneeringly confirmed by the pathetically easy devouring of any subversive phenomenon whatever, by the infinitely voracious appetite of commodification and consumption. Culture high, low, and indifferent has at its ready beck and call not «the burden of the past»—scholastic formulation—but rather its rich legacy of mimetic and non-mimetic, Aristotelian and Brechtian, tonal and atonal, formed and free-form possibilities for artistic creation, or at least for aesthetic convulsions. And who can penetrate the labyrinthine maze of influence, not upon artistic production (difficult enough in itself) but rather upon cultural marketing, which
will supposedly determine whether today's artists will feel like emulating Balzac or Joyce, Johann Strauss or John Cage, Monet or Munch or Pollock or Andy Warhol? Who knows just how decisive the marketplace really is in contemporary artistic endeavor; must the slogan about «art as commodity» remain unfalsifiable yet unverifiable leftist paranoia?

Such questions threaten immediately to overwhelm our much more modest point of departure: the question of the current stature of the avant-garde. The frenetic pace of contemporary culture virtually precludes the possibility of genuine recurrence of «events» similar to those artistic phenomena of the early twentieth century now enshrined as the «avant-garde» or, in the terms of the most significant recent analysis, that of Peter Bürger, the «historical» avant-garde. Such movements as Dada, Futurism, and most importantly Surrealism surely demonstrated their primal gesture of «épater le bourgeois;» but such a bourgeois audience for «high» culture as still remains has become accustomed to such mistreatment, having been insulted by Handke and harangued by assorted socialist Brecht epigones. They have subsidized (willingly or not) outrageously «up-to-date» renditions of virtually all the classics—from Shakespeare to Albee—that one could name. They have been subjected to the most questionable «works of art» in front of public buildings and—again, in shopping malls, the last remnant of a bourgeois public sphere, such as it is. (This habitual «épater» of course renders the National Endowment for the Arts a prime target for the new administration's budget cutters.) All these cultural phenomena and their creators frantically seek to fulfill (or perhaps even to create) authentic non-commodified needs, and this in an age when no need escapes commodification, not to speak of the status of created new ones.

Historical looks backward, hermeneutic theory has repeatedly assured and finally convinced us, are always impelled by a particular actuating force, a «cognition-guiding interest,» emanating from the present. In the case of Bürger's prototypical effort, the historical caesura can be located quite precisely: the year 1968. For when Bürger designates the intention of the historical avant-garde movements as follows: «Art should not simply be destroyed but rather transformed into life-praxis, where it would be preserved, even if in an altered form» (67), he does so from the perspective of that historical moment when it appeared that such an «aestheticization» of society might actually be possible. The moment that the
Parisian workers took to the streets was the moment that seemed to signal the concrete liberation of those aesthetic-social impulses first articulated by the historical avant-garde. From a European vantage point, the Paris May, along with the most virulent anti-authoritarian Berlin demonstrations by the German student movement, seemed for a brief moment to signal the dawn of a new era. The belief in a new beginning is not so very foreign to the American who wants to recall the events on this side of the Atlantic during that apocalyptic year. The March 31 resignation speech of Lyndon Johnson (who was simultaneously increasing the bombing) seemed to signal the triumph of the anti-war movement because of the shape of the American presidential campaign. Then in early April came King’s assassination, McCarthy’s continuing campaign (which had already defeated Johnson), Kennedy’s triumphal entry and assassination, and then the unforgettable August in Grant Park in Chicago (the same August was also unforgettable in Prague). Seen from this perspective, the German preoccupation with 1968 is not at all aberrant, rather eminently comprehensible. Real life seemed to be overtaking the wildest possibilities of modern art virtually moment by moment.

