Beyond Legislative Schizophrenia: Sustaining Long-Term Educational Reform and Short-Term Viability

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Beyond Legislative Schizophrenia: Sustaining Long-Term Educational Reform and Short-Term Viability

Susan B. Trimble and Carolyn Herrington

Introduction

A major challenge facing contemporary educational reform is the extended timeframe necessary to achieve substantive and demonstrable results (Fuhrman, 1993). Five years after the publication of A Nation at Risk, Firestone, Fuhrman & Kirst (1989) pointed to the fragmentation of reform efforts and the need for comprehensive and systematically aligned approaches. The same year Elmore and McLaughlin (1988) argued persuasively that real reform was accomplished only through slow ‘steady’ work. The now almost 15-year-old resolve to improve public schooling in this country has been met with a severely constrained institutional capacity brought on by constitutionally-imposed term limits. Questions surrounding the ability of state legislatures to maintain a long-term perspective in the best of times, today’s legislatures face a series of daunting challenges including having to deal with a range of issues previously handled at the federal level and with a severely constrained institutional capacity brought on by constitutionally-imposed term limits. Questions surrounding the capacity of state legislatures to sustain long-term educational reform are a critical area of inquiry which, while acknowledged, to date has received little empirical analysis from educational researchers. Failure to acknowledge, analyze and manage this presumed clash between reform requirements and legislative institutional capacity poses considerable risk to sustainable improvements in public schools. Ambitious and demanding state educational reform packages risk foundering on the shoals of a legislative capacity weakened by institutional instability as evidenced by leadership turnover, shifts in partisan control and membership volatility.

In an analysis of the evolution of standards-based systemic reform in the United States in the mid 1990s, Massell, Kirst and Hoppe (1997) document over a 10-year period the remarkable rise of the concept of standards-based systemic reform in the United States. They note the virtually unprecedented spread of a controlling idea for reform in the mid-eighties and its persistence through the nineties despite being challenged by anti-government rhetoric and despite significant changes in state political leadership. However, the political dynamics of the policymakers and their lawmaking institutions are not explored. The question we wish to address in this article is, How has state political leadership addressed and, if successful, resolved pressures to respond to continuous demands for reform with new and different reform paths? In other words, politically, how have state legislatures managed to stay the course of educational reform.

To explore and better delineate these tensions, we selected for investigation the state of Florida. Florida had committed itself in 1991 to a standards based reform strategy, one which emphasizes the development of curricular standards and assessments at the state level and the decentralization of practice at the local level and a state which appeared to be staying the course of the reforms it had set for itself. We believe Florida would provide a revealing case study of the ability of states to retain a commitment to reform over the long haul.

To do so, we selected as a point of investigation the year 1996, a year of re-election for a substantial number of state legislators and the mid-point between the passage of a large comprehensive reform package entitled The 1991 Blueprint 2000: School Improvement and Accountability Act and its targeted full implementation in the year 2000. In order to examine the intensity and the nature of pressure on lawmakers to modify the course and direction of reform, we analyzed the content of all educational bills enacted during the mid-point year, 1996, according to whether they supported or weakened the state’s new reform strategy.

The Case of Florida: Background

During the 1970s and 1980s, Florida developed a rather strong and distinctive political culture, particularly regarding educational reform, enacting a quantity of bold legislative actions during the 70s and the 80s (Turnbull, 1981). Florida was frequently signaled out as having the most active state legislature in the area of education in the country (Turnbull, 1981; Rosenthal & Fuhrman, 1981), as being willing to employ highly directive policy instruments (Wise, 1979), and as having a reputation as one of the most highly professionalized and technologically advanced legislative systems in the country (Huckshorn, 1991). This culture was made possible by a powerful set of legislative leaders who had strong convictions regarding educational reform and the political strength to see their ideas put into law.
Almost every legislative session in Florida in the 1970s had resulted in major educational policy enactments, including a new state aid formula; state-wide assessments of students and teachers; a high school graduation test; a state compensatory education program; a program to enhance the primary education program; and the beginning of a statewide, student-based management information system. This pace continued unabated in the 1980s. Florida adopted almost all of the reform efforts that other states passed out including a requirement of 24 credits for graduation; a longer school day; a merit pay program for teachers; a merit schools program; a performance-based evaluation system for principals; an alternative teacher certification program; a modernization of the curriculum through more emphasis on math, science and computer education, a reduction in teacher-pupil ratios in the early years, middle school enhancements; and a minimum GPA. Interstate companions have shown that the Florida proposals were the most numerous of any state (McCloskey, Provenzo, Cohn, and Kottkamp, 1991; Firestone, 1990).