The cultural revolution of the late 1960s appeared for a few moments to offer possibilities for emancipatory rejuvenation. Genuinely communal experiences such as Woodstock and the march on Washington were recreated in op, pop, happenings, and other such manifestations of spontaneity, in which bourgeois barriers of fragmentation and isolated contemplation were to be overcome. But viewed from the hindsight now made available by the entire decade of the 1970s, such events, along with their instantaneous interpretation, can be clearly seen as products of a particular historical moment. A configuration of factors could be named, but chief among them would be two: general outrage at the provocation of the superfluous and criminal war; and general prosperity, which enabled students to indulge in a period of selfless social commitment. They were safe in the knowledge that despite their academic majors in such «soft» subjects as sociology, Eastern philosophy, or literature, the economy was still expanding and could yet offer them prosperous refuge. Benjamin Braddock can always return to his «plastics,» and after he marries Elaine, he probably will.

Generations of rebellious youth are, however, hardly new events in cultural history. Similar generations rebelled in Germany
around 1770, from 1819 to 1835, and in the years before 1914 (with a tragic «sublation» here). These generational upheavals mark rather clearly significant and lasting changes in cultural consciousness. Hereafter, those defenders of «classical» contemporary high culture, apologists of Joyce and Kandinsky, advocates of the lasting accomplishments of modern art against the atrocities of the cultural upstarts, would be pressed into a defensive posture. Normative notions of genuine artistic creation become increasingly less convincing; they are continually being overtaken, not so much by newer art as by newer political events. To the Dutschke and Cohn-Bendit-led European students, the most recent heirs of this continuing cultural dialectic, the «classical» avant-garde was as distant as that «Great War» which played so large a role in it. It is a grim irony of this century that the cataclysmic triumph of technological warfare, the clear victory of the «rational» in the service of the overwhelmingly irrational, should have been so soon forgotten, repressed, one is tempted to assert, or at the very least overtaken by the rush of later political events. For the 1968 generation, the children of that generation which spent its childhood in the Hitler Youth, the mud of Flanders and the flame-throwers of Verdun were as remote as the Dada and Expressionist poets.

Thus the avant-garde was consigned to the junk heap of cultural memory along with the classics, although at least they were not (like the classics of Weimar) enlisted for the propagation of apolitical humanism in the school system. Thus the classical avant-garde in Europe became the special domain of the guardians of high culture. In Hermand’s usually witty formulation: «The highbrows raved about Joyce, Kandinsky, and Schönberg, while the ‘people’ satisfied its cultural needs with pop hits, comics, and pulp novels. And then suddenly around 1960, up popped a few ‘barbarians’...»³ American «pop» art may entail ideological slipperyness (affirmative or critical of the world of Campbell’s soup cans, Brillo soap pad boxes, Marilyn Monroe countenances?), but it was certainly at the very least a frontal attack on the «highbrows» and their institutions devoted to the pious worship of canonized modernity. In many respects, European developments during the decade were only pale reflections of the American effort to free art from its museums and concert halls. Viewed in this light, the events of 1968 were a logical conclusion to the decade’s own dynamics, regardless of the immediate historical provocation of the Vietnam War. From the love-and-peace messages of the flower children to
the outrageously sexual and blasphemous outpourings of shocker-pop theatricality, art was to become life. Hermand's insightful analysis of these events allows only the conclusion that these excesses were carried to the greatest imaginable extremes. Indeed they were forced to by the logic of what Hermand calls «Modcom» (for Commercial Exploitation of Modernity): «Yet because the threshold of sensibility steadily increases and consequently the sensations become ever 'bloodier,' the political provocateurs accelerate their shock effects into the realm of the madly gruesome and obscene, in order to attract any customers at all. In this manner, they end up with a kind of shocker-pop-commerce or horror-commerce, which can scarcely be distinguished from the popular entertainment industry.»

That is indeed the deadly dialectic, fatal to any effort to aestheticize life itself.

In Europe, such trends were more directly political in a traditional sense, but they nevertheless had their aesthetic overtones and predecessors. Karl Heinz Bohrer describes an anarchistic pamphlet distributed in 1967 at the Free University of Berlin, which called for bombing your local department store. «Surrealist cynicism terrorizes the nerves of morally aware people. The technique of satire is turned that one degree further, so that it can engender a feeling of utmost gravity. But that is precisely the literary and political attribute which was most obvious in the earliest tracts and provocations of the classical surrealists.» 1968 was then a logical consequence: German commentators were stirred up by Leslie Fiedler's visit (in lectures that became Cross the Border—Close the Gap) and by the funeral celebrated for traditional «highbrow» literature by that infamous issue 15 of Enzensberger's Kursbuch. And as socialism with a human face began to emerge in Czechoslovakia, Parisians hit the streets: «In 1968, impatience about artistic modernism at last spilled over from the salons and feuilletons into the streets, where in Paris, that is in French, was shouted and written on the walls: first that art was shit, and second, that poetry could now be seen in the streets.» The sublimated uselessness of older culture was to be replaced by a utopia of sensual beauty here and now, just as the flower children had intoned.

A mystical reality cannot be lived out by masses. The filmmaker Godard, himself a noted proponent of surrealist techniques in such films as Weekend, once stated as his aim making films «for the children of Marx and Coca-Cola.» The phrase reveals not only his European perspective, but also the eminently historical
character of all these developments. This impression is strengthened if one today looks for «events» or «happenings» such as these described by Hermand. Coca-colonization has suffered its setbacks in the decade just past. No longer can the massive vulgarity of culture and daily life in late capitalist countries be so easily contrasted with a vision of plenty and of production organized properly for the benefit of all. The new realities of scarcity (in the midst of undeniable waste), which can be traced roughly to the first Arab oil embargo of 1973, foster a new selfishness, in which idealist contempt for middle-class ease («lawnorder») gives way to self-centered acquisitive survival. Existing power structures, unmasked by the provocative gestures intended to call forth repression, can hide once again behind bland assurances of concern for all. The surreal historical moment has passed; today’s children are the offspring of Big Macs and Milton Friedman.

II

Herein lies the secret poignancy of Bürger’s rich, suggestive inventory of avant-garde artistic techniques and their protest against earlier «organic» conceptions of genuine art. He had begun his 1971 study of French Surrealism with the words: «At the latest with the events of May 1968, the relevance of Surrealism has become obvious.» And at the latest by 1973 to 1974, when the Theory of the Avant-Garde was conceived and written, it was obvious that the attack on the institution of art—the attempt to supersede the auralic status of art in an aestheticized life-praxis—had not only failed, but was itself the product of a particular historical moment which had passed. Bürger and other younger German intellectuals—products of that moment—undertook the project of a concretely «materialistic» literary science, which could only be achieved in the form of a theory of art in bourgeois society. His relatively brief 1974 essay then evoked a lengthy volume of Answers. Along with a 1972 essay collection entitled Autonomy of Art, these publications are exemplary for the efforts following the brief cultural revolution to continue and develop the work of their intellectual mentors who were the revolution’s high priests. Indeed, brief as Bürger’s book is, none of them is missing: Hegel and Marx of
course, also Marcuse and Benjamin, naturally Lukács, Adorno, and Brecht, certainly Gadamer and Habermas, even Kant and Schiller. Trenchant summary of key concepts naturally invites disputations from longer-winded colleagues. One (lengthy) contribution expands into many Bürger's few pages on Benjamin; another takes issue with his necessarily abstract notion of the transcendence of art in life-praxis; a third excoriates Bürger's foreshortened reception of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory; a fourth objects to his carefully qualified distinction between the «classical» or «historical» avant-garde and a contemporary «post-avant-garde.»