There was also a high degree of consensus within the legislature, a consensus that cut across political, ideological and geographic spectrums on the basic need for reform and the legitimacy of the state in using its powers to impose across-the-board solutions. In place was a highly cohesive set of legislative leaders, all veteran policymakers who considered themselves well-informed about the state’s educational system and who enjoyed the political power to force their definition of the problem and their solutions. The reforms of this period are characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of a few veteran political leaders and by across-the-board application of reforms (Herrington and Cistone, 1994).

**New Roles at the State and Local Levels: Centralization versus Decentralization**

Blueprint 2000 appeared in 1991 as a reaction to dissatisfaction with the centralized, top down reforms of the 1980s. The end of the decade had witnessed a slow erosion of the political consensus concerning the nature of educational reform, the economic climate of the state and the level of optimism about the state’s future. There was growing uncertainty about the efficacy of the earlier activities, declining fiscal resources accompanied by tax-payer resistance, and an increasingly partisan cast to reform debates. A consensus that had prevailed for almost 15 years on the efficiency of state mandated reform weakened in the face of implementation difficulties and the lack of student achievement gains as a result of the earlier reforms.

The 1991 Blueprint 2000: School Improvement and Accountability Act was a response to these perceived weaknesses in the design of earlier reforms. It attempted to free up local schools and school districts from higher-level restrictions and to enable them to pursue school reform based on local analyses of problems and local convictions of appropriate responses. Radically decentralizing in its thrust, Blueprint 2000 attempted to redefine the duties of the state and the local schools regarding reform. The state’s role was no longer to mandate specific behaviors and thus it eliminated most of the categorical programs created over the previous two decades including the statutes and regulations that prescribed them, and the funds that financed them. State mandates were limited to a narrow set of policies designed to force attention to school reform at the local level but not to force any particular approach to reform. Blueprint 2000 required all schools to engage in school-based management, appoint school advisory councils, develop school improvement plans and report to the public on school effectiveness. Schools were given three years in which to document improvement prior to the invoking of sanctions. The state’s role was redesigned as well. It converted to a more narrow and strategic role of assuring accountability through standard-setting and performance assessment.

**Weakened Legislative Institutional Capacity**

Blueprint 2000 created a new relationship between the state and local educational communities: the state would be responsible for setting standards and assessing their attainment; local school and school districts were responsible for determining how to do this. They were to be granted maximum discretion by the state in operating their schools. Against the backdrop of a new commitment to decentralization in educational reform, however, was a political environment that was becoming increasingly volatile and unstable. The 1992 and 1994 elections (due to redistricting and due to Republican gains, respectively) resulted in remarkably high levels of turnover of House and Senate membership and leadership. For example, in 1992 the Senate experienced a 50 % turnover in membership and in 1994 one of the legislative bodies came under the control of Republicans for the first time in over a century. The elected Commissioner of Education changed hands three times between 1991 and 1996 and switched party affiliations as well. Only the governor’s office remained the same between 1991 and 1996. This new group of policymakers differed considerably from those that had gone before. They lacked the cohesiveness of the previous leadership which had developed over a lengthy tenure of office. They were also more partisan in their analysis of educational reform, particularly around controversial issues of pay for performance and school choice. Perhaps even more significantly, a large number of the new legislators had not experienced the disillusionment with state-directed reforms that their predecessors had undergone. Nor had they been in office and therefore had not been part of the debate or the voting on the Blueprint 2000 reform package when it was passed in 1991.

Given this unstable political environment, we wanted to investigate if, and if so how, a state could stay the difficult path of reform. Prior to the nineties, the political environment in Florida had enabled a strong and relatively stable legislature which supported a highly centralized and direct role for state government in defining educational reform. By the mid-nineties, Florida policymakers faced a challenge in two ways. One, a temptation to return to the state’s previously dominant educational reform mode– centralization– which would be considerable if results from decentralization were not quick in coming. Two, a weakness in legislative leadership due to high turnover in membership and turnover in partisan control which would make it less likely that the leadership would be able to or would want to stay with a commitment made five years earlier by different members and under different leadership.

**Methodology**

**Data Sources**

The data for this study consisted of a content analysis of all the substantive (non-fiscal) bills relating to education that were enacted by the Florida legislature in 1996 to determine if they evidenced a weakening in the state’s commitment to a decentralized educational reform mode or a return to a centralized, top-down approach. The year 1996 was chosen because it was the mid-point in the educational reform timetable and a year of substantial activity in educational policy.
In fact, education was the dominating interest of the legislature that year. The years right after the passage of Blueprint 2000 in 1991 were characterized by a low level of activity in the state legislature regarding education as the focus shifted from policy to implementation. Also other issues crowded out education, in particular, an extraordinary preoccupation with criminal justice issues. Toward mid-decade lawmakers’ enthusiasm for incarceration as a solution to society ills had waned, and there was a growing understanding that large outlays for prisons was short-sighted and that those funds might best be invested in the education sector. In addition, there was a growing backlog of educational issues that had gone unappraised and were pressing on the agenda. As a result, a large number of educational bills (over 30) were enacted in the 1996 legislative session.

**Analysis**

For analytical purposes, we created a matrix of the conceptual framework underlining Florida’s reform initiative, Blueprint 2000. This framework delineates the two major assumptions behind Blueprint 2000; first, that the state’s efforts should focus on standards and assessing outcomes and not process, and concurrently, the local district should be granted maximum flexibility in terms of how they run their schools. The framework distinguishes between the foci of control, whether state or local, and among the domains of control, standards, accountability/assessment, and operations (see Table 1). We picked these three domains of control because of their centrality to the concepts undergirding Blueprint 2000. The first two domains, standards and accountability/assessment, are clearly areas in which state activity is to be intensified. This is key to the concept of greater accountability. The state should align and disseminate standards of performance for public education. This domain could include learning standards for students, professional standards for teachers and administrators, and district standards for schools. The second domain of accountability/assessment is also key to this new vision of the state role. This would include assessment of student performance, teacher performance, and system performance, in addition to an accountability system for regular reporting of performance levels. The third domain, operations, is, as the word suggests, the actual activities of the school system geared to meeting systems’ objectives.

As presented in Table 1, if the state was remaining true to the concepts of Blueprint 2000, one would expect legislative activity in the shaded areas of state and local control to increase. One would expect legislative activity in the blank areas to decrease.

**Table 1.**

*Conceptual Framework for Florida’s Blueprint 2000*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of Control</th>
<th>Foci of Control: State</th>
<th>Foci of Control: Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability/Assessment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

To investigate whether the state five years after major reform legislation was holding fast to the underlying principles of its reform initiative, we attempted to quantify the number of bill provisions that supported or undermined its intent. For bill analysis, we used individual provisions of the bills, rather than the bills themselves, as the unit of analysis. That is to say, we examined all the provisions to determine whether they enhanced the state’s role in standards setting and accountability/assessment and whether they enhanced local schools’ flexibility in managing their school system. If so, the provisions were deemed supportive of Blueprint 2000. If a provision weakened the state’s role in standard-setting and accountability/assessment and if a provision weakened local flexibility to manage operations then that provision was deemed counter to reform intentions.

To compile bill provisions that supported or weakened the intent of Blueprint 2000 by domain, we placed them in the thematic matrix by the three domains standards, accountability/assessment, and operations and by foci of control, state or local (see Table 2).