When one has read enough of such essays, an impression of circling scholasticism or infinite Talmudic twisting can sometimes set in. For our present purposes, the various ins and outs of the discussion are of less significance than the fact of the theoretical discussion itself: if the post-avant-garde (we shall use the term «post-modern» synonymously) does exist, it is as much in theory as in fact. That is not only the recurrent burden of German intellectual life, although one's stereotypical conception of much German literary criticism as being heavy on the theory and somewhat stingier with concrete analyses of works of art will not be contradicted by the volumes under discussion. (In this regard, the Germans may be pace-setters for the rest of us!) No, the retrenchment of hopeful street Surrealism into theory is rather one example of a more general current: the proliferation of theory.

This proliferation can be viewed in several ways. In the specifically German context, the apparently dominant literary trend toward the «New Inwardness» reflects both disappointment at the failure of the spontaneous movement and the recognition that a great deal of socio-political engagement during those heady times was the direct projection of personal neuroses. The same can be said for much of the theory then produced (quantitatively much more than later in the 1970s). It aimed at immediate street-level realization, tirelessly evoking post-bourgeois public spheres where none existed. But theory now proliferaes also in France, England, and America, each emerging out of different cultural contexts and for divergent reasons, but nevertheless with similar superficial results.

This multiplication of theoretical discourse—whether structuralist or post-structuralist, marxist or deconstructionist—invokes a multiplicity of codes and consequently often engenders gross
amounts of confusion. In this regard, there is something reassuring about this German discussion, with its Hegelian—Marxist roots by now well established by their twentieth-century progeny. Against the prevailing ahistorical and even anti-historical aspects of French thought and its colorful American reception, these students of Hegel continue to insist on the evolution of aesthetic categories in describable historical circumstances. «Hegel historicized aesthetics,» says Bürger (118). And Hegel’s most recent student must be the starting point for post-avant-garde aesthetic theory: «Adorno attempts radically to think through the historicization of art forms undertaken by Hegel, i.e. to give no historically appearing type of form-content dialectic preference over another. The avant-garde work of art appears in this view as a historically necessary expression of the alienation of late capitalist society» (120).

It is this Hegelian stress on history which sets apart the German discussion from its counterparts in neighboring countries. This becomes evident the moment one compares Bürger’s approach with an older, more traditional summary such as that of Renato Poggioli. For Poggioli, avant-garde artistic movements, while admittedly responding to such historical phenomena as the development of technology, remain essentially a creative possibility of any historical epoch. There is no sense of historical necessity due to non-artistic contingencies. His phenomenology of avant-gardism envisions a continuing give and take between periods of conventionality and emerging currents antagonistic to that conventionality. Despite its concentration on events in France after 1870, therefore, it is equally applicable to such earlier movements as Storm and Stress. This inherently formalistic approach yields a multitude of valid insights, but it also suffers from the recurring ailment of formalistic methodology: artistic «currents» come and go, emerging from and reacting to each other in a kind of aesthetic vacuum, separate from the real world and from history.

Bürger’s «critical hermeneutics» acknowledges the «present relevance» of historical research and constructs its analysis accordingly. With his point of departure the events of 1968, he can construct in retrospect a distinction not present for example in Poggioli, a distinction between earlier hermetic aestheticism (Symbolism, Impressionism) and the vitalistic energy of later avant-garde movements (Dada, Surrealism) surging out into the streets. On a much larger historical level of abstraction, Bürger returns to
the question of art in bourgeois society with an eye to its (society's) supersession. Yet he is justifiably dissatisfied with the «static opposition bourgeoisie-nobility» (51) and attempts to describe the process of art’s secular liberation from its earlier cultic function in terms of several «non-simultaneous» trends. Here, Benjamin’s unavoidable category of «aura» is evoked in a convincing manner. Even in its brevity, the discussion offers a persuasive outline of art’s emergence from the domination of the sacred toward its eventual claim of autonomy, an outline that does indeed go further than the usual unfruitful polarity. Refinement of the historical World-Spirit is ongoing.