**Results**

We found that approximately 70 percent of the bill provisions supported the reform intent. Table 2 presents a listing of bill provisions within each category. In the category of standards, the list includes bill provisions that supported the intent of the reform package by granting control to the state involving improvement of low performing schools, academics, the Welfare Reform Wages Act, the use of reasonable force, and high standards. Also in the category of accountability/assessment, bill provisions that supports the intent of the reform package included giving authority to a state agency to review a school districts’ management (Voluntary Performance Review), requiring a district to report use of lottery fund (Lottery Post Secondary Tuition Program), and adding an eighth goal of parental involvement (School Improvement Education Accountability). Likewise in the category of operations many bill provisions supported the intent of Blueprint 2000 by granting control to districts. These bills provisions included authorizing charter public schools (Charter Schools), deleting termination date and authorizing waivers for five years (Blueprint 2000 Waiver), authorizing expulsion or other disciplinary action for students who make false accusations against school staff and who commit criminal offenses on school property (student behavior), revising the age and offense criteria for committing a juvenile offender in an intensive residential treatment program (juvenile offenders), and authorizing discipline or expulsion of a student if the court determined he or she committed a felony or a delinquent act considered a felony if committed by an adult (expulsion option).

However, we also found that a number of bills’ provisions did not support the reform intent (see Table 3). Whereas the intent of the legislature as articulated in Blueprint 2000 was to leave operations to local control, the 1996 legislature increased the authority of the state in three areas of operations, areas broad enough to be considered significant constraints on local flexibility. We have categorized these areas as child health and welfare, student behavior and parental choice.

For example, the topic of student behavior included bill provisions related to discipline, student crime watch programs, juvenile offenders, dropout prevention, and penalties for assault/battery charges upon school employees. In this area, the legislature increased state authority contrary to the intent of Blueprint 2000 to increase local authority...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of Control</th>
<th>Foci of Control: State</th>
<th>Foci of Control: Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Standards          | Improvement Low Performing Schools: Public school accountability & extends school day; DOE data base for terminated school employees with fingerprinting of teachers and checking for crimes of moral turpitude (HB 1009)  
Academics: Raises GPA, limits Level I courses, requires algebra and course district performance standards (HB 104) - vetoed  
Welfare Reform Wages Act: Requires creation of minimum performance standards and standards-based outcomes to be applied to community child care programs (SB 1661)  
Use of Reasonable Force: BOE must adopt standards for the use of reasonable force by school personnel to provide guidance on the limitations of liability under current law (HB 341)  
High Standards: Provides funds for scholarship in keeping with high standards (HB 2405) |  
| Accountability/ Assessment | Voluntary Performance Review: Gives authority to a state agency to review a school districts' management with no requirement to follow recommendations (HB 1839)  
Lottery Post Secondary Tuition Program: Requires a district to report use of lottery funds (HB 2405)  
School Improvement Ed. Accountability: Adds eighth goal of Parental Involvement (SB 240) |  
| Operation | Student Behavior: Allows teachers to remove a student from class and to withhold consent to return the student; creates a placement review committee (two teachers and one principal designee) to determine placement of students removed from classroom; authorizes instructional personnel to have a stronger role in classroom management; teacher and bus driver recommendations - requires principals to consider teacher and school bus driver recommendations when referring a student for discipline (HB 341). Defines habitual truancy as 15 unexcused absences within 90 days; allows students who meet the definition and criteria of habitual truancy to be assigned to a second chance school; requires a cooperative agreement between school districts and the Dept. of Juvenile Justice to delineate the role and responsibility of each agency and to reduce the duplication of services; authorizes teachers to remove disruptive students and to refuse readmission into the classroom; creates a placement review committee to determine the best available placement of a student (HB 1009)  
Juvenile Offenders/Residential Treatment: Provides for education of students serviced by the Dept. of Health & Rehabilitation Services; provides for educational services in Dept. of Juvenile Justice programs; prescribes responsibilities of school districts to include summer school program (SB 792)  
Penalties for Assault/Battery Charges Upon School Employees: Revises provisions; provides for enhanced penalties; requires school boards to adopt rules for expulsion and alternative school placement who violate s. 784.041, F.S. (HB 459)  
Student Crime Watch Programs: Requires school boards to implement a student crime watch program (SB 970)  
Dropout Prevention: Requires assignment of a student to a second chance school if such a school exists in the district and if the students meets specified criteria (HB 559)  
Welfare Reform Wages Act: Requires a simplified point of entry to the child care service system; modifies the eligibility criteria for the Pre-K program; allows state Pre-K funds allocated to school districts to be used only pursuant to the plan developed in consultation with the District Interagency Coordinating Council. Sanctions may be applied for noncompliance. Depending on the passage of the federal block grant welfare reform package, all districts will be mandated to participate in the Vocational Performance-Based Incentive Funding Program (currently optional); districts will be partners in establishing the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Community Initiative; requires school districts to make reasonable efforts to provide extended day and extended year services to children and their families (SB 1662)  
Schools Providing Medications: Establishes requirement related to medications (HB 483)  
Personnel: Revises definition of instr personnel (HB 2449)  
Open Enrollment: Requires school districts to develop a plan of controlled open enrollment and to factor in parental preferences in school assignments; requires DOE to develop a Parental Choice Incentive Program (HB 403) | Charter Schools: Authorizes charter public schools (HB 403)  
Blueprint 2000 Waiver: Deletes termination date & authorizes waivers for five years (HB 1041 - vetoed)  
Student Behavior: Authorizes expulsion or other disciplinary action for students who make false accusations against school staff and who commit criminal offenses on school property; honors out-of-state expulsions; authorizes the school board to honor expulsion by another school (HB 341)  
SB 792  
Juvenile Offenders/Residential Treatment: Revises the age and offense criteria for committing a juvenile offender in an intensive residential treatment program; allows a child less than 13 years to be eligible to the program. Reclassifies the residential program for serious habitual offenders as a high-risk  
Student Behavior & Expulsion Option: Authorizes discipline or expulsion of a student if the court determined he or she committed a felony or a delinquent act considered a felony if committed by an adult. After third offense, permits expulsion of a student who possessed or used an illegal substance off school property even if a waiver condition is met (HB 1009) |
Table 2. Continued
Bill Provisions Layout of Blueprint 2000 By Domains and Loci of Control (Shaded areas refer to foci of control as intended by Blueprint 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of Control</th>
<th>Foci of Control: State</th>
<th>Foci of Control: Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation (cont.)</td>
<td>Home Schooling: Provides eligibility requirements &amp; insurance for home education students to participate in public schools’ sports (HB 2505); extends dual and vocational enrollment (HB 186)</td>
<td>Private Transportation: Requires districts to report on number of students using private car transportation (HB 2719)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.
Bill Provisions in Violation of the Intent of Blueprint 2000

| Welfare Reform Wages Act: Requires a simplified point of entry to the child care service system; modifies the eligibility criteria for the Pre-K program; allows state Pre-K funds allocated to school districts to be used only pursuant to the plan developed in consultation with the District Interagency Coordinating Council. Sanctions may be applied for noncompliance. Depending on the passage of the federal block grant welfare reform package, all districts will be mandated to participate in the Vocational Performance-Based Incentive Funding Program (currently optional); districts will be partners in establishing the Teen Pregnancy Prevention Community Initiative; requires school districts to make reasonable efforts to provide extended day and extended year services to children and their families (SB 1662) | Student Discipline: Allows teachers to remove a student from class and to withhold consent to return the student; creates a placement review committee (two teachers and one principal designee) to determine placement of students removed from classroom; authorizes instructional personnel to have a stronger role in classroom management; teacher and busdriver recommendations - requires principals to consider teacher and school bus driver recommendations when referring a student for discipline (HB 341) | Open Enrollment: Requires school districts to develop a plan of controlled open enrollment and to factor in parental preferences in school assignments; requires DOE to develop a Parental Choice Incentive Program (HB 403) |
| Schools Providing Medications: Establishes requirement related to medications (HB 483) | Student Crime Watch Programs: Requires school boards to implement a student crime watch program (SB 970) | Private Transportation: Requires districts to report on number of students using private car transportation (HB 2719) |
| Home Schooling: Provides eligibility requirements & insurance for home education students to participate in public schools’ sports (HB 2505); extends dual and vocational enrollment (HB 186) | Juvenile Offenders/Residential Treatment: Provides for education of students serviced by the Dept. of Health & Rehabilitation Services; provides for educational services in Dept. of Juvenile Justice programs; prescribes responsibilities of school districts to include summer school program (SB 792) | |
| | Penalties for Assault/Battery Charges Upon School Employees: Revises provisions; provides for enhanced penalties; requires school boards to adopt rules for expulsion and alternative school placement for students who violate s.784.041, F.S. (HB 459) | |
| | Dropout Prevention: Requires assignment of a student to a second chance school if such a school exists in the district and if the student meets specified criteria (HB 559) | |