The atomized present, however, presents different problems for the theorist. There is the situation of philosophical aesthetics itself, which is for all practical purposes the philosophy of Adorno. For it was here that the manifold development of modern art since Baudelaire—from aestheticism and l'art pour l'art through the historical avant-garde to modernity’s apparent extreme, Beckett, receives its historical-philosophical foundation as the necessary manifestation of late monopoly capitalism and its consequences for the individual. This art offers an accurately discordant account of the fragmented state of what remains of bourgeois individuality under such corporate, consummatory, and cultural conditions. The work of art can no longer be measured by older criteria of organic unity as in classicism or even bourgeois realism. Yet Bürger also accurately perceives the dangers of this trenchant philosophical analysis of modernity: «It seems at first as if Adorno had thereby broken through definitively all normative theory. Yet it is not difficult to recognize how the normative once again gains entry even in the course of radical historicization» (120). And if this rather exclusive view of authentic modernity tends toward the normative, how is one to confront those lesser lights who may themselves abjure classical wholeness? But even more to the point: what now?

Reinhard Baumgart has entitled an essay «What Comes After Modern Literature?» He writes: «Before our eyes, this entire modernism, from Baudelaire to Pound, from Henry James to Beckett, from Strindberg to Brecht, is beginning to sink back into tradition, to become classical.»17 In his view, «classical» means historical, available in museums, no longer exemplary for contemporary work. With justification, he feels drawn to Thomas Mann’s late refrain: «It seems to me that nothing more will come.» The essayist has no answer for his own question; his somewhat impres-
sionistic discussion of three novels which happened to appear during the epochal year 1968 can achieve no synthesis. There is no need to name the selected works here; the critic admits that they could readily be replaced by others. Indeed, that is part of the point: they incorporate a kind of «throwaway» use value. Various characteristics are noted: «They take leave of the bourgeoisie as subject, narrate from the edge of society and toward utopia, and depart at the same time from bourgeois realism as a method of writing.» «The narrative is in all three novels disconnected, cut quickly like film, diverted, without any continuity, permeated by montages consisting of mere fabricated parts, hackneyed slogans, newspaper articles, parodies.» This literature «obviously no longer wants to pretend to be critique or cognition, their fictions want by no means to imitate realities.» The aura of the exemplary event even of great avant-garde works is now absent, replaced by immediate use in a receptive context of «diversion.» Yet simultaneously, although Baumgart does not mention it here, noteworthy works are still being produced which could be seen as bourgeois realism, which offer a continuous narrative (even if it can sometimes only be recovered with considerable effort), which purport to contain cognition and critique. Does the critic intend to imply that the works he chooses are the genuine «post-modern» works while these latter ones are not? And if so, would that not claim for a particular version of «post-modernism» the identically normative status that already seemed problematic in Adorno’s conception of modernity?

And there still remains the question of theory. Adorno’s Philosophy of Modern Music first appeared in 1949 after years of preparation. From which critic can we expect today a philosophy of contemporary drama to accompany that produced for «classical» modernity by Szondi? Who will bestow upon us the philosophy of post-modern narrative? The questions, which we asked at the beginning, also bother Bürger with his almost resigned conclusion of «total availability of material and of forms...» (130). The bane of a historical philosophy of art—contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous—returns with a vengeance in a post-avant-garde setting. Where anything from the past can be—almost arbitrarily—made exemplary (or parodied), then nothing is exemplary any longer. When this chaotic situation is combined with suspicion of the cultural marketplace and its opaque mechanisms, our helplessness seems total: everything seems to flood the market,
and we have no way of knowing what is being purposely excluded. In this situation, the profusion and mutual dismantling of theories seems rather to point to the impossibility of theory. Post-modernism as the impossibility of transparent conceptualization?