in operational matters. Similar action was taken with other topics that included regulation or district policies governing open enrollment, schools providing medications, home schooling, extended day and year service to children, extension of dual enrollment, private transportation, referral policies, and the requirement of a simplified point of entry to child care service system (Welfare Reform Wages Act). In all of these areas, the state either removed or constrained previous discretion at the local level or introduced to new state mandates.

Discussion: Was Florida Staying the Course?

Does the examination of the data as assembled in Table 2 suggest that the state of Florida was staying the course of a decentralizing reform strategy or was it reverting to its previous reliance on state mandates? Was it assuming its responsibilities in the areas of standards-setting and assessing outcomes? Was it leaving the running of the school districts, local operations, to the districts themselves? An initial examination of the bills revealed a mixed pattern. There was consistency in the provisions regarding setting standards and assessing student achievement. In these areas, the new state provisions all strengthened the state’s role, as consistent with Blueprint 2000. However, in areas of operations, a number of provisions imposed new state mandates, in direct contradiction to Blueprint 2000.
Our first interpretation of these findings was that the state lawmakers were unable to refrain from continuing to modify state’s reform because of pressure to respond as new issues arose. For example, House Bill 403 required school districts to develop a plan of open enrollment, contrary to the intent of increased local authority in operational matters, and required local districts to permit the creation of charter schools. Similarly, in the area of dropout prevention, the state imposed requirements to the districts regarding the assignment of students to a second chance school.

Upon closer examination, however, an underlying pattern emerged that caused us to modify our original interpretation. The provisions under the operations domain that ran counter to Blueprint 2000, with the exception of only one– Personnel policies–, could be grouped in three categories: child health and welfare, student behavior and parental choice. These provisions, for the most part, shared the common property of being topical, highly visible and politically ‘hot’ issues on which the public or lawmakers had well articulated or intense opinions. For example, the area of student behavior, according to the logic of Blueprint 2000, should be under local control. However, new legislated provisions required school districts to create a student placement review committee and prevented schools from rejecting a teacher’s request for student removal. Revised provisions also enhanced penalties for assault/battery charges upon school employees and required school boards to implement a student crime watch program. These legislative provisions were clearly targeted responses to public concerns about personal safety which have reached record levels in this decade.

Of equal importance, however, the two areas most critical to the thrust of Blueprint 2000, state control in the area of standards-setting and outcomes assessment and local control in the determination of teaching and learning practice, remained largely untouched or were strengthened. The state did not back off; in fact, it strengthened its responsibility regarding setting standards for educational performance and devising the means to assess student attainment. Nor did the state encroach upon local discretion in the key areas of teaching and learning. It did not resurrect its more directive regulations of the previous decades such as new requirements regarding length of school day or number of periods in the day, for example.

Conclusion

Florida, despite a history of aggressive state-level activism in education policy, had reversed its own political culture committing itself in 1991 to a ten-year deregulatory reform strategy. This strategy called on the state to limit its role as regulator and to ascribe more responsibility and authority to schools and districts to initiate their own locally-determined improvements. This reform package posed two challenges. One, it required the state to maintain a political orientation (deregulatory) that bucked a twenty-year tradition of high-level state activism in educational reform and two, it required a hands off posture on the part of the state for approximately a decade as the local districts were allowed to design and implement their own reform strategies. Within three years of enacting the legislation and still six years away from full implementation, the state political environment had undergone significant turnover in legislature membership, state-level educational leadership, and partisan political affiliation. This raised provocative questions regarding the ability of the legislature to stay with a reform path which had been enacted by a previous legislature whose political affiliations, leadership and membership had changed significantly since the bill had been debated and enacted.

The analysis in this paper, looking at legislative provisions enacted during a mid-point year in 1996, found that indeed the state was unable to keep from imposing new requirements upon schools and districts, in direct contradiction to the philosophy of Blueprint 2000 but that the requirements were focused on a limited number of policy areas and did not significantly alter the reform areas of teaching and learning. We argue that legislation passed by the 1996 Florida Legislature despite its seemingly schizophrenic nature reflects a highly rational coping strategy that addresses simultaneously issues of extreme urgency to voters and sustains and reinforces the reform initiatives enacted five years prior.

Arguably, these coping strategies have a number of tangible benefits: first, they allow a highly visible response to hot issues helping to combat increasing public skepticism about the efficacy of legislative bodies, and they leave issues of teaching and learning to educators. In doing so, they release pressure emanating from voters for responses to areas of concern to them, and they buy time for long-term reform to take effect.

Legislators stand at a cross-point having to justify their time in office as having produced tangible products (i.e. laws) that address constituent concerns and also needing to support strategies, often instigated under former legislatures, for stimulating and sustaining long-term reform. A recognition of the structure of these tensions may help explain the apparent “schizophrenic” behavior we observed of politicians in Florida. What appears to be schizophrenic behavior in the short term can be seen as a rational coping strategy that enables law-makers to reconcile the necessity of sustaining the course of reform efforts over the long-term and the pressures of their constituents for immediate responses to certain issues. In this case, the same legislature was willing to exert the strong arm of the state in issuing mandates regarding areas such as suspension and referral policies, stronger deterrents to student misbehavior, open enrollment, and charter schools, and child care for women enrolled in training programs at the same time leaving to the discretion of local educators the vast array of other operational issues relating to teaching and learning.

Sustaining Long-Term Reform

As the U.S. educational reform movement approaches its third decade with no sign of abatement, the challenges of sustaining commitment to a long term reform strategy takes on greater importance for a number of reasons. One, there is a growing realization among all the actors committed to substantial reform– elected officials, educators, and the business community– that true reform will only be accomplished through slow steady work. Quick fixes have not worked; magic bullets have misfired. Two, reform efforts risk a slow and fatal erosion of credibility among educators if one set of reforms are continuously replaced with another set. This challenge to stay the course is arising at the same time that the political environment for elected officials has become less stable, less predictable and more turbulent. All factors that suggest a weakened capacity to focus on long-range policy strategies. Increased turnover of elected officials, increasing partisan polarization of reform strategies, and increased skepticism by the electorate in the ability of elected bodies to produce results, all militate against staying the course and increase the possibility of rapid and frequent changes in direction.
This study of one state’s coping strategy for sustaining long-term reform suggests a successful strategy to buy time to sustain long-term endeavors. Though elected officials are often better informed than their constituents about state education policy and reform legislation and thus often appreciate the need for sustained educational reform efforts better, they are still forced to respond to the conflicting and at times competing demands of their constituents to maintain political viability. As a country we are moved from relying on quick fixes and approaches to a growing consensus that major long term reform, even radical reform, will be required to build a new educational system that is capable of meeting the much greater demands that are placed on it today. We must brace ourselves for long term endeavors to invent a new way to educate at a time when state legislatures are less able to provide support and to remain stable. Our findings suggest that the tensions inherent in the process of organizational reform and the structure of contemporary political bodies can be balanced and the direction maintained.

References