III

Adorno's most influential student has asked himself similar questions in his recent speech accepting the Adorno prize. But Jürgen Habermas formulates the questions somewhat differently. He does not ask whether post-modernism can be conceptualized, but rather asks to what degree it must be regarded as anti-modern. If Bürger is correct that «classical modernism» sought the transcendence of art in life itself, then the most recent failure of that effort would logically bring with it for Bürger and friends a period of stock-taking and historical theorizing. But the problem is that «modernism» covers a multitude of sins, including not only the impulse toward this transcendence, but also the elitist gesture of sovereign withdrawal into hermetic aestheticism. Does the recent defeat of the former leave only the latter? Or will it not rather lead to wholesale rejection of even that «classical modernism» now only conserved in museums and seminar rooms?

Habermas criticizes the short-sightedness of Surrealism's attempted transcendence of art into life. At the same time, he is concerned to defend the cultural sphere from the intemperate attacks of those remarkable creatures, the neoconservatives (for America, he mentions Daniel Bell). «Neoconservatism namely transfers the unpleasant consequences of a more or less successful capitalist modernization from economy and society onto cultural modernism.»14 Thus the danger encountered by a theory of post-modernism which rejects the accomplishments of the historical avant-garde as mere bourgeois sublimation is the old danger of false friends. If it promotes—as Fiedler did in his original provocative remarks of 196814—a literary production consisting of science-fiction, pornography, or Indian stories in its effort to overcome artificial barriers between «highbrows» and the «people,» it stands to lose—reasons Habermas—precisely those characteristics that render it valuable: its continuing testimony regarding the
debilitating effects of the existing economic system on real human beings.

Nevertheless, Habermas' conclusion must give pause. His prime concern is clearly to combat those neoconservatives, who «greet the development of modern science, insofar as it goes beyond its own sphere only in order to promote technical progress, capitalist growth, and rational administration. Otherwise, they recommend a policy of defusion of the explosive content of cultural modernism.» The question is one of retaining this explosive content; but one wonders whether the final evocation of the mentor for whom the prize was named is the most felicitous means for rescuing the gesture of refusal and critique. If Adorno's conception of modernism was narrow and tended to become normative, a post-modern critique that rejects such normativism need not also reject these subversive content. Philosophical aesthetics cannot fall back even upon its most «progressive» historical position. Adorno himself reflected on the «obsolete» nature of his enterprise in the Aesthetic Theory.

So no immediately synthesizing facet is available. After the most recent hopes for a transcendence of art into life were dashed, such hopes seem only utopian in the negative sense of obscurantist. The limits of the exploitation of nature («enough could be produced for all, if one could only alter the structures of domination»)—that dynamic thesis of Frankfurt thought, seems relativized by the recent experience of scarcity, although one could imagine that if production for profit were halted and production for genuine (not created) needs instituted, scarcity might well become more scarce. So much for the economic sphere, which, confused as it is, seems virtually transparent in comparison to the cultural. If the total availability of all forms and aesthetic strategies—as Bürger contends—is indeed an accurate account of the current situation, then it is difficult to formulate general statements about it.

A theory of the post-avant-garde must above all—this is Habermas' prime concern—beware of applause from the wrong side. It must continue to insist on the ongoing emancipatory potential of that classical avant-garde which it is simultaneously attempting to—continue? overcome? For it must never forget that the avant-garde directed its attack chiefly at art itself, but with the goal of art's sublation, not its destruction. Faced now with constant and increasing danger of commodification no matter what one does, art
and its creators are once more cast adrift from any solid moorings. The profusion of theory—in the guise of mutually incomprehensible theories—can only constitute a transitory repose. The true enemy, neoconservatism, must not derive comfort from a theory of post-modernism so narrow that it eventually eliminates any possible critique or subversion that does not measure up to preconceived aesthetic standards. But that means that the colorful chaos of current artistic production continues to elude conceptual synthesis. That dialectic of concept and chaos defines our situation; but when was it not so?

NOTES

1. Peter Bürger, *Theorie der Avantgarde* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974). Page references in the text are to this volume. All translations from the German are my own.
14. Jürgen Habermas, «Die Moderne—ein unvollendetes Projekt,» in *Die Zeit*